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Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China during 
the Cold War have always been important and very complicated. At times, they were openly 
hostile and later tacitly amicable. The major reason for the problematic character of the rela-
tionship has always been the Taiwan issue. Even when in the late 1970s the U.S. government 
under President Jimmy Carter tried to establish official diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic - the so called normalization -, it was not a smooth process. The different positions 
of Washington and Beijing about Taiwan’s status and America’s relationship to the Kuomin-
tang regime there led to stalemate and frictions. It took different rounds of secret negotiations 
before both sides could finalize a normalization agreement in late 1978 which led to the estab-
lishment of official diplomatic relations in 1979. 
Accordingly, this study’s major question is what President Carter’s motivation was to 
risk the success of an objective as important as normalization, for the sake of preserving Tai-
wan’s security. The thesis advanced here is that the Carter administration’s tenacity becomes 
only understandable if one takes into account the American vision of itself as the dominant 
power in the Asia-Pacific region and the bilateral strategic set-up between the United States 
and China. If Taiwan was not controlled by Beijing, it could provide leverage against China. 
This mechanism is still working today, and it helps the United States to balance China’s 
growing power and influence in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, Taiwan matters! 
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Writing a dissertation is not a sprint. It is not even a marathon but appears rather a suc-
cession of multiple marathon races. Fortunately, in contrast to a marathon race, when 
writing a thesis, one is allowed to ask others for help. Without the ongoing support of 
many different people, I would not have been able to finish this project. The following 
lines serve to express my deep felt gratitude to all of those who gave me advice, critique, 
and encouragement whenever I needed it. 
 When I started this dissertation in 2009, I had already met several people who had 
influenced my development as a student of history; teachers at school as well as class-
mates and professors at the university. However, none of them taught me more about the 
study of history and the correct use of its methodology than my two doctoral advisors, 
Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Norbert Finzsch. I would have never been able to write this 
thesis without their personal support and academic advice. 
 I also benefitted from countless discussions with other researchers, my col-
leagues, and my fellow students at the University of Cologne and from other universities. 
Carolin Fisher, Annika Estner, Bill McAllister, David Nickles, Herrmann Halbeisen, Jens 
Jäger, Martin Albers, Tilman Pietz, Mathias Häussler, Sebastian Zamorano, Niclas Wei-
mar, Nikolas Dörr, Jochen Molitor, and Matthias Kreßner were very critical readers and 
listeners. Their input helped me to sharpen my ideas. Thank you to all of you! 
 Writing about U.S.-China relations and the Taiwan issue made it necessary to 
spend some time in Taiwan and China. Although the access to the archives in these plac-
es was much more restrictive than in the United States for example, it still made sense to 
take a look on the records there. Since my knowledge of the Chinese language is only 
rudimentary, I needed a lot of help to find my way through the archives in Taiwan and 
China and also through the Chinese language. My good and dear friend Jürgen Schipper 
was of particular help when it came to conducting my research trip to the People Repub-
lic of China, as he translated the material we found there. Others did the same when I 
was in Taiwan. The list of all the friends who helped me there is long: Liu Che-Yu, Lin 
Pin-Hsiu, Lie Chien-Yeh, Chia Yu Cho, Zhang Zhi-Dong and Peng Szu-Wei. I am really 
thankful for all your help and your kindness. 
 I am also grateful to all the people who proofread and edited my chapters, giving 
me valuable input. As a non-native speaker, it was not always easy to use the right words 
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and the right style. In truth, academic writing in a language which is not one’s first lan-
guage is much more difficult than I had ever expected. Thus, my gratitude here goes to 
Gabriel Kneisley, Manuel Becker, Tobias Rösner, Silvia Rodriguez-Parrinha, Dirk Lich-
te, Michel Hansel, Sulman Mirza, and Adam and Kendra Goforth. 
 I also have to thank the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Bonn. They did not only 
provide me with a full PhD grant for three years but also sponsored my research trips and 
some visits at international conferences. Without these trips, this project would not have 
been possible. In this regard, my special thanks goes to Ursula Bitzegeio and Julia Vater 
who were always supportive and tried the best they could to help me. 
 As a historian, I do not have a profound knowledge of the technical devices I am 
using to write and print my dissertation. At one point or another, it became necessary to 
ask others, more knowledgeable people for help concerning technical matters. I am ex-
tremely thankful that I could always count on Jens Klärner, Marco Horn, Armin Fiedler, 
and Marcel Buckebrede, when it mattered most. 
 In addition, I want to express my gratitude to the administrational staff of the 
University of Cologne. Different member of different departments and institutes have 
supported and advised me about the correct way to finish this project. It is always helpful 
to know the right people who know their way around the bureaucracy. 
 Most important of all, I want to thank my family. The ongoing support and the 
encouragement of my parents and my wife was sometimes everything that kept me go-
ing. I will never be able to express my love and my gratitude for the most important peo-
ple in my life. But I know that their love and their belief in me have always been in my 
mind and my heart, and I hope they are as proud of this book as I am. 
Finally, I want to make a last comment about the way I published this study. After 
contacting many different publishers in the United States and the United Kingdom, I real-
ized that I would have to make too many changes in order to be able to publish this book 
with one of them. Thus, I decided to write a new book about the history of the Taiwan 
issue and its role in the relationship between China and the United States later. Maybe, 
this will be more suitable for a broader audience. In the end, I think that it is a good idea 
to make my work part of the internet where everyone interested in the subject can use it. I 
also invite my dear readers to any kind of critique and comments and welcome your in-
put via email (ellessar979@web.de). 
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Sino-American relations have not been easy since the end of World War II, and this 
is still true for the relationship between Washington and Beijing today. During the 
Cold War, relations between the Chinese and Americans were entrenched in the 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the United States of 
America (USA) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were ideological and 
geopolitical enemies; later they decided to create something like a tacit alliance in 
order to put pressure on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Nowa-
days the relationship is even more complex and defined by the People’s Republic’s 
emergence as a great power. On the one hand, China’s rise challenges the United 
States’ (U.S.) position as the dominant power not only in Asia-Pacific but also on a 
global scale. On the other hand, the growing importance of the PRC in the realms 
of diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural exchange in today’s world makes 
the country essential for solving global problems. Thus, both sides endeavor to 
have a stable working relationship, instead of one that is exclusively defined by 
their different national interests. 
The legal basis for current Sino-American relations was created under U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter and PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s 
when both countries established official diplomatic relations.1 This event is also 
known and hereinafter referred to as normalization. Normalization was not an easy 
task to achieve. The governments of both countries negotiated hard with each oth-
er, and also faced a lot of domestic pressure. In China, Deng had to fight his way 
back to the top of the PRC leadership after he was demoted in the wake of Mao 
Zedong’s death in the September of 1976. Jimmy Carter needed to deal with prom-
ises to China, made by former U.S. administrations, as well as with Congress’ and 
the U.S. public’s expectation that the president would maintain U.S. involvement in 
the Taiwan Strait in order to ensure Taiwan’s security and American interests in 
                                                 
1 Writing Chinese terms and names in English represents a problem for western authors because 
there exist different styles of Romanization. Throughout this book, I will mostly use the younger 
Pinyin system, instead of the more traditional Wade-Giles system. The exception to this rule are 
those terms and names which are better known in their traditional Romanization like Kuomintang 
(instead of Guomindang) or Chiang Kai-shek (instead of Jian Jieshi). 
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Asia-Pacific. As we will see, these expectations presented the biggest obstacle to 
develop official relations between the United States and the People’s Republic. 
The dominant problem of U.S.-PRC relations has always been the Taiwan 
issue. The island’s unresolved political status and America’s role as its protector 
have represented a huge problem for Beijing. Chinese observers see the U.S. in-
volvement in the Taiwan Strait as an attempt to counterbalance and contain China’s 
rise as a great power.2 Many U.S. analysts admit that Washington has a strategic 
interest to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait.3 Accordingly, I am arguing that 
the close relationship the U.S. has with Taiwan serves to maintain the United 
States’ dominant position in Asia-Pacific, by counterbalancing China’s growing 
power and influence in the region. 
As this study sets out to explain, this strategic interest did not emerge with 
the beginning of China’s rise in the 1990s. Instead, this examination will show that 
the consideration to use Taiwan as a strategic hedge against the PRC has its foun-
dation in the China policy of the Carter administration which was set up in the late 
1970s. For Carter, his aides, and also U.S. Congress, Taiwan mattered. Sino-
American normalization and the derecognition of the Republic of China (ROC) 
made it necessary for Washington to define the role of the United States in the 
Taiwan Strait, resulting in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This U.S. law ex-
pressed America’s concern about the security and de-facto independence of Tai-
wan, and has served as the legal foundation of the continuing U.S. involvement in 
the Taiwan Strait until today. 
It has become conventional wisdom that the Chinese and American side 
agreed to establish official diplomatic relations because they saw this achievement 
as beneficial in their respective struggle with the USSR. From this point of view, 
normal relations between the People’s Republic and the United States served stra-
tegic Cold War considerations.4 As long as Moscow presented the biggest chal-
                                                 
2 E.g. Wu Xinbo, “U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China—U.S. Relations” in: Con-
temporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2000), 489; Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the 
Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U. S. Global Strategy” in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, 
No. 3 (Autumn, 2001) 353-354. 
3 E.g. Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security” 
in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1 (January/February 2010), 56. 
4 E.g. Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (Baltimore: School of Law University of Maryland, 1986), 51; James Mann, 
About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New 
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lenge for Washington’s and Beijing’s national security, any ally, tacit or official, 
who opposed the Soviets helped to strengthen their respective strategic position.  
While the archival record leaves no doubt that Cold War thinking had a big 
impact on both sides’ approach towards normalization, focusing solely on this as-
pect neglects another important matter. Putting pressure on the Soviet Union was 
merely the trigger that brought Chinese and Americans to the negotiation table. It 
was their different positions on the aforementioned Taiwan issue that defined the 
normalization process. In particular, the Carter administration’s position on the 
Taiwan issue demands a closer look. Washington’s behavior concerning Taiwan 
during the negotiations and in their direct aftermath suggests that Carter and his 
aides took into account not only Cold War considerations for their decision-
making. 
The U.S political scientist Robert Ross argues that the Carter administration 
disregarded the PRC and the goal of normalization in the early stages of Carter’s 
presidency.5 This claim is not correct. Carter’s China experts began working on a 
strategy to normalize relations with the PRC even before his inauguration. The 
problem was, as I will show, that the White House faced different kinds of obsta-
cles to developing a coherent strategy early on. The promises made to the Chinese 
by former administrations raised Beijing’s expectations, weakening the bargaining 
position of the United States tremendously as the new administration had to honor 
these commitments to a certain degree. The PRC leadership’s general inflexible 
attitude towards Taiwan further narrowed Washington’s options. In addition, Carter 
could feel the domestic pressure concerning his China and Taiwan policy right 
from the beginning, completing the limitations on his leeway at home and abroad. 
Thus, it took some time for the White House to develop a strategy that would allow 
normalizing U.S.-PRC relations and preserving U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
In order to understand the normalization process and the foundation of the 
U.S. position on the Taiwan issue in the past and today, we need to explain how 
and why the Carter administration insisted on U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait, brushing aside all Chinese complaints and hereby risking the success of the 
                                                                                                                                       
York: Alfred A. Knopp, Inc., 1999), 81; Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United 
States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 161. 
5 Ross, “Negotiating”, 118-119. 
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normalization initiative. Although official documents show that political decision-
makers in China and the United States agreed that the Taiwan issue represented the 
biggest obstacle to normalization, historians and other researchers have not provid-
ed us to date with an adequate and convincing explanation for the U.S. govern-
ment’s insistence on a security relationship with Taiwan.  
Scholars like Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Karl-Gottfried Kindermann, and 
Robert Ross only point to the domestic pressure, Carter faced on the matter.6 It is 
true that the president and his aides followed a tightrope walk back in Washington 
when it came to normalization and the Taiwan issue. This argument, however, does 
not take into account that a failure of normalization would have had more serious 
repercussions at home, than any negative consequences for Taiwan could have. A 
failure of normalization would damage U.S.-China relations tremendously. It 
makes sense to assume that the Soviet Union would exploit such a situation to 
weaken the overall position of the United States. In the worst case, a failure of 
normalization could lead to a reemergence of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the early 
Cold War years. In an international system dominated by the rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow, any disadvantage for the United States strengthened the 
Soviet position, and would have led to much harsher critique against the Carter 
administration than an ostensible let-down of Taiwan. 
The thesis advanced within this study is that the Carter administration’s te-
nacity on the matter of Taiwan becomes only understandable if its analysis takes 
into account the American vision of itself as the dominant power in the Asia-
Pacific region and the bilateral strategic set-up between the United States and the 
PRC. We must incorporate the long-term strategic thinking of the political deci-
sion-makers in the United States. This author therefore claims that the political 
elites in Washington expected China to become stronger over the decades follow-
ing normalization, potentially even challenging the U.S. position in Asia-Pacific. A 
Taiwan, which Beijing did not control, could provide the United States with some 
leverage against China amidst Sino-American tensions. As we will see, political 
actors in Washington, inside and outside of the administration, therefore had a pro-
found interest in keeping Taiwan out of the grasp of the PRC.  
                                                 
6 Nancy Bernkopf Tuker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China 
(Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2009), 101; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Der Aufstieg Osta-




I will further argue that the TRA demonstrated this attitude, constituting the 
U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait beyond normalization. In addition, the TRA 
also detached the Taiwan issue from Cold War significance because Taiwan no 
longer served as bulwark against communism in East Asia. As this thesis claims, 
after normalization close U.S. ties with Taiwan served to put pressure on the PRC 
in the following years. Since the TRA represents national law, binding the presi-
dent in a way no international or bilateral treaty could, it has also become much 
more difficult for Beijing to demand that the United States cut all security ties with 
Taiwan. This has made the TRA the perfect tool for the United States to assure that 
the country could continue to play a role in the Taiwan Strait. 
 The unique character of the TRA also makes it imperative to reevaluate the 
way it came into existence. Most studies about normalization and the TRA see the 
law as some sort of Congressional punishment for the Carter administration be-
cause Congress wanted to guarantee Taiwan’s security.7 However, Carter would 
have vetoed the TRA if he had deemed it in conflict with national interests. Instead, 
the administration’s strategic considerations beyond the Cold War led the president 
to let Congress have its way. 
 This study argues that, while the administration might not have agreed with 
every detail of the TRA, the United States had a clear interest in expressing a 
stronger U.S. security commitment in the Taiwan Strait, allowing Congress to en-
act more binding security language in the new law. Some officials in the Carter 
administration even stated this point of view in Congressional hearings. One should 
therefore characterize the manner, in which the TRA was developed, as division of 
labor between the executive and legislative branches, rather than as a Congression-
al revolt against the president. In the end, the U.S. Congress was in a position to do 
things that the Carter administration could not do due to diplomatic constraints.  
 
                                                 
7 E.g. David Tawei Lee, The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2000)3; Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: 
American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2003), 107; Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China. An Investigative History 





Goals and Arguments of This Study 
The significance of the Taiwan issue arises from its character and meaning for the 
relations between China and the United States. The unresolved status of the island 
has been the most awkward and contentious element of the relationship. Many ob-
servers, like American historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, see this problem as the 
“single most dangerous challenge for the United States in the World.”8 The Taiwan 
issue is the one issue between Washington and Beijing that could lead to an armed 
conflict, because Taiwan possesses huge strategic and political importance for both 
nations. For the People’s Republic, the island is part of its own territory and the 
Chinese therefore consider the Taiwan issue to be a domestic affair. PRC leaders 
have always believed that giving up Taiwan would damage their prestige and could 
mean a considerable blow to China’s sovereignty. The United States has always 
seen Taiwan as an important asset to their position in Asia-Pacific. Thus, as ac-
commodating as any U.S. administration has been about Taiwan in order to im-
prove relations with the PRC, an abandonment of the island and an end to the U.S. 
involvement in the Taiwan Strait has never been part of American strategic think-
ing. 
When the Carter administration pursued normalization, their approach did 
not include the abandonment of Taiwan. Carter and his aides were willing to make 
far reaching concessions to the Chinese. This included the acceptance of their pre-
conditions to sever all official ties with the regime in Taipei, withdraw all Ameri-
can troops from Taiwan, and terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between 
the United States and the ROC. Domestic pressure and strategic considerations, 
however, did not allow the administration to cut all security ties with Taiwan. No 
representative of the White House, Department of State (DOS), or any other U.S. 
agency who had any influence on U.S. foreign policy pursued such an approach. 
Normalization was an important goal for the Carter administration, motivat-
ed by an urge to gain a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. The logic behind 
this thinking was the same as during the preceding rapprochement process of the 
early 1970s which culminated in Richard Nixon’s visit in China in February of 
                                                 
8 Bernkopf Tucker, “Strait”, 1. 
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1972. After the collapse of the alliance between the PRC and the USSR led to hos-
tility between the two communist powers, the U.S. executive calculated that better 
relations with China would bring relative advantages in America’s struggle against 
the Soviets.  
Although it was not their only consideration, Jimmy Carter and his National 
Security Advisor (APNSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski followed this logic, and expected 
Sino-American normalization to have a similar effect as rapprochement had. While 
the common interest of Washington and Beijing in countering Soviet influence 
played an important role in their negotiations and willingness to accommodate each 
other, it was also clear that especially Carter, influenced by his Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, saw normalization in a broader context. Numerous times, Carter and 
his aides emphasized that normal relations with China did not only serve to put 
pressure on the Soviets by strengthening the so called China card, but were a ne-
cessity to cope with the political realities in Asia and the rest of the world.9 Particu-
larly the Taiwan issue’s sensitivity meant that Sino-American post-normalization 
relations lost their purely Cold War character and became more dimensional, not 
focusing solely on the containment of the Soviet Union. 
A failure of normalization, on the other hand, involved the risk of alienating 
the PRC leadership to the degree that China would seek reconciliation with the 
Soviets, damaging the strategic position of the United States. The White House 
knew that the success of normalization was never a sure thing mostly because of 
Taiwan. The Chinese government had always opposed any U.S. interference in the 
Taiwan issue, and, from Beijing’s point of view, arms sales or other U.S-Taiwan 
security ties were considered as interference. This became clear when only a few 
hours before the announcement of Sino-American normalization, Deng Xiaoping 
“agreed to disagree” on the matter of arms sales, postponing any discussions about 
the topic to a time after normalization. It was the Carter administration’s determi-
nation to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait that forced the hand of the Chinese 
to either accept the U.S. position or let normalization fail. 
                                                 
9 The idea behind the term China Card was that Washington could use better relations with the PRC 
to put pressure on the Soviets. This tactic was to force Moscow to cooperate on different matters of 
significance as the SALT negotiations for example. In the late 1970s, many academic articles dis-
cussed the advantages and disadvantages of “playing the China Card”: e.g. Chalmers Johnson, “The 
New Thrust in China's Foreign Policy” in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall, 1978); Adam Ulam, 
“U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence” in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3 (1978). 
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The central goal of this study is therefore to explain, how the different posi-
tions on Taiwan shaped negotiations and discussions between the Chinese and 
Americans, and how this topic affected the outcome and the consequences of the 
normalization process. In this context, the major question is, what President 
Carter’s and his aides’ motivation was to risk the success of an objective as im-
portant and prestigious as normalization, for the sake of preserving Taiwan’s secu-
rity. How could the United States succeed in ensuring U.S. involvement in the 
Taiwan Strait beyond 1979? With regard to the latter question, this study also 
wants to find out how the TRA evolved and what role this U.S law was set to play 
for the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait. Why did the Chinese leadership not 
let fail normalization when they faced Washington’s tenacity about Taiwan and 
learned from the TRA, even though their reaction meant tacitly accepting the ongo-
ing continuation of a U.S. security relationship with Taiwan? 
In fact, Beijing valued the new relationship with the United States highly 
because it improved China’s strategic position relative to the Soviet Union, and 
increased Chinese security. In addition, the United States could offer access to 
modern technologies. China needed to rise to great power status, and to this end it 
needed a stronger economy. Deng Xiaoping believed economic reforms and access 
to Western technology helped this purpose. Therefore, he allied with the Vice 
Chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chen Yun and Li Xiannian who 
shared Deng’s vision. They planned to modernize China’s economy by liberalizing 
trade as well as by opening the country for foreign investments. This strategy 
granted a high priority to access to Western markets and their technology. Normal 
relations with the United States helped because it made buying American and 
Western European technology easier for China. Since Deng initialized the reform 
process, he linked his political position and prestige to the success of China’s mod-
ernization and normalization with America. This fact indicates that Deng’s consid-
erations went beyond pure Cold War thinking. 
One could assume that the Carter administration was aware of Beijing’s 
priorities and knew about their leverage. However, archival material and other doc-
uments suggest that this is highly doubtful. Instead, Washington generally had little 
insight into the inner debates of the CCP. Regardless, Carter risked the success of 
normalization in order to save American involvement in the Taiwan Strait. With 
regard to the aforementioned problem that a failure of the normalization process 
9 
 
could lead to disadvantages in America’s strategic position, the risk Carter and his 
aides took was unexpected. While Congress and the American public put some 
political pressure on the White House to ensure Taiwan’s security, alienating the 
PRC and leaving a strategic advantage to the Soviet Union would lead to much 
heavier domestic pressure for the president and his aides. Therefore, domestic poli-
tics alone does not explain Carter’s decision to remain involved in the Taiwan is-
sue. 
A broader perspective on the decision-making process of U.S. China policy 
at this time is helpful for understanding why the Carter administration insisted on 
an ongoing American involvement in the Taiwan Strait. While Taiwan’s strategic 
role had declined within the framework of the Cold War, its relevance never entire-
ly went away. Officials agreed that the future of Sino-American relations was im-
possible to foresee, and they knew that Taiwan could still be a strategic hedge 
against the PRC in the future. Moreover, it was clear that Beijing would spend vast 
resources to keep Taiwan in check. Such efforts would limit Chinese measures to 
counter American influence in the Asia-Pacific. While the administration was in no 
position to admit such considerations officially, the Congress could not only state 
these thoughts in public, but was also able to carve them in stone by passing the 
TRA as a consequence of Sino-American normalization. 
The TRA allowed the United States to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait. 
It was a U.S. law passed by U.S. Congress, and hence not subject to international 
law. This made it much harder for the People’s Republic to blame the Carter ad-
ministration who thrust aside any Chinese complaints with reference to the political 
system of the United States and the restraints it put on the White House. In addi-
tion, other than the MDT, which it replaced, the TRA has left the decision for any 
kind of intervention in the Taiwan Strait completely to the USA, not allowing Tai-
wan to put diplomatic pressure on the United States. This made the law the perfect 
instrument for Washington to secure American involvement in the Taiwan Strait. 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, Taiwan had been helping to keep 
communist China in check. The Carter administration and Congress concluded that 
the island was still useful for U.S. China policy. Normalization and the TRA 
changed the framework for U.S.-Taiwan relations and the meaning of the island. 
While the Taiwan issue was, until the late 1960s, entrenched in Cold War consider-
10 
 
ations because the regime in Taipei served as an anti-communist bulwark in East 
Asia, rapprochement in the 1970s left it as a topic for negotiations between the 
Chinese and Americans until both sides achieved normalization in 1979. The expe-
rience with the Taiwan issue between 1949 and 1978-79 helped the U.S. admin-
istration to reevaluate the significance of Taiwan. While ideological considerations 
faded into the background and in spite of normalization, Taiwan could still serve to 
put pressure on the Chinese in the event of U.S.-PRC tension in the future. The 
negotiations and last minute concessions by Deng indicated as much. Moreover, 
Taiwan’s location and the importance of the Taiwan Strait for international ship-
ping made it prudent for Washington to keep the island out of the grasp of the PRC.  
Since normalization in 1979, Taiwan has remained an important part of the 
American strategy to maintain its preponderance of power in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. After normalization, the difference was that the Taiwan issue was not en-
trenched in the Cold War anymore. The issue morphed into a purely bilateral mat-
ter between the PRC and the United States, not related to the context of U.S. rivalry 
with the Soviets. The archival record suggests that the decision to maintain a secu-
rity relationship with Taiwan was not influenced by Cold War considerations. If 
such thinking had dominated Carter’s decision-making, the White House would 
have cut all security ties with Taiwan, as the rivalry with the USSR still dominated 
U.S. foreign policy. Instead, Washington opted for a preservation of U.S.-
Taiwanese security ties, resulting in the TRA and a continuation of military and 
political U.S. support for Taiwan. The TRA took into account the future develop-
ment of U.S.-China relations, as many observers in Washington believed that Deng 
Xiaoping’s China of the year of 1979 could become a rival in the future. In such a 
case, Taiwan would serve as an instrument to contain the PRC and preserve U.S. 




Relevance and State of Research 
In July 2009, U.S. President Barrack Obama stated “[t]he relationship between the 
United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as 
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any bilateral relationship in the world.”10 This statement characterized today’s Si-
no-American relations as one of the most important issues for both countries’ for-
eign policy. Since the mid-1990s, different scholars from all over the world have 
published a huge amount of books and volumes that deal with China’s emergence 
as a new superpower and the way the United States is going to react to this chal-
lenge.11 The same issue has been discussed in numerous journal articles and discus-
sion papers.12 
The scholarly interest in the relationship is mirrored by public concern, par-
ticularly in the U.S. According to polls by the PEW Research Center from 2011, 
Asia is nowadays the top focus of U.S. foreign policy, while the interest in Europe 
is declining. 34% of those interviewed were “very interested in news from China”, 
relegating France (6%), Germany (11%), Italy (11%), and even Great Britain 
(17%) to places further down the list.13 Other PEW polls from 2012 indicate that 
the U.S. public sees the relationship with the People’s Republic as a challenge for 
U.S. policy. 68% of those surveyed do not trust the PRC, and 66% characterize the 
country as a competitor to the United States. To sum up this pessimistic impres-
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sion: in 2013, only 33% of interviewees had a favorable image of China.14 Such 
views suggest that the United States see themselves entrenched in a rivalry with the 
PRC, and the public opinion adds to the way the U.S. administration conducts its 
policy in Asia-Pacific and its relations with China. 
Since 2011 the importance of the Asia-Pacific region has grown in U.S. 
strategic thinking. In an essay from 2011, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
was one of the first U.S. officials who explained the necessity for the United States 
to focus their strategic attention on Asia-Pacific.15 Shortly before Clinton’s article 
was published, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that U.S. 
military presence in Asia would remain stable in spite of plans to cut the Penta-
gon’s budget, something Barrack Obama himself confirmed a few weeks later.16 
Then in 2012, the United States sent a strong signal for their growing interest in the 
Asia-Pacific region by deploying a U.S. Marine Corps battalion in Australia.17 An-
alysts conclude that this shift was aimed mainly at China’s rise, leading Beijing to 
intensify their “perceived sense of insecurity.”18 Such actions suggest that the Unit-
ed States puts pressure on China in order to maintain its dominance in Asia-Pacific, 
but also to deter the PRC from pursuing an aggressive strategy in the region. 
Despite the U.S. efforts in the region, it is difficult to point fingers at who is 
responsible for the rivalry between the PRC and the United States. Over the last 
decade, the PRC has followed a path that suggests growing ambition. According to 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Beijing has in-
creased its military budget by 170% since 2004, spending an estimated amount of 
almost 190 billion U.S. dollars for its defense.19 Only recently, the PRC govern-
ment renewed Chinese claims on big parts of the South China Sea, fueling the con-
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flict with Vietnam and the Philippines, while also provoking a diplomatic response 
from the U.S.20 The potential for conflict exists, although the character of relations 
between the United States and the People’s Republic appears much more complex. 
China expert Aaron Friedberg for example believes the “[…] contemporary U.S.-
China relationship is clearly mixed, consisting of an array of cooperative and com-
petitive elements.”21  
The reason for this complexity lies in today’s balance of power between 
these two major powers, but also in historical developments. We cannot understand 
today’s U.S.-China relations, without understanding their past.22 The current rela-
tionship between Beijing and Washington is deeply ingrained in historical devel-
opments going back to the Cold War.  
In particular, the normalization between the United States and the People’s 
Republic in 1979 had a great influence on how the relationship has developed since 
that point in time. This event set up a framework that prevented both sides from 
solving the most controversial issue between them, the Taiwan issue. Official U.S.-
PRC relations did not only mean a change of titles for the respective representa-
tives in Washington and Beijing. It corrected an historical inconsistency, ending 
decades of secret interactions and indirect communication. Normalization also 
meant the transfer of America’s diplomatic recognition from the ROC (Taiwan) to 
the PRC. At the beginning of the year 1979, the U.S. executive under Jimmy Carter 
recognized that the communist regime in Beijing was the only legitimate govern-
ment of China. Moreover, Washington was now obligated to have only unofficial 
people-to-people relations with Taiwan. However, the new legal framework of U.S. 
relations with China and Taiwan did not prevent the United States from remaining 
involved in the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, the TRA allowed Washington to 
maintain security ties with the island, guaranteeing constant quarreling between 
China and the U.S. 
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In spite of the significance of normalization for the development of U.S.-
China relations since the late 1970s, surprisingly, there are no historical studies 
which examine the normalization process exclusively, shedding light on the inter-
twining considerations, interests, and actions of the Carter administration and the 
Chinese leadership on the basis of archival documents and other historical sources. 
While the rapprochement process of the early 1970s has been subject of a number 
of studies, normalization is often examined only as a continuation of the same pro-
cess.23 Some studies remain within the framework of the Cold War,24 and other 
analyses reach beyond the late 1980s and early 1990s.25 
China experts and political analysts began discussing normalization in jour-
nal articles and discussion papers shortly after the announcement of normalization. 
The topics of these analyses varied. Some dealt with the strategic implications of 
normalization, putting the new character of Sino-American relations into the bigger 
Cold War context by asking how normalization changed the strategic position of 
the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.26 Other papers discussed the conse-
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quences of normalization for Taiwan, coming to a variety of conclusions what the 
end of diplomatic U.S.-ROC relations, the so called derecognition, meant for the 
people on the island. Most of these authors argued that as long as the U.S. provided 
Taiwan with arms, the Taiwanese were in a position to remain out of the main-
land’s grasp.27 As important as these articles are as a first wave of analysis, they are 
only based on public sources, interviews, and press coverage material, minimizing 
their value for a historical discussion and evaluation of Sino-American normaliza-
tion. Nowadays, they could better serve as sources themselves, giving us an idea 
how normalization and the TRA were perceived in the immediate aftermath of 
events. 
The mid-1980s saw the first broader studies about normalization, dealing 
exclusively with the U.S. perspective of the process. While these analyses were 
limited in their access to archival material like the aforementioned journal articles, 
they still added a new dimension to the debate, focusing mainly on the domestic 
aspects that influenced U.S. China policy in the late 1970s. The first was China 
expert Robert G. Sutter, who examines the thinking and behavior of policy makers 
in Washington D.C., arguing that President Carter alienated the Congress by con-
ducting secret negotiations with the Chinese.28 The political scientist Leonard A. 
Kusnitz uses the China policy as an example to explain the presidential administra-
tion’s responsiveness to domestic public opinion.29 The Taiwanese political scien-
tist Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, on the other hand, uses a variety of complex theoretical 
models in order to find out how Washington approached its China policy in the 
1970s, focusing on the timing of normalization, and the manner in which the Carter 
administration reacted to Beijing’s three preconditions for normalization.30  
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While none of these studies put normalization in a historical context, each 
of the authors contributes to our understanding of this process, by concluding that 
the Carter administration struggled with the political situation at home. Sutter ex-
plains this struggle through the administration’s estrangement from Congress.31 
Kusnitzer explains the criticism about Carter’s China policy with the shortcomings 
in the White House’s preparation of the U.S. public for normalization.32 Chang also 
reasons that domestic pressure influenced U.S. China and Taiwan policy, because 
Carter and his predecessors were not powerful enough to push normalization 
through without political costs at home, which affected the timing of normaliza-
tion.33 Later studies which had at least access to a certain amount of archival mate-
rial argued in a similar direction, emphasizing the meaning of internal problems in 
China and the United States.34 Still, although domestic factors played an important 
role in China’s and America’s decision-making process, they cannot explain the 
whole process and the motivations behind it. 
 As mentioned above, many studies put the establishment of U.S.-PRC dip-
lomatic relations in the context of the Cold War, arguing that the basic motivation 
for China and the United States to normalize their relations was their perception of 
the Soviet Union as a common threat. In the 1970s, the strategic set up of both 
countries allowed them to pursue a tactic along the line of “my enemy’s enemy is 
my friend”. Especially more recent works from the mid-1990s and early 2000s pur-
sue this line of argument, namely authors like Richard C. Bush, Harry Harding, 
James Mann, and Patrick Tyler.35 Rosemary Foot’s study from 1995 adds that the 
rapprochement and normalization process served exclusively Washington’s attempt 
to achieve global hegemony.36 Such a perspective makes sense since an alliance 
between the Chinese and Americans, even a tacit one, put a lot of pressure on the 
Soviet Union.37 Similar to the early 1950s, when political circles in Washington 
                                                 
31 Sutter, “China”, 5. 
32 Kusnitz, “Opinion”, 3. 
33 Chang, “United States”, 177, 183. 
34 One example is Harry Harding who argues, it needed new leaderships in both countries, China 
and America, before normalization could be finalized, see: Harding, “Relationship”, 5-6. 
35  Bush, “Purposes”, 3-5; Harding, “Relationship”, 9-10, 17; Mann, “Face”, 11, 79-80; Tyler, 
“Wall”, 230, 255 
36 Foot, “Practice”, 1-2. 
37 There are studies that deal with the triangular relationship between China, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. In this context, China has often been seen as the decisive factor tipping the toe in 
favor of one side or another. E.g.: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “China as a Factor in the Collapse of the 
Soviet Empire” in: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Winter, 1995-1996); Robert S. 
17 
 
perceived the Sino-Soviet alliance as an immense threat to the U.S. position in the 
world and in Asia, close relations between the United States and the People’s Re-
public were seen as a gain in relative power vis-à-vis the Soviets. Subsequently, a 
good relationship to the PRC stabilized the U.S. position in the world, and not only 
in Asia-Pacific. The Carter administration agreed with this view. 
The only problem is that by focusing on the Soviet threat as motives for 
normalization, we cannot explain why both sides had such a hard time reaching 
agreement in their negotiations. If the Soviet Union represented such a danger to 
Chinese and American security, it appears that both sides had no reason not to co-
operate with each other in order to counter Moscow’s power. As explained above, 
the reason for the delay in finding an agreement was the Taiwan issue which is 
crucial to understanding Washington’s and Beijing’s approach to the normalization 
negotiations and their outcome.  
America’s relationship with Taiwan has always been the most contentious 
issue between Washington and Beijing. According to current research, this has not 
changed to date.38 The U.S. role as protector of the regime in Taipei has been a 
constant source of Chinese disdain. Nowadays the Chinese public sees U.S. in-
volvement in the Taiwan Strait as the most dangerous aspect of Sino-American 
relations.39 The PRC neither understands nor accepts Washington’s constant inter-
vention in an issue that Beijing perceives as an internal affair. As a matter of fact, 
the Carter administration faced exactly the same accusations in the late 1970s when 
the normalization process was initiated. 
Rosemary Foot (1995) and Ralph Berger (2003) do not see normalization as 
a genuine policy initiative but as the logical consequence of rapprochement.40 They 
underestimate the Carter administration’s efforts which led to the achievement of 
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normal U.S.-PRC relations. While Nixon’s rapprochement policy and the Shanghai 
Communiqué were important and provided a basis for more cooperative U.S.-
China relations, it was Carter who found a way to overcome the problem of the 
Taiwan issue. 
Robert S. Ross sees the Cold War dynamic as the decisive factor that 
shaped normalization. His study from 1995 is also the first which incorporates the 
significance of Taiwan for the whole process. He argues that especially the Taiwan 
issue forced Washington and Beijing to constantly re-negotiate mutual cooperation, 
constantly threatening the successful conclusion of normalization negotiations.41 
Alan D. Romberg (2003) agrees with this view, also stating that the United States 
has always had an honest interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.42 Bri-
an Hilton’s argument from his doctoral thesis from 2012 underlines the importance 
of the Taiwan issue for U.S.-China relations, claiming that Washington’s Taiwan 
policy served solely to put pressure on the PRC, so that Beijing would alter its for-
eign policy.43 Yet, none of these authors offers an explanation for why the Carter 
administration risked the failure of normalization, by insisting on security ties with 
Taiwan which culminated in the creation of a legal foundation for U.S. involve-
ment in Taiwan’s security beyond normalization, the TRA. 
 In 2005, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker explained Washington’s interest in Tai-
wan with strategic considerations. She holds the view that, going back to the 1950s, 
the United States has always sought a strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan.44 This 
means that the USA has always wanted to keep the KMT regime on its own side 
but sought for ways to prevent the situation in the Taiwan Strait from escalating. In 
a later work from 2009, Bernkopf Tucker develops her argument further, calling 
the U.S. approach “dual deterrence” because both the Communists and Nationalists 
should be prevented from attacking each other. As long as the PRC and the Soviet 
Union remained allies, she argues, such an approach worked well within the 
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framework of the Cold War, although the relationship between Washington and 
Taipei has always been influenced by a huge amount of mistrust.45 
While it is correct and important to put the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as 
well as the continuation of this commitment after normalization in a strategic con-
text, we have to understand that the tenacity of the Carter administration and the 
Congress to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait went beyond pure Cold War con-
siderations. With the achievement of normalization, on the one hand, Taiwan lost 
its value as a bulwark against communism in Asia. On the other hand, however, it 
remained valuable beyond the Cold War. A continued commitment did not only 
calm down any anxieties of other U.S. allies in the region like Japan and South 
Korea. It also served as a means to put pressure on China in the event of tensions 
between the two countries.  
The decision-makers in the White House, the State Department and Con-
gress were aware that the PRC’s national interests were not congruent with Ameri-
can interests in Asia-Pacific in the long-term. Therefore, we have to understand 
that the TRA was more than just a Congressional intervention, aimed at damaging 
Carter’s prestige and political position. The TRA constituted the United States’ 
ability to maintain its influence on the situation in the Taiwan Strait for over 30 
years. The motivation for this commitment was ingrained in the normalization pro-
cess and the Carter administration’s tenacity to ensure Taiwan’s security. 
Carter’s insistence on a security relationship with Taiwan prevented the 
PRC and the United States from solving the matter. Instead, they agreed to ignore 
the Taiwan issue for the sake of normalization. As Huang Jing and Li Xiaoting 
(2010) argue, this was possible because in regards to the One-China-principle 
Washington accepted the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. Accord-
ing to Huang and Li, this makes normalization an important breakthrough for the 
Taiwan issue.46 However, they underestimate the significance of Taiwan for the 
U.S. position in Asia-Pacific. Since normal relations between Washington and Bei-
jing meant that Taipei was relegated to have only unofficial relations with the Unit-
ed States, Taiwan’s significance should have diminished. Instead, the United States 
still sought for a way to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait. The result of these 
efforts was the TRA, a law that allowed Washington to sell arms to Taiwan and 
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maintain a security relationship with the island, prompting complaints by the Chi-
nese. 
Some authors see the TRA as a result of political struggle between the 
Carter administration and U.S. Congress. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker claims in her 
important study from 2009 about the Taiwan issue that Carter’s vagueness about 
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security forced the Congress to reject the admin-
istration’s own Taiwan bill, developing the TRA with more explicit and provoking 
security language.47 But the TRA must be seen in the broader context of strategic 
considerations. It was not only, as Hao Yufan wrote in 1997, a compromise be-
tween the executive and the legislative branch, enabled by the political system of 
the United States.48 It was also not only, as David Tawei Lee (2000) claims, the 
result of Congressional sympathy for Taiwan.49 Instead, the law was the result of a 
distribution of complementary roles. We have to ask what the Congress could do, 
and what the Carter administration could not due to diplomatic constraints. Assum-
ing Washington had an honest interest in maintaining a security relationship with 
Taiwan, only Congress could create this framework. This allowed the United States 
to have such a military and political relationship with Taiwan. Rather than serving 
as a rebuke, the TRA has allowed Carter and his successors to give no ground on 
the Taiwan issue, without contradicting the legal agreements between the United 
States and the PRC. 
While Congress played a major role in the creation of the TRA, its influ-
ence on Carter’s actual China policy and the normalization negotiations was almost 
non-existent. Xu Guanqiu claims as much in his study from 2007 about Congres-
sional influence on U.S.-China relations. In reality, however, Congressmen seldom 
fulfilled any official assignments despite multiple trips by different members of 
Congress to China during the late 1970s. At times, they acted as messengers for the 
Carter administration, or conveyed their own or Chinese views back to the White 
House and State Department, but Xu’s argument that the Congress was not limited 
to its natural role as legislator appears exaggerated if we consider how much effort 
Carter and his aides put in keeping House and Senate out of the whole process.50 
                                                 
47 Bernkopf Tucker, “Strait”, 115. 
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Instead, Congress began to play its role after the announcement of normalization, 
when Capitol Hill contributed to the shaping of the future relationship between 




Sources and Archival Material 
This thesis endeavors to base its observations and analysis on archival material, 
using the existing literature about the topic of Sino-American normalization mainly 
to discuss interpretations and arguments. Writing about Chinese-American rela-
tions and the Taiwan issue, made it necessary to seek access to a variety of sources 
and archival material in different kinds of archives in China, Taiwan, and the Unit-
ed States. More than 30 years have passed since the achievement of Sino-American 
normalization and the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act, so that the retention 
period for most archival documents has expired. In China and Taiwan, however, 
legal restrictions for archival material differ from western standards. The access to 
material from the period of time, examined in this study, is heavily restricted, mak-
ing it impossible to give a profound interpretation of the Chinese and the Taiwan-
ese behavior during the normalization process. Therefore, this study is based most-
ly on material and documents from the United States, and here primarily on docu-
ments from the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia, and the National Ar-
chives II (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. 
 The Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State has published a 
variety of volumes in the series Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) that 
deal with the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic, 
going back to the early 1950s. In this study about the period of time from 1977 to 
1979, the volumes dealing with China from 1949 to 1968 served merely for de-
scriptive means. The volumes covering 1969 to 1976 are not discussed in the main 
part of this study, but provide essential background information. A thorough under-
standing of the rapprochement process, started by the administration of Richard M. 
Nixon and continued by Gerald R. Ford, is necessary to understand Jimmy Carter’s 
approach towards China, especially in the early period until August, 1977. Accord-
ingly, volumes XVII, XVIII, and E-13 which deal with Nixon’s and Ford’s China 
policy held some analytical value and were consulted for analytical purposes. The 
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same is true about volume V about the U.S. policy in the United Nations (UN), 
which contains documents concerning the question of China’s representation in the 
UN. 
In 2013, the Office of the Historian published a variety of important docu-
ments about U.S.-China relations in Volume XIII of the series. The volume in-
cludes material about U.S. China policy from the complete period of Jimmy 
Carter’s presidency from 1977 to 1980. It offers a wide breadth of memoranda, 
briefing papers, and negotiation protocols. As an introductory source, it was a valu-
able asset to the writing of this dissertation. The same can be said about volume VI 
about U.S.-Soviet relations, also published in 2013. However, since the space in 
such volumes is limited, the editors were not able to incorporate all relevant docu-
ments which are available in different American archives. 
 The largest collection of documents about the Carter administration’s ap-
proach towards China and Taiwan can be found in the Jimmy Carter Library in 
Atlanta, Georgia. Of particular significance here is the material from Carter’s Na-
tional Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. He left two different collections. One 
consists of all declassified bureaucratic documents from his office with the title 
National Security Affairs/Brzezinski Material. The second collection, titled Donat-
ed Historical Material/Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, was a gift by Brzezinski, 
consisting of material that he held personally important. These boxes include the 
memcons of his talks with Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese officials as well as the 
most important memoranda and reports he wrote to President Carter. Additionally, 
it includes all reports about the normalization negotiations. Another very important 
collection from the Carter Library is the so-called Vertical Files.51 They include 
important memoranda and memcons of talks between different U.S. and Chinese 
officials. The personal records of President Carter, the so called Plains File, do not 
include much declassified materials about China. Carter’s personal notes and 
memoranda are not part of the accessible documents in this collection. 
 NARA in College Park, Maryland, also contains some important sources for 
enhancing our understanding of the Carter administration’s China policy. While 
many documents of this period are still not declassified or processed, partly due to 
a lack of bureaucratic capacities to work through all of the material, especially 
Record Group (RG) 59 contains material valuable for the topic of this study. The 
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collection Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981 gives us insight into the early peri-
od of the administration’s China policy and the development of its concept. Deputy 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s collection Records of Warren Christopher 
[sic], 1977-1980 consists of material about the development of the Taiwan legisla-
tion which culminated in the Taiwan Relations Act. Unfortunately, the personal 
records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were not available. 
The Library of Congress in Washington D.C. has many different documents 
available which deal with Congressional actions during the normalization process 
and its aftermath. Most influential for this study were the protocols of Congres-
sional hearings conducted by the House and Senate. They were important for the 
development of the Taiwan legislation after normalization, leading to the Taiwan 
Relations Act. Especially the Hearings of the House’s Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, the House’s Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the Senate’s 
Committee on Foreign Relations from February 1979 provide insight into the de-
bate between administration and Congress concerning normalization and the future 
relationship of the United States and the people of Taiwan. Also of interest were 
these committees’ reports to the Senate and House, as these documents provide the 
basis for the whole Congress’ decision-making. Of minor importance are the actual 
debates in Congress because they did not incorporate any information that went 
beyond the aforementioned hearings. 
Although this thesis deals mostly with the Presidency of Jimmy Carter, oth-
er presidential libraries and public archives in the United States were still consult-
ed. The Richard Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California and the Gerald Ford 
Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan hold numerous documents which are important 
for the rapprochement process in the early and mid-1970s. The archives of the 
Hoover Institute at Stanford University in Stanford, California, did not offer much 
material concerning Sino-American relations for the time after the 1950s and 
1960s. The Ronald Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, on the other hand, 
does not have any material about China from the time before 1980. The biggest 
challenge in the Reagan Library is that to date many documents have not yet been 
declassified. In addition, in order to consult these materials in the future, historians 
are required to make a Freedom of Information Act request, making significant 




Due to the reasons mentioned above, this study does not cover Chinese and 
Taiwanese perspective on the normalization process and its consequences in an 
extensive way. The National Archives of the Republic of China in Taipei has not 
declassified the bulk of material about the period of time important for this study. 
The same is true for the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The 
archives of the Academia Sinica in Taipei only have documents available until the 
year of 1975. The Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na in Beijing which represents the most important archive for the history of the 
PRC’s foreign relations has only declassified material from the period before the 
Cultural Revolution which begun in 1966. The Second Historical Archives in Nan-
jing contains only declassified records which deal with Sino-American relations 
until the early 1950s. Other state archives like the one of the CCP are not accessi-
ble to researchers. Municipal archives like the ones in Qingdao or Shanghai do not 
possess any material of significance for this study’s topic. 
Other international archives served this thesis to gain insight into the per-
spectives of non-involved actors, mainly in Europe. The Federal Archive of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in Koblenz as well as the Political Archive of the 
German Foreign Office in Berlin did not have many documents available about 
Sino-American relations. Germany’s diplomatic focus was not aimed at this topic, 
and the material in the archives was limited to some reports from the German em-
bassy in Beijing. Catalogue searches of the National Archives of the United King-
dom in Kew/London and the Centre des archives contemporaines in Fontainebleau 
led to the same conclusion, which is why their records had no impact on this thesis. 
In addition to archival documents, the analysis in this study makes use of 
public resources, mostly accessible via the Internet. Most important among such 
sources were President Carter’s speeches and press briefings which are accessible 
via The American Presidency Project established by the University of California at 
Santa Barbara. Other Internet sources were used on an individual basis after their 
background had been checked as thoroughly as possible. 
This study also used articles from American, Chinese, and Taiwanese 
newspapers and magazines. Despite the use of these sources, the author does not 
claim to offer an in-depth analysis of the news coverage about normalization. The 
examination used mostly articles available via the database Lexis Nexis and other 
databases accessible via the internet. As background to how the negotiations were 
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framed in China, the author read accounts from the 人民日报 (People’s Daily) and 
the ᯠ华月报 (Xinhua Yuebao). The newspapers provided no substantive insight 
into the decision-making of the PRC leadership, but did show the propaganda used 
to communicate with the Chinese populace. 
Interviews and other kinds of oral history did not play any role in this anal-
ysis.52 While the author conducted some interviews, mostly with Taiwanese and 
Chinese researchers, they were not used for analytical or descriptive purposes for 
two reasons. First, the interviews did not produce any insights beyond those found 
in available archival material or literature. Second, the interviews did not meet the 
methodological demands for the use of oral history, especially in a precarious polit-
ical context like the triangular relationship between the U.S., the PRC, and the 






While historians are obligated to tell the story of the past, they are also obliged to 
provide some explanation for the object of their research. Yet, explaining human 
behavior, especially in the past, requires interpretation. Interpreting historical 
events, however, always happens on a subjective basis.54 A theory can help to keep 
interpretations within a pre-determined framework, increasing the level of objectiv-
ity.55 The following paragraphs serve as a theoretical frame to explain historic re-
                                                 
52 One interview with former ROC foreign minister Dr. Frederick Chien provided some useful in-
formation, but was not incorporated due to technical issues. Moreover, his accounts can also be 
found in his autobiography: Frederick F. Chien, 錢復回憶錄 [Memoirs of Chien Fu] (Taibei: Tian 
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ality, and should help to understand the conclusions drawn in later chapters. This 
frame is mostly borrowed from the field of International Relations (IR)-theory, 
although we have to be careful how we apply such theories to a historical study.  
 According to the Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, IR-theories seek 
to predict the future. Thus, they produce generalizations in the sense of classical 
scientific methods by excluding variables that do not fit the model of the theory. 
Gaddis argues that this method leads to a departure from reality, and hence “gener-
alizations of this kind perform badly when applied to the real world, which func-
tions along behavioral, structural, and evolutionary axes simultaneously.” To Gad-
dis, theories are not able to incorporate the unpredictability of human behavior.56 
Since this author agrees with Gaddis’ view, it must be clear that the follow-
ing theoretical considerations shall not serve as means to predict anything. Instead, 
I argue that IR theory offers a number of tools that can still help the study of histor-
ical events. First, theory of any kind helps to narrow the scope of possible interpre-
tations.57 Primary sources, the major empirical tool for historians, do not always 
contain information about the exact intentions of single actors, or by what motiva-
tions they were driven. In the context of the Carter administration, normalization, 
and the Taiwan issue, we find only indirect hints, at best. 
Therefore, in the particular case of Sino-American normalization, the theo-
retical framework developed here shall guide us for the purposes of selection, or-
der, and explanation.58 The tools of selection and order make the task of explaining 
historical reality easier. Theories support the process of making sense of the 
sources and material used in this examination. Theoretical assumptions and conclu-
sions serve as an additional basis besides the critical study of empirical evidence by 
offering logic and causality. In a way, theories help the development of hypotheses 
which can be tested with the help of historic material. 
Methodologically as well as topically, this study is a contribution to the 
field of international history, dealing with questions concerning the decision-
making of policy-makers in the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and 
the Republic of China. Due to a lack of primary sources, analysis of Chinese and 
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Taiwanese decision-making is constrained to public resources and existing litera-
ture. It also deals with the interactions between these three actors in the realm of 
international policy.  
As I argue, the significance of the Taiwan issue for the process of normali-
zation, on which this study is focusing, can only be understood if we go beyond the 
level of Sino-American diplomatic relations. Otherwise we overlook important 
matters and do not grasp the connection between these aspects of normalization. 
The theoretical framework shall therefore incorporate different levels of analysis, 
namely the level of the international system and the level of the actors them-
selves.59 Otherwise, we cannot explain why Taiwan was so important for the U.S. 
in order to balance China’s power. 
First, we have to understand the structure of the international system during 
the normalization process because this defined the frame for the Chinese and 
American negotiators, influencing their preferences and their strategy. The nature 
of the international system matters because it gives us an idea how the power was 
distributed among the actors in this system, and what rules the system is subject to. 
This is important because political elites are aware of these conditions when they 
make decisions. The U.S. historian Zara Steiner for example argues, that a political 
leader asks “not how he can use the international system to achieve his goals but 
what kind of goals a workable international system allows him to pursue.”60 Politi-
cians can easily find themselves manipulated by the nature of the international sys-
tem because it sets the conditions for policy-makers and their policy options. 
The political scientist Kenneth Waltz developed a theory, called Neo-
realism, which provides us with the necessary tools to understand the nature of the 
international system and its defining dynamics.61 Neo-realism seeks to explain how 
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the structure of the international system shapes the behaviour of states in the realm 
of international relations.62 It also claims that structural effects lead to similar be-
haviour by states.63 This assumption results in the development of Waltz’ so called 
Balance of Power paradigm. He argues that the anarchy of the international system, 
its units’ pursuit of security, and the distribution of power among these units force 
them to compete for power which is not an abundant resource in the realm of inter-
national politics. Thus, states want to become as powerful as possible because this 
makes them more secure in the anarchy of the global self-help system, they exist 
in. They try to counterbalance (and to surpass) the power of their rivals.64 In that 
context, it does not matter how a state gets stronger, whether by internal or external 
means. All that counts is to become stronger at all. This also applies to the situation 
of the United States and the People’s Republic in the late 1970s. 
As the U.S. historian Melvyn Leffler observes, the bipolar set-up of the in-
ternational system saw the Soviet Union and the United States entrenched in a ri-
valry over political, cultural and economic influence all over the world. The roots 
of the antagonism between the Soviets and Americans did not only lie in differing 
national interests, but also in different visions how the international system should 
be shaped. 65  Both countries led their respective alliances either as benevolent 
hegemon or imperial dominator, neutralizing each other in a perceived equilibrium 
of power. The dominance of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the bipolar Cold War system 
and especially Moscow’s power influenced U.S. and PRC decision-makers. China 
and the United States perceived the USSR as the biggest threat to their own securi-
ty. This was actually what brought both sides to the negotiating table in the first 
place. 
Decision-makers in Washington sought ways to gain an advantage vis-à-vis 
the Soviets. One way to achieve such an advantage was a more cooperative rela-
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tionship with the PRC. Having the PRC on America’s side would shift the distribu-
tion of power in the United States’ favour. This would improve the U.S. position 
worldwide, but most of all in Asia-Pacific. The same logic, however, should later 
suggest the continuation of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan issue because the unof-
ficial alliance with Taiwan granted the United States an instrument to contain Chi-
nese power in the future, just in case U.S.-China relations would deteriorate after 
normalization. While an alliance with the PRC led to relative gains vis-à-vis Mos-
cow, the continuation of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security made the 
U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific region stronger and hence the United States more 
powerful. In addition, as long as the island was not under the domain of the PRC, 
Beijing would spend vast resources to contain the regime in Taipei. China would 
not be able to use these resources against the United States. 
The People’s Republic found itself in an even greater dilemma after the end 
of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s, having non-friendly and even hostile 
relationships to both superpowers. Improving China’s security needed to begin 
with the rapprochement policy conducted by Nixon and Kissinger and Mao and 
Zhou. This policy enabled a tacit alliance between Chinese and Americans which 
aimed at containing Soviet influence in Asia. Closer ties with the United States in 
the shape of official diplomatic relations would further improve the PRC’s strategic 
situation. In addition, only normalization would allow China to gain easier access 
to western technology which was important for the modernization of the country. 
Successful modernization would enable the PRC leadership to self-strengthen their 
country, making it more powerful and more secure. 
As we see, structural constraints had a strong influence on the decision-
making in Beijing and Washington. However, Neo-realism is not able (nor does it 
seek) to explain the internal circumstances in which an actor’s decisions are made. 
In Waltz’ theory, states are “black boxes” which only differ in the amount of power 
they possess.66 For the purpose of this study, however, we need to open the “black 
box”.67 Otherwise, we cannot explain why the Carter administration put normaliza-
tion at risk when they insisted to continue U.S. engagement in the Taiwan Strait, 
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and why the PRC regime accepted the TRA although the law virtually constituted 
the American role as a protector of Taiwan beyond the Cold War.  
In order to open the “black box”, we need another IR theory that seeks to 
explain actors’ behaviour. The theory chosen for this study is Neoclassical Realism 
which provides us with a connection between the levels of the system and the ac-
tors. This connection arises from the political decision-makers’ perception of the 
distribution of power in the international system.68 Structural constraints like the 
distribution of power can only take full effect if statesmen or other influential so-
cial groups within a state are aware of them.69 Thus, it matters how policy makers 
in China and the United States perceived their environment, externally and inter-
nally. This is what makes human perception an important variable for the whole 
normalization process. How powerful a state is, and how powerful it can become 
due to certain actions, is connected to the way political decision-makers perceive 
the distribution of power in the international system. The amount of power which a 
nation’s decision-makers believe to possess influences how secure a state feels, and 
what kind of national preferences it develops. 
Numerous times, Chinese leaders made clear to their American interlocu-
tors that they were interested in more cooperation between the PRC and the U.S. in 
order to cope with the Soviet Union. The regime in Beijing saw Moscow and its 
allies like Vietnam as the biggest threat to China’s security. Moreover, Deng Xiao-
ping and his fellow party leaders were aware that the People’s Republic was too 
backwards and not powerful enough to deal with this threat alone. Self-
strengthening was only possible with the help of the West, and it would take years 
to achieve the goals Deng and his allies at home had in mind. In the meantime, the 
broadening of the tacit alliance with the United States improved the Chinese strate-
gic situation, deterring the Soviets from any aggressive measures against the PRC. 
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 Washington pursued a more divergent strategy with its China policy, not 
only reducing normalization to a way to strengthen the China card. Yet, Carter and 
his aides saw this process and especially the achievement of normal relations with 
China still as a necessity to gain power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Closer relations 
with the PRC put pressure on the Soviets, forcing the Kremlin to cooperate with the 
United States in areas like arms control and regional conflicts. The decision-makers 
in Washington also were aware that Taiwan was a strategic asset for the U.S. posi-
tion in Asia-Pacific. Since the U.S. administration was sure that the Chinese needed 
the United States more to improve their strategic situation, than the U.S. needed 
China, Washington took a calculated risk, forcing the PRC to accept U.S. involve-
ment in the Taiwan Strait beyond normalization. 
Washington’s considerations were based on a second factor we should in-
corporate in this analysis: the historical experience of the United States with China 
and Taiwan. While Taiwan and the Kuomintang (KMT) regime presented some-
thing like a troublemaker for the United States due to Chiang Kai-shek’s (CKS) 
ambition to reconquer the mainland during the 1950s, the island also served as a 
loyal ally and a bulwark against communism in East Asia. It helped to contain 
communist China and was an example for America’s credibility and reliability as 
an ally, assuring Japan, South Korea and other American partners in the region that 
Washington would not disengage from the Asia-Pacific region. The experience of 
Taiwan’s usefulness told the decision-makers in Washington that, even after nor-
malization, the island possessed strategic value. Moreover, since history had 
demonstrated that American and Chinese interests were not always congruent, fric-
tion and even conflict between China and the United States had to be anticipated by 
American leaders. In such an event, Taiwan would prove to be a useful strategic 
hedge. 
 But the Carter administration’s motives for a continuation of U.S. involve-
ment in the Taiwan Strait did not end here. As the works of neoclassical realists 
suggest, we must incorporate a third variable to explain the White House’s behav-
ior concerning Taiwan. Political decision-makers have to take care that their deci-
sions will be accepted at home. Otherwise, governments have problems accumulat-
ing enough resources to pursue the policy necessary to realize their decisions.70 As 
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Thomas Christensen argues, this is true for all political systems, democratic and 
non-democratic, since all governments have to achieve a certain amount of legiti-
mization via mobilization, when implementing new and costly foreign policy strat-
egies.71 
 The Carter administration knew right from the beginning that the U.S. pub-
lic and especially U.S. Congress were very critical of any China policy that would 
force the United States to abandon its engagement in the Taiwan Strait. Although 
most Americans saw normalization as a positive development, they were concerned 
about the security of Taiwan. In order to find broad support for his China policy, 
Jimmy Carter had always made clear that he did not plan to abandon the Taiwan-
ese, and U.S. officials conveyed this position to their Chinese interlocutors many 
times. For the U.S. public and Congress, normalization could only work if the 
United States were able to guarantee Taiwan’s security, leading eventually to the 
TRA. Even if Carter had not wanted to maintain U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait, casting a veto against the TRA would have cost the U.S. president vast polit-
ical resources at home, making future projects even more difficult. This risk added 
to the Carter administration’s decision to develop a security relationship with Tai-
wan. 
 The need for legitimization also made China accept the TRA, though in the 
PRC’s case the reasoning is much more complex. First of all, one should not un-
derestimate the CCP’s urge to solidify its rule over China. Of course, Beijing could 
never openly allow the United States to remain involved in the Taiwan issue, pro-
longing the period until China could be unified. But the PRC leadership was aware 
that the standard of living had to improve in China. Otherwise, the Chinese people 
would start questioning the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule of the country. Therefore, 
it needed reforms and modernization in China, and the communist leaders saw 
normal relations with Washington as an important part of this approach. A higher 
standard of living would help the stabilization of the CCP’s rule much more than 
the division of China along the Taiwan Strait could ever question it. This indicates 
that the issue of domestic legitimization also applies to China’s decision to accept 
U.S.-Taiwan security relations and the TRA. 
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 As I am going to show, the interplay of these three variables helps us to 
explain why the Carter administration risked the failure of normalization in order to 
maintain the U.S. role as the protector of Taiwan. Since the records only offers 
indirect hints and not a complete explanation of the whole context of the U.S. be-
havior concerning Taiwan, theoretical abstraction allows us to see the connection 
between the perception of the distribution of power, the historical experience, and 




Structure of Dissertation 
This thesis attempts to explain, how the United States and the People’s Republic 
achieved normal relations, and what role the Taiwan issue played in this context. In 
order to do so, one needs to understand the historical roots of the problem, at first. 
They provided the basis for the Carter administration’s leeway in their approach 
towards normalization. The first part of this study, chapter I, therefore deals with 
the development of U.S.-China relations after World War II. At this time, the Unit-
ed States was searching for its role in the Taiwan Strait after the Chinese Civil 
War. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how the Chinese and Americans tried 
to manage their tense relationship in order to prevent an escalation, which could 
have had a global impact due to the Cold War framework that defined the first dec-
ades of Sino-American relations after 1945. 
 Chapter II also provides background information, dealing with the rap-
prochement process under U.S. Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. 
The promises these former U.S. administrations had made to the Chinese influ-
enced the whole normalization process and defined parts of the leeway that the 
administration under Jimmy Carter had for their own China policy. Moreover, the 
rapprochement process changed the character of the relationship between Washing-
ton and Beijing, not only lowering the level of conflict but creating something like 
a tacit U.S.-PRC alliance against the Soviet Union. Accordingly, rapprochement 
enabled normalization, although, as will be demonstrated, the latter cannot be seen 
simply as the continuation of the former. 
 After the historical background is covered, the study proceeds with its main 
part, the analysis of the normalization process. Chapter III provides us with an in-
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sight into the early period of the Carter administration’s China policy, explaining 
the development of its framework which culminated in the creation of Presidential 
Review Memorandum (PRM)-24. The subsequent chapter, chapter IV, describes 
the U.S. executive’s opening moves towards the Chinese, demonstrating Washing-
ton’s willingness to normalize relations. This development is framed by visits by 
Carter’s most important foreign policy advisor to China, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance in August 1977 and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in May 
1978. The chapter also makes clear how serious PRC officials were about their 
disdain for the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait.  
Beijing’s disapproval of the Carter administration’s intentions to remain in-
volved in the Taiwan issue played a major role in the actual negotiations about 
normalization. Chapter V deals with these negotiations and the problems both sides 
faced during their talks, before they finally reached an agreement. Chapter VI ex-
plains why and in which way the Carter administration endeavored to promote 
normalization to the international and U.S. public, using the historical visit of Deng 
Xiaoping to the United States as an instrument to boost public approval for normal-
ization. Chapter VII is about the creation of a piece of legislation that allowed the 
United States to maintain people-to-people relation with Taiwan, but also to remain 
involved in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act which stands in the center 
of this last main chapter ensured the United States’ status as Taiwan’s protector. 
The final part presents a summary and also explains the outcome and con-
sequences of normalization. The author discusses if the theoretical framework de-
veloped in this introduction broadened our understanding of the Chinese and Amer-
ican behavior concerning the Taiwan issue. Moreover, the chapter sheds light on 
the question of why the Carter administration’s China and Taiwan policy was suc-
cessful, and why the TRA should be not seen as a failure of the White House. The 
last part also includes this author’s view on Taiwan as an ongoing, contentious is-
sue between the U.S. and China and how that affects today’s distribution of power 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Chapter I: Managing the Conflict, 1945-1968 
 
America’s relationship to China after World War II was full of misunderstanding, 
tension, and hostility. The roots for the Sino-American drama lay in the result of 
the Chinese Civil War. Due to the communist victory, there existed two govern-
ments which claimed to represent all of China, one on the mainland and one on 
Taiwan. In 1949, the Communists ruled in Beijing and had the mainland with 
around 540 million people under their control, while the Nationalists controlled 
Taiwan with only around nine million people living on this island. It was a signifi-
cant disparity, leaving Chiang Kai-shek and his regime in a bad position. But as we 
will see, ideological constraints and strategic Cold War considerations ensured 
CKS regime’s survival, thanks to the intervention of the United States. 
 In the wake of the Cold War and due to growing anti-communist sentiments 
in the United States, Washington only recognized the regime on Taiwan, the Re-
public of China, even signing a defense treaty with Taipei in the mid-1950s. It was 
thus not surprising that it did not take long before the regime on the mainland, the 
People’s Republic of China, developed strong animosities towards the United 
States, seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union. These actions eventually led to 
ongoing tensions between Washington and Beijing which were to last well into the 
late 1960s. 
 This chapter deals with the development of Sino-American relations be-
tween 1945 and 1968. To understand the process of normalization in the late 1970s, 
it is of utmost importance to understand how the conflict between the United States 
and the PRC emerged and what role the Taiwan issue played in this context. The 
historical experience of both sides influenced the course of the discussions between 
the Chinese and Americans from 1977 to 1978. Beijing even thought that the U.S. 
owed the People’s Republic a debt due to Washington’s behavior during this period 
of time. Interestingly, despite all the differences and the hostility of the 1950s and 
1960s, U.S.-China relations never reached any extremes, neither culminating in a 
declared war nor leading to genuine friendship. Instead, we find a relationship of 
great vicissitude whose only constant was the different views of Beijing and Wash-
ington about the Taiwan issue. 
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 Neither U.S. nor Chinese leaders had a plan how to handle the situation 
between their two countries after the end of the Chinese Civil War. Yet, over the 
course of the following decade, both regimes made decisions which prompted re-
sentment and even hostility against each other. Ideological, political, and strategic 
considerations in Washington and Beijing defined the role of the Taiwan issue, 
linking this problem to the greater scheme of the Cold War. In the end, these con-
siderations led to a chain of events that set the frame for the negotiations about 
normalization between the Carter administration and the PRC leadership around 
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Moreover, these experiences shaped the percep-
tions of the decision-makers and other political actors in Taiwan, China, and the 
United States, influencing their behavior during this process. 
 In the late 1940s, conflict between the U.S. and the PRC was not ascer-
tained. The United States tried to mediate between Nationalists and Communists in 
an attempt to stabilize China and keep it out of the zone of influence of the Soviets. 
Even after the Nationalists had fled to Taiwan, the White House considered friend-
ly relations with the regime in Beijing, but the events of the Korean War poisoned 
the relationship for years to come. This became evident during the two Taiwan 
Strait crises of the 1950s, when the U.S. commitment to protect Taiwan grew 
stronger, finally resulting in the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. However, both 
crises also demonstrated the limits of America’s willingness to support CKS as the 
United States were not willing to risk a conflict with the Soviet Union.  
 In the aftermath of the crises, Washington and Beijing endeavored to pre-
vent escalation between them. Different U.S. administration sought for ways to 
lower the tensions with the PRC in the 1960s. However, both countries became 
distracted by other problems, preventing them from pursuing any accommodating 
steps. The United States intervened in Vietnam and was drawn into a war which the 
superpower would not win, while the PRC tore itself apart during the Cultural 
Revolution. When in addition the tension with the Soviet Union grew more intense, 
the CCP regime had to fear for its very existence, forcing Beijing to change its for-






The Conflict Takes Shape 
Traditionally the United States had pursued an “Open Door” policy in China.72 
This meant that no other foreign power should control China which was regarded 
as a market area with unimaginable possibilities. All nations with commercial in-
terests in China should enjoy the most favored nation status and have access to the 
Chinese market with equal trading opportunities. Although every great power of 
this period claimed its own zone of influence within China, the “Open Door” prin-
ciple remained valid for the first decades of the 20th century. When the Japanese 
invasion of China threatened the free access to the Chinese market, the U.S. decid-
ed to intervene. 
The main reason for U.S. military support for China was to keep the country 
out of Japan’s grasp, because an independent China was useful to detain Japan 
from becoming a hegemon in the Asian-Pacific region.73 China served primarily as 
arena to pin down parts of the Imperial Japanese Army, so that they could not fight 
U.S. forces during the Pacific War. After the World War II China became more 
important as the Americans reacted to Moscow’s attempts to bring the CCP in posi-
tion to take over the country. However, it quickly became apparent that Washing-
ton had problems to define China’s role in the upcoming antagonism with the Sovi-
et Union.74 
At the end of World War II the United States emerged as the world’s most 
powerful nation. Its economic strength was unrivaled, its conventional military had 
proved its reliability, and country was the only one with access to nuclear weapons. 
Other allies, however, did not benefit from the victory over Nazi Germany. Alt-
hough they belonged to the victors, the European powers France and Great Britain 
had suffered greatly under Hitler’s war. Their colonial empires started to disinte-
grate and their national economies were in a profoundly compromised state. Thus, 
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they lost global influence and became, at least in some areas, dependent on the 
United States. All in all, the U.S. position had strengthened. Only one major prob-
lem remained. 
 The fourth member of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union, was also 
able to strengthen its strategic position. While the country had suffered greatly un-
der the German invasion, it still benefited from the postwar situation. The Soviets 
occupied most regions the Red Army had liberated from the Germans, and was 
incorporating these territories into its own zone of influence.75 In order to strength-
en its grasp of these areas, Moscow did not allow the development of democratic 
structures there. Instead, most Eastern European states were bound in obedience to 
the USSR and had to adopt a socialist form of government. This approach alienated 
the former members of the anti-Hitler coalition from each other, leaving the United 
States, Great Britain, and France on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. 
 At this point, however, the United States had no interest in a global en-
gagement. Neither U.S. Congress nor the American public seemed willing to sup-
port such efforts. Stalin’s attempts to enhance the Soviet zone of influence to Tur-
key and Greece changed this attitude. Moscow’s behavior seemed to prove the 
conclusion, which the U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan’s had drawn in his Long 
Telegram, that Moscow pursued an expansionist policy, threatening the stability of 
Europe.76 This perception led to a more interventional approach in Washington’s 
foreign policy, expressed in the Truman Doctrine which President Harry S. Truman 
made known to the public in his famous speech from March 12, 1947.77 The Tru-
man Doctrine aimed at containing the expansion of worldwide communism, leav-
ing Moscow only the zone of influence it had already created.78 For many Histori-
ans, the Truman Doctrine also marked the beginning of an antagonism that should 
affect international politics for more than 40 years.79 
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 In the early stages of implementing the new doctrine, the focus of the new 
strategy lay in Europe and the Middle East, demonstrated by the stationing of U.S. 
forces in these regions.80 Another important instrument to support struggling re-
gimes against communism was financial aid. The most important program of all 
was the European Recovery Program (ERP, also known as the Marshall Plan) 
which led to serious frictions between Soviets and Americans, especially in Ger-
many.81 The U.S. engagement in Europe and other places deepened the Soviet-
American conflict which also started to take shape in Asia. 
 Japan’s defeat had left a power vacuum in Asia-Pacific, and the United 
States and the USSR struggled to fill the gap. China played a major role in these 
efforts but the internal conflict between Nationalists and Communists kept the 
country from getting some peace after the hard years of war with Japan.82 The rul-
ing Nationalists were unable to stabilize the country. They could not bargain a 
compromise with the Communists and did not care to reform China’s political and 
social-economic system. Instead, Chiang and his KMT clung to their power,83 
while the Communists who had close ties to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) demanded to be a part of the Chinese government after they also 
had fought the Japanese Imperial Army.84 
 The United States had a strong interest in a stable China. The country 
should be free from Soviet influence. For that purpose, Washington was ready to 
approach the Chinese communists, although one such attempt by Truman’s prede-
cessor Franklin D. Roosevelt had already failed, because Chiang Kai-shek had 
convinced Roosevelt’s emissary Patrick J. Hurley that the United States were better 
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off by supporting the KMT unconditionally.85 Assuming to have the full support of 
the United States, Chiang did not make a great effort to appease the CCP, and the 
Chinese Civil War, which was interrupted for the period of the war with Japan, 
flared up again.86 
 The White House reacted with restraint to the conflict in China. The policy 
planers of the Truman administration did not believe that the United States could 
have a major influence on the outcome of the civil war, without getting too in-
volved and maybe provoking a Soviet intervention.87 Instead, the White House 
tried to prevent any escalation, sending former U.S. Army General Gorge C. Mar-
shall as the president’s personal emissary to China. He should mediate between the 
KMT and the CCP. At first, Marshall was even able to get the parties back to the 
negotiating table, but lack of trust and Chiang’s refusal to share his power brought 
Marshall’s mission to a quick end.88 
 From the CCP’s perspective, the failure of Marshall’s initiative deepened 
the perception that they could not trust the United States. It confirmed Mao’s view 
that U.S. policy after World War II was defined by reactionary and anticommunist 
groups, trying to control China via the KMT regime. In addition, Mao’s ideology 
which mixed Marxist-Leninist theory with Chinese nationalism rejected any inter-
vention by foreign powers in Chinese affairs, emphasizing China’s territorial integ-
rity and national sovereignty.89 As we will see in later chapters, these ideas influ-
enced the PRC’s strict position concerning the Taiwan issue in the negotiations 
with U.S. officials about normalization. Chinese nationalism born from the experi-
ence of the 19th century made it difficult for the CCP to accept any American at-
tempts to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.90 
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 In reality, the Soviets intervened much stronger in the Chinese Civil War 
than the United States. A good example for Moscow’s favoring of the CCP was the 
situation in Manchuria after Japanese forces had left and the Red Army had taken 
control of the region. The Soviets gave the complete military equipment left by the 
Imperial Army to the Communists, helping the CCP to transform their rather guer-
rilla like army into a regular one with the capability to defeat the Nationalists.91 It 
was a decisive turning point in the development of the Chinese Civil War. 
 Still, the USA was reluctant to increase its support for the Nationalists, 
avoiding any kind of military involvement in the Chinese Civil War.92 George C. 
Marshall, who had become Secretary of State briefly after his return from China, 
was even reluctant to provide more financial aid for CKS’s regime. It was the Con-
gress who forced him to change his attitude, as Marshall needed Congressional 
support for the implementation of the ERP.93 The influential senator Arthur Van-
denburg (Rep-Michigan) made clear to the Secretary that China was a place where 
communism had to be contained, demonstrating that Congress held China im-
portant for the U.S. strategy to counter Soviet influence worldwide.94 This inter-
vention by members of Congress in the administration’s China policy was only the 
first of many to come. The Nationalists had always had supporters on Capitol Hill, 
but now the influence of the so called China bloc started to grow because of the 
White House’s dependence in budgetary matters.95 
 Congress was not the only political player in Washington who argued in 
favor of extended aid for the KMT. The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, 
believed Chiang could help to prevent further communist expansion in the world. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) shared this view in a policy paper from June 
1947.96 Forrestal and the JCS’s conclusions were as much affected by strategic as 
by ideological considerations, something that did not remain concealed to CKS. 
 The KMT leader knew how to make use of the strong anticommunism in 
the United States, hiring professional lobbyists to affect American politicians and 
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other social actors. This approach resulted in the emergence of the China lobby 
whose influence should grow over the next years.97 Although Marshall maintained 
his adverse position, the growing pressure from the China bloc led eventually to an 
increase of U.S. aid for the Nationalists in 1948.98 Chiang’s supporters were even 
able to gain public approval for this approach since the U.S. public viewed the sup-
port of the KMT as part of the general U.S. campaign against worldwide com-
munism.99 Americans did not understand the difference between Soviet and Chi-
nese communism. Similar to the views of political hardliners in Washington, their 
perspective was based on anti-communist sentiments and not on strategic consider-
ations.100 In this context, the U.S. historian Stephen Whitfield argues that the U.S. 
public reacted “phobic” to communism, overestimating the danger it presented in 
the United States.101 Anti-communism was one of the defining dynamics of U.S. 
foreign policy at this time. 
In the end, even additional financial help from Washington could not save 
the Nationalists. U.S. aid was not nearly enough to have a sustainable impact on the 
KMT regime’s position. After the communist forces had crossed the Yangtze River 
in April 1949, the Nationalists had to retreat from the Chinese mainland and fled to 
Taiwan. In October then, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China 
with its capital in Beijing. Now, the Truman administration had to make the deci-
sion whether they would accept CKS’s defeat, resulting in the recognition of a new 
regime in China, or whether they would help the KMT to survive and perhaps even 
reconquer the mainland. 
Truman and especially his new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, enter-
tained the idea of coming to an understanding with the CCP, keeping the new Chi-
nese regime from allying with the Soviet Union.102 The idea was to bait Mao with 
trade agreements, a seat in the United Nations, and diplomatic recognition.103 Since 
the growing anti-communism in U.S. public did not allow Washington to make far 
reaching concessions to the CCP regime, Acheson also wanted to put pressure on 
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Beijing, by stopping the financial aid for those regions in China that were under 
communist control.104 At Mao’s command, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai approached 
the Americans, offering a chance to come to a mutual understanding. However, 
when the United States denied to recognize the PRC regime and rejected to stop its 
supplies for the KMT, Acheson’s plan was ultimately moribund. Moreover, instead 
of containing Japanese militarism, Washington seemed to encourage the develop-
ment armed forces in Japan. In Mao’s view, these efforts aimed to contain com-
munist China.105 Washington’s ambiguous behavior and the Chinese leader’s mis-
trust against the United States prevented any cooperation between the PRC and the 
U.S. governments. The PRC had to look for help elsewhere. 
 In Mao’s opinion, only the USSR was able to provide China with the sup-
port the country needed to rebuild its economy. The PRC regime had already indi-
cated that it would join the Soviet bloc. In his “Lean to One Side” speech from July 
1 in 1949, the CCP’s chairman made clear that the People’s Republic would stay 
on the Soviet Union’s side in its struggle to change the capitalistic world order. 
This intention made a stable relationship between Washington and Beijing very 
unlikely.  
 The U.S. administration had failed to develop a coherent strategy for its 
China policy. The administration’s China White Paper from August 1949 did not 
only come too late, but served less the development of an effective China policy 
but rather to “set the facts straight on the difficult situation in China.”106 The presi-
dent and his aides wanted to thwart the accusation of having lost China.107 Simul-
taneously, the document’s critical assessment of the KMT regime made clear that 
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Chiang’s attempts to gain more support from the White House had failed.108 Thus, 
discussions among U.S. agencies about the defense of Taiwan were not surprising. 
 Acheson and the DOS still believed that keeping the PRC from a formal 
alliance with Stalin was possible, if the United States would reduce its support for 
the Nationalists.109 Washington’s diplomats also feared that further help for the 
defense of Taiwan would lead to a direct military involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait.110 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and the JCS disagreed, arguing that 
Taiwan was easy to defend and too important for the shipping routes in the Asia-
Pacific region.111 In spite of Congressional critique, it was Truman who ended 
these discussions in early 1950 when he made clear in a public speech that his ad-
ministration had no plans to intervene in the Chinese Civil War, and would not 
establish any military cooperation with the regime on Taiwan.112 
 The president’s statements encouraged Acheson to hold his famous Press 
Club Speech on January 12, 1950. In his speech, the Secretary defined the U.S. 
defensive perimeter in the Asian-Pacific region, without including Korea or Tai-
wan.113 This should later have repercussions when North Korea attacked the South. 
However, at this time, Acheson’s words had only an impact in Washington where 
his ideas were heavily criticized. In addition, the attitude towards the KMT regime 
in Taiwan changed within the Truman administration after the anti-communist 
Dean Rusk had become Second Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. 
Step by step, defending Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland became part 
of U.S. China policy.114 In the end, it was the anti-communist atmosphere at home 
that spoiled the Acheson’s plans. 
 The PRC’s image in the United States had never been good. Besides anti-
communist sentiments, the case of Angus Ward who had been U.S. Consul to 
Shenyang undermined the U.S. public’s view of China. In 1948/49, Ward and his 
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staff members were put under house arrest for over a year after PRC officials had 
accused them of espionage.115 In the spring of 1950, Beijing also decided not to 
pay back the 800 million U.S. dollars of debts China had contracted with the Unit-
ed States. The PRC government’s argument on the matter was that these terms had 
been negotiated between the KMT and the U.S. administration. They were there-
fore not legally binding for the People’s Republic.116 This last event made U.S.-
PRC accommodation impossible. The Truman administration was stuck with CKS 
and his regime in Taiwan. 
 The drama of losing China concluded when the People’s Republic and the 
Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance on February 14, 1950.117 It became clear that the postwar China policy 
of the United States had not achieved any of its goals. It had neither kept Mao and 
his CCP from beating the Nationalists, nor had Washington been able to keep the 
PRC from an alliance with Moscow.118 Although it is highly doubtful that it had 
ever been possible to win communist China over for the U.S. struggle against the 
Soviet Union, the Truman administration’s indecisive and ambiguous policy to-
wards the CCP and the KMT helped to lose China. Now, the U.S. government had 




From Conflict to Hostility 
The Sino-Soviet friendship treaty secured considerable loans for the People’s Re-
public, enabling Mao and his young government to start working on the solution of 
China’s economic problems. However, although Beijing and Moscow enhanced the 
level of cooperation, both sides maintained reservations towards each other. Stalin 
saw Mao very critical because he was worried about the Chinese nationalism which 
the chairman of the CCP had mixed into the socialist teachings. Such nationalism 
could lead to more ambition within the communist bloc, questioning the Soviet 
Union’s leadership role. The CPSU leader’s anxiety was not limited to the political 
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and strategic level but had also a personal dimension. He did not want to share the 
role of the leader of international communism, and Mao’s charisma fueled by his 
ideological autonomy promoted such a development.119 
 Mao still seemed to consider a working relationship with the United States 
in order to keep China’s strategic options more flexible and less dependent on the 
Soviets. Moscow, hence, feared that the PRC leader could become the next Tito.120 
In 1948, The Yugoslavian leader, Josip Broz Tito, had decided after quarrels with 
Stalin to leave the Soviet bloc. In the aftermath, the U.S. administration, which had 
not suspected Tito’s move at this time, supported his regime to keep Yugoslavia 
out of the grasp of the Soviet Union.121 It was a warning for the Soviets that the 
loyalty of their communist allies was not guaranteed. They were aware that losing 
another ally would weaken the USSR’s strategic situation considerably, especially 
since Moscow saw China as the motor for the socialist revolution in Asia.122 
 In the meantime, the level of militarization in U.S. foreign policy increased, 
thanks to anti-communists like the aforementioned Dean Rusk and others. This had 
also an influence on Washington’s attitude towards Taiwan. National Security 
Council (NSC) Report-68 from April, 1950 was the political manifest of the milita-
rization process.123 While the document did not often mention China, the draft had 
direct implications for U.S. China policy. NSC-68 broadened the horizon of Amer-
ica’s anti-communist struggle and directed it towards East Asia. Director of Policy 
Planning for the State Department Paul Nitze, the main author of NSC-68, argued 
that a shift in the balance of power in Asia would have negative implications for 
the strategic position of the United States. The JCS supported Nitze’s view, adding 
in another report that Taiwan served to stabilize the American strategic position in 
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East and Southeast Asia.124 The first result of this new policy was growing finan-
cial aid for the KMT regime. The U.S. support for Taipei should even increase 
when the Korean War broke out. 
 The Korean peninsula had not played a major role in Washington’s strategic 
considerations after World War II. The United States deemed the country as too 
underdeveloped to be of any importance.125  Still, U.S. decision-makers did not 
want the country to fall under Soviet influence. Therefore, Washington negotiated 
with the Soviets in order to come to an agreement about Korea. However, the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union were unable to find consensus. Korea was divided, 
and put under the trusteeship of the United Nations.126 Shortly after U.S. and Soviet 
troops had withdrawn from Korea, the leader of communist North Korea, Kim Il-
Sung, asked Stalin for permission and support for an attack on the south in order to 
reunify the peninsula. 
 At first, Moscow reacted cautiously since Stalin did not want to risk any 
open conflict with the United States. Only Acheson’s aforementioned Press Club 
Speech changed the Soviet leader’s attitude, as the U.S. Secretary of State had not 
included Korea in the American defensive perimeter. Acheson’s statement left the 
Soviets with the impression that they did not have to care about any U.S. retalia-
tion. After the Chinese had made no objections to Kim’s plans, Moscow gave up its 
restraints and assured the North Korean leader of Soviet aid for the attack. 
 North Korea’s invasion started in June 1950 and was very successful. With-
in six weeks, communist troops had captured 90 percent of the South Korean terri-
tory. However, other than from the communist bloc expected, the attack triggered a 
harsh reaction by the United States who forced the UN to sanctify a multinational 
intervention under U.S. leadership. Stalin’s hopes, that the Soviet Union could easi-
ly enhance its zone of influence, did not materialize. In this situation with the 
chance for a strategic advantage vanished, the Soviets could only prevent an escala-
tion of the conflict in Korea. 
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 The communist attack in Korea seemed to prove Nitze’s argument. Foreign 
policy analysts in Washington were convinced that the USSR stood behind North 
Korea’s actions. They also saw the strategic position of the United States eroding. 
The loss of Korea could threaten Japan, the only fully industrialized nation in Asia 
and an important piece of U.S. security strategy in Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, 
Washington had to demonstrate U.S. credibility as the dominant power in East 
Asia.127 Hence, President Truman made three decisions. First, he sent U.S. troops 
to Korea to fight the communists. Second, he increased the U.S. aid for France in 
its struggle in Indochina. Finally, the president ordered the Seventh Fleet to the 
Taiwan Strait in order to keep the Chinese communists from an attack on the is-
land. Now, in spite of all former U.S. reluctance to become involved in the Chinese 
Civil War, Taiwan and its Nationalist regime became a centerpiece of Washing-
ton’s containment policy in East Asia. Due to the war in Korea, the island was 
pushed right into the middle of the Cold War. 
Truman’s decision to send troops to Korea, and the Seventh Fleet to the 
Taiwan Strait, filled Beijing with suspicion. The Chinese leaders believed the 
American actions were the first step of a campaign to drive communism out of 
Asia. This thinking was fueled by the blockade of the Taiwan Strait through the 
Seventh Fleet, something that Mao interpreted as an U.S. intervention in the Chi-
nese Civil War and a new level of hostility.128 The development of the war in Ko-
rea made things worse. As Mao’s advisors had predicted, U.S. forces landed close 
to the 38th parallel, apparently seeking to reunify Korea after the defeat of Kim’s 
troops. Beijing was afraid that U.S troops would occupy all of Korea after the war. 
This scenario was much more threatening for the PRC leadership than the defeat of 
the North Korean regime itself.129 Thus, when the U.S. led troops of the United 
Nations crossed the 38th parallel and approached the River Yalu, the stream that 
divides Korea and China, Chinese leadership decided to enter the war. 
Washington ignored Beijing’s indirect warnings. Subsequently, Un and 
South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel, easily defeating the North Korean 
army. This triggered a Chinese response. Divisions of the PRC, who officially had 
the status of volunteers and not official troops of the People’s Liberation Army 
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(PLA), took the troops of South Korea and the United Nations by surprise. The 
PLA was able to push their opponent back deep into South Korean territory. After 
some mutual counterattacks, a military stalemate emerged similar to the situation in 
World War I.130 Due to the military impasse, only a political solution could resolve 
the conflict. Unfortunately, a lack of trust and the feeling of great sacrifices on all 
sides postponed such a solution, and protracted this war beyond any sense of ra-
tional strategy. 
The lack of direct communication lines prevented both sides, Chinese and 
Americans, to explain their interests and behavior in a manner that made it clear to 
the other side that its prejudices and fears were unwarranted. Beijing did not pursue 
any expansionist goals, but China’s entrance in the Korean War confirmed Wash-
ington’s believe that Mao and his regime was a Soviet puppet.131 The Truman ad-
ministration was so blinded by its urge to counter any sort of communist aggression 
that it did not consider the Chinese desire for territorial integrity and national secu-
rity.  
Beijing, on the other hand, had not been able to convey its warnings in a 
fashion that the United States would reconsider its military approach. Moreover, 
the Chinese leadership itself ignored American warnings not to intervene in Korea. 
In fact, the U.S. administration had hinted several times that the Korean War 
should remain limited to the Korean peninsula.132 Finally, the lack of empathy for 
the Chinese ideological perceptions, and the lack of communication due to political 
and diplomatic reasons were responsible for the deepening of U.S.-PRC hostility 
during the Korean War. 
The Chinese participation in the war made it impossible for the Truman 
administration to even consider concessions to the Chinese because the USA could 
not afford to appear weak, something that became apparent during the armistice 
talks. Anticommunist currents in Washington around Senator Joseph R. McCarthy 
(Rep-Wisconsin) and General Douglas MacArthur put too much pressure on the 
president. Therefore, the White House was not willing to give in to Beijing’s de-
mands about Taiwan and the United Nations. U.S. support for CKS’s regime would 
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not stop and the PRC would not enter the UN. For strategic and ideological rea-
sons, Taiwan was not expendable anymore, and U.S. Congress made sure that the 
executive knew this. 
While the Truman administration had been able to define the basic strategic 
interest of the United States, namely containing Soviet power on a global scale, the 
White House was not able to dictate the way this goal was pursued, at least not 
exclusively. As Thomas J. Christensen points out, the anti-communist attitude in 
the United States did not allow the Truman administration to “make public distinc-
tions between strongpoints and peripheral interests.”133 Since the American execu-
tive needed public and Congressional support to raise the defense budget in order 
to implement its grand strategy of opposing Soviet expansionism, the Truman ad-
ministration needed to make political compromises, accommodating demands of 
the U.S. public. One such compromise was the increasing support for the KMT 
regime in Taiwan.134 As we will see in the following chapters, the search for com-
promises between executive and legislative branch became the defining dynamics 
in Washington’s Taiwan policy over the next decades. Sacrificing Taiwan in order 
to rescue Korea or even Europe was impossible because Congress would never 
allow it. The White House had to find other ways to end the Korean War. 
Fortunately, the other global superpower helped Washington out. Moscow 
had also a strong interest in an end of the Korean War, because Stalin did not be-
lieve the original goal of unifying Korea under the banner of communism was pos-
sible anymore.135 Instead the risk of escalation grew, and the Soviets did not want 
to take such a risk. Thus, the Soviet leader forced China and North Korea to start 
talking with the Americans about an end of the war. In an informal meeting, 
George F. Kennan and the Soviet ambassador at the United Nations, Jacob Malik, 
found enough common ground for the beginning of armistice negotiations. The 
talks started in Kaesong on July 8, 1951. Due to disagreement about the future bor-
ders between the two Koreas and especially the repatriation of prisoners of war, it 
still took two years to end the conflict. On July 27, 1953, all involved actors except 
South Korea signed the armistice agreement.  
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After all those years of battle and millions of deaths, Korea remained divid-
ed. Nothing had changed. Korea was not the only country in East Asia that two 
different national governments laid claim to. China remained divided as well, and 
the CCP had not given up its desire to finish the KMT regime off. Therefore, it did 
not take long until the next Asian crisis occurred. This time it was in the Taiwan 
Strait, and the United States was forced to make a decision how far its engagement 




Managing the Cultivation of Tension 
The escalation of the Korean War and the Chinese intervention deepened the ani-
mosities between Washington and Beijing to the degree of hostility and armed con-
flict. At the same time, both sides had been reluctant to let the situation escalate to 
a full scale war. Still, Beijing saw President Truman’s order to send the Seventh 
Fleet to the Taiwan Strait as means to weaken the communist rule over China. 
From Beijing’s point of view, Truman’s decision confirmed what Mao and other 
Chinese leaders had claimed all the time: the United States had intervened in the 
Chinese Civil War on behalf of the Nationalist regime. Fearing further communist 
expansion, Washington, on the other hand, answered the intervention of Chinese 
volunteers in Korea with increased military and financial aid for CKS’s regime in 
Taiwan. The goal was to strengthen the position of the anti-communist bloc in East 
Asia, by making it impossible for the PLA to conquer the island. 
This U.S. attitude was illegal and hostile in Beijing’s view. The Chinese 
leadership argued the division between China and Taiwan was not the result of an 
international agreement but of the civil war, and thus an internal affair. Still, since 
Mao perceived the United States as the biggest threat for China’s national security, 
it made sense to ease tensions between Washington and Beijing. In this context, 
Mao hoped to dissuade the U.S. government from further help for Taiwan. This 
approach was part of the long-term strategy of the PRC.136 The best chance for 
PRC officials to talk with U.S. leaders about their relationship and the Taiwan issue 
                                                 
136 Zhang Baijia, “The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 
1954-1970” in: Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (ed.), Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China 
Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 48-50. 
52 
 
was the Geneva Conference in 1954 where all global major powers met to settle the 
issues in Korea and Indochina.137 
The People’s Republic wanted to make use of the conference in order to 
gain more international recognition. In addition, Beijing sought for more independ-
ence from the Soviet Union in its foreign policy after Stalin had died in March 
1953. A first step was Zhou Enlai’s development of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence which should guide Chinese foreign policy for the following decades. 
Beijing demanded respect for its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Na-
tions should agree on mutual non-aggressions. No nation should intervene in an-
other nation’s internal affairs. The foundation of relations between states should be 
quality and mutual benefit. Finally, all nations should exist in peaceful co-
existence.138 Regarding Taiwan, this meant that the United States had to stop its 
involvement, leaving the KMT regime on its own. 
Washington’s approach to China and Taiwan did not change. In 1952, the 
Republican and former U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presi-
dential elections. He assumed office on January 20, 1953, and pursued an even 
harder line against communism than his predecessor. During the election campaign 
Eisenhower and his fellow Republicans had blamed Truman’s containment policy 
as too global, too passive and too defensive, weakening the United States abroad 
and at home.139 Enhancing the idea of containment, the new Republican admin-
istration wanted to pursue a “roll-back” strategy that aimed to drive the com-
munists out of those countries that had recently fallen under their rule. Such an 
approach did not allow disengaging from the Taiwan Strait. 
The new U.S. president’s strict position towards communist China did not 
mean that Washington granted CKS unconditional support. While the United States 
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sent military advisors to Taiwan and almost doubled the financial aid for the Na-
tionalists,140 the willingness to put pressure on the CCP regime was limited. The 
White House did not want to risk any further destabilization in East Asia. One ex-
ample for Eisenhower’s restraint was his rejection of the KMT’s plans to reconquer 
the mainland.141 Another example was the administration’s public statement that 
the off-shore islands Quemoy, Matsu and Dachen belonged to China although the 
Nationalists used them as defensive strongholds. From Washington’s point of view, 
only the status of Taiwan and the Pescadores remained unsettled due to their histo-
ry as Japanese colonies.142 Similar to Acheson’s comments about Korea and the 
U.S. defensive perimeter in early 1950, these words did not have the effect Wash-
ington hoped for. Instead, they offered Beijing a chance to weaken CKS and his 
regime. 
Facing domestic criticism for not having liberated Taiwan already, Mao de-
cided that it was time to clamp down on the Nationalists.143 He explained his plans 
to the CCP’s Politburo in July, 1954. The PLA was to attack the KMT’s strong-
holds on the small islands close to the mainland’s coast in order to weaken 
Chiang’s capabilities to strike against the mainland. Moreover, the chairman con-
cluded such an attack would demonstrate to the Americans, how costly it was to 
defend Taiwan and the off-shore outposts. The goal was to keep Washington from 
a defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek.144  
 Before the military actions against the Nationalists began, the PRC leader-
ship conducted a propaganda campaign which started with an editorial in the 人民
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日报 (People’s Daily) entitled “We Must Liberate Taiwan!” on July 23.145 The 
campaign ran for several months until on September 3, 1954, the PLA began 
shelling the off-shore islands. In spite of the aggressive PRC propaganda, this 
move was unexpected for Washington, forcing the U.S. leadership to decide how 
far their commitment to Taiwan went. Similar to the situation in Korea, this was 
not only a matter of strategic considerations but also of the United States’ credibil-
ity and reliability as an ally. To Eisenhower, it was a question of prestige.146 
By adopting a strong stance against the PRC’s actions, Washington tried to 
deescalate the situation. In an attempt to deter the PRC from further aggression, the 
White House did not only condemn China’s actions and emphasized the American 
resolve to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. The U.S. administration also threat-
ened to use nuclear weapons against China and entertained publicly the idea of an 
intervention by U.S. forces in the Taiwan Strait.147 With this belligerent rhetoric, 
Washington wanted to protect Taiwan, but also sought to prevent a new war with 
China. 
The developments in Asia since the early 1950s led the Eisenhower admin-
istration to reevaluate the strategic value of Taiwan. After the French withdrawal 
from Indochina, there were not many allied forces left in East Asia. In order to 
counterbalance the expansion of communism in the region, Eisenhower thought the 
United States and its allies needed CKS and the ROC troops.148 This thinking add-
ed to the so called “New Look” doctrine which based on nuclear deterrence and 
America’s resolve to maintain the status-quo not allowing any further expansion of 
worldwide communism.149 The threat of massive retaliation was combined with the 
strengthening of regimes and groups that were opposing communism in places of 
strategic interest for the United States. The White House’s new approach put Tai-
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wan in an altered strategic context, making the island and its regime an important 
aspect of the administration’s grand strategy.150  
In the critical situation of late 1954, Washington was now ready to negotiate 
a defense treaty with Taiwan demonstrating its commitment to Chiang’s regime 
and the fight against communism. If the attack on the KMT outposts had aimed to 
prevent an official alliance between the United States and the Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Beijing had failed. On December 2, 1954, Washington and Taipei signed a 
Mutual Defense Treaty.151 The agreement limited the defensive obligation of the 
United States to the Taiwanese main island and the Pescadores islands. Moreover, 
it was just a defense alliance, and did not include the promise to support a national-
ist invasion of the mainland.152 
The Treaty was exactly what Mao had wanted to avoid. Yet, neither Que-
moy nor Matsu nor the Dachens were included in the agreement. This encouraged 
Beijing to continue its attacks, focusing now on an invasion of the Dachen islands 
after the PLA had already conquered Yijiangshan Island. However, the attack had 
to be postponed several times, because Mao wanted to prevent direct clashes with 
the U.S. forces, operating in the area. The Chinese leadership had to wait for Wash-
ington to make its next move. 
In a compromise typical for the U.S. China policy of the first decade after 
World War II, Eisenhower opted to leave the Dachens to the mainland. At the 
same, in an attempt to appease CKS, the president promised to defend Quemoy and 
Matsu. After harsh arguments between U.S. and ROC officials, Chiang gave in and 
ordered the withdrawal from the Dachens.153 The assurances about the other off-
shore strongholds served to save U.S. credibility as an ally and found their expres-
sion in the so called Formosa Resolution.154 The resolution meant a “blank check” 
for the U.S. president on behalf of Taiwan’s defense, linking Eisenhower’s own 
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credibility and prestige to the security of Chiang’s regime. Nonetheless, the U.S. 
administration still wanted to prevent an escalation and another conflict with the 
Chinese communists, searching for a diplomatic solution of the crisis. 
Again, the Soviet Union helped Washington out. After the Soviets had indi-
cated that Moscow did not want any further escalation of the crisis, Beijing ap-
peared more open for a diplomatic solution. Since Stalin’s death in March 1953, 
the Soviet leadership had been occupied by internal rivalries, diminishing the Sovi-
et resources for a conflict with the United States. Even after Nikita Khrushchev had 
successfully concluded the internal struggle with Lavrentiy Beria, the new first 
secretary of the CPSU still faced a rivalry with Georgy Malenkov which was not 
resolved until early 1955.155 Therefore, the Kremlin made clear to Beijing that the 
Soviet Union would not support any further attacks on the KMT’s outposts because 
the off-shore islands were a local problem not worth the risk of a full scale war 
with the United States.156 Since Mao had always claimed the Taiwan issue to be an 
internal affair, he could not argue with Moscow’s point of view. Besides, the PRC 
was too dependent from Soviet aid for the further development of its economy.157 
Beijing could not afford any resentment between the two communist regimes and 
followed Moscow’s advice. 
In the end, Beijing demonstrated its willingness to lower tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait via different actions of good will. First, at the Bandung Conference, 
Zhou Enlai announced his government’s willingness to solve the crisis in the Tai-
wan Strait peacefully. He suggested the continuation of the ambassadorial talks 
which had started at the Geneva Conference. The Chinese Prime Minister wanted 
to use the talks with the Americans to gain more respect for the PRC’s government 
and make Washington more sensitive for the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Later, 
Beijing also released several U.S. citizens out of Chinese custody.158 Finally, the 
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PLA stopped the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu on May 1 1955, ending the mili-
tary period of the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
At first, Washington rejected Zhou‘s offer to continue the ambassadorial 
talks.159 However, John F. Dulles later changed his mind. The talks could continue 
as long as any discussion about Taiwan’s status was excluded due to the absence of 
ROC officials. The U.S. Secretary of State saw the talks as a possibility to further 
deescalate the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and buy some time on the matter. Alt-
hough the Taiwan issue was of utmost importance for the Chinese, they agreed for 
the sake of progress. In August, 1955, the ambassadorial talks continued. Although 
they never led to an agreement about Taiwan’s status, the regular meetings between 
PRC and U.S. officials served as a direct channel of communication between 
Washington and Beijing until the 1960s. 
The course and result of the first Taiwan Strait Crisis led to different conse-
quences for the further development of Sino-American relations and particularly 
the Taiwan issue. Taipei was now assured of the United State’s support which was 
the result of a lack of alternatives for Washington. However, the U.S. executive had 
also demonstrated the limits of U.S. commitment to defend the ROC regime as the 
Eisenhower administration had done all it could to avoid an escalation of the situa-
tion. As Nancy Bernkopf-Tucker argues the difficulties to control its allies on Tai-
wan caused Washington to develop the policy of strategic ambiguity, which should 
deter both sides of the Taiwan Strait from attacking each other.160 Another conse-
quence was that the White House’s threat to use nuclear weapons in order to de-
fend Taiwan led Mao to the decision to develop a Chinese nuclear arsenal.161  
The latter became necessary after Moscow had made clear that the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear arsenal did not serve the PRC’s purpose to solve the Taiwan issue. 
From Mao’s point of view, the U.S. commitment to the security of Taiwan went 
further than Moscow’s readiness to stand behind its Chinese ally. This conclusion 
set the root for the Sino-Soviet conflict which eventually led to hostility between 
the two communist countries in the late 1960s. Another drawback was that Mao 
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had failed in his attempt to prevent a formal U.S.-ROC alliance. At least, this made 
the American behavior concerning Taiwan more predictable for the Chinese. All in 
all, it was a disappointing end of the crisis. Yet, there was no need for PRC leaders 
to admit defeat in the Taiwan Strait because they could sell the whole operation as 
a success to the Chinese people, after winning back the Dachen Islands. Hence, 
new attempts to weaken CKS’s regime were not excluded. 
In the years after the crisis, the Eisenhower administration reiterated the 
limits of its commitment in the Taiwan Strait. NSC 5723 from October 1957 made 
clear that Taipei should not provoke the PRC. The United States did not support 
any plans to reconquer the mainland. U.S. military aid for CKS’s regime was main-
ly limited to non-offensive measures. Fortunately, the MDT gave Washington a de-
facto veto against military adventures by the Nationalists. In Robert Accinelli’s 
opinion, this made the treaty “a highly useful diplomatic instrument in keeping 
Chiang’s armed forces in check, thereby promoting stabilization in the Taiwan 
Strait.”162 However, NSC 5723 also emphasized that the KMT regime remained an 
important ally. In the context of Eisenhower’s domino theory, this meant that Tai-
wan was of strategic value, its protection part of the United States’ struggle against 
the Soviet Union and worldwide communism. 
In the late 1950s, Beijing faced different problems that weakened the posi-
tion of the CCP’s regime considerably. The Sino-Soviet alliance started to deterio-
rate in the middle of 1958 due to differing ideological and political attitudes in Bei-
jing and Moscow. Furthermore, China faced a difficult economic situation. The 
first Chinese five-year-plan (1953-57) had demanded a great effort by the Chinese 
people, uncovering the great imbalance between the sectors of agriculture and in-
dustry in China’s economic system. Thus, in order to accelerate the industrializa-
tion and modernization of China, Mao and his aides decided to start an economic 
and social campaign. They called it the Great Leap Forward.163 
To distract the people in China from the great sacrifices, Mao’s plan would 
ask of them, the Chinese leadership sought to create a new crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait. The idea was to provoke an American intervention, so that the United States 
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could serve as a powerful enemy stereotype. Furthermore, a success at the cost of 
the Nationalists could help the CCP’s regime’s legitimacy at home.164 On July 17, 
1958, the PRC leadership ordered the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. The bom-
bardment started several weeks later on August 23, and took the KMT troops by 
total surprise, killing around 600 men in the beginning. After the experience of the 
first crisis, Mao wanted to avoid a direct conflict with the United States. Therefore, 
he ordered to avoid any American casualties.165 Although it took some time, the 
White House did not disappoint the CCP Chairman, reacting harshly to the attack. 
On September 4, the Eisenhower administration announced its resolve to 
fulfill its duty as an ally. The loss of their strongholds and the troops stationed there 
would mean a tremendous setback for the Nationalists, weakening the anti-
communist resistance in Asia. Eisenhower therefore ordered the Seventh Fleet to 
escort supply convoys for Chiang’s troops on Quemoy and Matsu. Under the im-
pression that the Chinese would not risk a full scale war with the United States, the 
president also wanted the American forces in the region to stand ready for “war 
operations”. This order served to deter the Chinese side from any further escala-
tion.166 The message for the Chinese communists should be loud and clear: The 
United States was ready to defend the Nationalist outposts. 
This demonstration of U.S. resolve and Soviet signals to Beijing that Mos-
cow did not endorse the Chinese attempts to conquer the KMT outposts brought the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis to a quick end in October. The PLA lacked the capa-
bilities for an amphibious assault on the small islands anyway, especially with the 
U.S. Navy blocking the Taiwan Strait. Since there seemed nothing more to gain for 
the PRC, Zhou Enlai suggested to Washington the continuation of the ambassador-
ial talks in Warsaw. This gave both sides a chance to sort out a diplomatic solution, 
something the White House welcomed. 
Although both sides were still not able to agree about Taiwan’s status, they 
were able to settle the crisis. Washington promised to stop U.S. escorts for the na-
tionalist supply convoys, as the PRC stopped the shelling of the islands.167 Yet, this 
new crisis had demonstrated how unstable the situation in the Taiwan Strait was. 
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This problem would not go away as long as the KMT regime had troops on Matsu 
and Quemoy.  
In the aftermath of the crisis the White House urged CKS to withdraw his 
forces from the islands, but the ROC leader refused. Chiang’s argument was that 
his regime’s legitimacy to rule Taiwan based on the idea of reunification with the 
mainland. A withdrawal from the off-shore strongholds would appear as a with-
drawal from this idea. According to CKS, the effect of the loss of Matsu and Que-
moy “on the morale on Taiwan would be so serious that the defense of Taiwan it-
self would crumble.”168 The U.S. administration had to find another way to stabi-
lize the Taiwan Strait. 
Dulles found a solution. Washington forced the ROC to sign a joint com-
muniqué, in which the regime denounced the use of force to re-gain the main-
land.169 Taipei’s renunciation was the final piece to deescalate the crisis.170 In re-
turn, Washington agreed that the security of Taiwan was linked to Quemoy and 
Matsu. According to Gottfried Karl Kindermann and Robert Accinelli, this promise 
incorporated the KMT outposts into the framework of the MDT.171 
Interestingly, Mao seemed to agree with his old adversary Chiang about the 
importance of KMT forces on the off-shore islands. The communist leader was 
afraid that a withdrawal of the Nationalists’ troops meant the beginning of the sepa-
ration of Taiwan from the mainland which could result in a Two-China-policy. 
Therefore, despite all the belligerent rhetoric at Warsaw, the Communists took 
steps to prevent the KMT from leaving Quemoy and Matsu.172 Both, the Com-
munists and Nationalists, wanted to prevent the United States from conducting any 
kind of Two-China-policy, an idea the DOS had unsuccessfully tinkered with be-
fore but that was vetoed by Eisenhower. Mao’s and Chiang’s rejection of an Amer-
ican Two-China-policy established a tacit agreement between them about the One-
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China-principle.173 This principle had a major impact on the Chinese-American 
rapprochement process that was initiated by Richard Nixon over a decade later. 
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis consolidated the status-quo of the Taiwan 
issue. Washington demonstrated its resolve to defend Chiang’s regime, and indi-
cated to their allies the limits of the U.S. commitment. The latter helped to stabilize 
the situation in the Taiwan Strait, by preventing the KMT from any military ag-
gression against the PRC. This was the only advantage Beijing gained from the 
crisis. The regime in Taipei had not been weakened, and the Chinese had to learn 
again that the Soviet Union pursued its own interests in order to prevent a major 
conflict with the United States. Moreover, Moscow denied the PRC access to mod-
ern nuclear technique. This attitude, further ideological differences, and the PRC’s 
refusal to allow the Soviet navy permanent access to Chinese ports led to disso-
nances in Sino-Soviet relations.174 Worst of all, the Great Leap Forward failed, 
leading to a famine in China which killed around twenty million people between 
1959 and 1962. Mao was able to remain in power, but his plan had not led to the 
kind of self-strengthening, he had intended.175 
Both crises in the Taiwan Strait demonstrated, how far away the Taiwan is-
sue was from being settled. The rift between all involved actors deepened. Bei-
jing’s attacks on the off-shore outposts of the KMT regime increased the level of 
U.S. engagement in the Taiwan Strait. However, in their outcomes, they helped to 
stabilize the situation in East Asia, minimizing the risk of new escalations in the 
region. Washington and Beijing were able to manage their hostile relationship, 





Searching for New Ways 
In the early 1960s, Mao shifted his attention from economic planning to social and 
ideological considerations. The late 1950s had been very difficult for the PRC. The 
economic development went slower than expected, and the relationship with the 
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Soviet Union became more difficult. It was a time when Mao realized that the CCP 
had to fan the flame of class struggle anew in China. The result was the so called 
“Learn from Lei Feng” campaign of 1963, a program that should teach the Chinese 
society the basic values of socialism. Mao also criticized attempts of economic 
reformers like Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun as revisionist, and blamed CPSU First 
Secretary Khrushchev’s idea of a peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West 
from 1956 as responsible for the problems in China. According to Beijing, the So-
viet “revisionism” prevented the successful continuation of the international social-
ist revolution, which had repercussion for socialism in China.176 This criticism did 
not only serve as an explanation for the problems in the country but was also an 
attempt to question the leading role of the Soviet Union among socialist states. 
Sino-Soviet relations had been deteriorating since the late 1950s, and this 
process continued in the early 1960s. While the PRC claimed the Sino-Soviet alli-
ance to work well, numerous encounters about ideological and political questions 
between Chinese and Soviet officials at international conferences proved the grow-
ing rift between the two biggest socialist countries. The main battle ground for 
those arguments was the question of Albania’s striving for more independence 
from Soviet influence. Since Beijing wanted to outrival Moscow, the PRC decided 
in 1961 to support Albania with industrial equipment and generous financial aid 
although the situation of the Chinese economy remained difficult. An even more 
obvious sign for the Sino-Soviet dissent was that the Soviet Union withdrew all 
experts who worked in China as advisors in the fields of economics, engineering, 
and military.177 The relationship was seriously damaged, and Beijing had to be 
more careful in its foreign affairs if it wanted to avoid international isolation. 
The situation in the United States in the early 1960s was different and 
marked by political change. The main reason for this impression was the change in 
the White House from a Republican to a Democratic executive. In 1960, the Dem-
ocrat John F. Kennedy (JFK) had beaten the Republican hardliner Richard M. Nix-
on in the elections for the succession of Eisenhower. Many people believed the 
new administration was going to alter U.S. China policy as even the Taiwan-
friendly Congress realized that Washington’s approach to Beijing had to become 
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more flexible. However, neither Kennedy nor his successor Lyndon B. Johnson 
(LBJ) were strong enough to enforce concessions to a communist country against 
Congressional opposition. Furthermore, JFK remained skeptic about the PRC 
whose aggressive behavior and belligerent rhetoric alienated him. The Chinese 
success to develop its own nuclear capabilities did not help to lessen Kennedy’s 
concerns that China could threaten the balance of power in Asia.178 
Still, when Washington learned about the rift in the relationship between 
Beijing and Moscow, the White House considered its options how to realize better 
U.S.-China relations. It was clear that Congress would not accept all of them. Ac-
cess for the PRC to the UN for example was out of question. Due to domestic pres-
sure, the Kennedy administration pursued the same policy on this matter as the 
previous administrations. In a private letter, JFK promised to CKS the United 
States would do all it could to keep the Communists out.179 The easiest way to keep 
this promise was to treat China’s representation as an Important Question. That 
way, it would need a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (UNGA) to 
change the status-quo.180 Getting one-third of the member states to vote against the 
People’s Republic was easy to achieve for Washington. At this time, the United 
States could still expect to have enough allies in the UNGA for a vote in their fa-
vor. In the end, the PRC had to wait another decade until it could enter the United 
Nations. In the meantime, the White House had to look for other ways to improve 
its relationship with the Chinese communists. 
The Kennedy administration, and later the Johnson administration, focused 
their efforts now on the development of trade relations as well as the improvement 
of travelling authorization for U.S. citizens who wanted to go to China. The trade 
embargo against China had existed since the Korean War, and it was more restric-
tive than the one against the USSR or other Eastern European countries. However, 
the White House’s insistence that Beijing had to ask Washington for economic help 
postponed any improvements. It took until the late 1960s before the United States 
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sold the first food and medical supplies to China. It needed even several more 
years, before medical personnel and scientists were allowed to travel from the U.S. 
to China, and some additional time before the USA invited Chinese journalists to 
the United States.181 Even in these rather low profile matters, Washington was not 
able to develop a basis for trustworthy relations with the People’s Republic. The 
only real tangible concession from the Kennedy administration came on the matter 
of Taiwan. 
After two severe Cold War crises (Berlin 1961 and Cuba 1962) which had 
tested global stability to its limits, Kennedy wanted to make sure that it would not 
come to a third crisis of such extent . In his opinion, the Taiwan Issue represented a 
very volatile matter. An escalation of the situation in the Taiwan Strait seemed al-
ways possible. Moreover, the growing tension in Southeast Asia occupied the Unit-
ed States too much to “babysit” Chiang. JFK wanted stability in the Taiwan Strait. 
When Washington learned that the Nationalists prepared an attack on the mainland 
in an attempt to exploit the failure of the Great Leap Forward, it became necessary 
“to put the Nationalists on a leash”. During the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, the 
Kennedy administration even informed the PRC that the U.S. did not support a 
Nationalist attack against the mainland.182 It was not the first time that JFK took a 
stance against Taiwan. As U.S. Senator in Congress, Kennedy had voted against 
the Formosa Resolution, leaving CKS with the impression U.S.-ROC relations 
would deteriorate during Kennedy’s presidency. 
Despite Kennedy’s plans to visit Taiwan, the different interests of the U.S. 
and ROC governments led to an incremental erosion of their relationship. This de-
velopment continued after Johnson had replaced the assassinated JFK as president. 
From CKS’s point of view, the U.S. dismissal of his “recover-the-mainland cam-
paign” was responsible for France’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the 
PRC in 1964. The situation for Taiwan became even worse when the PRC detonat-
ed its first atomic bomb in the same year.183 Now, the KMT leader urged the U.S. 
leadership to destroy all nuclear facilities on the mainland, but LBJ rejected such 
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plans. As a final blow to U.S.-ROC relations, Washington entertained the idea of a 
Two-China-Policy, but Chiang was able to convince Washington to abandon this 
idea. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, at this point, relations between Washing-
ton and Taipei were in a dismal state.184 
Washington’s and Taipei’s interests differed vastly from each other, and 
were even contradicting at times. It was Taiwan’s dependency on American sup-
port that prevented the U.S.-ROC alliance from breaking apart. It also helped that, 
in 1966, the PRC started one of the most radical and self-destructive campaigns of 
all time: the Cultural Revolution. The radicalization of China and the deepening 
involvement of the United States in Vietnam helped Washington and Taipei to re-
new the common ground of their relationship as their interests became more con-
gruent again. Still, Washington’s occupation with other more pressing problems 
(Vietnam for example) made the containment of communist China a low priority. 
The CCP regime simply did not represent a direct threat to U.S. key interests at the 
time. This way, the Taiwan issue was reduced to a bilateral problem, diminishing 
Taiwan’s strategic value in the context of the Cold War. his development helped 
the process of normalization later.  
The search for new ways in U.S.-China relations proved difficult because 
the Kennedy and the Johnson administration were too weak to defy domestic oppo-
sition against concessions towards communist China. The War in Vietnam added to 
these problems. However, the level of conflict between the United States and the 
People’s Republic diminished significantly. Washington did not have to manage 
the hostility with China anymore, as the probability of an escalation between the 
two countries dwindled due to the restraint of Chiang and the de-facto ending of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance. Nonetheless, an improvement of Sino-American relations 
became impossible because of the Cultural Revolution and the self-chosen interna-
tional isolation of the PRC. 
 
                                                 






Since 1964, the situation for Beijing had improved. After the first successful nucle-
ar test in October of the same year, China’s status in the international system had 
advanced to the status of a nuclear power. This boosted the Chinese strategic posi-
tion overnight because it granted the country some level of nuclear deterrence, 
making China less susceptible for coercions from foreign powers, mainly the Sovi-
et Union.185 This success also underlined Beijing’s claim that the U.S. containment 
policy had failed. Communist China had been able to rise to major power status 
despite Washington’s attempts to bring the CCP’s regime down. After the disaster 
of the Great Leap Forward, Mao had been under pressure but now the Chinese 
leader’s political prestige was reinstalled. The nuclear program promoted the tech-
nological development in the country and helped the Chinese economy to recover, 
strengthening the legitimacy of the communist regime.186 It was a good situation to 
approach the United States in order to avoid international isolation, but Washington 
seemed occupied by other problems. 
The change in the White House from JFK to Lyndon B. Johnson after Ken-
nedy’s death had not led to a change in Washington’s China policy. The new U.S. 
president was too concerned to appear weak and did not risk concessions toward 
any communist regime. Therefore, he quickly abandoned the idea to initialize for-
eign minister level talks with the PRC because this would have provoked Congres-
sional critique. Another reason for the Johnson administration’s decision was that 
Beijing supported North Vietnam with military equipment. Washington had a 
genuine interest to prevent further friction in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere due 
to the intensifying conflict in Vietnam. LBJ, however, lacked the political courage 
to pursue an active improvement of Sino-American relations, which could increase 
the level of flexibility in U.S. Asia policy.187 When in 1966 the PRC leadership 
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initialized the Cultural Revolution, all chances for an improvement of U.S.-China 
relations disintegrated into thin air. 
In an attempt to intensify the class struggle within the Chinese society, Mao 
developed the idea of a Cultural Revolution whose ideological justification became 
known as the “May 16 Notification”. The true reason for Mao’s initiative was the 
attempt to assure his own political position, by weakening the party leadership.188 
Concerning the Chinese foreign policy, the Cultural Revolution meant a shift of the 
decision-making from the Politburo to the Cultural Revolution Group which con-
sisted exclusively of leftist supporters of Mao.189 This step did not only weaken the 
party leadership but also limited Zhou Enlai’s influence on foreign policy matters 
as he and foreign minister Chen Yi were publicly criticized on several occasions. 
Several other leaders of the foreign ministry were replaced by members of the Cul-
tural Revolution Group, without consulting Zhou or Mao. The consequence of 
Zhou’s and his aides diminishing influence was a radicalization of Chinese foreign 
policy with the questionable highlight of an attack on the office of the British char-
gé d’affaires on August 23, 1967 in Beijing. 
While this event prompted Mao and Zhou to push the influence of the radi-
cals back, the damage was already done. The PRC was internationally isolated as 
Zhou had to admit on March 15, 1968. Even worse, the PRC had helped this devel-
opment when the country had called back its ambassadors from all over the world. 
Only when the domestic problems caused by radical factions became too difficult 
to handle, Mao called for an end of the radicalization. Pulling back from his former 
radical views, he ordered the leftists to bring “the great disorder under heaven” 
under control.190 Still, it took until the 9th Party Congress in April 1969 before the 
reign of the Cultural Revolution Group came to an end. The election of a new Cen-
tral Committee and Politburo led to a new shift in the decision-making process.191 
The new situation lifted a great burden from Zhou and his aides though it did not 
solve all problems of the PRC’s foreign policy. 
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Even after the level of radicalization of the Cultural Revolution had dropped 
significantly, foreign policy making remained complex and difficult in the PRC. 
Too many agencies provided the Chinese leaders with information and analytical 
material, hampering the decision-making process considerably. All decisions were 
still discussed and ultimately made in the Politburo.192 At least, the PRC leadership 
made some changes. The foreign ministry became again responsible for diplomatic 
questions and all ambassadors were sent back to their posts. In addition, Zhou Enlai 
received more competences which reinstated national interests and not radical ide-
ology as the guiding basis for Beijing’s foreign policy.193 
The Cultural Revolution made an improvement of Sino-American relations 
impossible. The PRC’s belligerent rhetoric during these years and the threat to at-
tack Japan left the Johnson administration’s China experts irritated. The biggest 
problem, however, was that Beijing suspended the Warsaw talks.194 The Chinese 
decision took Washington not only by surprise but also limited the U.S. administra-
tion’s options in its China policy. 
In spite of the belligerent tones from Beijing which appeared rather ritually 
than threatening, Johnson saw the China threat diminishing. The war in Vietnam 
and the nuclear arms race were more important concerns for the U.S. As a conse-
quence, the White House developed three modest goals for its China policy. First, 
Washington wanted to stop the PRC’s support for the North Vietnamese and the 
Vietcong. Second, the Johnson administration tried to improve the U.S. image in 
China. Third, the administration strove to lay down the basis for better Sino-
American relations after the Cultural Revolution.195 
Washington was mainly interested to prevent the PRC from a direct inter-
vention in Vietnam. As long as U.S. ground forces did not invade North Vietnam, 
Beijing would not feel threatened. The White House was willing to overlook Chi-
na’s, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), purely defensive support 
for Vietnam.196 Although LBJ wanted to avoid any friction with the PRC, the Chi-
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nese overall restraint allowed him to order the extension of airstrikes against North 
Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder).197 Beijing’s calmness about Vietnam sug-
gests that the PRC wanted to prevent an escalation of the situation as much as 
Washington. 
China had a strong interest in a quick end of the Vietnam War. Beijing 
feared that U.S. troops could invade North Vietnam, representing a direct threat to 
Chinese territory. This could lead to a similar situation as during the Korean War 
when U.S. led troops crossed the 38th parallel. Moreover, the CCP’s regime was 
afraid that Moscow’s influence in Southeast Asia could increase if North Vietnam 
won the war. Hence, the PRC was genuinely interested to contain the conflict, 
without direct involvement. In this situation, Beijing used a double-edged strategy. 
On the one hand, the Chinese regime made unequivocally clear to Washington un-
der which conditions China would have no other choice than to militarily intervene. 
On the other hand, when Moscow suggested that the PRC should increase its sup-
port for Hanoi, this appeal was denied, demonstrating how deep the rift between 
the former allies had become. 
The mid-1960s had left Washington and Beijing with a chance to improve 
their bilateral relations. The degree of hostility had significantly decreased, and 
both countries shared a desire to avoid any escalating conflict between them be-
cause both sides were occupied with other issues that bound valuable resources. 
Unfortunately, these same issues prevented Beijing and Washington from concrete 
measures to improve their relationship. Instead, they again managed their mutual 
aversion. While the United States was deeply entrenched in the war in Vietnam, the 
PRC was caught in self-inflicted international isolation due to the Cultural Revolu-
tion and the quickly declining relationship with the USSR. Especially the latter, 
however, should open a chance for the improvement of Sino-American relations, a 
chance which LBJ’s successor Richard M. Nixon was going to grasp. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
The political struggles between Americans and the Chinese began for two reasons. 
The first reason was the aforementioned Taiwan issue that one can trace back to the 
fight between the nationalist KMT under Chiang Kai-shek and the CCP under Mao 
Zedong. As soon as the Chinese Civil War broke out shortly after the surrender of 
the Imperial Japanese Army, Washington decided to support the KMT’s regime, 
which was the official government of China at this time. However, when the civil 
war ended with the victory of the Communists in 1949, the United States did not 
accept this outcome. Washington declined to recognize the new communist gov-
ernment in Beijing, and continued instead to have official diplomatic relations with 
the Nationalists who had fled to Taiwan. 
 In this context, we have to ask if the Truman administration could not have 
done more, either to save the nationalist regime, or prevent the alienation from the 
Chinese communists. At times, Truman and his aides appeared too hesitant out of 
fear to provoke the Soviet Union. Washington should have either provided the Na-
tionalists with the aid needed, or accommodated the Communists after their victo-
ry. Thomas J. Christensen correctly argues that although there was no chance for 
friendship between Washington and Beijing, an opportunity for a working relation-
ship existed. All it needed was the official recognition of the PRC regime.198 In-
stead, the Truman administration appeared indecisive and confused in its China 
policy. In addition, anti-communist sentiments in the U.S. were too strong. In the 
end, any chance for U.S.-PRC cooperation completely disintegrated after Mao’s 
decision to have an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
 The emergence of the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, hence, represents the second reason for the problems between the People’s 
Republic and the United States. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry eventually led to a bipolar 
system in the world with a liberal-capitalistic bloc led by the United States on the 
one side, and the totalitarian-communist bloc led by the Soviet Union on the other. 
This constellation forced most nations on the globe to choose their side in the con-
flict. The young PRC regime was no exception and finally opted to “lean to one 
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side”, allying itself with the Soviet Union.199  
 In this situation, the Chinese Nationalists became an attractive ally for the 
United States, an assessment that was confirmed when the PRC entered the Korean 
War in late 1950. Taiwan helped to contain communism in East Asia, and kept the 
PRC in check. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker puts it, while the Taiwan issue was the 
result of the unsettled Chinese Civil War, the American involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait based mainly upon the anti-communist ethos of the Nationalists and the 
American search for allies in the global conflict with Moscow.200 Thus, from a U.S. 
point of view, the regime in Taiwan represented all of China. Certainly, this did not 
reflect political realities, but ideology and power politics entrenched the Taiwan 
issue now into the Cold War, leaving Chinese and Americans stuck in a conflict for 
decades to come.  
 While Sino-American relations between 1945 and 1968 were mostly de-
fined by conflict, Washington and Beijing still endeavored to keep the level of es-
calation as low as possible. Thus, the degree of animosity varied but led never to 
the ultima ratio. Both sides were afraid that a full scale war would cost too much. 
Beijing was afraid, the PRC regime could lose control over China, and the United 
States wanted to prevent an intervention by the Soviet Union which could easily 
escalate to a Third World War. This was too dangerous due to the huge nuclear 
arsenals, Americans and Russians had at their disposal. 
 The Taiwan issue stood in the center of dissent between the U.S. and the 
PRC leadership. Although the island had proven its strategic usefulness as a bastion 
against the spread of communism in the region, different U.S. administrations had 
made clear the limits of America’s willingness to support Chiang. This did not 
mean that the United States seriously considered giving up Taiwan as the political 
costs at home and within the western alliance would have been too great. But both 
crises in the Taiwan Strait demonstrated how fragile the situation there was. There-
fore, if the White House wanted to preserve stability in Asia-Pacific, it was impera-
tive to avoid any escalation in the Taiwan Strait. Washington could not allow the 
regime in Taipei to provoke the mainland.  
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 In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration made it known to the PRC 
that it would not support any attempts by the Nationalists to re-conquer the main-
land. The “leashing” of CKS, however, was not an overture for rapprochement 
plans, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, but had rather the character of a pragmat-
ic Cold War decision.201 JFK wanted to signal America’s good will to Beijing in an 
attempt to lower tensions with China, making use of the developing frictions be-
tween the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic.  
 Different developments during this period, however, prevented Washington 
from exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift. The Vietnam War and later the Cultural Revo-
lution ruined any hopes for the establishment of a Sino-American working relation-
ship, which could lead to long-term stability. The conflict in Vietnam and the nega-
tive image of communist China in the U.S. left no leeway for rapprochement. The 
start of the Cultural Revolution in China and constant threats to intervene in South-
east Asia made such a development impossible. In the meantime, China’s conflict 
with the Soviet Union deepened, and the country launched itself into self-inflicted 
international isolation. 
 Considering the course of Sino-American relations after World War II and 
the reasons for its conflictual character, it seems obvious that the only chance for 
real reconciliation between the United States and the People’s Republic lay in a 
compromise about Taiwan. However, due to political constraints at home and 
abroad, the Chinese and Americans were not able to find one. This problem did not 
vanish during the years of rapprochement and normalization, when strategic con-
siderations forced both countries to weigh the benefits of a partnership. Their dif-
ferent views about Taiwan allowed Chinese and Americans, even in times of a de-
facto alliance, to become only lukewarm with each other, adding to the difficulties 
both sides faced when they negotiated about normalization. 
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Chapter II: Breaking New Grounds, 1969–1976 
 
Sometimes history seems to have its own sense of irony. After World War II the 
relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic was defined by 
mistrust, hostility, and conflict. The different social orders in each country prevent-
ed their political leaders to search for ways of reconciliation. Out of fear of escala-
tion, Washington and Beijing endeavored to keep the level of conflict manageable, 
avoiding full scale war with each other. However, ideological and cultural differ-
ences affected both sides’ mutual perception; therefore it is not surprising that only 
simultaneous strategic re-evaluations on both sides enabled positive change. The 
Cold War influenced most strategic consideration in Washington and Beijing. The 
aforementioned irony lies in the question of who conducted this change in Sino-
American relations. 
 The Republican President Richard M. Nixon had always been one of the 
most fervent advocates of an uncompromising attitude towards “Red China”. For 
many people in Washington, he was the epitome of American anti-communism.202 
However, he should be the president who altered U.S. relations with the PRC. This 
superficial contradiction is explained by the fact that Nixon also was a realpolitiker 
who had understood that China could play a more useful role in America’s Cold 
War struggle. This insight led him to develop, together with Henry Kissinger, the 
policy of rapprochement. In the end, Nixon did not only change the U.S. attitude 
toward the PRC but was also the first American president to make a state visit to 
China. Nevertheless, interferences of domestic politics in China and the United 
States as well as the ongoing differences about Taiwan prevented Nixon and his 
successor Gerald R. Ford from achieving their China policy’s ultimate goal: the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
 This chapter serves to explain the rapprochement process, the Nixon admin-
istration started in 1969. This process which lasted until 1976 was the precursor to 
the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979. While the Carter administra-
tion suffered heavily under the promises made by Nixon and Ford which limited 
Carter’s leeway in his administration’s negotiations with Beijing, it needed a cata-
lyst to enable the Chinese and Americans to bring their relationship to a new level, 
especially if they wanted to use their new relationship to put pressure on the Soviet 
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Union. Nixon’s approach was the result of changes in the strategic environment of 
the United States, and the PRC shared this perception. The Soviet Union had closed 
the power gap to the United States and represented the biggest threat the security of 
America and China. Sino-American cooperation therefore made strategic sense. 
 Rapprochement ended the virtual standstill in U.S.-China relations which 
had occurred since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, helping to lower the 
tensions between Chinese and Americans beyond anything both sides had experi-
enced since the end of World War II. However, the success of rapprochement was 
never a sure thing because political differences between Washington and Beijing 
still existed. This time, not only the Taiwan issue represented a problem but also 
the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The Nixon administration wanted to end this war, 
and thought the regime in Beijing could assist in the solution of the conflict. 
 The biggest problem for the White House was to communicate with the 
PRC. After a somewhat adventurous exchange of indirect signals with the Chinese, 
the U.S. president sent his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing in 
order to explain his intention of forging better ties with China. The Chinese wel-
comed Kissinger with open arms and were willing to cooperate with the United 
States. The ultimate success of Kissinger’s mission was that the PRC leadership 
around Mao and Zhou invited the president to visit China in 1972. This success 
was enabled because both sides left the Taiwan issue mostly out of their talks, fo-
cusing on their common interests, and agreeing to disagree on the matter. This ena-
bled the so called Shanghai Communiqué which should present the legal basis of 
Sino-American relations until the accomplishment of normalization in 1979. 
 Nixon’s visit and the communiqué constituted the peak of the rapproche-
ment process as the relationship between Washington and Beijing started to stall, 
after the establishment of liaison offices in 1973. From then on, both sides found it 
harder to ignore the profound differences between them. The Chinese insistence 
that the Americans had to give up its security relationship with Taiwan was unac-
ceptable for the Nixon and the Ford administration. Congressional and public sup-
port for Taiwan was still too strong, the political risk too unpredictable. 
 After the Watergate scandal reached the White House and forced Nixon to 
resign, his successor Gerald R. Ford lacked the political strength to make any un-
popular decisions concerning Taiwan. Political turmoil in China after the death of 
Mao Zedong added to the problematic situation. The new PRC leaders were neither 
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willing nor able to make any concessions to the Americans, which could help them 
to cope with the opposition in Washington. When the power struggle in Beijing 
ended in late 1976, the political landscape in the United States had also changed. 
Now, the Democrat Jimmy Carter sat in the Oval Office, and while he also strove 
for normalization with China, he had a more precise notion of what he was willing 
to concede to the Chinese concerning Taiwan than his predecessor Ford. As the 
main part of this book will show, Carter’s only problem was that the Chinese ex-




The Idea of Rapprochement 
The 1960s were turbulent years for China and the United States as both nations 
battled problems at home and abroad. In the People’s Republic’s case it was the 
Cultural Revolution and the conflict with the Soviet Union.203 At the same time, the 
United States was losing an unpopular war in Vietnam that transformed the Ameri-
can culture and society by questioning America’s social order.204 Both countries’ 
experience of inner and external crises which was unprecedented in their respective 
history led both political leaderships to search for new ways to strengthen their 
respective strategic situation. This discretion forced them to question the current 
state of U.S.-Chinese relations, opening the path to rapprochement. 
 As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, the American rapprochement policy 
was neither a coincidence nor a sudden idea that came out of nowhere. Structures 
which could help the process already existed. Polls of the 1960s suggested that the 
U.S. public favored the development of a two-China policy that could also offer a 
chance for better relations with the PRC. In this context, though suspended, the 
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw could provide a basis for direct communication. 
Furthermore, since the PRC had not collapsed, politicians in Washington became 
aware of China’s possible strategic meaning in America’s struggle with the Soviet 
Union. Especially the Sino-Soviet split gave the United States hope that approach-
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ing the Chinese could help the American overall position in the realm of the Cold 
War.205 Michael Schaller adds to this last argument that the end of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance led Washington to doubt the image of the “monolithic communist bloc” 
without a conflict among its cornerstones.206 All these arguments led U.S. leaders 
to think about new strategies in U.S. China policy. 
 Surprisingly, it was the Republican and well known anti-communist Rich-
ard M. Nixon who finally altered the U.S. attitude towards China when he became 
president in 1969. In the wake of détente, he initiated, assisted by his National Se-
curity Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, a rapprochement policy toward Beijing to gain 
advantages over the Soviets.207 In fact, Nixon mentioned his new found perspective 
on China in an article he had written for Foreign Affairs in 1967: “Taking the long 
view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of na-
tions...”208 Nixon argued that communist China still represented a threat to all non-
communist nations in Asia. However, he did not think that isolating the most popu-
lous country in the world would help to restrain Beijing’s aggressive behavior. In-
stead he suggested “pulling China back into the world community -but as a great 
and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”209 The article did 
not completely abandon anti-communist rhetoric, but it was a first hint that the 
American attitude towards “Red China” could change. 
 This was also indicated by the so called Nixon doctrine (also known as 
Guam doctrine) from July 1969.210 The new doctrine stated that while the United 
States would contain Soviet power on a global scale, regional powers had to man-
age their security by themselves. U.S. troops should not fight again for the preser-
vation of a foreign regime like they did in Vietnam. It was the beginning of the 
reduction of U.S. engagement in Asia. This approach should also reduce the costs 
of the United States’ struggle against the Soviet Union after the White House had 
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realized that it had lost relative power compared to its rival.211 In order to incorpo-
rate the PRC into this new approach, the president ordered the preparation of a 
study about U.S. China policy which should also include “[a]lternative U.S. ap-
proaches on China and their costs and risks.”212 It was another indication that the 
United States was exploring new ways to change its China policy. 
The Chinese interest in better relations with the United States resulted from 
the international isolation the country had been facing since the split with the Sovi-
et Union and the initialization of the Cultural Revolution. After a short border con-
flict in 1969 that included skirmishes at the river Amur, Beijing was very con-
cerned about the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities.213 A report by four high rank-
ing officers of the PLA from September 17, 1969 stated that the Soviet Union and 
not the United States imposed the biggest threat to China’s security. The Soviet 
Union was seen as a “socialist imperialist” country. It was the first time that an 
official document acknowledged something like this. This conclusion meant the de-
facto end of the Sino-Soviet alliance although the bilateral friendship treaty expired 
later in 1979.214 
In this situation, Mao had to face an inconvenient truth. If the People’s Re-
public was not able to improve its relations with at least one superpower, China 
was threatened by a two-front war. The PRC leadership eventually opted for better 
relations with the United States in order to deter the Soviets from any potential at-
tack against China. Thus, Beijing sent signals to Washington, indicating that they 
were ready to talk.215 This decision marked the end of the People’s Republic’s 
strive for the victory of world socialism. Now, the regime looked for its own sur-
vival and pursued realpolitik, relegating ideological considerations to the back-
ground. 
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In this early period of rapprochement, the Nixon administration decided not 
to leave the Taiwanese completely in the dark about its plans. When the new U.S. 
ambassador to Taiwan, Walter P. McConaughy, met Chiang Kai-shek for the first 
time on December 17, 1969, he indicated that the United States was searching for 
new ways to deal with mainland China. Yet, McConaughy added the United States 
would still ensure Taiwan’s security. Surprisingly, Chiang reacted cautiously, ad-
mitting that the global system was changing. The Generalissimo was aware that 
objecting to U.S. plans would only lead to problems between Taipei and Washing-
ton.216 Thus, he opted for restraint. 
 The image of the regime in Taiwan was not very positive in the United 
States. In spite of the impressive economic development of the Taiwan which was 
sponsored by U.S. aid of 100 million U.S. dollars between 1950 and 1965, the 
KMT failed to take steps to democratize the political and social system on the is-
land. According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, the KMT regime was certain that 
Washington still saw Taiwan as a bastion against the Soviet Union and com-
munism in East Asia. Similar to U.S. allies in Latin America, the relationship be-
tween the United States and the Republic of China had its foundation in a common 
anti-communist sentiment and strategic considerations, not in a shared social and 
cultural vision.217 Thus, Taipei thought political changes were not necessary to con-
tinue the security relationship with the United States. 
In late 1969 and early 1970, however, U.S.-ROC relations were unproblem-
atic. The United States had no intention to let the relationship deteriorate. For ex-
ample, a memorandum for Vice President Spiro T. Agnew contained a report 
which stated that the United States still valued its security relationship with Tai-
wan.218 A message from December 1969 conveyed by U.S. Ambassador McCo-
naughy to the ROC leadership echoed this sentiment. While the U.S. administration 
“believed that it had an obligation to take every practicable and prudent step to 
lower tensions in the area [East Asia]”, the United States did not plan to reduce its 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region: “The U.S. was not changing its attitude of 
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vigilance or its posture of readiness to carry out its commitments in the area.”219  
Nixon himself also tried to calm down Taipei’s anxieties. In spring 1970, 
ROC Vice Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) went to the United States for a 
ten day state visit, discussing Taiwan’s security with U.S. officials. In a meeting 
with Nixon, CCK warned that the Chinese communists would use force against 
Taiwan, planning a surprise attack on the island. Nixon did not take this threat seri-
ously but assured the Taiwanese that the United States still stood by its treaty 
commitments.220 According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Chiang was not convinced 
of the Nixon administration’s loyalty but believed the USA would continue to de-
fend Taiwan.221 Considering, Nixon’s plans for a new China policy, this was all the 
ROC regime could ask for. 
Chiang’s assessment that the United States would stand to its commitment 
concerning Taiwan’s security was shared by PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. In 
his opinion, the United States was not to abandon Taiwan any time soon. Thus, he 
preached to communist cadre patience on the matter, arguing national principles 
like the Taiwan issue did not prevent the PRC from progressing. This kind of re-
straint should also help the Nixon administration to keep the public pressure in the 
United States low. This was important because domestic opponents could still pre-
vent the U.S. president from pursuing a conciliatory course of action towards the 
PRC.222 
Zhou’s calculations seemed to work. Washington reacted positively to Chi-
nese restraint, reducing the number of destroyer patrols in the Taiwan Strait. In an 
attempt to calm down any protests from Taipei, the White House claimed this 
move to be a consequence of budgetary constraints. Simultaneously, however, Kis-
singer asked the Pakistanis to inform the Chinese about this step.223 The Nixon 
administration wanted to make use of everything that helped to convince the PRC 
of Washington’s honest interest to improve Sino-American relations. More such 
steps followed, as Nixon’s new China policy took shape. 
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The Uncertainties of Indirect Communication 
At first, the White House used indirect channels to signal their readiness for talks to 
the Chinese. These channels went through Romania and Pakistan.224 The first at-
tempt of the Nixon administration to send a direct signal occurred at a reception in 
the Yugoslavian embassy in Warsaw in late 1969. At the end of the event, U.S. 
Ambassador Walter Stoessel followed the Chinese delegation to convey the mes-
sage that the United States was willing to talk. Zhou Enlai decided to accept this 
offer, and both sides agreed to re-start the Warsaw talks.225 
 The Chinese Political scientist Gong Li and the U.S. historian Chris Tudda 
agree that the Chinese leadership saw the talks as a chance to improve the PRC’s 
relations with the United States. Such a step could help to counter the Soviet threat, 
to make progress on the issues of Taiwan and Vietnam, and to lessen China’s inter-
national isolation. The situation became even more promising after Nixon had con-
ceded that his administration would not oppose any settlement between the main-
land and Taiwan as long as this would be accomplished by peaceful means.226 
Former ROC ambassador in Washington D.C. James Shen states in his memoirs 
that the KMT regime was concerned about the re-start of the Warsaw talks.227 
 Nixon and Kissinger, however, did not believe these talks to have real sub-
stance.228 The president did not want to use the Warsaw channel anymore. Instead, 
he wanted to develop a direct communication line between himself and the Chinese 
that would not involve people outside the president‘s inner circle. Therefore, Am-
bassador Stoessel told the Chinese on January 20 –only a few weeks after the re-
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start of the talks- that Nixon wanted to send an U.S. emissary to China for confi-
dential high level talks.229 As the Chinese authors Jia Qingguo and Zhang Baijia 
claim, this development was accelerated when the PRC postponed any new meet-
ings in Warsaw after U.S. troops had started operations in Cambodia.230 
The importance of the Warsaw talks decreased. They were substituted for 
talks in Paris. Here, Nixon’s personal confidant, the Military Attaché of the U.S. 
embassy General Vernon Walters, met several times with the Chinese. Simultane-
ously, Nixon and Kissinger extended the use of the Pakistani channel. Over the 
course of 1970, the Nixon administration conveyed different messages to the PRC 
this way. According to Chris Tudda, at the same time, the White House missed the 
significance of the American journalist Edgar Snow’s visit of China’s National Day 
celebration in August 1970. Snow talked to Zhou and Mao there, and the Chinese 
leaders wanted to signal subtly their interest in improved Sino-American rela-
tions.231 In November, the Pakistani President Yahya Khan told the PRC leaders on 
behalf of Nixon that the U.S. president was looking to improve relations with Chi-
na. It took some time before Khan conveyed the Chinese reaction to the White 
House, but they responded positively. Beijing’s only condition for further talks was 
that the United States would withdraw its troops from Taiwan. Although the Amer-
icans signaled readiness for reconciliation about the Taiwan issue, a withdrawal 
was too much to agree with. Thus, it needed some more time before direct talks 
could start.232 
Instead of furthering direct communication, Chinese and Americans went 
back to the approach of indirect signals to demonstrate their willingness for better 
relations. First, in March 1971, the USA lifted all restrictions for Americans who 
wanted to travel to China.233 A month later, the PRC regime invited the American 
ping-pong team who was playing in Japan at this time to an exhibition game in 
China -the beginning of the so called “ping-pong diplomacy”.234 Although the his-
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torian Wang Guanhua argues the PRC made extensive use of the “ping-pong di-
plomacy” during the period of the Cultural Revolution, it was the way Beijing used 
this instrument to approach the United States, which made it famous.235 
The invitation to the American team became a huge public relations suc-
cess, and both sides saw a chance to initiate political talks. Shortly thereafter, at the 
end of April, the Chinese repeated their invitation for a “special envoy” of Presi-
dent Nixon who could discuss the Taiwan issue. According to Henry Kissinger, the 
Chinese leaders asked for Secretary of State William P. Rodgers, President Nixon, 
or Kissinger himself. For the sake of secrecy, Nixon decided to send his APNSA. 
According to Chris Tudda, this preference was the result of Nixon’s consideration 
that it was easier to control Kissinger than Rodgers, because Kissinger had a lower 
political profile than the Secretary of State. On May 10, the White House replied to 
the Chinese, emphasizing the secret talks should contain more than only the Tai-
wan issue.236 It was the chance, Kissinger had been waiting for. 
In the meantime, the CCP’s leadership discussed its next steps concerning 
the developments in Sino-American relations. A Politburo report from May 25, 
1971 revised by Zhou contained eight points that constituted the Chinese position 
toward rapprochement with the United States. The Americans had to withdraw 
their troops from Taiwan, and had to recognize that the island was part of China 
and the settlement of the Taiwan issue an internal affair. The PRC would try to 
liberate Taiwan by peaceful means, but would also oppose any kind of Two-China-
policy. These were the basic conditions for the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions. As long as the United States would not pursue a Two-China-policy, Beijing 
was willing not to raise the UN-representation issue. Sino-American trade relations 
could be resumed, if the United States would withdraw its troops from Taiwan. 
Finally, the report stated that Washington needed to remove its troops from Vi-
etnam, Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia. The document also contradicted concerns 
that rapprochement would harm China’s interests or lessen its people’s will to op-
pose capitalist imperialism, by arguing this diplomatic course would strengthen 
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China. The next step was to invite a member of the Nixon administration to Chi-
na.237 
Although the U.S. had not accepted the PRC’s precondition about Taiwan 
yet, Zhou Enlai welcomed the idea of a visit by a U.S. official in public. He be-
lieved Washington would adopt a new position on the Taiwan issue, making rap-
prochement possible.238 In Zhou’s opinion, the whole process was about leaving 
issues like Taiwan aside, and emphasizing common interests instead.239 Zhou’s 
conclusion echoed the thinking of the aforementioned report by the four PLA of-
ficers who had argued that forgoing an agreement with Washington concerning the 
Taiwan issue was the “prerequisite” for improved Sino-American ties.240 
As Gong Li claims, Mao and Zhou disagreed about this aspect. Due to sever 
pressure from the leftists within the Chinese leadership around Mao’s wife Jiang 
Qing, the chairman thought Zhou to be too accommodating concerning Taiwan. At 
this time, leftists like the Gang of Four or the Lin Biao Clique dominated the ideo-
logical debate in China. The Gang of Four consisted of Jiang Qing, the political 
theorist Zhang Chunqiao, the Politburo members Yao Wenyuan, and Wang 
Hongwen. They were allied with Lin Biao who was vice premier of the PRC and 
the most likely candidate for Mao’s succession, before he fell in disgrace in 1971. 
Both groups needed domestic disorder as well as tense relations to both superpow-
ers in order to maintain their influence, while simultaneously limiting Zhou’s. 
However, while Qing and her ally Lin Biao opposed rapprochement with the Unit-
ed States, they also realized that they could not stop this development since Mao 
wanted better relations with Washington.241 High level talks with the United States 
would happen, and Henry Kissinger visited China from July 9-11, 1971. 
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Kissinger’s trip which was named Operation Polo should remain secret. Again, the 
Americans used their Pakistani allies to make the necessary arrangement. During a 
visit to Pakistan, Kissinger faked illness and remained in seclusion so he could se-
cretly board a plane to China. When he and his aides touched Chinese soil in July 
1971, they faced self-assured Chinese officials who did not show any signs of ten-
sion. In his book about China, Kissinger describes the whole setting as part of the 
traditional Chinese diplomacy which uses hospitality, ceremony and personal rela-
tions as diplomatic instruments.242  
 Personal relations are, according to Richard H. Solomon who was a member 
of the NSC at this time, the most important aspect of Chinese negotiation behav-
ior.243 The idea is to charm the most important person of a foreign delegation into 
sympathy for Chinese culture and China’s national interests. For that purpose, Chi-
nese diplomats pick out one guest who has significant influence on the decision-
making process of their interlocutors. This person shall not only feel comfortable 
but also appraised. The last step of this approach is to add a personal note to the 
relationship, strengthening the bond between one or more Chinese officials and the 
target person. In the case of rapprochement, the person picked by the Chinese was 
Kissinger. As we will see, during the process of normalization, PRC officials chose 
President Carter’s APNSA Zbigniew Brzezinski for the same reasons, Zhou chose 
Kissinger. 
 The archival record suggests that Zhou did not lose time to befriend Kissin-
ger, attempting to build a personal relationship as quickly as possible. Early on, 
during his first meeting with the APNSA, Zhou tried to charm his counterpart by 
demonstrating his sharp intellect and ironic humor.244 Zhou’s attitude appealed to 
Kissinger, mirroring much of his self-image as an intellectual strategist with a fine 
sense of irony. In his report to Nixon, Kissinger called Zhou even a “heroic stat-
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ure.245 Comparing Zhou and Mao, he writes that “Mao dominated every meeting. 
Zhou filled it with light.”246 Leaving all political tactics aside, Zhou’s and Kissin-
ger’s sympathy for each other meant a good beginning for the talks. 
 Nixon wanted Kissinger to demonstrate restraint on the matter of Taiwan 
avoiding any far reaching debate about this issue. Still, the Chinese side was eager 
to discuss this matter, blaming the U.S. side for its involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. Zhou made clear that, if normal relations between Washington and Beijing 
should become reality, the United States “must recognize the PRC as the sole legit-
imate government of China and not make any exceptions.” The Chinese Prime 
Minister also reiterated the PRC’s demand that all U.S. troops had to withdraw 
from Taiwan.247 He repeatedly emphasized that Taiwan was the most important 
issue between the United States and the PRC, stating that “by the time we have 
established diplomatic relations the treaty between the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek 
[the MDT] should not have any effect.”248 
 With these blunt words, Zhou had taken the initiative and forced Kissin-
ger’s hand. The APNSA was very accommodating towards the Chinese, admitting 
that without the Korean War “Taiwan would probably be today a part of the PRC.” 
He also assured Zhou that the Nixon administration would not pursue a Two-
China-policy, and was willing to reduce U.S. troops on Taiwan. Subsequently, 
however, Kissinger made clear that “[t]here’s no possibility in the next one and a 
half years for us to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China in a formal 
way.”249 The China lobby in Washington would oppose any concessions to Beijing 
at the cost of Taiwan. As the APNSA explained, the concessions already promised 
by Kissinger were only possible because Nixon had a broad power base in the right 
wing of the Republican Party.250 Yet, to “sweeten” the prospects for the Chinese, 
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Kissinger indicated that full normal relations could be established after Nixon’s 
reelection.251 
Both sides also discussed a state visit to China by the U.S. president. The 
American side was afraid the Chinese could make such a visit dependent on pro-
gress on the Taiwan issue. Fortunately, the PRC government did not set any pre-
conditions about Taiwan for Nixon’s visit but Zhou believed “that there must be a 
certain direction of efforts as a result of the visit, because we [the PRC] have al-
ways viewed the question of Taiwan as our internal affair which we must solve 
ourselves.” This was encouraging to Kissinger who also emphasized that the idea 
for Nixon’s visit resulted from a Chinese initiative which the U.S. administration 
was “happy to accept.”252 President Nixon was going to visit China in February 
1972. Kissinger himself would go to China in October 1971.253 Finally, both sides 
agreed that future communication would run over the respective embassies in Paris 
because U.S. military attaché Walters was, according to Kissinger, “[…] complete-
ly our [Nixon’s] man.”254 Kissinger left China in a good mood, writing later that 
his talks with Zhou had “laid the groundwork for you [Nixon] and Mao to turn a 
page in history.”255 
 The Chinese side also had to be satisfied with the result of Kissinger’s visit. 
According to Yongshin Kim, they were very reluctant to mention the Soviet threat 
because Beijing did not want to limit its bargaining position on matters such as 
Taiwan and Vietnam. Since Kissinger brought up the issue, they were still able to 
discuss ways how the United States and the PRC could help each other to put pres-
sure on the Soviets.256 On the matter of Taiwan, Kissinger made more concessions 
than Beijing had expected. Jia Qingguo and Zhang Baijia argue Beijing was willing 
to accept a partial solution of the Taiwan issue due to its hope for Sino-American 
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rapprochement. The PRC regime believed that better relations between China and 
the U.S. would improve the chances of reunification with Taiwan. Close U.S.-PRC 
relations would leave the KMT regime isolated, or at least, due to its dependency 
on the United States, in a weaker position than before. This would be advantageous 




The United Nations Debacle 
From the White House’s perspective, the concessions to the PRC were necessary 
although the USA did not plan to abandon Taiwan. Therefore, when Kissinger’s 
trip became public, Nixon decided on advice of Secretary of State William Rodgers 
to explain Washington’s plans to the ROC’s new ambassador in the United States, 
James Shen.258 The president sent Kissinger to speak with the KMT official. The 
APNSA expressed regret about the secrecy concerning his trip to China calling it 
“painful” not to inform the Taiwanese who “were our [America’s] loyal friends.” 
He continued his ingratiation by naming the regime in Beijing “fanatical maniacs” 
who were not better than the Soviets. Several times, Kissinger made clear that the 
Nixon administration’s plans to accommodate China had nothing to do with Tai-
wan but would only be born out of strategic necessity. In order to further assure the 
ROC regime of the White House’s good intentions, Kissinger promised to keep 
Taipei informed about the progress of U.S.-PRC talks as long as access to such 
information was limited to Ambassador Shen, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-
kuo.259 
 While Kissinger enveloped himself in a cloak of dramatics and ingratiation, 
he bluntly lied to Shen, claiming the Taiwan issue did not play a major role in the 
context of the Nixon administration’s new China policy and the talks with the Chi-
nese. The APNSA must have held the Taiwanese either naïve or did not trust them 
to keep calm, so that he did not mention Washington’s willingness for concessions 
to the PRC regime concerning America’s military presence on Taiwan. Moreover, 
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Kissinger claimed the United States had not indicated a readiness to accommodate 
the communists on the matter of UN-representation.260 In truth, the APNSA had 
conveyed the Nixon administration’s willingness to grant the PRC access to the 
United Nations. 
Kissinger’s attempts to calm Taipei’s concerns made sense from the Nixon 
administration’s point of view. Taiwan had many friends in the United States, who 
could potentially stir up some trouble for Nixon. Thus, the White House endeav-
ored to appease the Taiwan Lobby and conservatives in Washington.261 In August 
1971, still 56% of Americans saw the PRC as the most dangerous nation in the 
world.262 This made it necessary to sell cooperation with communist China in small 
and digestible portions to the U.S. public. It was imperative to avoid the impression 
that rapprochement with China would happen at Taiwan’s expense, and the UN 
question was one issue where the administration had to act in this spirit. 
Chris Tudda summarizes the problem by arguing that the UN-representation 
issue was a two-edged sword for the Nixon administration. On the one hand, Wash-
ington could not leave the PRC out, if they wanted to pursue rapprochement seri-
ously. On the other hand, voting against Taiwan’s interests would alienate a loyal 
ally, and raise the China lobby’s anger at home. However, Nixon, Kissinger, and 
even Rogers did not see any alternative to voting in Beijing’s favor in the event of 
a vote about the China representation. Later, they would have to vote against the 
expulsion of the ROC in order to save America’s face.263 This dilemma made the 
upcoming decision in the UN even more difficult. 
Since the end of 1970 increasing diplomatic pressure from allies of the 
United States had influenced Washington’s considerations to accept the PRC in the 
UN, as long as Taiwan could remain in the UN, too.264 The concept that both Chi-
nese governments would have a seat in the UNGA was called dual representation. 
Since Nixon deemed better U.S. relations with China vital for the strategic position 
of the United States at this time, he opted to pursue this approach.265 Although 
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Nixon’s plans could alienate the PRC, according to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, he 
“wanted to maintain geopolitical leverage against Beijing […] by keeping Taipei in 
the General Assembly.”266 Washington’s dual representation approach presented a 
dilemma for the KMT regime’s claim to represent all of China. Nevertheless, Tai-
pei was willing to agree as long as it would keep the seat in the Security Council 
(UNSC).267 Taipei hoped that the Important Question procedure, which led to the 
requirement of a two-third majority in favor of the PRC’s entrance, would save the 
ROC’s claim for sole representation of China in the UN. 
The State Department left no stone unturned to convince other countries to 
keep Taiwan in the United Nations, eventually convincing Japan to co-sponsor the 
American resolution concerning the Important Question and dual representation.268 
Still, the DOS also warned that due to the “PRC’s continuing skillful application of 
pressures and of intense Chirep [Chinese representation] activity in New York…” 
success for the U.S. resolution was not guaranteed.269 The skeptical mood did not 
change over the course of the following weeks as a memorandum by Rodgers indi-
cates.270 
In the end, nothing could help Taiwan’s cause. As U.S. diplomats had ex-
pected, the vote about the U.S government’s resolutions was lost on October 25. 
While cautious assessments had suggested that the U.S. could win the Important 
Question vote, some last minute shifts in the Arab bloc led to a defeat by four 
votes.271 Later that day, the Albanian resolution which sought to expel Taiwan and 
grant the PRC access to the UN was adopted by a large majority of votes. Before-
hand, the ROC government made things worse when Foreign Minister Zhou 
Shukai stated in front of the UNGA that “[i]n view of frenzy and irrational behav-
ior in this hall, [the] del[egation] of China [ROC] has decided not to take part in 
any further proceedings of this Assembly.”272 Then, the Taiwanese delegation left. 
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This act of self-sabotage put the final nail into the coffin of the ROC’s inclusion in 
the world organization. 
Taipei’s insistence on the seat in the UNSC demonstrated a lacking sense of 
reality. The regime forced other countries to choose between Taipei and Beijing. 
Many UN member states were not willing to accept the ROC regime’s claim to 
speak for hundreds of millions Chinese people although these people were not 
ruled by the KMT regime. The Taiwanese’s denial of political realties made it im-
possible for U.S. officials to keep Taiwan in the UN although Washington’s policy 
had contributed to the outcome. The biggest impact in this context was Kissinger’s 
decision, supported by Nixon, not to reschedule his second trip to China.273 As dif-
ferent scholars claim, this signaled to the world that rapprochement with China was 
more important than Taiwan’s seat in the UN, undermining all diplomatic ef-
forts.274 
The debacle about the Chinese representation issue demonstrated the diffi-
culties the U.S. administration was facing when it tried to improve relations with 
the PRC, on the one hand, but was also endeavoring to maintain its close relations 
with Taiwan, on the other. It was the same dilemma every administration thereafter 
had to face for their China and Taiwan policy. The UN question was only one as-
pect where the Taiwan issue had a great impact on U.S.-China relations. Ignoring 
that his policy had contributed to the ROC’s expulsion, Richard Nixon states in his 
memoirs that he was surprised and disappointed about this result.275 
The rapprochement process, however, benefited from the PRC’s entry to the 
UN. Beijing’s representatives at the UN gave the White House another private 
channel to the Chinese. In fact, Kissinger met the PRC ambassador at the UN, 
Huang Hua, several times to discuss different political issues, not informing the 
State Department about this practice.276 The first such meeting occurred only two 
weeks after the UN vote.277 Nonetheless, the White House still used the Paris chan-
                                                 
273 Kissinger, “Memoiren“, 819, 825. 
274 Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable”, 130; MacMillan, “Nixon”, 216; Ross, “Negotiating”, 
43. 
275 Nixon, “Memoiren“, 573. 
276 Macmillan, “Nixon”, 219. 
277 Memo, Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 11/26/1971 in: FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, 
China, 1969-1972 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 2006), 595-598. Kissinger had 
another such meeting with PRC ambassador Huang Hua in early December when they had an elabo-
rate exchange about the tensions between India and Pakistan, see: Memcon, Henry Kissinger, 
91 
 
nel more frequently, as General Walters’ discussions in Paris were of major im-




Kissinger’s Second Trip 
During Kissinger’s second trip the Chinese and Americans discussed mainly the 
circumstances of President Nixon’s upcoming visit in China. Of central importance 
were the negotiations about the communiqué Nixon and Zhou should sign at the 
end of the trip. As previous meetings with Chinese officials had indicated, the Tai-
wan issue and the status of the island represented the biggest obstacle for agree-
ment. Early on, in an attempt to demonstrate U.S. resolve to remain involved in the 
Taiwan Strait, Kissinger made clear that the United States would not give up its 
relations with Taiwan. The APNSA explained to Zhou that the Chinese would not 
respect the United States if Washington abandoned an old loyal ally like Taiwan.279 
Of course, this did not convince the Chinese Prime Minister, and the negotiations 
became a test for Kissinger’s political and physical constitution. 
 Kissinger explained that the president would confirm the concessions, the 
APNSA had made during his first visit, including U.S. willingness to gradually 
reduce its military personnel from Taiwan. Kissinger also asked Zhou if “the Peo-
ple’s Republic can on its own, in the exercise of its own sovereignty, declare its 
willingness to settle it [the Taiwan issue] by peaceful means […],” because this 
would make the situation for the U.S. administration much easier.280 Zhou turned 
this request down after a somewhat lengthy explanation, referring to the Chinese 
view that the status of Taiwan was determined and that the issue was a Chinese 
affair and hence for the Chinese to resolve.281 At this point, Kissinger signaled that 
the U.S. was willing to concede in a joint communiqué that the status of Taiwan 
was determined in the sense “that there’s only one China and that Taiwan is part of 
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that China.”282 This was the farthest reaching concession the U.S. side could make, 
without risking critique from the China lobby in Washington. 
 Later, the Chinese explained for the first time the conditions under which 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States would be possible. 
First, the United States had to withdraw all its military personnel from Taiwan. 
Secondly, Washington had to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. 
Thirdly, the United States needed to cut its diplomatic ties with the ROC govern-
ment.283 The Nixon administration and any subsequent administration had to accept 
these so called preconditions if they wanted normal relations with China. Hence, 
they played an important role in the early period of the Carter administration’s 
China policy in the late 1970s, limiting the political leeway for Jimmy Carter sig-
nificantly. 
The whole discussions about Taiwan and the drafting of the communiqué 
made apparent that Beijing was not willing to let the White House “off the hook” 
concerning the Taiwan issue. According to Kissinger, Zhou pressed for a language 
in the communiqué that was unacceptable to the Nixon administration. The funda-
mental difference between Washington’s and Beijing’s objectives was that the 
Chinese wanted the language concerning Taiwan as explicit as possible while the 
U.S. delegation wanted to leave it ambiguous.284 According to Kissinger, PRC offi-
cials were ready to incorporate the fundamental differences between Chinese and 
Americans in the communiqué.285 While this approach was very unusual for a joint 
communiqué, the APNSA believed it served the U.S. better than a conventional 
communiqué which stressed only vaguely the consensus between two sides. He 
reasoned that the Chinese approach reflected the reality of Sino-American relations 
which would increase the credibility of the parts where both sides agreed.286 
The negotiations with the Chinese left Kissinger convinced that “the Chi-
nese leadership is committed to a course leading toward an improvement of rela-
tions with the U.S.” In his opinion, drawbacks would lead to fights among PRC 
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leaders.287 This was significant because especially the leftists in Beijing did not 
support rapprochement. If Washington did not want to face the Chinese radicals, 
they had to make sure that Zhou Enlai and his supporters looked convincing be-
cause only this way rapprochement could succeed. 
After his return to Washington, Kissinger met with ROC officials to brief 
them about his trip, and as before, he lied to them. This approach fitted Kissinger’s 
previous instructions to his subordinates that U.S. officials should not to speak 
honestly to their Taiwanese counterparts about future developments in U.S. China 
policy.288 Of course, Kissinger wanted to prevent any uproar in U.S.-ROC rela-
tions, and he also repeated U.S. assurances that the United States “wanted them 
[the ROC] to stay alive, and to maintain their integrity and their identity.” The 
Nixon administration would try “to support them [Taiwan], and to keep them in as 
many international organizations as possible.”289 
In spite of all skepticism, this had to be encouraging news for the ROC. The 
regime planned to strengthen its bilateral relations with the United States and Japan 
in the aftermath of the UN debacle, and thus needed Washington’s support.290 
However, the Taiwanese were also aware of Kissinger’s double play, as Shen’s 
criticism in his memoirs suggests. Kissinger’s assurances of his deep felt friendship 
did not appear genuine to Shen, and the ROC ambassador appeared annoyed by 
Kissinger’s exaggerated self-confidence.291 Yet, the Taiwanese could not afford to 
appear offended, as the regime in Taipei was relegated to a wait-and-see-approach, 
completely dependent on the benevolence of the United States.  
Washington’s reassurances also demonstrated that the White House had an 
honest interest to keep CKS and his regime in line.292 The island was still important 
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for U.S. policy in the Far East. Moreover, rapprochement could only be successful 
if the White House was able to maintain a close relationship with Taiwan, guaran-
teeing the island’s security and the KMT regime’s survival. Otherwise, the U.S. 
public and Congress would not endorse Nixon’s policy. These considerations were 
reflected in the final shape of the joint communiqué of Americans and Chinese 




A Moment of History 
On February 21 1972, Richard Nixon and his wife Pat walked down the stairs of 
Air Force One to touch Chinese soil as the first “first couple” in the history of the 
United States.293 It was a moment of history, and Nixon was fully aware of it. He 
was under the scrutiny of the entire world. Thus, during a previous conversation 
with Kissinger, the president made clear that “[t]he [China] trip must succeed.”294 
Hence he ordered Deputy National Security Advisor Alexander M. Haig to warn 
the Chinese “that there [should] be no public embarrassment to the president as a 
result of his visit to Peking.”295 The Nixon administration had worked tirelessly 
towards this trip, and they needed a success to bring the president’s rapprochement 
policy to a climax. 
In early January, Nixon sent Kissinger’s aide and former General Alexander 
Haig for final discussions about his trip to China. Although they talked mostly 
about the technical aspects of the president’s visit, Haig also emphasized that the 
domestic situation in the United States made it difficult for the White House to be 
publicly accommodating concerning Taiwan, as “the Left has been joined in a 
strange wedding with those conservative elements who are strong supporters of 
Taiwan.” Haig thus urged the Chinese to adopt a language in the joint communiqué 
that would be “less truthful and somewhat less precise” concerning the status of 
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Taiwan.296 To Washington’s relieve, Zhou Enlai seemed willing to make conces-
sions “because as we [the PRC] have mentioned before we are always willing to 
get the work done as best as possible because you must work with a view toward 
the future.”297 
 Maybe, it helped that Mao Zedong did not show any deeper interest to dis-
cuss matters of dissent with Nixon when they met shortly after the president’s arri-
val in Beijing. The CCP’s chairman pretended not to be willing to discuss matters 
like Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union but only questions of philosophical 
scope, claiming “[a]ll those troublesome problems I don’t want to get into very 
much.” Indeed, as the record suggests, Nixon and he talked about these issues ra-
ther superficially, agreeing in the end that neither side presented a threat for the 
other.298 This attitude indicated a division of labor among PRC leaders. Similar to 
the situation, the Carter administration faced in the late 1970s, the PRC’s head of 
state (and chairman of the CCP) played the role of an elder statesman and philoso-
pher while lower ranked PRC leaders were responsible for practical matters and 
political negotiations. 
Accordingly, Nixon’s talks with Zhou Enlai were more substantial. The 
president was very accommodating concerning Beijing’s conditions for further 
progress in Sino-American relations. However, he also underlined that the final 
withdrawal from Taiwan depended on how much “progress is made on the peaceful 
resolution of the” Taiwan issue. Furthermore, Nixon indicated that due to domestic 
restraints his administration was forced to express a certain degree of support for 
Taiwan. The Chinese had to play along with this. As he told Zhou empathically, the 
U.S. president did “not want to be forced when I return to the United States, in a 
press conference or by Congressional leaders, to make a strong basically pro-
Taiwan statement because of what has been said here.”299 Fortunately, the PRC 
premier demonstrated sympathy for the U.S. administration’s position, stating that 
the Chinese “have already waited over twenty years -I am very frank here- and can 
wait a few more years [for reunification with Taiwan].”300 It was a good sign for 
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the Americans, and Nixon expressed in his memoirs his satisfaction with Zhou’s 
words and the final draft for the joint communiqué.301 
Parallel to Nixon’s meetings with Mao and Zhou, other U.S. officials met 
their Chinese counterparts to discuss more technical matters. According to Gong 
Li, all PRC officials reported back to Mao who made the final decisions.302 In one 
of these meetings, PRC Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei explained to his counterpart 
Rogers that normal relations between the PRC and the U.S. required that Washing-
ton would “recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China.” Further-
more, all U.S. troops had to be removed from Taiwan, and the Mutual Defense 
Treaty to be terminated.303 Any U.S. administration that pursued diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC had to accept these requirements, as Carter and his aides were 
to find out a few years later. 
The Shanghai Communiqué, however, did not contain any hints that the 
Nixon administration was willing to break up its security relationship with Taiwan. 
Instead, the document said that “the Taiwan question is the crucial question ob-
structing the normalization of relations between China and the United States”, 
proving that Chinese and Americans had not found common ground about the mat-
ter of Taiwan.304 Furthermore, Washington was able to achieve its goal to use an 
ambiguous language in the communiqué, and the PRC did not succeed in forcing 
the USA to accept Taiwan’s status as province of China, as the Nixon administra-
tion only acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait main-
tain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”305 
The ambiguous language of the Shanghai Communiqué resembled much 
more the ideas of the U.S. side than of the Chinese. Evelyn Goh and Robert Ross 
share this assessment, arguing the document did not only prevent a stalemate of the 
rapprochement process but also served the U.S. position on the Taiwan issue be-
cause Washington did not have to accept the Chinese view that Taiwan was a part 
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(or better a province) of the People’s Republic.306 Li Xiaoting and Huang Jing go 
even a step further, claiming that the ambiguous formulation gave Washington 
some sort of veto power concerning the settlement of the Taiwan issue in the event 
of any unilateral changes, either in Beijing or Taipei. The aforementioned language 
indicated that Washington would reject any non-peaceful settlement, limiting the 
PRC’s chances to reunify China along the Taiwan Strait significantly.307 
Still, as Gong Li says, the communiqué served both sides, because it also 
improved China’s strategic situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. That was the view, 
Zhou Enlai expressed in a report from March 1.308 Zhou’s assessment is not sur-
prising, as the communiqué strengthened the pragmatic circles around him. His 
political prestige was bound to the success of rapprochement –a similar situation as 
Deng Xiaoping would face in 1978 during the normalization process. Mao’s sup-
port guarded Zhou’s back, containing the ultra-leftist’s influence. As Li Jie ex-
plains, the strengthening of the pragmatic circles in Beijing opened the way for 
three important developments. First, many old cadres who were purged during the 
Cultural Revolution were reinstalled. Secondly, China’s economic reconstruction 
could begin. Thirdly, Deng Xiaoping re-emerged for the first time from the depth 
of the Chinese province, constituting his image as political weeble.309 
The Shanghai Communiqué should herald the start of a new era of Sino-
American relations. It did not only constitute the de-facto alliance between PRC 
and United States against Moscow, but also served as legal basis for the future 
conduct of this relationship. The document offered both sides a beacon of orienta-
tion, and expressed their common interests after decades of hostility and mistrust. 
Especially PRC officials became never tired to remind their U.S. counterparts of 
the spirit of the communiqué, an experience which the members of the Carter ad-
ministration would make, too. In the end, Chinese and Americans achieved a dip-
lomatic and strategic success, helping their situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
 
                                                 
306 Goh, “Constructing”, 200-201; Ross, “Negotiating”, 41-42. 
307 Huang/Li, “Seperation”, 81. 
308 Gong, “Decision”, 355.  





The Spirit of Shanghai 
The Shanghai Communiqué proved the success of rapprochement, as it had a 
worldwide impact and brought strategic benefits for the Chinese and Americans. It 
marked the peak of Nixon’s China policy, but also contained the fundamental prob-
lems that should prevent the U.S. and PRC from normalizing their relations in the 
aftermath. The ambiguous language and the deep going differences about Taiwan 
should not be the only obstacles to the establishment of official diplomatic relations 
but they contributed massively to the later development of dissent. Nonetheless, 
Chinese and Americans handled the first year after signing the communiqué very 
well, honoring the spirit of Shanghai, even establishing liaison offices in Washing-
ton and Beijing in May 1973. The latter indicated that normal U.S.-China relations 
were within reach. 
The honeymoon between Chinese and Americans, made the regime in Tai-
pei feel uncomfortable. A report by the MOFA underline this thinking.310 Never-
theless, the ROC did not search for new allies, expecting the United States to keep 
its security commitments to Taiwan. Thus, when ROC foreign minister Zhou 
Shukai suggested that Taipei needed to approach the Soviets, President Chiang 
reacted harshly and made clear in a public statement that Taiwan would not be in-
terested in an alliance with Moscow. This action proved Taiwan’s firm stand on the 
side of the United States, no matter what was to happening elsewhere. Being politi-
cally pragmatic, CKS even saw something positive in the whole situation, reason-
ing that U.S.-China rapprochement diminished the threat of an attack from the 
mainland for at least 10 years. Such stability could help the regime to attract for-
eign investors, supporting the continuance of political and economic reform.311 
It is difficult to assess the reasons why the Nationalists did not look for new 
ways to assure their security. The ROC regime even welcomed Nixon’s reelection 
in late 1972 because his policy appeared much more stable to Taipei than the one 
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of a Democratic president.312 One reason for this attitude was certainly Chiang’s 
profound anti-communism. Taiwan’s status as a bulwark against the spread of 
communism in East Asia had always been an important political asset for the re-
gime. Another reason might have been that Taipei was widely isolated. Japan fol-
lowed the U.S. example, attempting to normalize its relations with Beijing, and 
other major powers had no interest to risk their good relations with the PRC. Final-
ly, Chiang and his aides surmised that Taiwan had still influential friends in Wash-
ington who would make sure that the United States was not to abandon the island. 
Discussions of ROC Ambassador Shen with Kissinger and Nixon indicated as 
much.313 Here, especially Nixon made clear that the KMT regime had no other 
choice than to accept the U.S. position, advising Chiang “not be belligerent” 
against the PRC, and “not quarrel with our statement to the effect that there is a 
[U.S.] commitment” to Taiwan’s security, because this could “force an eventual 
failure, which would not be in anybody’s interests” due to “a tremendous isolation-
ist movement developing in this country.”314 In other words, Nixon told the Tai-
wanese to calm down and shut up. 
In the meantime, Washington and Beijing worked on the implementation of 
the Shanghai Communiqué. Unfortunately, U.S.-China trade did not benefit that 
much from these efforts, as the PRC was still too poorly developed.315 Nonetheless, 
the Chinese leadership was satisfied with the way the Americans implemented the 
communiqué and, although the U.S. side had not fulfilled the three Chinese pre-
conditions yet, agreed to establish liaison offices in Beijing and Washington in 
February 1973. These offices gave Sino-American relations an official character 
and improved the communication between Chinese and Americans. In May, they 
were opened. David K. E. Bruce became the first Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office -
George H.W. Bush became his successor in 1974-, while Huang Zhen became the 
first head of the PRC Liaison Office, later succeeded by Han Xu. 
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The Elusiveness of Normal U.S.-PRC Relations 
After the establishment of liaison offices in Beijing and Washington, Sino-
American relations stalled. The profound differences between Chinese and Ameri-
cans about Taiwan made taking steps towards normalization difficult. In addition, 
the United States was to experience a political crisis of seismic proportions when 
the recently reelected Richard Nixon had to resign in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal.316 But political upheaval occurred also in China after the death of Mao 
Zedong in September 1976. The leftist Gang of Four grasped for power in Beijing 
and forced the moderate circles to get defensive. Li Jie argues that these power 
struggles hampered the decision-making process in China significantly and made 
Sino-American normalization impossible.317 It was this mix of internal problems in 
the political systems of China and the United States as well as bilateral friction 
which contributed to the elusiveness of normalization and a postponement beyond 
the presidential terms of Nixon and Ford. 
In spite of all the dissent between the KMT regime and the Nixon admin-
istration, Taipei saw Nixon’s reelection in November 1972 as a good sign because 
Chiang and his cohorts did not trust the Democrats. Furthermore, although the U.S. 
did not sell the new F-4 Phantom jetfighter to the ROC, Washington approved con-
siderable sales of modern military equipment to the island.318 In fact, military assis-
tance for Taiwan was to increase between 1973 and 1976.319 This decision was 
somewhat surprising because PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had made clear dur-
ing Kissinger’s China trip in February 1972 that military assistance to Taiwan 
“should be phased out over time.”320 It was the first time that the Chinese had made 
this aspect of U.S.-ROC relations an issue, but it should not be the last time. Mili-
tary sales became an important part of the American security relationship with 
Taiwan after normalization in 1979. 
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Selling more military equipment to Taiwan had two reasons. First, the PRC 
increased the pressure on Taipei to start talks about the political reunification.321 
More military assistance for the ROC should strengthen the regime’s resistance to 
such talks, indicating that the Nixon administration had no interest in negotiations 
between Beijing and Taipei. Secondly, the arms sales served political needs at 
home. From late 1973 on, conducting China policy became difficult for Nixon. 
Although the administration tried to deal with other matters, Watergate occupied 
the president and his aides more and more.322  The Chinese were aware of the 
events around the scandal as a conversation between Deng Xiaoping and Kissinger 
–since September 1973, Secretary of State- indicated in April 1974. The vice prem-
ier was concerned Watergate could influence Sino-American relations, although 
“[s]uch an issue is really incomprehensible to us [PRC leaders].”323 Deng’s con-
cerns proved prophetic, as Sino-American relations lost their momentum over the 
course of 1974. 
In this situation, Kissinger, who served Gerald Ford as Secretary of State, 
tried his best to end the stalemate. After his new interlocutor, Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping, had threatened a non-peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue and urged the 
Americans to accept the Japanese formula in order to break the stalemate,324 Kis-
singer declared during his China visit in November 1974 the general willingness of 
the United States to accept the three Chinese preconditions (severance of U.S.-
ROC official ties, withdrawal of all U.S. troops, and termination of the MDT). In 
addition, he promised the use of the Japanese formula. In return, the Secretary of 
State only asked for a Chinese statement that the Taiwan issue would be solved 
peacefully325 
In spite of the far reaching concessions by the Ford administration, the Chi-
nese saw no reason to be obliging themselves. A statement about Beijing’s willing-
ness to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully was out of question. Deng made clear 
that the PRC could not “undertake any commitments or make any promises in in-
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ternal affairs like when and how we will do or establish things that pertain to inter-
nal affairs [reunification].”326 This fundamental argument brought him to the con-
clusion that “time is not ripe yet to solve this question [Taiwan issue], because ac-
cording to your formula, it would not be possible for us to accept this method of 
normalization.”327 This was not only a question of foreign policy but also one of 
domestic politics. Deng Xiaoping was in a difficult position. He had just come into 
office after Zhou Enlai, ill from cancer, had convinced Mao to appoint him as vice 
premier, responsible for Sino-American relations. Therefore, Deng stood under 
scrutiny from the leftists, and he needed a breakthrough in his negotiations with the 
U.S. in order to strengthen his position at home.328 
In their November talks, both sides demonstrated the fundamental issues be-
tween them. The U.S. executive was neither willing nor able to make any conces-
sions concerning the security relationship with Taiwan, while the CCP regime 
could not commit itself to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, fearing for its 
prestige, legitimation, and territorial integrity. If the PRC and U.S. governments 
wanted to establish normal relations, it needed one side to make huge concessions 
but neither government was in a position to do so. 
Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford, lacked the political capital in Washing-
ton to make any far reaching concessions concerning Taiwan.329 Considering the 
way the Ford administration had treated the Taiwanese before, constantly denying 
ROC officials any kind of information, warnings, or consultations about U.S. China 
policy, these concerns appear surprising, especially because Taipei already per-
ceived its relationship with the United States as deteriorating.330 Still, it was impos-
sible for Ford to leave Congress and U.S. public with the impression that he was 
willing to sell out Taiwan. This lack of political leeway was the reason, why he did 
not expect a substantial outcome from his visit to China.331 
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It was this weakness together with the political turmoil in the PRC that 
saved the regime in Taipei. Neither Washington nor Beijing were in a position to 
make the necessary concessions. Ford’s trip to China in December 1975 made this 
obvious. The president only tried to console the Chinese with the promise that “af-
ter the election [in November 1976] we [the U.S.] will be in a position to move 
much more specifically toward the normalization of relations…” Ford even sug-
gested to do so “[…] along the model perhaps of the Japanese arrangement…”332 
These words were virtually a promise to the Chinese that Washington would settle 
with the Japanese formula. This concession should later significantly limit the 
Carter administration’s leeway vis-à-vis the PRC because Beijing took this promise 
as the minimum condition for normalization. 
 Chinese concessions towards the United States concerning Taiwan were 
also not possible in late 1975. At the end of year, the leftists gained ground, when 
Mao harshly criticized Deng in public for his failure to achieve progress in Sino-
American relations. Matters became even worse for Deng due to Mao’s illness, 
which led to a leadership crisis in the PRC. When Lin Biao died in 1971, after his 
attempt for a coup d’état had failed, Mao had not anointed a new candidate for his 
succession. It had always been the chairman who had kept the balance between the 
pragmatic and leftist circles in Beijing. According to Li Jie, it was Mao’s omission 
to organize his succession which “enabled Jiang Qing and other leftists to attack 
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.” In the end, the Gang of Four prevailed, and Deng 
was demoted after Zhou had died in January 1976. The result was political turmoil, 
which ended after Mao’s death in September of the same year. After some struggle 
among the Chinese leadership, the Gang of Four was dislodged. Now, the political 
situation in Beijing allowed another push toward normalization.333 The problem for 
the Chinese was that the U.S. officials who had made all those aforementioned 
promises to them were not in office anymore. A new administration under the re-
cently elected Democrat Jimmy Carter replaced them. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
The idea for rapprochement originated from the Nixon administration’s realization 
that the power gap between the United States and the Soviet Union was diminish-
ing. Containing the Soviet Union alone was deemed too costly, and the White 
House searched for new ways to share this burden. In this situation, Nixon pursued 
different measures to improve the situation of the United States, and, according to 
Michael Schaller, rapprochement with the People’s Republic was only one of them. 
The whole approach of détente and rapprochement helped Nixon to achieve three 
important political goals; first, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agree-
ment with the Soviets, second, the end of the war in Vietnam, and third, he got 
reelected in 1972.334 
 The Chinese pursued similar interests as Washington when they decided to 
improve their relations with the United States. Since the USSR represented a huge 
threat to China’s security, closer relations with the other superpower could help to 
improve the PRC’s strategic situation. However, neither Beijing nor Washington 
ever sought a formal alliance. Their respective social systems and their national 
interests were too different. Their antagonism to the Soviet Union only allowed 
them to look beyond these fundamental issues so far as it helped them to put pres-
sure on Moscow.335 
 This problem became visible in the negotiations about the Shanghai Com-
muniqué during Kissinger’s second trip to China. The discussions between Zhou 
Enlai and the APNSA made it clear that the Taiwan issue was the most controver-
sial matter between Chinese and Americans. Since the communiqué would state the 
official views of both sides, neither Beijing nor Washington could commit them-
selves to a language, which would contradict their respective political interests. The 
PRC could not allow the United States to remain involved in a matter that they 
considered a pure Chinese affair, while the White House could not risk alienating 
the U.S. public, Congress and American allies in Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, 
both sides realized that they had to find a compromise. The solution was to present 
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their different views on the matter of Taiwan in separate statements attached to the 
joint communiqué.336 
 Yet, it seems as if the Nixon administration was still too eager to please 
their Chinese counterparts. As Rosemary Foot suggests, the U.S. administration 
gave away too much too early. Nixon and his aides appeared obsessed by the idea 
to gain advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This impression is fueled by the se-
crecy and centralization of the whole U.S. decision-making process, which made 
the development of a full scale bargaining strategy even more difficult. Therefore it 
was easy for Beijing to adopt a less reconciliatory position, exploiting the lack of 
cohesion in the U.S. administration.337 The White House’s eagerness to court the 
Chinese is even more surprising because both Nixon and Kissinger seemed aware 
that China could become a superpower in the future.338 Both weighed strategic and 
political consequences thoroughly, but did not really consider the consequences of 
their concessions to the PRC. Their promises, however, fueled Chinese expecta-
tions. Once Washington had made several concessions, Beijing was under the im-
pression the PRC did not have to give something in return. This attitude later made 
it much more difficult for the Carter administration to put pressure on the Chinese 
during the normalization process. 
  
                                                 
336 Kissinger, “Memoiren“, 832-833. 
337 Rosemary Foot, “Prizes Won, Opportunities Lost. The U.S. Normalization of Relations with 
China, 1972-1979” in: William C. Kirby/ Robert S. Ross/Gong Li (ed.), Normalization of U.S.-
China Relations: An International History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 114-115. 
338 Kim, “Mannipulating”, 29. 
106 
 
Chapter III: Settling on a China Policy, January 1977-
June 1977 
 
When Jimmy Carter became the 39th President of the United States of America on 
January 20, 1977, he had a very precise notion of what kind of foreign policy he 
wanted to conduct. He sought to improve the global situation in general and 
strengthen the American position in the world in particular. He did not realize how 
difficult it would be to navigate through the shallows of the seas of politics of 
Washington D.C. Despite being narrowly elected after grueling primary battles in 
both parties, Carter considered his victory a mandate. Yet, he underestimated the 
importance of gathering allies and resources before beginning work on contentious 
policy goals. The early stages of his presidency already indicated that the fate of his 
plan to normalize U.S. relations with the People’s Republic would become a pain-
ful political lesson. 
 In this chapter I examine the internal and external pressures the Carter ad-
ministration faced during their first months in office, and how this epxerience 
shaped the administration’s development of a strategy for its China policy. I will 
show that, while Sino-American relations had stalled since the establishment of 
liaison offices in 1973, the former administrations under Nixon and Ford had 
agreed with the Chinese leaders to a stiff framework. Carter had difficulties to 
overcome this framework since he had to honor the idea of continuation in Ameri-
can foreign policy. Due to the far-reaching promises Nixon and Ford had made 
concerning future American ties with Taiwan, Carter’s options to assure Taiwan’s 
security were severely limited. The Chinese inflexibility to allow the United States 
close relations with Taiwan added further limitations, and made it much harder for 
the Carter administration to cope with Taiwanese and Congressional demands re-
garding the assurance of security to the island. 
 This Chinese inflexibility and wide-spread pressure, not a lack of purpose 
by Carter, delayed the formation of a coherent normalization strategy that would 
have allowed the Carter administration to approach normalization earlier than it 
eventually did. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues the Carter administration’s China 
policy was off to a “false start” because the administration was indecisive and una-
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ble to deal with the domestic pressure they faced.339 This observation completely 
underestimates Carter’s determination to approach China and the Taiwan issue ear-
ly in his presidency. 
The archival record shows that it took some time for officials of the Carter 
administration to gain access to the China material from the Nixon and Ford ad-
ministrations. As soon as they had worked through the documents, they immediate-
ly began working on the process of normalization. In fact, some of Carter’s advi-
sors had already begun to assess the administration’s options toward China.  
Archival and other material further suggests that Carter and his aides were 
careful in their approach. Nonetheless, Carter’s China experts had developed a 
strategy paper for the administration’s China policy no later than May 1977. This 
paper which became publicly known as Presidential Review Memorandum-24 
would outline the principles of the Carter administration’s approach towards Sino-
American normalization and the Taiwan issue. PRM-24 considered normalization 
with the PRC to be an important point in U.S. containment of the Soviet Union. A 
key difference in PRM-24 from previous strategy papers was the inclusion of min-
imum requirements the Chinese had to meet -something neither Nixon nor Ford 
had included out of fear of alienating Beijing. 
By mid-1977, the Carter administration was not only willing but also well-
prepared to begin serious talks with the People’s Republic about the normalization. 
Therefore, Robert Ross’s and Patrick Tyler’s argument that the Carter administra-
tion was apparently delaying the process because it was confident with the status-
quo is an exaggeration.340 It is true that President Carter did not put all his admin-
istration’s efforts into the China initiative due to other objectives in his foreign pol-
icy agenda. His administration, however, dealt with the matter continuously, not 
forcing anything. Since it was so early in Carter’s presidency, it was not feasible 
for the administration to prioritize normalization more than they currently were.  
I argue that Carter’s careful approach was intentional deliberateness rather 
than delay or acceptance of the status-quo. The White House needed more infor-
mation and a better understanding of the Chinese perspective. Consequently it 
needed preliminary high-level talks to test the administration’s strategy. The visit 
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of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Beijing in August 1977 would serve as an 




The Great Wall of the Past 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that Jimmy Carter’s China policy was off to a slow 
start because it took several months before the White House published its first 
strategy paper on China. It took even longer until the first top official of the Carter 
administration visited Beijing in order to talk about the possibility of normaliza-
tion.341  My research suggests this delay was not the result of a lack of priority. It 
was rather the consequence of a conundrum of different problems the new admin-
istration faced, and which were not easy to overcome. The expectations for further 
progress in Sino-American relations for the Carter administration were, on the con-
trary, very high. A paper of the Democratic Party for the presidential campaign of 
1976 stated: “Our [U.S.] relations with China should continue to develop on peace-
ful lines, including early movement toward normalizing diplomatic relations 
[…].”342 Carter himself made clear during the first Presidential Campaign Debate 
with Gerald Ford in October 1976 that he “would certainly pursue the normaliza-
tion of relationships with the People's Republic of China.”343 In his memoirs, he 
repeats that the establishment of official diplomatic relations with Beijing was an 
important goal for his administration.344  
However, normalization was only one of Carter’s foreign policy goals. He pur-
sued a multitude of ambitious objectives which were not only supposed to improve 
the strategic situation of the United States but also to alter the way U.S. foreign 
policy was conducted. The new president sought to highlight human rights in 
American foreign policy, promote peace in the Middle East, find a new arrange-
ment for the Panama Canal, and revive the détente process with the Soviet Un-
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ion.345 Since Carter could be sure that all of these objectives would lead to domes-
tic debates, he required vast political resources both at home and overseas. He 
could not use this reservoir exclusively for normalization. This underlines the im-
portance of the third factor delineated from Neoclassical Realism: the need to legit-
imize a certain policy and find acceptance for it at home. The administration had to 
accumulate enough resources to assert its political goals even against domestic op-
position. This was to have a profound and continuing impact on Carter’s China and 
Taiwan policy. 
Carter and his aides were aware that Sino-American normalization was a high-
ly delicate matter. The designated Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, indicated as 
much in a memorandum from before the elections: “The issue of ‘normalization’ is 
very complex and must be approached with caution […] I do not think we have to 
rush.” One of the reasons for Vance’s caution was his concern about the leadership 
struggles in China after Mao’s death. 346  National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski described the new leadership around Hua Guofeng later as more “tradi-
tional” and “somewhat unimaginative”. In his opinion, this made Chinese conces-
sions concerning matters of dispute such as the subject of Taiwan very unlikely.347 
The uncertainties of the PRC’s leadership situation left Washington also question-
ing how reliable China would be in the mid- and long-term. In this situation, the 
Carter administration recognized that they needed to be patient to see which group 
among the PRC’s leadership would prevail. In the meantime, the Carter administra-
tion could pursue other goals. 
Since Carter’s foreign policy agenda was so ambitious, the president had to 
consider his tactics carefully in order to achieve all of his goals. The administration 
needed to be patient, and approach each issue step-by-step. Each attempt to achieve 
one of the president’s objectives, subtracted from the political resources which the 
administration needed to legitimize its policy. Within Washington’s political sys-
tem with its balance between executive and legislative branches, this limitation of 
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resources had a direct impact on the timing of Carter’s China policy and the even-
tual delay of normalization. The new administration did not only face the problem 
of timing its China policy correctly, it also had to account for the legacies of the 
previous administrations. Mutual historical experience, the second factor from Ne-
oclassical Realism, had a strong influence on the White House’s options vis-à-vis 
the Chinese. 
Carter’s predecessors had already made considerable concessions to Beijing 
that substantially limited the president’s leeway. This problem became clear even 
before Carter and his aides assumed their new positions. At a reception in Wash-
ington, departing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger personally introduced his des-
ignated successor Cyrus Vance to China’s Chief of the liaison office Huang Zhen. 
The meeting happened in Kissinger’s office in the State Department in early Janu-
ary, before Vance was officially Secretary. In that meeting, much to Vance’s sur-
prise, when Huang stressed the three preconditions his government had set for 
normalization, Kissinger agreed with Huang. 348  The Chinese ambassador also 
openly criticized some of Carter’s statements concerning Taiwan and the One-
China-principle, claiming his remarks run “counter to the principles of the Shang-
hai Communiqué.” Not yet in office, all Vance could do was to state that Carter 
stood “firmly behind the implementation of the Shanghai Communiqué as the guid-
ing principle which should govern our bilateral relations.”349 What else could he 
have said since Kissinger’s ‘introduction’ to Huang had severely limited Vance’s 
options? 
The meeting demonstrated that the Carter administration could not expect the 
Chinese to show much flexibility on the matter of normalization, particularly con-
cerning the Taiwan issue. Due to statements and assurances of the previous admin-
istrations, the Chinese had precise expectations on what the new American gov-
ernment had to do if it wanted to move towards normalization. These expectations 
based on the historical experience of PRC officials with former administrations and 
added to the limitations of Carter’s China policy in its early stage. 
Vance’s meeting with Kissinger and Huang also demonstrated that the admin-
istration had to know what exactly the state of Chinese-American relations was. 
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Thus, the first task for the administration’s China experts after assuming office was 
to search through all available material about the former administration’s handling 
of Sino-American relations. Since the previous negotiations between Washington 
and Beijing had not taken place in a public environment, Carter and his aides had 
to learn the details of the framework, which constituted Washington’s current rela-
tionship to the People’s Republic. Michel Oksenberg, a scholar from the University 
of Michigan appointed as senior staff member of the National Security Council, 
was assigned to this task. As Patrick Tyler describes in his book, Oksenberg and 
other officials of the Carter administration had to search different archives and 
agencies all over the country to get all relevant documents together.350 This alone 
cost the White House valuable time in its development of a coherent China strate-
gy. 
After having problems to get complete access to all the necessary material, 
Oksenberg found the former administration very accommodating on the matter of 
Taiwan. When Nixon had accepted Beijing’s aforementioned five principles in his 
meetings with Mao and Zhou, this wide ranging concessions changed former 
American positions on Taiwan, and was “[a]bsolutely crucial and behind the lan-
guage of the Shanghai Communiqué.”351 Unless Carter did not want to harm Amer-
ica’s credibility as a negotiating partner, he had to honor the former administra-
tion’s concession at least to some extent, although this would further limit his op-
tions. 
The situation got even worse when the Carter administration realized that Hen-
ry Kissinger had already stated U.S. willingness “to complete normalization along 
the lines of the Japanese solution […].”352 This solution referred to the Japanese 
formula that was implemented when Japan and the PRC had established diplomatic 
relations in 1972. It had allowed Tokyo to retain economic and cultural relations 
with Taiwan on the basis of non-governmental people-to-people relations. Kissin-
ger’s commitment to the Japanese formula made it far more difficult for the Carter 
administration to preserve America’s role as the patron of Taiwan’s security. Under 
these conditions, Beijing could easily decline any American involvement in Tai-
wan’s future security. Furthermore, the Japanese formula represented a huge set-
                                                 
350 Tyler, “Wall”, 236-237. 
351 Memo, Michel Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 02/04/1977, “China MR-NLC-98-215 (1)” 




back for any plans the Carter administration had to save certain aspects of its offi-
cial relations with the ROC regime like the establishment of a liaison office in Tai-
pei.  
The record demonstrated that both former administrations, Nixon’s and Ford’s, 
had established a rigid framework that allowed Carter only limited room to maneu-
ver, particularly on the matter of Taiwan. This rigidness caught the members of the 
Carter administration by surprise, delaying the conception of a strategy concerning 
the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. However, such a strategy 
was necessary if the Carter administration was to enter serious talks about normali-
zation. The problem for Carter was that not only past decisions added to the Carter 
administration’s difficulties, but historical experiences as well. 
As their predecessors before them, the officials of the Carter administration 
could not escape the pressure to maintain close relations with Taiwan and to make 
sure keeping the island out of the grasp of communist China. Otherwise, it would 
be impossible to legitimize normal relations with the PRC. Some circles within the 
United States watched vigilantly for any signs of American concessions to Beijing, 
which could weaken U.S. ties to Taiwan. Just a few weeks in office, Carter’s aides 
received first warnings of how sensitive this issue was. 
A letter written by Yale professor and former Under Secretary of State for Po-
litical Affairs in the Johnson administration Eugene V. Rostow was only one ex-
ample of attempts to raise the administration’s awareness for the Taiwan issue. 
Rostow claimed that the end of formal U.S.-Taiwan security relationship would be 
“a disaster – a global catastrophe, weakening the deterrent credibility of all Ameri-
can security commitments.”353 Letters like Rostow’s demonstrated that broad cir-
cles in the American elite still sympathized with Taiwan. The ROC regime was not 
only an ideologically more suitable friend than the communist mainland but also a 
strategic asset for the American position in Asia. The Carter administration had to 
be careful what it was going to say in public about its plans for Taiwan. The do-
mestic pressure did not leave Carter much flexibility and further limited his op-
tions. It would need a major effort to get the American public and Congress to ac-
cept Sino-American normalization if this meant any change in Washington’s rela-
tionship to Taipei. 
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Only a few weeks in office, the Carter administration faced a wall of problems 
whose foundation was built on the decisions and experiences of the past. The need 
to find acceptance for the president’s normalization plans added to the difficulties. 
This “Great Wall” consisted of three major problems that would accompany the 
whole process of normalization. First, the Chinese side did not appear flexible on 
the matter of Taiwan because Beijing saw the Taiwan issue as an internal affair. 
Beijing even believed that the U.S. owed the Chinese because Washington had 
been intervening in Chinese affairs for so long. This position made Chinese con-
cessions concerning Taiwan unlikely. Second, the domestic pressure the White 
House faced was heavy. Taiwan still had many supporters throughout all circles of 
the American elites. This made it more difficult for Carter himself to make conces-
sions to Beijing concerning Taiwan. Finally, Carter discovered that the former ad-
ministrations had made far reaching promises to Beijing, particularly on the matter 
of Taiwan. Those promises had to be taken into account in order to maintain conti-
nuity in U.S. foreign policy and to avoid any harm to America’s international cred-




The Importance of the Soviet Threat 
After the Carter administration had identified the major obstacles to quick progress 
on the matter of normalization with Beijing, Carter and his aides had to evaluate 
how they wanted to proceed with their China policy. It was imperative to develop a 
concept that would allow the administration to pursue the matter at a pace that 
would be in stride with its general agenda. Yet, as Neoclassical Realism suggests, 
the first thing the administration had to assess was what impact the normalization 
of relations with Beijing would have on the international distribution of power and 
on the global position of the United States. Unfortunately, not all members of the 
administration agreed in their assessment of China’s importance. 
 The differences among Carter’s aides became already visible in the higher 
levels of the administration. Carter’s two most important foreign policy advisors 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski did not agree on the strategic significance of Sino-American normaliza-
tion. Vance was more cautious concerning the effects of normalization on the over-
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all strategic situation. He doubted that China “might be a useful counterweight to 
the Soviet Union.”354 Nonetheless, the Secretary of State also believed in “the ulti-
mate goal of normalization of diplomatic relations” with China since this country 
“constituted a political, economic and cultural weight in the world that the United 
States could not ignore […and] that had an important role to play in the final quar-
ter of the twentieth century.”355 For Vance, normalization was highly desirable, but 
not only for the sake of strategic advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Normaliza-
tion was an end to itself that would prove its significance in the future. 
 Brzezinski did not share this view. He was of Polish descent and seemed to 
have a particular aversion towards everything that was Russian. He had also been a 
constant critic of détente.356 In his opinion, Washington should make use of any 
advantage vis-à-vis Moscow to weaken the Soviet Union. Carter’s APNSA was 
convinced that concerns about the USSR had caused Nixon’s rapprochement policy 
in the early 1970s.357 Accordingly, Brzezinski saw normalization as “a key strate-
gic goal of the new Administration…” that would bring advantages for the United 
States’ struggle against the Soviet Union. Yet, as Brzezinski was aware, this di-
mension of Sino-American relations could not be discussed publicly.358 Consistent 
with the Neorealist premise that the most powerful actors within the international 
system stay in a contest for power, Brzezinski wanted Sino-American normaliza-
tion to strengthen the China card in the power play against the Soviets. 
 During the early stages of Carter’s presidency, Brzezinski’s view did not 
prevail. Carter claims in his memoires, following Vance’s line of argument, he 
wanted the American China policy to be independent from its policy towards the 
Soviet Union.359 Establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic had 
its own merits as it could offer new chances for U.S. trade with China. Moreover, 
as Brian Hilton suggests, Beijing could help the Carter administration to improve 
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global peace and stability.360  In a memorandum to Carter from early February 
1977, even Brzezinski admitted that better relations with the PRC had helped to 
stabilize the American position in East Asia significantly after the U.S. had been 
struggling to keep out of armed conflicts there for 25 years.361 Having China on 
America’s side influenced the distribution of power in the nation’s favor and would 
be advantageous in Carter’s pursuit of other objectives. Normalization was there-
fore a political necessity. The only problem was that the administration was not 
able to conclude when and under which circumstances it could achieve this goal. 
 Beijing had already signaled its readiness to talk about full normalization. 
The mutual interest was there. The new administration could take the initiative, but 
Carter had also to be careful. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Gleysteen, Beijing’s first impression of the 
Carter administration’s policy was not a positive one. Gleysteen argued that the 
administration’s efforts to ensnare the Soviets early on had alienated the Chinese. 
Moreover, Beijing perceived Carter’s former statements concerning the Taiwan 
issue during the presidential campaign as directed against the PRC. violating the 
spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. Hence, Gleysteen thought, the president’s first 
meeting with the Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen was important in order to set 
the tone for the future of the relationship.362 It was important for Carter to demon-
strate his seriousness about normalization as well as a basic understanding of the 
Chinese position. 
 Another problem was Carter’s emphasis of human rights. According to 
Mevyn Leffler, this matter should become “the central, theme of his foreign poli-
cy.”363 Yet, the questions of human rights in China and morality in U.S. foreign 
relations were not going to play a significant role in the normalization process.364 It 
needed until the 1990s before this topic became important for U.S.-China rela-
                                                 
360  Brian Hilton, “Maximum Flexibility for Peaceful Change”: Jimmy Carter, Taiwan, and the 
Recognition of the People’s Republic of China in: Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4 (September, 
2009), 598-599. 
361 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 02/04/1977, “China MR-NLC-98-215 (1)” folder, 
Box 40, Vertical Files (VF), Jimmy Carter Library. 
362 Memo, Michael Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 02/18/77, "China (People's Republic of) 1-
2/77" folder, Box 8, NSA Brzezinski Material Country File, Jimmy Carter Library. 
363 Leffler, “Soul“, 263. 
364 For an introductory reading about Carter’s human rights approach, see: Hauke Hartmann, Die 
Menschenrechtspolitik unter Präsident Carter: moralische Ansprüche, strategische Interessen und 
der Fall El Salvador (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004), 43-63. For more information about the 
implementation of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, see: Mary E. Stuckey, Jimmy Carter, Hu-
man Rights, and the National Agenda (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008). 
116 
 
tions.365 The Chinese leadership did not understand the emphasis of moral stand-
ards in Carter’s foreign policy because they had a complete different understanding 
of ethics and human rights.366 As we will see in later chapters, Beijing repeated its 
differing views concerning human rights, choking off any discussions about this 
topic. Under these circumstances, it was not prudent for Carter to insist on his so-
phisticated position on human rights vis-à-vis China, relegating this issue to a time 
after normalization. Thus, in his meeting with Huang, the president did not mention 
this theme at all. 
 Carter spoke with the PRC ambassador on February 8, 1977. Although 
Carter writes in his memoirs that the meeting demonstrated that “the United States 
and China would soon be ready to move towards normal relations”, it was merely 
an exchange of views on the strategic situation in the world like the Middle East 
and southern Africa. Carter and Huang mostly avoided any direct talk about nor-
malization. The Chinese ambassador and the U.S. president agreed that the “basis 
of our relations will be the Shanghai Communiqué.” This was important since the 
Chinese side was not sure if the new president honored the results of the negotia-
tions between the former U.S. administrations and Beijing. Carter also expressed 
his hope for “a strong movement toward normalization.”367 However, as true as this 
desire was, Carter’s gesture was only a weak demonstration. In reality, he lacked 
the true conviction that normalization was quickly to occur. The differences on the 
matter of Taiwan still seemed hard to overcome. 
This perception was the reason for Carter’s restraint. From his point of 
view, the meeting had shown how far away both sides were on, according to 
Huang, “[t]he crucial question” of Taiwan. While Carter expressed his understand-
ing for the Chinese position that the Taiwan issue was “an internal matter”, he also 
made clear that the United States had “a long-standing hope and expectation that it 
can be settled in peaceful ways.” Carter’s statement urged Huang to repeat Bei-
jing’s claim that “[n]o outside power has the right to interfere” on the matter of 
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Taiwan. The Chinese diplomat even argued that due to “a bunch of counter-
revolutionaries on the island, it seems there is no other way [to solve the Taiwan 
issue] than by force.” Carter was concerned about Huang’s words. Thus, after real-
izing the gravity of the differences between China and the United States about the 
question of Taiwan, he urged his interlocutor to “move to other concerns.”368 
Carter’s delaying tactic demonstrated that his administration was not yet ready to 
confront Beijing with the president’s differing ideas about the future of Taiwan in 
general, and U.S.-Taiwanese ties in particular.  
Carter wanted to avoid any deeper friction with Beijing before serious talks 
about normalization had even begun. He was aware that the U.S. bargaining posi-
tion was not very strong due to the promises made by Nixon and Ford. However, 
the baseline of his position about the Taiwan issue became apparent. While Carter 
obviously accepted the Shanghai Communiqué as the foundation of Sino-American 
relations, he did not seem willing to follow his predecessor’s conciliatory line of 
policy toward the PRC. In particular, he avoided the acceptance of Beijing’s three 
preconditions for normalization (withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, severance 
of all diplomatic ties with Taipei, and abrogation of the MDT). 
Instead, he conceded his understanding of the Chinese position on the mat-
ter, which “had been presented to us on my occasions.”369 It was clear that no mat-
ter how much emphasis Beijing put on the Soviet factor, Taiwan remained the de-
cisive aspect in Sino-American relations. But Carter could not hope to influence 
Chinese views without having established a coherent strategy of normalization 
first. Therefore, it made sense to divert Huang from the differences between their 
positions in order to find more common ground. This helped to keep the communi-
cation lines open between Chinese and Americans. 
The common ground shared by Washington and Beijing was their respec-
tive antipathy against the Soviet Union. Both sides believed that closer bilateral 
relations would increase their power at the cost of Moscow. In fact, after Carter’s 
suggestion to talk about other issues than normalization and Taiwan, Huang used 
the opportunity to criticize Carter’s attempts to revive détente as “a Munich-like 
thinking […that] lulls the people and causes them to lose their militant will.” He 
emphasized what a threat the Soviet Union was to the United States and particular-
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ly Western Europe. The latter, he characterized as “soft, weak, and disintegrated.” 
From Beijing’s point of view the Western European allies “should be stronger” 
since the “U.S. alone also may not be strong enough” to counter Soviet expansion-
ism.370 These words reflect the neoclassical realist assumptions, that actors develop 
their national interests in accordance with their perception of the distribution of 
power. Huang’s words implicated that the People’s Republic could be a strong ally 
for the United States, influencing the balance of power in Washington’s favor. 
What he did not mention, though, was that the United States could do the same for 
the PRC. 
The White House was going to use the argument that the United States 
needed strong allies in the discussions with PRC leaders about security ties be-
tween Washington and Taipei. The U.S. side was to argue that the American sup-
port for Taiwan served the global credibility of the United States and its image as a 
reliable ally. Both aspects were important in order to keep the Soviet Union in 
check, something that was also in the interest of the PRC.  
It was helpful for the Carter administration to learn about China’s fear of 
the Soviet Union as it demonstrated that the Chinese needed Washington to coun-
terweigh the Soviets. Huang Zhen’s statements in his meeting with the president 
had made Beijing’s anxieties clear although he had not expressed them explicitly. 
If Beijing wanted to improve its strategic situation, there was no alternative to ap-
proaching Washington because Sino-Soviet accommodation was unlikely. 
Beijing’s emphasis of the Soviet threat gave the Carter administration some 
kind of leverage in its dealings with Beijing. While the Carter administration hoped 
that better relations with China would lead to advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Un-
ion, the Soviet threat was not the only aspect of importance in Carter’s thinking. It 
was rather a useful instrument to remind the Chinese that they needed Washington 
at least as much as Washington needed the PRC. The Soviet Card increased Wash-
ington’s bargaining power, although it was wise not to overplay it when moving 
towards normalization. As Michel Oksenberg had stated before, the Chinese cri-
tique of Carter’s détente policy made it necessary to eradicate the Chinese leader-
ship’s concerns that Washington and Moscow could come to an arrangement at the 
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cost of the PRC. Otherwise, further improvement of Sino-American relations 
would become difficult.371  
In Oksenberg’s opinion, the Carter administration had to lessen Beijing’s 
worries about an anti-Chinese Washington-Moscow-axis. The best way to calm the 
Chinese down was to move towards normalization. Further stalemate in Sino-
American relations would only weaken the U.S. position. Oksenberg argued the 
administration had “to develop the strategy for making the effort to normalize rela-




The Early Stage of Developing a China Policy 
Many people worked on the China strategy of the Carter administration. It was a 
difficult topic. All major agencies concerned with foreign and security policy had 
their own China experts who expected to contribute to the administration’s China 
policy. According to the former U.S. diplomat Harry E.T. Thayer, the most im-
portant people concerned with this matter were Richard Holbrooke, William 
Gleysteen, Burt Levin, Harvey Feldman, Paul Kreisberg, Donald Anderson, Lynn 
Pascoe (all DOS), Michel Oksenberg (NSC), and Morton Abramowitz (Department 
of Defense [DOD]).373 While this abundance of expertise might have added to the 
interagency struggles that occurred occasionally, it also gave the administration 
different views for the development of its normalization strategy and the way it 
should deal with the Taiwan issue. 
In December 1976, Cyrus Vance had already taken first steps to develop a 
strategy for the Carter administration’s China policy and the establishment of nor-
mal relations with Beijing. He installed a team consisting of Richard Holbrooke, 
Anthony Lake, William Gleysteen and Michel Oksenberg to examine the whole 
issue. In spring 1977, this group came up with a memorandum, which the Secretary 
of State sent to the president for further review on April 15.374 It was a decisive 
step in the development of the Carter administration’s China policy. The memo-
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randum had a major impact on the conception of the normalization policy since it 
elaborated many aspects that should guide the administration’s position during the 
eventual negotiations with the People’s Republic. 
Vance’s first argument reflects Neorealist assumptions that actors within the 
international system seek to gain more power than their most obvious rivals in or-
der to improve their strategic position and increase their level of security. Vance 
believed “that in terms of our strategic position normalization is highly desirable”, 
because closer relations with China allowed Washington to put pressure on the So-
viets. This would improve the American position vis-à-vis Moscow. The Secretary 
of State also concluded that the United States would currently enjoy better relations 
with Moscow and Beijing than these nations had with each other, and normaliza-
tion with the PRC would help the U.S. “to deal most effectively with any change in 
the Moscow-Peking leg of the triangular relationship.”375 Although the improve-
ment of U.S.-PRC relations served bilateral purposes, we should not deny its sig-
nificance for the improvement of America’s strategic position. Closer relations 
with China made the United States more powerful in relation to the Soviet Union. 
Vance identified another reason to move swiftly towards normalization with 
Beijing. Better Sino-American relations could have a positive influence on peace 
and stability in East Asia. Although normalization could improve Washington’s 
dialogue with Beijing about global issues, Vance was sceptical that the Chinese 
would be willing to support U.S. efforts to solve problems like the situation on the 
Korean peninsula or the further development of international arms controls.376 
Echoing the neoclassical realist argument that any government has to legit-
imize their decisions, the Secretary of State’s biggest concern was how to sell nor-
malization and its consequences to the U.S. public. He put it this way: “While the 
American people overwhelmingly favour ties with Taiwan, they also overwhelm-
ingly favour better relations with the PRC.” Vance knew that the Carter administra-
tion was under close scrutiny on the matter. This observation was confirmed by 
public opinion polls conducted in April 1977. The interviewees were asked how 
important it was for them that the U.S. would continue to ascertain the security of 
the people of Taiwan. Over 60 percent saw this matter as “very” or “fairly im-
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portant” while only 22 percent felt it was “not particularly important” or “not im-
portant at all”.377  
Vance still thought the administration had to pursue normalization. He ar-
gued this achievement “would enhance trade and cultural exchange prospects” with 
China. But in order to achieve normalization, Washington had to make concessions 
to Beijing concerning Taiwan; first of all, the acceptance of the PRC’s three pre-
conditions. Vance knew that “a demonstrable ‘sell-out’ of Taiwan would evoke a 
serious outcry” in the U.S. public.378 This public ambiguity constituted the core of 
the dilemma Carter faced within the domestic debate. 
The necessity for concessions towards the PRC at the cost of Taiwan was 
not easy to explain to U.S. citizens. As Vance wrote, this task became even more 
difficult due to “[t]he emergence of the human rights issue as a major American 
foreign policy concern…” A later State Department memorandum echoed these 
concerns. The diplomats argued that the new administration’s emphasis of human 
rights made it much harder to justify cutting all government-to-government ties 
with Taiwan. To large parts of the U.S. public, it seemed certain that, for the people 
of Taiwan, falling under the control of “Red China” would inevitably endanger 
their human rights.379 Due to Carter’s claim that the American “moral sense dic-
tates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding re-
spect for individual human rights”, his foreign policy was not only measured by 
political but also moral standards.380 Taiwan was much closer to the hearts of the 
American people than the communist mainland could ever be. Carter had to be 
careful how to deal with the Taiwan issue. 
Indeed, Vance’s paper explicitly stated that “the only obstacle to normaliza-
tion is the Taiwan question.” This conclusion did not come as a surprise since Bei-
jing’s aforementioned preconditions for the beginning of normalization negotia-
tions all concerned the official relationship between the United States and the re-
gime on Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing was only willing to accept private relations 
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between Americans and the Taiwanese but not official government-to-government 
relations. Therefore, as Vance pointed out, the Carter administration had to “con-
sider whether American interests will be best served by continuing our formal in-
volvement in the Peking-Taipei problem or whether we should start to disengage, 
maintaining substantial support for ROC military capabilities [...].”381 
The question for Carter and his aides was not whether the United States 
should stay involved in the Taiwan Strait, as this went without saying, but whether 
this involvement had to maintain a formal character. As Vance’s memorandum put 
it, “the security of Taiwan does not rest primarily on our present treaty assuranc-
es.”382 Indeed, it was possible for Washington to protect Taiwan, even without offi-
cial relations and a defence pact because as past experiences during the Taiwan 
Strait crises in the 1950s had demonstrated, it mainly needed the political will to 
detract Beijing from any aggression. 
Michel Oksenberg, a member of the NSC staff, had implied the same point 
in an earlier memorandum. He argued that the Carter administration had two viable 
options to deal with the Taiwan issue. Either Washington would develop an infor-
mal security relationship with Taiwan that the Chinese would tacitly tolerate, or 
Washington would develop a security relationship, without discussing the matter 
with Beijing at all.383 Of course, it was easier for Washington to handle the situa-
tion if Beijing would accept the Carter administration to develop direct security ties 
with Taiwan. Such security ties mainly meant the sales of U.S. arms to the island.  
Whichever approach Carter would choose, the United States would not 
leave Taiwan all by itself. Vance made clear that Beijing had to meet some “mini-
mum requirements for normalization.” This was a rather vague description, and the 
administration had to develop these requirements in more detail. If Beijing would 
reject Washington’s conditions, both sides faced “an indefinite postponement of 
diplomatic relations.”384 Although Vance knew that such a stalemate could endan-
ger the normalization process, he still suggested limiting U.S. concessions to the 
Chinese.  
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Vance’s memorandum indicated that, for the sake of Taiwan’s security, the 
Carter administration was ready to risk the failure of normalization. Keeping Tai-
wan out of the mainland’s grasp was a deep concern for the Carter administration. 
Vance did not believe that they “should feel so compelled to establish diplomatic 
relations with Peking that we jeopardize the well-being and security of the people 
of Taiwan.” In order to ascertain the latter, the U.S. had to “maintain a military 
supply relationship with Taipei.” Subsequently, it needed “continuing government-
level ties, however disguised, [...] to help sustain Taiwan’s prosperity and stabil-
ity...”385 Taiwan’s security had to be ensured before normalization could be initiat-
ed.  
Vance did not want to achieve Sino-American normalization – as desirable 
as it was - at the cost of the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait. As the 
crises in the 1950s had suggested, only the American involvement could guarantee 
stability in the region. Vance, therefore, argued that since the Chinese leadership 
“will not give us assurances on a peaceful settlement of their differences with Tai-
pei”, it was imperative to make clear that Washington would never tolerate a mili-
tary solution of the Taiwan issue “even leaving open the possibility of direct inter-
vention” of the United States.386 In fact, the Taiwan Strait crises of the past had 
demonstrated that a military solution of the Taiwan issue could easily escalate. A 
new crisis could destabilize East Asia. This was not in the interest of the United 
States because it would force the country to intervene on behalf of its allies. All of 
these deliberations showed that neither Vance nor his staff were ready to give up 
on Taiwan. Even after the derecognition of the Republic of China in favor of the 
People’s Republic, there had to be some sort of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
Vance’s considerations of Taiwan’s security also confirmed the importance 
of the Carter administration’s perception of the distribution of power in Asia-
Pacific. Washington thought that as long as Beijing did not control Taiwan, it did 
not control some of the most important shipping lanes in the region, improving the 
PRC’s strategic situation enormously. In addition, the KMT regime was a tradi-
tional ally of the United States, helping to constitute Washington’s status as domi-





nant power in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan was too valuable for the United 
States in terms of global and regional strategy. 
The Secretary of State’s April memorandum summed up the situation 
Washington faced when it would negotiate with the Chinese about normalization. It 
demonstrated that Vance and his team had a pretty good idea about the conse-
quences of any further accommodation between Washington and Beijing. The Tai-
wan issue was a matter of principle for the Chinese who had demonstrated their 
inflexibility on this topic in numerous meetings with U.S. officials before. The 
Carter administration had to find a way of breaking through the Chinese “shell” in 
order to get its minimum requirements fulfilled. Otherwise, it was impossible to 
ascertain Taiwan’s security. Failing in this regard would make it much harder for 
Carter to gain the public support he needed in order to finalize and later implement 
normalization. 
The early stages of the development of the Carter administration’s China 
policy demonstrated the importance of the Taiwan issue. Still, the advantages of 
normalization easily outweighed the problems, which the White House would face 
during this process. The most delicate task was to find a way to protect Taiwan on 
an unofficial legal basis. Otherwise, it would be difficult to convince the American 
people and the U.S. allies of the long-term advantages of normalization. As a later 
memorandum of the DOS concluded, the short-term benefits of normalization 
would favor the PRC. Hence, the administration needed all political allies it could 
muster in order to legitimize its approach and the sacrifices it was going to make.387 
Facing such odds, it was clear that the Carter administration had to deal with the 
Taiwan issue and the Taiwanese empathically. Otherwise, the risk of antagonizing 
the American public towards normalization grew. Surprisingly, Carter and his aides 




Ignoring the Taiwan Lobby’s and the Congress’ Disruptions 
The first scapegoat of Jimmy Carter’s approach was the ambassador of the Repub-
lic of China, James Shen. After shaking hands once with Carter at a White House 
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reception for all foreign ambassadors stationed in Washington on the day of the 
president’s inauguration, he was never to meet Carter again. Shen, who was an 
alumnus of the University of Missouri, felt downgraded and humiliated. These feel-
ings were even exacerbated when Carter met the chief of the PRC liaison office 
only a few weeks after he had assumed office.388 The White House then turned 
down Shen’s request to meet Vice President Walter F. Mondale.389 Instead, he only 
was allowed to meet Under Secretary of State Philip Habib, who presented the 
ROC ambassador with a fait accompli by explaining that the Carter administration 
would continue to pursue normalization. The U.S. diplomat also clarified that the 
Taiwanese could not expect to be briefed on U.S.-PRC negotiations as it had been 
the case during previous administrations.390 This episode demonstrated that instead 
of being careful with the Taiwanese, the Carter administration had chosen to leave 
them completely out of the normalization process. 
This was not the first time that Taipei faced adversity from the United 
States. After Washington and Beijing had agreed on the Shanghai Communiqué in 
1972, Kissinger had decided to limit the ROC ambassador’s access to the major 
decision-makers of U.S. foreign policy. At first, the Carter administration had con-
sidered to change this practice, which appeared “unnecessarily harsh.” But since 
the administration did not want to send the wrong signals to the PRC before the 
beginning of any “serious dialogue with Peking”, the White House decided to fol-
low Kissinger’s example. Subsequently, the administration did not grant James 
Shen or any other ROC official access to high officials of the U.S. administra-
tion.391 After realizing that they had no access to the American executive branch, 
the ROC leadership had to resort to its contacts in the legislative branch.392 
The president was aware of Taiwan’s influence on members of the U.S. 
Congress. It was something he was very critical about, seeing it as one of the rea-
sons why former administrations had not finalized normalization. As he argues in 
his memoirs, “[i]n the absence of constant presidential leadership, Taiwanese lob-
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byists seemed able to prevail in shaping United States policy on this fundamental 
issue [Sino-American normalization] in the Far East.” It was something he had 
experienced himself after he had won some primaries in 1976 when people who 
were close to him were suddenly invited by the ROC regime to visit Taiwan in or-
der to influence Carter’s decisions about China and Taiwan.393 According to Brian 
Hilton, “Carter’s disdain for lobbying predated his presidency” as it was the conse-
quence of “his earlier legal battles against ballot stuffing and corrupt party bosses 
in the Georgia state senate.”394 However, in the context of Washington’s China 
policy the reasons for Carter’s rejection of the Taiwanese lobbying exceeded his 
personal opinion. 
Carter kept the Taiwanese out of the decision-making process to define his 
policy toward the People’s Republic and the Taiwan issue on his own terms. The 
president did not want anyone to spoil his approach. Moreover, Carter was afraid 
that he could experience the same setbacks previous presidents had faced when the 
Taiwan Lobby played a major role that “progress toward full relations [with China] 
was put on a hold.”395 It was almost as if Carter feared that Taipei’s influence in 
Washington could dispute his place in the history books. 
 Carter’s argument was not unfounded as only a few months after he had 
assumed presidency, Taipei started the first disruptive actions. Documents from the 
ROC’s National Archives from 1976 show that the MOFA planned an aggressive 
diplomatic campaign for 1977 to influence the new U.S. administration. The goal 
was to emphasize the mutual interests of Washington and Taipei and manipulate 
U.S. public in Taipei’s favor.396 Chiang Ching-kuo, who had replaced his father 
after his death in 1975 as main decision-maker in the KMT leadership, was aware 
of Carter’s human rights policy. Hence, Taipei planned to undermine Beijing’s 
image, by making use of the president’s moral standards.397  The KMT regime 
wanted to demonstrate to the U.S. president how little the leadership in Beijing 
cared for human rights. 
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The result of Taipei’s attempts was the so called “Shanghai letter” from 
March 13, 1977. The letter contained complaints about the human rights situation 
in China saying that “[t]he Chinese mainland today is a hell on earth” whose peo-
ple lived like slaves. The author asked Carter to “support us [the Chinese people] 
with the same commitment you gave to the Soviet human rights leader…”398 The 
document was originally sent from a presumed citizen of Shanghai named Hung 
Yen-chr to Derek Davies, editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review. Assuming 
the letter was genuine, Davies forwarded it to the White House, asking the presi-
dent “to extend your concern for human rights to the Chinese People’s Repub-
lic.”399 Experts of the State Department doubted the authenticity of the letter, and 
the president did not answer it personally. Instead, an official from the DOS in-
formed Mr. Davies in a polite but very sterile manner that the administration had 
no intentions to act on the matter.400 This reaction demonstrated the trend that hu-
man rights were never to play a role within the negotiations of Sino-American 
normalization.401 The Taiwanese had to look for other ways to influence the admin-
istration. 
 Taipei tried to approach people who shared the president’s political values. 
Therefore, the KMT leadership invited a delegation from the state of Georgia for 
the second anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek’s death. In Zbigniew Brzezinski’s opin-
ion, it was an attempt by the Taiwanese “to cultivate an image of good relations 
with the President’s home state.” Such a development would make Beijing to be-
lieve that Carter sympathized with the dead KMT leader, not respecting the PRC 
leadership’s disdain for the generalissimo. Such an impression would damage the 
administration’s efforts to accommodate Beijing since, according to Brzezinski, 
“[t]his kind of publicity would run counter to our foreign policy efforts at the pre-
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sent time, which seek to maintain good relations with Taiwan while strengthening 
our relations with the People’s Republic of China.” While he could not forbid the 
delegation to attend the celebrations in Taipei, the National Security Advisor asked 
the State Department to deter the representatives from Georgia to “use the name of 
the President” in the whole context.402 Brzezinski prevailed and was able to avoid 
further damage. 
 It became obvious to ROC leaders that they could not manipulate the U.S. 
executive directly. Therefore, Taipei tried to mobilize the U.S. public in order to 
influence the decision-making in the White House. The regime in Taiwan used a 
wide range of actions to do so, including a letter-writing campaign of 200.000 peo-
ple.403 Indeed, this campaign appeared successful to a certain degree as many im-
portant people of America’s public life responded to Taipei’s call, by writing to 
their contacts within the administration. Many influential people within American 
business circles reacted to Taipei’s call. One of them was Robert Murphy, chair-
man of Corning International Corp., who wanted to make the U.S government 
aware of the “beneficial and profitable general relationship […] with Taiwan.” In 
Murphy’s opinion, the Carter administration should be careful and keep in mind 
that “[w]hatever form of recognition the United States may eventually accord the 
People’s Republic of China, it is urgently in our [national] interest to sustain the 
status of Taiwan.”404 But not only businessmen asked the Carter administration to 
be considerate of Taiwan’s needs. 
Many academics wrote to different members of the executive in order to 
convey their views about the PRC and Taiwan. Franz Michael from the George-
Washington University for instance expressed his concern that the administration 
could make a mistake due to “the pressure by some well-meaning people to com-
plete so-called normalization [with the PRC] by sacrificing Taiwan.”405 Michael 
was only one of many academics who favored Taiwan in this whole issue. There 
were many others. But the list of Taipei’s supporters stretched beyond elitist cir-
cles. 
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Even groups that basically supported normalization like the American Le-
gion, a union of U.S. veterans, who supported Carter’s “efforts to promote peace 
and trade with the People’s Republic of China”, warned that “under no circum-
stances should the United States abandon our good and faithful ally, the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) and we urge a continuation of U.S. diplomatic relations and 
treaty commitments with Taiwan.”406 This pledge was another example for the am-
bivalence of the American public on the matter. In fact, not many people and 
groups argued against normalization with China in general but many of them were 
concerned about Taiwan and the American commitment to protect the island. All 
these interventions on behalf of the ROC regime demonstrated the closely connect-
ed network of supporters Taiwan had assembled in the United States over the pre-
vious decades.  
This was also true for political entities as Taipei was able to convince sev-
eral state and municipal parliaments to pass resolutions that insisted on the contin-
uation of American ties to Taiwan.407 One example was the State of New York 
whose legislative passed a resolution that “commends the United States Govern-
ment for maintaining its continuous and historic policy of support for the freedom 
and security of the Republic of China and its courageous, industrious people.”408 
The ROC still knew how to make sure that the Taiwan issue remained on the radar 
of American public life. 
Such episodes showed that criticism and advice for Carter’s normalization 
plans came from different sides. In some cases like the aforementioned letter by 
Robert Murphy, President Carter felt compelled to assure those people personally 
that he “intend[ed] to maintain economic and cultural relations and other appropri-
ate ties with the people on Taiwan”, and that the president did “not intend to jeop-
ardize their chance for a peaceful, prosperous future.”409 However, in most cases 
the administration did not seem to care, and ignored the concerns of U.S. citizens. 
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It was U.S. Congress which mainly worried Carter because that was the one 
political agency that could successfully prevent the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic. Carter needed the legislative branch to assert 
his policy, not only his China initiative but also other objectives. Congressional 
acceptance of his China policy was therefore imperative. Thus, the administration 
had to be cautious in its dealings with the ROC. While Brzezinski concluded in one 
of his weekly reports to Carter based on a memorandum by Michel Oksenberg that 
“[t]he Taiwan Lobby does not constitute a major obstacle to normalization […]”, 
he still conceded that “[s]ome staunch supporters [of Taiwan] exist on the Hill...”410 
Indeed, multiple instances proved the existing Congressional support for Taiwan.  
One example was a memorandum for Carter from the Democratic Senator 
Henry M. Jackson (Dem-Washington). Jackson supported Carter’s plans for nor-
malization because Chinese and Americans were “strategically useful to each oth-
er”. Yet, he also insisted on continuing relations with Taiwan. Senator Jackson was 
convinced that due to America’s strategic usefulness for Beijing, Washington 
should be able to achieve an agreement with the PRC “which would enable us [the 
U.S.] to establish full diplomatic relations with Peking while retaining a full range 
of economic and cultural ties with Taiwan, including arms sales.”411 While Jack-
son’s advice was rather supportive, the administration also faced open critique 
from other members of the Congress. 
A letter from Congressman Sinclair W. Burgener (Rep-California) from 
August 1, 1977 signed by 53 members of the House of Representatives, including a 
handful of Democrats asked the Carter administration to meet ROC Ambassador 
James Shen to hear Taiwan’s point of view. The White House still refused such a 
meeting, even though the Congressmen had indicated that termination of the de-
fense treaty with Taiwan would not find Congressional support: “[H]ow can we 
abrogate such a treaty [the MDT] for the sake of informal representations by the 
PRC that a ‘peaceful settlement’ of the China question [meant is the Taiwan issue] 
will take place?”412  
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Another letter from Dawson Mathis (Dem-Georgia) signed by 28 members 
of the House of Representatives made clear that the United States did “not only 
have a moral obligation to honor our mutual defense treaty with our long-time 
friend and ally, the Republic of China, but that it is in the long range security of our 
own nation to this commitment.”413 It would not be the last time that Taiwan’s se-
curity was linked to national security and strategic interests of the United States. 
Some other members of the Congress found harsher words for the idea of 
normalizing Sino-American relations at the cost of Taiwan than Burgener or 
Mathis. John M. Ashbrook (Rep-Ohio), member of the House of Representatives, 
called Carter’s plans a “betrayal of the basic principles Americans hold dear”, and 
blamed the Carter administration to ignore “our best interests and those of our 
friends [Taiwan] to try to impress those [the PRC] who are the slavemasters of 800 
million people.” Moreover, Ashbrook argued that cutting Washington’s security 
relationship with Taiwan would weaken the overall position of the United States: 
“By abandoning Free China U.S. policy does not exhibit strength.”414  
William L. Dickinson (Rep-Alabama), another member of the House of 
Representatives went a step further, presenting the preservation of U.S. ties with 
Taiwan as a matter of morality. Hence, the congressman openly claimed to forgo 
on normalization at all since the People’s Republic “is still a totalitarian Com-
munist dictatorship.” Dickinson further argued that only “[a]micable relations 
should be maintained with the PRC, if possible, but not wholly on their terms” be-
cause Beijing would “need us [the U.S.] more than we would need them...”415  
It is difficult to measure how much of the Congressional support for Taiwan 
was the result of the aforementioned Taiwanese efforts and how much was political 
tactic, pragmatic intentions, or even pure anti-communism on the part of conserva-
tive politicians like Barry Goldwater Jr. (Rep-California), John Ashbrook, or Wil-
liam Dickinson. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker states the Taiwan Lobby’s influence was 
very limited, arguing that “Taiwan could prevent recognition [of the PRC] only if it 
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could cause a revolt in Congress, which it could not...” Instead, as her argument 
continues, Taipei was only able to prevent abandonment.416 However, as we will 
see, this was not necessary because Carter had no plans to disengage from the Tai-
wan Strait and leave Taiwan on its own. 
It is clear that the strategic advantages, which Washington could gain via 
normalization with the PRC, outweighed Taiwan’s worries by far. This precluded 
the majority of the Congress to reject normalization in general. As the American 
diplomat Charles Freeman Jr. who served in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter admin-
istration says, any Congressman “with any strategic sense” knew that China’s stra-
tegic value as a counterweight to the Soviet Union was simply too high.417 A com-
plete “revolt” of the Congress was therefore unlikely but the legislative branch 
could still cause problems for the Carter administration. 
The statements in the aforementioned letters from Capitol Hill made clear 
that the administration could not expect Congress to watch how the president pro-
ceeded with normalization in a way that could do any harm to the American inter-
ests in the Taiwan Strait. As the previously quoted letters indicated, different cir-
cles in the Congress presented a wide range of arguments in favor of the preserva-
tion of America’s ties with Taiwan. They stressed the island’s strategic, economic, 
and political value for the United States. Some congressmen even went as far as 
calling it a moral duty to ensure Taiwan’s security. But did the Carter administra-
tion really care about the Congress’ opinion? 
Legitimizing U.S. China policy was an important part of the equation. Since 
gaining support for normalization itself was not too problematic, the more pressing 
question was how the White House would deal with Taiwan and the legislative 
branch. Subsequently, Carter and his aides tried to delay the moment when they 
had to deal with the public and the Congress concerning normalization and the 
Taiwan question. The goal was to keep the political costs low. Hence, secrecy 
would become an important aspect of the administration’s tactic. As Neoclassical 
Realism suggests, the White House was aware that the political stakes were high 
and that it needed a lot of effort in order to accumulate enough resources to make 
normalization with the PRC and derecognition of the ROC work. 
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The Carter administration’s approach of delay and secrecy indicated that the 
Carter administration was afraid of Congressional interventions. According to 
Brzezinski, this anxiety influenced Carter’s and his aides’ discussions about the 
course of normalization.418 Because Carter had to assemble public and Congres-
sional support in order to legitimize his policy, he could not ignore the Congress 
completely. Yet, this did not change the administration’s policy in the aftermath. 
As a letter from the Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison Frank 
Moore to Representative Dickinson shows, the White House barely tried to appease 
its Congressional critics stating only that it planned “to retain active economic, 
cultural and other relations with Taiwan.”419 Such platitudes, however, left the im-
pression that the Carter administration did not seem to take Taipei’s concerns for 
its future seriously, though, as I will show, this was not the case. But why did the 
Carter not make his intentions to continue the American engagement in the Taiwan 
Strait clear in public?  
There is more than one answer to this question. First and foremost, the pres-
ident could not afford to alienate the People’s Republic in this early period of the 
normalization process when negotiations had not even begun. It was important to 
prevent Beijing from thinking that the American involvement in the Taiwan issue 
would only change in name but not in substance. In this case, the PRC leadership 
would at least publicly question the administration’s seriousness about normaliza-
tion. Moreover, such a maximum demand by Washington would reduce the flexi-
bility of the Carter administration because getting anything less than a strong U.S.-
Taiwan security relationship after normalization would appear as a weak result for 
the White House. Such an outcome would result in outrage of those people who did 
not want any kind of change in U.S.-ROC relations at all. Due to Nixon’s and 
Ford’s promises to PRC officials, the Carter administration’s leeway for its China 
policy was already significantly limited. Giving a public statement about his ad-
ministration’s intentions to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait would only further 
reduce Carter’s policy options as it would lead to frictions between Washington 
and Beijing. 
The second reason for Carter’s reluctance to state his intentions concerning 
Taiwan publicly was of a political nature. There was no guarantee that the Con-
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gress and the administration’s political opponents would cease criticizing Carter’s 
China policy. Carter had already hinted, even before he became president, that he 
“would never let that friendship with the People's Republic of China stand in the 
way of the preservation of the independence and freedom of the people on Tai-
wan.”420 As we have seen, conservative circles nonetheless criticized his plans for 
normalization. The administration needed time to convince a critical mass of Con-
gressmen of the price normalization would cost. This price was derecognition of 
the ROC and only unofficial relations with Taiwan in the future. The problem was 
that a public debate about normalization and the Taiwan issue would disrupt 
Carter’s China policy. Public pressure would prevent the administration to make 
the necessary concessions to the Chinese concerning Taiwan. Without American 
concessions like the acceptance of the PRC’s three preconditions, the president 
would not be able to achieve normalization at all. 
Finally, the Carter administration wanted to prevent any disruptive actions 
by the Taiwanese. While a strong statement about the preservation of U.S.-Taiwan 
security ties would alienate Beijing, such a statement would also encourage Taipei 
to further torpedo Carter’s efforts for normalization. It was therefore necessary to 
tame the Taiwanese and their friends in the United States in order to keep as many 
options as possible open to the White House. The best way to do so was to ignore 
Taiwan and his supporters. From this point of view, I argue that the White House 
had nothing to gain from being honest about its commitment toward Taiwan’s se-
curity. Therefore, Carter and his aides had no reason to put much effort into ac-
commodating U.S. Congress and the regime in Taipei. Instead, they widely ignored 
the legislative branch and the Taiwan Lobby for as long as possible in order to 
avoid a premature heating up of the public debate about the topic. 
The Carter administration’s lack of empathy for Taiwan was based on a 
feeling of superiority vis-à-vis Taipei. A memorandum written in Brzezinski’s 
name by Oksenberg confirmed this attitude. Oksenberg argued the administration 
should proceed with its plans for normalization, ignoring any disturbances by Tai-
pei because “all the bargaining leverage is on our [U.S.] side.” The KMT regime 
simply needed U.S. support in order to secure its survival. Therefore, as the paper 
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advised, the Carter administration should not “exaggerate the Lobby’s [sic] effec-
tiveness and thereby intensify in our minds an essentially manageable problem.”421 
 This advantage vis-à-vis Taiwan allowed the Carter administration not to be 
considerate of Taipei’s anxieties. It also enabled a reconciliatory course toward 
Beijing, without alienating the ROC regime too much. As a consequence, Carter 
approved to downgrade the relations with Taipei step-by-step. He wanted to 
demonstrate to Beijing how serious he was about normalization. For that purpose, 
the Carter administration had already rejected any requests of ROC officials for 
high-level meetings. The next step was the White House’s decision to downgrade 
the rank of the commander of the American forces on Taiwan. This was a smart 
move since it gave Beijing the impression that Washington cherished its improving 
ties with the PRC more than its security relation with Taipei. On the other hand, 
Carter’s decision did not do any real damage to Taiwan’s security since as Harold 
Brown argued the “nature and size of this command [the U.S. Taiwan Defense 
Command] no longer requires a three-star officer.”422 
Despite all efforts by the Carter administration to ignore all Taiwanese and 
Congressional disruptions as well as the White House’s decision to accommodate 
the PRC, there is no hint that the administration planned to abandon Taiwan. The 
Carter administration was aware that Taiwan still held value for the U.S. position in 
East Asia, as Oksenberg wrote in the aforementioned memorandum about the Tai-
wan Lobby. He argued that the U.S. “have derived benefits from our association 
with the KMT [Taiwan]: trade, access to a strategically important island, and the 
infusion of an Asian society with some of the values we esteem.” It was no ques-
tion that “we [the U.S.] wish to maintain these benefits and we have a historic obli-
gation to help Taiwan sustain a peaceful, prosperous future.”423 Oksenberg’s con-
clusion reflects my argument derived from Neoclassical Realism that close security 
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ties with Taiwan supported the American position in Asia-Pacific at the cost of the 
PRC.  
From the Carter administration’s point of view, Sino-American normaliza-
tion was not going to threaten the prosperity and security of Taiwan because Tai-
wan’s security did not rest on the U.S.-ROC defense treaty as long as the United 
States found other ways to remain involved. According to Oksenberg, the ROC 
leadership seemed to share this perception because “[i]n reality, Chiang Ching-kuo 
believes Taiwan can survive” without the MDT.424 This notion made the Carter 
administration believe that it could accept Beijing’s three preconditions. In the 
meantime, Washington had to find a way to make unofficial relations with Taiwan 
work in all fields required: political, economic, cultural, and military. The answer 
to this problem could only be found through the development of a guideline for 




Presidential Review Memorandum-24 
The Carter administration did not intend to abandon Taiwan, not even for the sake 
of normal relations with Beijing. Instead, Washington did not see any reason to 
discuss its plans to assure Taiwan’s security in public because this could alienate 
Beijing. Still, during the first months of Carter’s presidency, the White House did 
not seem to have an idea of how it was going to achieve normalization with the 
People’s Republic while also guaranteeing the continued U.S. involvement in the 
Taiwan Strait. This changed in late spring 1977, when Carter’s aides discussed the 
further course of action. The result of these discussions was PRM-24. Other than 
Vance’s memorandum which discussed normalization on a rather abstract level, 
this document set the foundation for Carter’s normalization policy, including the 
administration’s plans about Taiwan and the position it should take during the ne-
gotiations with the Chinese. 
Although PRM-24 took the Taiwan issue into account, it focused on the 
foreign policy implications of the normalization process while elaborating on the 
basic benefits of normalization for the United States. The first advantage was the 
possible reduction of the U.S. military engagement in Asia since the United States 




did not have to counter Chinese aggression in the region, anymore. Now, Washing-
ton could focus on counterbalancing Soviet influence in the region, and the Chinese 
side would even welcome such efforts.425 This was a complete reversal of the situa-
tion in the 1950s and 1960s, when the United States had to be much more careful in 
its interventions in the Far East. 
Due to normalization, the balance of power would turn in Washington’s fa-
vor and Moscow would face more pressure, not only in East Asia but also on a 
global scale. Perceiving that the distribution of power would favor the United 
States in the foreseeable future, the authors of PRM-24 expected the Soviet Union 
to demonstrate a significant willingness to cooperate with Washington on matters 
like arms control, fearing the pressure Washington could force on them if normali-
zation was to occur. The improvement of U.S.-PRC relations together with the “Si-
no-Soviet rivalry provides important and tangible strategic benefits to the United 
States.”426 Indeed, the Soviets seemed nervous about the increasing exchange be-
tween Chinese and Americans, as USSR Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin indicated 
during talks with Jimmy Carter in the spring of 1977.427 
PRM-24 also argued that the Soviet factor was an important incentive for 
Beijing for further improvement of its relations with the United States. The docu-
ment claimed that, since the Chinese leadership, and especially Deng Xiaoping, 
saw the Soviet threat as the biggest danger for China’s security and its territorial 
integrity, closer cooperation with the United States would help to secure the Chi-
nese eastern borders, so that its vulnerability to Soviet provocation decreased.428 
Due to this analysis, the State Department’s policy planners thought Washington’s 
bargaining power favorable, so that the Chinese would be more accommodating 
during normalization negotiations than they had been in previous discussions. 
Similar to rapprochement in the early 1970s, the consequence of normaliza-
tion was that the United States would have better relations with China and the So-
viet Union than these two communist powers enjoyed with each other. Therefore, 
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the American China experts claimed that any delay in Sino-American reconcilia-
tion could tempt the Chinese to seek an improvement of their relations with Mos-
cow. Success in that regard would strengthen Beijing’s position in its negotiations 
with Washington. This would make it more difficult for the U.S. to gain conces-
sions from the Chinese side concerning the American involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. Moreover, the authors of PRM-24 warned that a failure of Washington’s 
efforts for normalization with China was likely to result in a long-term stalemate in 
U.S.-PRC relations, which “could also relieve Soviet anxieties about prospects for 
improvements in US-PRC relations and thus have an adverse effect on our overall 
strategic position.”429 The necessity for a quick move towards normalization be-
came obvious. 
Although the policy planners hoped that Beijing would appear patient on 
the matter of Taiwan, they saw no alternative to severing Washington’s formal re-
lationship with Taiwan. This was the price the United States had to pay for the 
conclusion of normalization. There was no alternative because the continuation of 
the formal U.S. military engagement in the Taiwan Strait would virtually mean the 
failure of normalization. As PRM-24 suggested, the administration had to find a 
way to maintain U.S.-Taiwan security relations on an informal basis.430 The only 
consolation in this regard was that leaving the manacles of formal security ties with 
Taiwan behind offered more flexibility for Washington’s future policy in the Tai-
wan Strait. 
 As past experiences of U.S. administrations had demonstrated, any U.S. 
president needed as much flexibility as possible in order to lessen tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait. Otherwise, as long as the Taiwan issue was not settled, the danger of 
destabilization in the whole region was omnipresent. The MDT with Taiwan bound 
Washington, constituting which side the United States had to take in the event of a 
conflict. This made it much more difficult to act as an intermediary between Taipei 
and Beijing. The authors of PRM-24 believed that “[n]ormalization would reduce 
the degree to which important US interests […] remain hostage to the PRC-Taiwan 
dispute.” The end of the formal engagement of the United States in the Chinese 
Civil War “would somewhat lessen the PRC’s nationalistic concerns about Taiwan 
and substantially decrease Peking’s short-term incentive to use Taiwan as a pres-





sure point against us.” Moreover, the end of official U.S.-Taiwan security relations 
could help “to settle the Taiwan problem through mutual accommodation rather 
than military confrontation”, although neither Taipei nor Beijing seemed willing to 
pursue such a solution at that time.431 
The benefit of flexibility was worth risking the short-term stability of the 
regime on Taiwan. PRM-24 admitted that normalization would be a shock for the 
Taiwanese people. However, the document also assumed that the KMT regime 
would react reasonably once it came to derecognition of the ROC. The regime 
would be able to keep its citizens in check. The United States also did not have to 
fear the intervention of other countries like the Soviet Union. Taipei knew this 
would trigger a harsh reaction from the mainland, and the KMT’s legitimacy could 
suffer tremendously. Moreover, the KMT’s anti-communist attitude prevented 
them from exchanging Washington with Moscow as Taiwan’s protecting power.432 
It was rather the reaction of other countries in the region that concerned policy 
planners. 
The abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty could harm America’s 
credibility and its image as hegemonic power in East Asia. As the State Depart-
ment’s policy planners argued, eliminating “formal US security ties with Taiwan, 
coupled with the withdrawal of US ground forces from Korea and possible cut-
backs in our Philippine bases, could give the impression of a major US retrench-
ment in the Pacific.” Such concerns made it even more imperative for Carter to 
pursue a careful approach concerning normalization and the American obligations 
to Taiwan as an ally. The American public favored normalization but PRM-24 reit-
erated that this attitude would change if normalization was achieved “at the ex-
pense of our present relations with Taiwan”, since the American people did not see 
the “inherent contradiction in this position.” Even political allies in the U.S. Con-
gress could “feel that the way Taiwan is treated should take precedence over other, 
geopolitical considerations...”433 
Carter had to convince the U.S. public and Congress that Taiwan’s security 
and the well-being of its people would not be sacrificed for the sake of normal Si-
no-American relations. Therefore, Taiwan’s security and the American involve-
ment in the Taiwan Strait had to be compatible with normal relations with the 






mainland. It is important to note that the president had asked his advisers to take 
the latter into account when they drafted PRM-24.434  
The authors of PRM-24 suggested setting up some minimum requirements 
the Chinese side had to meet if the PRC wanted to establish diplomatic relations 
with the United States. The first requirement was that Beijing should give “ac-
ceptable assurances that the PRC will not take military action against Taiwan for 
the foreseeable future.” In addition, the United States should be allowed to provide 
Taiwan with arms in order to defend itself. Furthermore, the United States required 
full “economic and financial relationships” with Taiwan “which will sustain Tai-
wan’s economy and assure continued growth of foreign trade and investment.” Fi-
nally, the United States should express its hopes for a peaceful accommodation 
between Taipei and Beijing.435 The Chinese would react critically to these demands 
but it was necessary for the Carter administration to maintain Taiwan’s de-facto 
independent status. 
In fact, the requirements elaborated in PRM-24 allowed the United States to 
play a very active role in the Taiwan Strait. They represented not only an alibi for 
the Carter administration towards the U.S. public and the legislative branch in or-
der to save its face. They indicated a lack of trust towards the Chinese. To the 
Carter administration, it was not clear what would happen in the Taiwan Strait if 
the formal security relationship with Taiwan ceased to exist. The historical experi-
ence suggested that the PRC could quite well pursue a more aggressive approach to 
force Taiwan into reunification talks. Thus, PRM-24 made clear that it was not in 
Washington’s interest to end its involvement in the Taiwan Strait. The document 
only suggested changing “the form but not the substance of our relations with Tai-
wan.”436 This approach became even more obvious with the passing of the TRA in 
early 1979. Whatever would happen after normalization, the reunification of China 
did not seem to be in Washington’s interest. Instead, Washington sought stability in 
the Asia-Pacific region and strove to secure the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
This would allow the United States to focus its attention on Europe and other plac-
es of strategic interest like the Middle East and Southern Africa. 
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In the end, PRM-24 set the frame for Carter’s further China policy. The lit-
erature about normalization has mainly overlooked the meaning of the document. 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker mentions the memorandum but does not grasp its signifi-
cance for the normalization process.437 As I claim, it was the decisive document for 
the development of the Carter administration’s approach towards normalization and 
the way Washington was to deal with the Taiwan issue. The memorandum did not 
only formulate the goal of normalization but also weighed its advantages and bene-
fits versus the risks of failure. Of utmost importance in that context was the defini-
tion of the minimum requirements the PRC had to meet if it had an honest interest 
in normalization. Since the beginning of Nixon’s rapprochement policy in the early 
1970s, the American side had always reacted to Chinese demands, without defining 
the limits of its willingness for concessions. Now, the U.S. executive had a guide-
line, which did not only determine the goal itself but also the way, the White House 
could achieve normalization. With PRM-24, Washington virtually set the condi-
tions for normalization, not the Chinese. 
After the decision about PRM-24 had been made, the next step was to let 
Beijing know about the Carter administration’s intentions. The president himself 
used a speech at the University of Notre Dame in May 1977 to publicly announce 
his administration’s desire to start talks about normalization: 
“It's important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the 
People's Republic of China. We see the American and Chinese relationship 
as a central element of our global policy and China as a key force for global 
peace. We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on the 
problems that confront all mankind. And we hope to find a formula which 
can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us.”438 
These words made clear that China was important for Carter’s foreign policy, and 
that he wanted to find a way to make normalization happen. He wanted to achieve 
what neither Nixon nor Ford had been able to do. The major problem was still the 
Taiwan issue but, as PRM-24 indicated, the U.S. policy planners saw a chance to 
prevent this matter from spoiling the whole process. Next, it needed good timing to 
approach the Chinese, and the State Department identified four options for further 
steps. 
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 In a memorandum which prepared Cyrus Vance for a meeting with other 
high level members of the administration (the so called Asia group), Assistant Sec-
retary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke and the Chief 
of Policy Planning for China Paul Kreisberg described four options the United 
States could take in order to pursue better relations with China. Holbrooke and 
Kreisberg wanted to pursue normalization as quickly as possible, demanding a 
timely and serious effort to do so, including cutting all official ties with the ROC 
which would also mean the abrogation of the defense treaty. Simultaneously, the 
U.S. would continue to sell military equipment to Taiwan, announce unilaterally 
that it expected a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, and have cultural and 
commercial relations with Taiwan. According to the State Department’s officials, 
this approach stood in accordance with PRM-24, and fulfilled the United States’ 
minimum requirements to make sure Taiwan’s security. The administration just 
had to be careful not to alter the language of the Shanghai Communiqué, which did 
not foreclose self-determination for the people of Taiwan. As Holbrooke and 
Kreisberg insisted, it was important for the U.S. side to maintain an ambiguous 
language that would leave room for interpretation. 439  Together with PRM-24, 
Holbrooke’s and Kreisberg’s memorandum prepared the final decision about the 
Carter administration’s short-term approach toward normalization. 
On June 27, the Asia group began to set up the next steps. The meeting in-
cluded Secretary of Treasury Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of Defense Brown, 
the Director of the CIA Stansfield Turner, and National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski. Supported by the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense includ-
ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the group followed Holbrooke’s and Kreisberg’s line 
of argument. They choose the first option of proposing a serious effort towards 
normalization. However, in order to avoid any limitation for U.S. policy, they also 
opted to seek additional measures to improve Sino-American relations. These 
measures included the reduction of U.S. troops on Taiwan. Finally, the Asia group 
agreed that due to the political situation in the United States, the whole process 
could not “be absorbed domestically until sometime in 1978 at the earliest.”440 
Thus, it was impossible to develop a fixed timeline for the negotiations, especially 
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because Carter and his aides had no idea how the Chinese would react to Washing-
ton’s minimum requirements. 
The first chance for the administration to test its concept and to find out 
what the Chinese had in mind was Cyrus Vance’s visit to Beijing scheduled for late 
August 1977. The Secretary of State’s talks with Chinese top officials responsible 
for foreign affairs would determine what exactly the Chinese side demanded con-





Conclusion and Discussion 
When Jimmy Carter assumed presidency, he developed a host of ambitious foreign 
policy goals that included the objective of establishing full diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. Backed by Neorealist theory the archival rec-
ord suggests that such normalization aimed to strengthen the strategic position of 
the United States within the frame of the Cold War. This step should serve to put 
pressure on the Soviet Union and increase the incentives for Moscow to cooperate 
on a multitude of international issues. The new administration did not know what 
exactly the state of Sino-American relations was, since former presidents had con-
ducted their China policy in secrecy. It was quite shocking for Carter and his aides 
to discover the far reaching promises former administrations had made to the Chi-
nese, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue. According to Enrico Fardella, these 
promises weakened the new administration’s bargaining position.441 For the sake of 
continuation, Carter had to honor the former commitments between the United 
States and the PRC although it limited his policy options. 
The new administration had to face additional problems, which further lim-
ited its leeway. The Chinese government made clear that it expected the White 
House to follow the path Carter’s predecessor’s set, by accepting the three precon-
ditions the People’s Republic had laid down for normalization (withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Taiwan, severance of all diplomatic ties with Taipei, and abrogation of 
the MDT). Early meetings demonstrated how serious Beijing was on the matter. In 
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the Chinese’s point of view, the Taiwan issue was an internal affair and that the 
PRC would not tolerate any attempts of the Carter administration to continue the 
American security ties with Taiwan after normalization.  
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker writes that the reason for Carter’s reluctance to 
push stronger towards normalization with China in the early stage of his presidency 
was his desire to find a way to protect the people on Taiwan.442 The White House 
knew it needed to preserve its security relationship with Taiwan at least to a certain 
degree if Carter wanted to find domestic support for his normalization policy. Oth-
erwise, he would not be able to accumulate enough political resources to assert his 
plans and legitimize normalization with the PRC at the cost of derecognizing the 
regime in Taipei. The administration did not intend to abandon Taiwan. Carter and 
his aides just could not state this in public in order to avoid friction with Beijing. 
But the island’s security was deemed important for the U.S. position in East Asia. 
The U.S. public and even more so U.S. Congress put pressure on the White 
House, criticizing every step by the administration that could alter the status of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations in the future. Such disruptions were partly initialized by the 
regime in Taipei that sought to influence American policy as much as possible 
though only with minimal success. The Carter administration mostly ignored Tai-
pei’s pledges for more exchange. The executive also tried to keep Congress out of 
the decision-making process. Carter’s concerns that the Taiwan Lobby and U.S. 
Congress could spoil his administration’s attempt to normalize relations with China 
were immense. 
Robert Ross and Michael Schaller claim, the White House did not pursue 
normalization seriously at the beginning of Carter’s term because Washington was 
optimistic that it could handle the Soviet threat alone.443 This perspective neglects 
the aforementioned numerous problems Carter and his aides faced concerning their 
China policy. While the strategic situation vis-à-vis Moscow had always played a 
role in the Carter administration’s considerations, Carter and most of his aides pur-
sued normalization for more than this one reason. In fact, lacking flexibility and 
growing domestic pressure were responsible for the delayed development of the 
administration’s normalization strategy; not over-confidence vis-à-vis the Soviet 
                                                 
442 Bernkopf Tucker, “Strait”, 90. 
443 Ross, “Negotiating”, 93-97; Schaller, “United States”, 203-206. 
145 
 
Union, as Ross and Schaller claim. In addition, the Carter administration had to 
find a way how to deal with the Taiwan issue before it could really approach the 
Chinese. 
Considering the administration’s situation in the first half of 1977, Carter 
and his aides were not at all off to a slow start in their China policy. For example, 
only one week after Carter had met the Soviet ambassador in Washington Dobryn-
in, he met PRC Ambassador Huang Zhen. More important, the development of 
ideas and plans for normalization had started even before Carter’s inauguration.444 
A working group installed by Cyrus Vance shortly after the elections developed a 
memorandum, which discussed the advantages and risks of normalization on a 
broad scale. These ideas reappeared later in PRM-24, a document that was crucial 
for the further development of Carter’s China policy. All this happened in the first 
half of 1977. As the archival record shows, the administration had a clear notion of 
its China policy no later than early May. 
PRM-24 did not only state the motives for the administration’s pursuit of 
normal relations with China, but also defined the limits of Washington’s willing-
ness to make concessions to the People’s Republic. For the first time since Nixon’s 
rapprochement policy had begun in 1970/1971, the United States had set its mini-
mum requirements for normalization. Taiwan’s security should not be jeopardized. 
Beijing had to accept U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, Washington would 
publicly state its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, expecting the 
Chinese not to contradict such a statement. Such claims would present much more 
resistance to the PRC’s demands than the Chinese were used to face after having 
dealt with the Nixon and Ford administration. Carter and his aides felt prepared to 
take further actions towards normalization, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s 
trip to the People’s Republic which was planned for August 1977 would become 
the first real test for the Carter administration’s determination to normalize its rela-
tions with Beijing. 
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Chapter IV: Proving Seriousness, July 1977-May 1978 
 
In the summer of 1977, Jimmy Carter had been president for more than half a year. 
He had tackled many issues in foreign affairs, initiating negotiations about a new 
SALT agreement and a new agreement about the Panama Canal as well as talks for 
peace in the Middle East. His China policy, by contrast, seemed to stagnate as even 
his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted in a memorandum 
from late July, 1977.445  
However, this was about to change. After the administration had developed 
a strategy paper (PRM-24) for its China policy, Cyrus Vance’s trip to China, which 
was scheduled for late August, provided a chance to galvanize the normalization 
process. But as the Secretary of State’s talks with the Chinese would demonstrate, 
the Chinese and American position on Taiwan and the details of normalization 
were still far from being congruent. 
 This chapter deals with the period after the Carter administration had devel-
oped a political strategy for normalization, examining how the Chinese and Ameri-
cans approached each other in order to bring themselves in the best possible posi-
tion to start talks about normalization. Although negotiations between the PRC and 
the U.S. had not been initialized yet, the White House wanted the Chinese to know 
about the U.S. administration’s desire for progress in the normalization process. 
The visits of Cyrus Vance in August 1977 and Zbigniew Brzezinski in May 1978 
were of major importance for this aim. While some analysts of the history of Sino-
American relations have deemed Vance’s talks with the Chinese leadership a fail-
ure,446 these talks were in fact absolutely necessary for the White House to learn 
more about Beijing’s lacking readiness for concessions on the matter of Taiwan. 
Furthermore, it was important to let the Chinese side know that Washington also 
had conditions for normalization to work.  
 From my point of view, Vance had to “fail”, so that Brzezinski could “suc-
ceed” later. The Carter administration had to probe what maximum position it 
could pursue. It was also important to let the Chinese know how Washington’s own 
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demands looked like. Otherwise, the PRC would maintain a position where it could 
dictate the further course of negotiation process. In addition, the Carter administra-
tion learned about the pertinacity of Beijing concerning the Taiwan issue. As dis-
appointing as Vance’s visit appeared, its outcome was necessary because both sides 
needed to see what bargaining position the other side had adopted.  
 Now, Chinese and Americans did their best to demonstrate to each other 
how serious they were about normalization. Particularly Beijing’s behavior during 
the months following Vance’s visit underlined the Chinese interest in normal rela-
tions. It also became apparent that they preferred an interlocutor who was less in-
clined to promote détente. Instead, PRC officials wanted someone who despised 
any kind of cooperation with the Soviets. 
 As we will see, the Chinese thought Carter’s National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski would be this person. He fit very well in Beijing’s negotiation 
approach. Deng Xiaoping sought to develop a personal relationship with one U.S. 
top official, similar to the relationship between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger 
during rapprochement. A personal relationship with Brzezinski could help Deng to 
make the U.S. side understand the PRC’s position, particularly concerning the 
Taiwan issue. Deng’s choice was not surprising. Vance seemed tougher and more 
straightforward on the matter of Taiwan, while Brzezinski preferred a more subtle 
approach, using vague and indirect phrases to describe the necessity for the Carter 
administration to maintain a security relationship with Taiwan. Moreover, the for-
mer professor from Columbia University in New York was a well-known anti-
Soviet.447  
The Chinese flattering suited Brzezinski well as he wanted to control the 
administration’s China policy in order to use it as leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Un-
ion. According to the journalists James Mann and Patrick Tyler, this ambition was 
the reason for some interagency struggle, and Brzezinski was able to alter some 
basic decisions.448 In the end, his trip to China would gain importance as he was to 
announce the president’s willingness to start negotiations about normalization as 
soon as possible. 
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The APNSA underestimated the president’s determination to maintain con-
trol over the China policy as he denied Brzezinski’s wish to improve the relations 
with the People’s Republic by selling American technology to China. Carter had 
his own notion of how to proceed with the normalization process. The president 
was not willing to let others make decisions, which could dilute the U.S. bargaining 
position or would expose his administration to political pressure at home.449 This 
included Carter’s intention not to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of normalization. In 
this author’s opinion, the island was still too useful, and would even gain useful-
ness in the decades to come as it provided future leverage vis-à-vis the PRC. The 
record clearly demonstrates that the Carter administration was rather willing to risk 
normalization than giving up its exclusive influence on Taiwan although the U.S. 
president did not explain his intentions to the KMT regime. 
While the Americans could not bluntly tell the Chinese they were not to 
give up Taiwan, Brzezinski was instructed to make them aware about the Carter 
administration’s minimum requirements concerning the island. The discussions 
about this topic made clear that Deng Xiaoping was going to be the main interlocu-
tor for the Americans. He also seemed to be the one Chinese official who was most 
interested in normalization. Above all, Deng appeared willing to make concessions 
if necessary. Since he was the most powerful figure among PRC leaders, he was in 
a position to do so. Eventually, it was Deng’s reconciliation that would enable both 
sides to begin with the normalization negotiations only a few weeks after 




Interim Report and Preparations 
Although the Carter administration had made great strides in developing a strategy 
for its China policy during the spring of 1977, Brzezinski was not satisfied with the 
administration’s achievements in that area of foreign affairs. He gave the admin-
istration good marks for its efforts in the Middle East, South Africa, and the Horn 
of Africa. Yet, he remained cautious about Carter’s China policy, seeing a need for 
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“[c]orrective measures” in order to demonstrate the administration’s seriousness 
about normalization.450 Cyrus Vance’s upcoming trip to Beijing represented the 
first chance to demonstrate this seriousness. It was also the first chance after the 
Americans had set normalization as a policy goal to learn more about the Chinese 
position and the limits of their flexibility. This made the Vance mission a serious 
and delicate matter.451 
 The question was how far Vance should push in order to convince the Chi-
nese side that Washington would be ready to start serious talks about normaliza-
tion. In preparation of Vance’s meeting with the president and other members of 
the administration who worked on its China policy, the Secretary’s aides wrote a 
memorandum, which discussed the purpose of Vance’s trip to Beijing. The State 
Department considered setting of a target date for normalization as problematic 
because of the domestic opposition to changes of the status-quo in U.S. China poli-
cy. Conservative circles were almost paranoid when it came to the Taiwan issue, 
and it would be difficult to gain Congressional support for normalization if it meant 
derecognizing the ROC regime.452 The administration had to be cautious, which 
concessions it would make to the Chinese.  
The memorandum also suggested a bold approach concerning Washington’s 
minimum requirements, as laid down in PRM-24. Vance had to point out the U.S. 
need to station government personnel in Taiwan although these people “would not 
perform diplomatic functions.”453 Since Vance’s talks would set the tone for the 
upcoming negotiations with the Chinese, this advice appears surprising as it could 
alienate the Chinese while leading to an impasse of the normalization process. 
However, the Carter administration had to state its own conditions in order to 
maintain some initiative during the upcoming negotiations. Carter shared this view. 
 In a meeting on July 30, the president ordered Vance to be very direct about 
U.S. requirements concerning arms sales and a security relationship with Taiwan. 
Carter said that his “experience in life has been that it never pays to procrastinate.” 
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He also agreed with the DOS that setting a target date for normalization was not 
necessary, urging Vance to use phrases like “’promptly’ or ‘as soon as possible’” in 
order to demonstrate Washington’s solemnity. The president even wanted his sec-
retary to draft a normalization communiqué. Carter was aware that an acceptance 
by the Chinese would put some time pressure on the administration. At the same 
time, Carter was sure that “[i]t would take two months to prepare Congress and 
others” for normalization, and he was “prepared to work within that time frame.”454  
 This prompted Carter, against the previous practice to avoid talks between 
high-level members of the administration and representatives of the ROC, to con-
sider a meeting with ROC Ambassador Shen to inform Taipei about his inten-
tions.455 The president’s deliberation left no doubt that he thought normalization 
was within reach. Otherwise, his fears that the KMT regime would spoil his plans 
would have prevented him from informing Taipei. 
 Brzezinski, however, was not as optimistic as the president about Vance’s 
chances for success in China. He seemed concerned that Carter’s enthusiasm for 
normalization could neglect the administration’s efforts to strengthen the China 
Card, which should help to put pressure on the Soviets. Thus, in a memorandum 
from August 5, Brzezinski tried to lower Carter’s expectation. The National Securi-
ty Advisor was skeptic that the Carter administration’s “flexible posture on normal-
ization will elicit a favorable response” by the Chinese. Therefore, besides discuss-
ing the bilateral issue of normalization, Vance’s agenda should incorporate an ex-
change of matters of strategic dimension. According to Brzezinski, “[t]he plain fact 
is that our [Chinese and American] parallel strategic interests against the Soviet 
Union, not bilateral [sic] interests, provide the impetus to our relationship with 
China.”456 Reminding the Chinese about the strategic dimension of their relations 
with the United States should strengthen the relationship and also emphasize the 
American willingness to counter Soviet power. These points underlined that the 
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National Security Advisor valued normalization only in terms of strategic ad-
vantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.457 
 Carter disagreed with Brzezinski’s approach, seeing the usefulness of nor-
malization on a much broader scale. In a letter with instructions for Vance’s trip, 
the president underlined that Vance’s main goal was “to engage the Chinese in 
meaningful discussion on issues where we potentially can be helpful to each other: 
Korea, southern Africa, the Horn, Southeast Asia, and possibly South Asia.” Talk-
ing about such issues was not neglecting the Soviet dimension of U.S.-China rela-
tions, since Carter also asked Vance to “give a full exposé of our policy regarding 
U.S.-Soviet relations, with strong emphasis on our capacity to manage those rela-
tions effectively.” 458  In accordance with Neorealist conclusions, normalization 
should still serve to improve the strategic situation of the United States, by creating 
a more favorable balance of power. Carter’s intentions, however, went beyond pure 
Cold War thinking. 
The president saw normalization and its consequences very clearly, know-
ing that the U.S. would have to give up its official ties with the ROC. Hence, he 
wanted to prove his determination not to sell out American interests or the future of 
the people on Taiwan:  
“[I]n addressing the Taiwan issue, we must make certain that our actions in no 
way jeopardize the confidence of the people of Taiwan in a prosperous, tran-
quil future. Clearly, if we are to alter the form of our relations with Peking and 
Taiwan, we have an obligation to do so in a way that maintains the peace and 
stability of the region.”459 
Carter also wrote that he wanted the Chinese to be more flexible on the matter of 
Taiwan. This meant that they would have to tacitly accept U.S. arms sales after the 
conclusion of normalization. The president knew that the Chinese had to gain from 
normalization as much as the United States. He did not see any reason to accom-
modate Beijing at any price, without getting something in return. 
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Carter’s emphasis on the necessity to protect Taiwan also sharpened his 
sense of reality since he did not expect that Vance would actually achieve normali-
zation during his trip. Hence, the president assured the Secretary of State that “[t]he 
success of your trip will not be measured by its immediate results but by whether 
you have set in motion processes which over a period of time will consolidate our 
favorable position.”460 Despite his enthusiasm, Carter was aware of the difficulties 
between the Chinese and the U.S. He still saw Vance’s trip as a probe maintaining 
quite a measure of skepticism about Beijing’s willingness to accept Washington’s 
conditions concerning Taiwan. 
While Carter considered to inform Taipei about his intentions, Brzezinski 
thought it would be better if the president or the Secretary of State would speak 
with the Taiwanese after Vance’s return from Beijing.461 The APNSA was obvi-
ously concerned such a meeting would send the wrong signal to the mainland’s 
leadership. Yet, Carter had decided to brief the ROC leadership about the purpose 
of the Secretary’s trip. It was an attempt to be honest and direct to Taipei, and also 
to avoid accusations by the Congress that the White House left its loyal ally out of 
its considerations. This made Carter’s considerations part of the administration 
efforts to accumulate enough resources to legitimize its China policy. 
Prior to Vance’s trip, the State Department sent Ambassador Leonard Unger 
to ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Unger should inform the Premier that the Sec-
retary of State was going to talk with the PRC leadership about the possibility of 
normalization. The ambassador should also still Taipei’s fears that the United 
States would abandon the island, as Washington’s “approach to normalization will 
continue to be guided by our [American] concern not to undercut Taiwan’s security 
and well-being”, making sure “that any agreement on normalization protects the 
essence of Taiwan’s current relations with the U.S.”462 The briefing served two 
purposes. First, it should prevent Taiwanese protests which could lead to public 
criticism of the Carter administration’s China initiative. Second, the president 
wanted to demonstrate his concerns about Taiwan, not leaving the KMT regime in 
the dark about his intentions. Chiang reacted reserved and warned the Americans 
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that Beijing would “make no concessions on Taiwan…”463 As Vance was to find 




Vance’s Trip to China 
When Vance arrived in Beijing on August 21, the 11th National Congress of the 
CCP had just been concluded on August 18. It was the first Party Congress after 
the death of Mao Zedong and the purge of the Gang of Four. Hua Guofeng used 
the meetings in the Great Hall of the People to foster his position as the CPP’s 
chairman, while Deng Xiaoping was officially reinstated in his offices. Only a 
month before, he had reemerged after being purged in 1976. It was a time when the 
new PRC leadership had just been able to stabilize its grasp of power. Especially 
Deng was not in a stable position. Although he had a considerable power base, he 
was still positioning himself within the higher ranks of the PRC government.464 In 
such a situation, Vance and his delegation could not expect to find the CCP regime 
in a very conciliatory mood. 
 The U.S. Secretary of State pursued his mission with a series of meetings 
with PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua from August 22-24. Huang who had started 
his career as an English translator for Mao possessed a lot of experience in negoti-
ating with the Americans. He was involved in the armistice negotiations that ended 
the Korean War as well as in the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in the late 1950s. 
Before he was appointed as foreign minister in 1976, he also served as the PRC’s 
ambassador to the United Nations. This position offered him some insight into the 
thinking of his American counterpart. While he was not the main decision-maker in 
Chinese foreign policy, he was perfect in conveying the PRC’s position. As most 
successful diplomats, Huang could not only exhibit polished rhetoric, polite re-
straint, and genuine humbleness, but also possessed a good mix of cold blooded 
confidence and barefaced snappishness. Meeting Huang was a true first test for 
Vance. 
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In the meetings with Huang, Vance presented the U.S. point of view on dif-
ferent issues of global, regional, and bilateral interest. According to Patrick Tyler, 
Vance’s presented the U.S. position in a rather sterile manner reading from notes 
without searching for eye contact. Tyler criticizes that Vance’s attitude made it 
difficult to establish an atmosphere of mutual courtesy.465 Indeed, the record sug-
gests that Vance had opted for an unemotional approach wrapping himself in a 
mantle of calmness. However, other than Tyler argues, this approach reflected the 
uncertain situation the American delegation was facing. Since the Secretary of 
State did not know exactly how the Chinese would react to his proposals, it made 
sense to appear unmoved, restrained, and at times even humble. The Americans 
wanted to learn the Chinese position; they had not come to Beijing to win a debate 
contest. 
Early on, Vance and Huang discussed the strategic situation of the United 
States and its struggle with the USSR. The Chinese claimed that Washington need-
ed the PRC to cope with the Soviets. They exaggerated the threat the Soviet Union 
represented to the United States, arguing “the continued rivalry between the US 
and the Soviet Union is about to lead to a world war.” Huang questioned the Amer-
ican strength concluding “the US is a bit afraid of the Soviet Union” since “the 
Soviet Union is going on the offensive and the US is on the defensive.” Further-
more, he passionately criticized Washington’s “appeasement policy.” In his view, 
détente was responsible that “Soviet ambitions for aggression and expansion have 
become bigger…”466 Of course, Vance could not allow such statements to remain 
unanswered. 
The Secretary of State emphasized again and again that the United States 
saw itself in a strong position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He admitted that the So-
viet Union was the main threat to U.S. security, and the rivalry between Washing-
ton and Moscow would be fueled by strategic and ideological differences.467 Vance 
even conceded to Huang that the U.S. expected its competition with the USSR to 
continue.468 However, he strongly disagreed with Huang’s conclusion about Amer-
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ica’s strength, being adamant that due to the economic and political superiority the 
United States enjoyed vis-à-vis Moscow “the US is not on the defensive, and we 
certainly are not afraid of the Soviet Union.”469 The Carter administration still in-
tended to search for ways to lessen tensions with the Soviet Union, and it would 
not allow Beijing to spoil its attempts to revive détente.470 On the one hand, Beijing 
should see the United States as a strong partner in global and regional issues. On 
the other hand, the PRC leadership should not think it could manipulate U.S. poli-
cy.  
With this emphasis of strength, Vance underlined that the United States 
could handle its Soviet rival even without Chinese help. The U.S. administration 
was convinced that the USA was still more powerful than the USSR. Washington 
also wanted to prevent the impression that it needed better relations with the PRC 
in order to cope with Moscow. Such an impression would have left Beijing with a 
lot of leverage over Washington. Vance was convinced that the PRC was more 
afraid of the USSR than the United States. Hence, the Secretary of State tried to 
advertise the U.S. as a powerful nation, making a tacit alliance with the United 
States so tempting for Beijing that the PRC would make concessions concerning 
Taiwan. Unfortunately, Vance’s plan did not work out, as the Chinese proved to be 
inflexible on the matter of Taiwan. 
When Vance started his deliberations about Sino-American relations and 
normalization, he appeared very accommodating, stating that both sides should 
leave history aside, since normal relations between Washington and Beijing should 
be natural despite differing positions on key issues. The basis for the process of 
normalization would be the Shanghai Communiqué. However, referring to the 
aforementioned Carter administration’s minimum requirements, Vance also made 
clear that it needed the prospect of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. In 
addition, the United States wanted to continue some form of informal ties between 
the United States and Taiwan. Only then, Washington’s “diplomatic relations and 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei would lapse, and we would be prepared to af-
firm that publicly…” The Secretary added that the U.S. side was also “prepared to 
complete the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Tai-
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wan…” concluding that “in principle, I can say we are prepared to begin the pro-
cess.”471 This was the first time a member of the Carter administration announced 
the willingness to fulfill China’s three preconditions. 
Yet, as Vance continued his proposal, he urged the Chinese to take into ac-
count U.S. domestic politics. As soon as the president would break off official rela-
tions with Taiwan, he was to face domestic pressure because of the “strong feelings 
of friendship for the people of Taiwan” in the American public. Vance pointed out 
that it was important for President Carter to avoid an “unduly divisive debate at 
home” in order to continue the normalization process. Therefore, the U.S govern-
ment wanted to maintain strong cultural and commercial relations with Taiwan. In 
order to do so “it would be necessary for U.S. Government personnel to remain on 
Taiwan under an informal [sic] arrangement.”472 These conditions alone were un-
acceptable for the PRC leadership, but Vance asked for even more. 
If the process of normalization should be publicly supported in the U.S., the 
Carter administration needed to maintain some sort of security relationship with 
Taiwan. Abandoning Taiwan would weaken U.S. alliances. Vance argued the 
American credibility as an ally, particularly vis-à-vis Japan and the NATO depend-
ed on such a relationship. For the sake of regional stability, Washington did not 
want to jeopardize Taiwan’s security. Vance assured the Chinese that the United 
States did not intend to intervene in the solution of the Taiwan issue. Instead, he 
pointed out that due to the Shanghai Communiqué, the United States had “taken [a] 
number of steps to reduce our role” in the Taiwan Strait including troop reductions 
and a more controlled arms supply for the island.473 It was a tightrope walk Vance 
had to walk, but it was necessary to make the Chinese understand that Washington 
had requirements of its own that had to be met if normalization should work out. 
Vance himself painted a positive picture of his meetings with Huang and his 
own performance. According to him, Huang even praised his understanding of the 
Chinese negotiation style.474 The Chinese were most interested in the Soviet Union, 
Korea, India, and the NATO. However, Sino-American relations and normalization 
remained in the center of the Chinese attention. Vance felt how eager the Chinese 
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side was to approach the normalization issue as his “interlocutor, foreign minister 
Huang Hua, signaled clearly several times that he wanted to hear our views on 
normalization as soon as possible.”475 Nonetheless, he also admitted that the PRC 
still opposed the U.S. position concerning Taiwan.476  
Indeed, Huang Hua’s statement from August 24 stated nothing new about 
the Chinese position on Taiwan.477 The foreign minister openly criticized the U.S. 
concession to be “lip-services” since the Carter administration’s views would vir-
tually negate the three preconditions. This left the impression that the U.S. would 
continue to interfere in Chinese internal affairs: “You regard Chiang Kai-shek as 
your pet and you boasted about the Chiang Kai-shek clique and gave it support. 
[…] It seems to me that you are still in need of Taiwan.” From Beijing’s point of 
view, the question was for what purpose the United States would need the island. 
At least, Huang alluded indirectly to China’s patience on the matter of liberating 
Taiwan: “If we can’t liberate Taiwan in this generation, we will do it in the next 
generation.”478 It was a sign of hope that agreement between Washington and Bei-
jing was still possible. 
Huang’s emotional release was rather a rhetorical exercise than a substantial 
exclusion of further progress in Sino-American relations. It was an attempt to gain 
bargaining power by showing no empathy for the needs of the U.S. on the matter of 
Taiwan. The Chinese style of negotiating rested on the idea to maintain a maxi-
mum position for as long as possible. Such a position was presented as a matter of 
principle and national pride. The aim was to prevent an interlocutor from gaining 
an advantage through early concessions.479 Officials of the Carter administration 
would face this attitude multiple times over the following months. The next PRC 
leader Vance met was Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, a charismatic but humble tac-
tician who was a master of the Chinese approach to negotiations. 
Deng who was born in 1904 had served the CCP in numerous positions. As 
a protégé of Zhou Enlai, he had fallen out of grace during the Cultural Revolution 
                                                 
475 Report, Cyrus Vance to White House, 08/22/1977, “China, 1977” folder, Box 34A, Chief of 
Staff Jordan, Jimmy Carter Library. 
476 Report, Cyrus Vance to White House, 08/23/1977, “China, 1977” folder, Box 34A, Chief of 
Staff Jordan, Jimmy Carter Library. 
477 Report, Cyrus Vance to White House, 08/24/1977, “China, 1977” folder, Box 34A, Chief of 
Staff Jordan, Jimmy Carter Library. 
478 Memcon, Cyrus Vance to White House, 08/24/1977, “China MR-NLC-98-215 (2)” folder, Box 
40, Vertical Files (VF), Jimmy Carter Library. 
479Solomon, “Behavior”, 71. 
158 
 
due to intrigues by the Gang of Four.480 Purged from the leading ranks of the CCP, 
it took the support of high leaders in the PLA for him to regain influence from 
1977 onwards. Deng chose not to assume the leading role in the communist party, 
leaving the position of the CCP’s chairman to Hua Guofeng. Instead, he settled in 
the background, pulling the strings in a way compatible with his political objectives 
–his main goal was the modernization of China.481 In spite of his less prominent 
role in the hierarchy of the PRC leadership, Deng was the most important decision-
maker in the country’s foreign policy at this time, and Vance’s talks with him were 
of major importance to gain the real perspective on the Chinese position. 
When Deng met the Secretary of State on August 24, the Chinese vice 
premier reinforced Huang’s criticism. He reminded Vance that President Ford had 
promised the use of the Japanese Formula. The Carter administration’s formula, 
however, “is not a step forward from the original process of normalization. It is, on 
the contrary, a retreat from it.” Deng made clear that the PRC government did not 
have to make concessions: “[…] it is the United States which will have to make up 
its mind” because “the United States owes a debt to China” –something former 
Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed with. All Vance could do in that situation 
was to point out that the Carter administration’s position was consistent with the 
Shanghai Communiqué and China’s three preconditions which the U.S. govern-
ment was ready to accomplish.482 No matter what U.S. officials said, the Chinese 
were apparently not to give up their principle position on Taiwan. 
The differences between Americans and the Chinese came down to two 
points. The first problem for Deng remained, according to Vance, that the United 
States “were asking China to violate its historic principle that Taiwan was an inter-
nal affair by requiring a statement of peaceful settlement…”483 The second problem 
was, as Deng put it, that the Americans wanted “an Embassy that does not have a 
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sign on its door…switching the Liaison Office to Taiwan.”484 Now that both sides 
had learned about the other side’s conditions for normalization, concessions from 
the Chinese on the matter of Taiwan appeared even less likely. 
Surprisingly, in spite of the differences about Taiwan, the Chinese remained 
patient, and demonstrated their interest to work towards normalization. Deng did 
not believe both sides had to rush toward an agreement: “We have stated on many 
occasions we are patient. This is to mean that in improving relations between our 
two countries we can afford to do it in a more leisurely manner...” It was an expres-
sion of understanding for the American position that was further fueled when Deng 
indicated that China was also patient concerning the timetable for the liberation of 
Taiwan.485 Deng’s words appear as an early hint that the Carter administration 
could expect at least minor concessions on the matter of Taiwan. Vance even went 
as far as stating “that the mood surrounding the visit changed sharply after this 
meeting...”486 
When Vance met Chairman Hua Guofeng, they did not discuss the matters 
of normalization and the Taiwan issue. As Hua put it he had “no new opinion to 
add” to the comments of Huang Hua and Deng Xiaoping, but to Vance it appeared 
that Hua wanted Sino-American rapprochement to continue. 487  The chairman 
talked in length about the threat the Soviet Union presented to global stability, 
characterizing the United States as the strategic counterweight to Moscow: “The 
more important point in common is confronting the Polar Bear together.”488 This 
attitude supports Brian Hilton’s argument that Beijing regarded the Sino-American 
relationship essentially as one-dimensional at this time. The United States served 
the PRC to keep the Soviet Union in check.489 
Although Hua Guofeng formally held the highest position within the PRC’s 
leadership, Deng was the main interlocutor for Washington. He was clearly the 
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most candid Chinese official and seemed at times to leave the “boxlike” thinking, 
which limited China’s flexibility on the Taiwan issue. Hua, on the other hand, act-
ed like an elder statesman who could not be bothered with the details of normaliza-
tion –similar to Mao Zedong in 1972. His role was to explain to the Americans 
how the thinking of the Chinese leadership worked. This attitude gave him the ap-
pearance of a teacher and not so much of a politician. The Carter administration 
learned that they would negotiate with Deng. If the U.S. side wanted to force the 
Chinese to make concessions, the vice premier was the man they had to convince. 
Unfortunately, Deng’s political position was too unstable for him to be accommo-
dating concerning Taiwan. 
This observation was confirmed when rumors emerged in the U.S. press 
that Vance had gained concessions from Beijing concerning Taiwan. In that situa-
tion, it was Deng who harshly rebutted such rumors in an interview to a group of 
American journalists on September 6. He countered the impression “that the Chi-
nese would be flexible about promising not to take Taiwan by force if the United 
States withdraws” as he emphasized that “there is no such flexibility on the part of 
the Chinese.”490 According to this report by Associate Press journalist Louis Boc-
cardi, Deng further said Vance’s proposal contradicted President Ford’s promise to 
relay on the Japanese formula, and to severe diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The 
whole interview served the display of Deng’s disappointment. As much as these 
words served to criticize the U.S. administration, they also should underline Deng’s 
role as protector of China’s principle interests. However, even in this situation, 
Deng was keen not to close the door for further talks. Although he could not say so, 
the Americans had to understand that Deng and the PRC leadership were not able 
yet to make far reaching concessions. Thus, Deng conceded that, although there 
had been no progress on the matter of normalization, the meeting with Vance was 
still useful because it provided a platform for the exchange of views.491  
This last aspect was very important. We should understand it as the overall 
theme of Vance’s trip. It was obvious that Deng tried to put some pressure on the 
Carter administration, urging the USA to confirm its acceptance of Beijing’s three 
preconditions. However, Deng’s interview also demonstrated to the U.S. public 
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that the Carter administration had not made any far reaching concessions to the 
PRC concerning Taiwan’s security. This impression helped the administration to 
cope with the domestic situation and to accumulate more political resources. In the 
end, Deng’s interview did not hamper the normalization process, but was a public 
confirmation of Beijing’s position concerning Taiwan. 
As the record shows, in his talks with Huang Hua, Deng Xiaoping, and Hua 
Guofeng, Cyrus Vance proposed a strategy of maximum demands concerning U.S.-
Taiwan post-normalization relations. He never expected the PRC leaders to accept 
this proposal, and they eventually rejected it. Vance argues that he deliberately did 
not offer to the Chinese the more reconciliatory communiqué draft which he had 
with him. His decision was based on his concern that such a step could influence 
the domestic discussions about the Panama Canal treaty.492 Negotiating a new trea-
ty that granted control over the Panama Canal to the state of Panama after 1999 
was one of the major foreign policy goals of the Carter administration at this time. 
It was also an issue that the political circles in Washington discussed controversial-
ly.493  A push towards normalization at this time would have tested the White 
House’s ability to accumulate enough political resources at home to legitimize all 
its foreign policy projects. It was a choice between ratifying the Panama Canal 
treaty or normalizing U.S.-PRC relations at the cost of Taiwan. 
The Congress’ critical position on normalization and its consequences for 
U.S. ties with Taiwan became clear during the Congressional hearings in the fall of 
1977. The hearings dealt with the question of how the United States could achieve 
normalization in a manner that would serve American interests and commitments 
best. Congress eventually recommended the pursuit of normalization but warned 
that the executive should not achieve this objective at the cost of Taiwan.494 Ac-
cordingly, the Japanese formula was not sufficient to preserve American interests 
in the Taiwan Strait.495 The result of the hearings made clear that Vance’s instincts 
were right. If the administration wanted to gain Congressional approval for the 
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Panama Canal treaty, normalization had to wait. The administration was not able to 
bear the political costs of two controversial projects at the same time. 
In his memoirs, Brzezinski agrees that the Panama Canal treaty played a 
role for the decision to be more cautious on the matter of normalization. Further-
more, President Carter had second thoughts and was worried about the reaction of 
the Senate if the administration was to fulfill Beijing’s preconditions. In order to 
succeed with the Panama Canal Treaty, the administration needed the legislative 
branch’s support. The president therefore tended to choose a slower pace in his 
China policy. This decision, finally, led to the disappointing end of Vance’s visit. 
While the Chinese saw the whole meeting as a setback, the U.S. side was critical of 
Beijing’s lack of flexibility as well as their public anger about the situation. Never-
theless, as Brzezinski emphasizes, the Secretary of State’s trip had reopened the 
dialogue between Washington and Beijing.496 Yet, the result of Vance’s visit and 
Deng’s interview left the impression of a serious rift in Sino-American relations. 
The Carter administration had to act quickly if it wanted to improve the situation 




The Long Way Toward Reconciliation 
It did not take long until Carter’s aides started to make suggestions how the admin-
istration could accommodate the Chinese. Brzezinski believed that the U.S. side 
should indicate some flexibility on its position about Taiwan during Huang Hua’s 
visit in New York in late September 1977.497 Surprisingly, it was the Chinese side 
that used Huang’s meeting with Cyrus Vance at the United Nations to demonstrate 
China’s ongoing interest for better relations with America. The Chinese foreign 
minister transmitted a message from Hua Guofeng to Carter, which said: “Sino-
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U.S. relations are not a diplomatic question but a political question. It is necessary 
to consider this issue with long-term strategic interests in mind.”498 
 The chairman’s statement indicated the PRC’s strong interest to avoid a 
stalemate of the normalization process. The political dimension of Sino-American 
cooperation referred to both nations’ strategy to counter Soviet influence. In Hua’s 
opinion, this common interest was more important than their diplomatic differences 
about bilateral matters such as Taiwan. The statement urged the U.S. president to 
put normalization beyond problems like Taiwan, so that disagreement about this 
matter would not spoil their chances to contain the USSR. Hua appealed to Carter’s 
sense of strategic necessity, trying to remind him that the rivalry with the Soviet 
Union was America’s major concern, and not the loss of official relations with 
Taiwan. 
The White House was not aware of Hua’s attempt to manipulate the admin-
istration’s attitude on the Taiwan issue. Instead, everyone appeared relieved that 
the Carter administration’s proposal during Vance’s visit had not done any long-
term damage to the relationship. According to Brzezinski, it needed careful public 
statements in the future to maintain an atmosphere of benevolence. Additionally, 
the U.S. side had to show its resolve to pursue normalization seriously. That way 
the U.S. could “sustain the relationship at its present level for at least the next few 
months.”499 
 It was necessary that the administration informed the PRC government 
about its intentions to make a serious move toward normalization. This role fell to 
Carter’s man in Beijing Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, former President of the 
United Auto Workers. His instructions underlined that he was not to let the relation 
deteriorate by mutual misunderstanding. The White House wanted to demonstrate 
that it took Beijing’s differing views about normalization and Taiwan seriously. 
Therefore, Woodcock should clarify that a public statement by the U.S. about the 
peaceful solution of the Taiwan question was directed at U.S. Congress, and not 
meant as a contradiction to the Shanghai Communiqué.500 
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 While these suggestions did not mean the abandonment of Taiwan by any 
means, they, nonetheless, put the administration in a defensive position. In fact, not 
all staff members of the National Security Council shared Oksenberg’s point of 
view. In a polemic memorandum to Brzezinski from late September, Thomas P. 
Thornton, NSC expert for South Asia, indicated that the Carter administration 
should avoid the impression to chum up with the Chinese. Referring to Nixon, 
Ford, and Kissinger who had “haul[ed] themselves off to Peking to do homage”, 
Thornton thought the administration should not treat the PRC different from other 
countries.501 
It was a fair point, and in the aftermath of normalization, Carter and his 
aides had to face similar accusations from their political opponents. But in Septem-
ber 1977, Oksenberg campaigned to accommodate Beijing. In his opinion, the Chi-
nese had continuously demonstrated their willingness to be patient with the United 
States and its position on the Taiwan issue distinguishing between public and pri-
vate positions within the Carter administration.502 Considering Hua Guofeng’s em-
phasis on normalization as a political matter, Oksenberg was right. However, he 
underestimated that none of the involved actors could afford to overlook domestic 
politics and, in America’s case, even third parties like Taiwan and the Soviet Un-
ion. This pressure from the inside and outside forced the PRC and U.S. govern-
ments to save face in order to legitimize any concessions they would grant to their 
counterparts. 
Oksenberg disagreed with Thornton, and expressed his differing opinion in 
a memorandum to Brzezinski, criticizing Thornton’s lack of knowledge about Chi-
na and Sino-American relations.503 Instead, Oksenberg wrote in another paper: “If 
it takes a certain amount of deference to Chinese symbols to help ease Chinese tacit 
support for our global strategic posture, it is a cheap price to pay.”504 Brzezinski 
agreed with Oksenberg, and Thornton’s objections remained without consequences 
for the further development of the administration’s China policy. The disagreement 
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between Thornton and Oksenberg indicated that the latter had a strong influence on 
Brzezinski’s China approach. The archival record suggests that the APNSA took 
his suggestions concerning the PRC seriously.505 Oksenberg’s China friendly ap-
proach and his influence on Brzezinski certainly added to the fact that the APNSA 
was the most accommodating U.S. official toward the Chinese.  
It was also Oksenberg who insisted that the administration needed to 
demonstrate its resolve to continue the normalization process. A high level visit of 
another U.S. official seemed perfect for this intention.506 Thus, Oksenberg indicat-
ed in a meeting with Qian Dayong, the political counselor of the Chinese Liaison 
Office, that Brzezinski was interested in coming to China during his trip to East 
Asia in the spring of 1978. Qian seemed interested.507 It took a while before the 
Chinese sent their answer, but finally, in early November, they welcomed the pos-
sibility of a visit by the National Security Adviser.508 According to Patrick Tyler, it 
is not surprising that the Chinese liked Brzezinski as he favored the same relentless 
approach toward the Soviets as they did.509 
As soon as he heard of the Chinese reply, Brzezinski acted quickly, sending 
a cable to Leonard Woodcock asking for his opinion about his plans. The APNSA 
intended to limit the purpose of his mission to explaining the global aspects of Si-
no-American normalization as well as Washington’s reasons for approaching Mos-
cow on matters of mutual interest.510 Woodcock saw this as a good opportunity and 
agreed with Brzezinski to keep the scope of discussions limited.511 In reality, how-
ever, the APNSA was much more ambitious. 
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Brzezinski saw his trip not only as a chance to gain a better understanding of the 
Chinese position. He also wanted to get a stronger grip on the administration’s 
China policy. His goal was to lead it in the direction that he desired: a de-facto alli-
ance against the Soviet Union. His visit served to demonstrate Beijing that for 
Washington good relations with the People’s Republic were more important than 
better relations with Moscow. To prove this point, he also arranged a NATO brief-
ing for Chinese officers under his own authority. The briefing served to underline 
the security aspect of U.S.-China relations. It was a signal and a warning to Mos-
cow that Washington had a strong and deepening relationship with the PRC. An-
other such signal was the APNSA’s intention to treat China more favorable than 
the Soviets on the matter of technology transfers. Since PRC officials had suggest-
ed his visit, Brzezinski believed to have their trust, making him the logical choice 
to speak with the Chinese leadership. He claims in his memoirs Vice President 
Mondale and Secretary of Defense Brown supported his initiative.512 
Brzezinski’s plan led to a conflict within the Carter administration as Vance 
opposed the trip. Oksenberg thought Vance’s pleas against Brzezinski’s proposal 
were essentially of a bureaucratic nature.513 The Secretary of State had good rea-
sons for his opposition. Vance’s first argument was indeed of a rather bureaucratic 
character. He stated that U.S. foreign policy should be represented only by the 
president or the Secretary of State. Otherwise, the public perception of U.S. foreign 
policy could be confused. The second argument against the visit was more substan-
tial. Vance assumed the National Security Advisor would force an agreement at the 
cost of Taiwan and other U.S. interests he regarded as less important. Considering 
Brzezinski’s desire to hurt the Soviets, Vance was probably right. Ironically, Vance 
also claims in his memoirs that he had Vice President Mondale’s support.514 As 
stated above, Brzezinski claims the same. The historical record is not clear about 
this matter, but it is likely that the vice president rather supported Vance than 
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Brzezinski, because Mondale was supposed to be the next member of the admin-
istration to go to China, before Brzezinski intervened on his own behalf. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that he forgo his chance to go to China in Brzezinski’s favor. 
In the end, it was again the president who ended the argument. Vance 
should go to Moscow to discuss SALT, while he sent Brzezinski to China. In his 
memoirs, Carter explains that his decision was based on the importance of the 
SALT agreement. The president wanted to prevent any delay of this issue. Fur-
thermore, he believed that Brzezinski’s exploration about normalization could help 
the SALT negotiations.515 The president did not seem to be concerned about any 
possible interagency struggles about his administration’s China policy. His desig-
nation of Brzezinski to visit Beijing was not an attempt to downgrade Vance’s po-
sition. It was a pragmatic decision, which should underline the meaning of SALT 
to the president. 
During the period from late 1977 until early 1978, the Carter administration 
looked for as many opportunities as possible to signal Beijing its interest in seeking 
a compromise. If the process of normalization was to be completed after the Con-
gressional election in fall 1978, the Carter administration would have to start prepa-
rations as soon as possible after the Panama Canal Treaty vote in March. Before the 
vote, Oksenberg urged Brzezinski to get the president’s approval for some moves 
that would accommodate Beijing. The NSC China expert suggested measures like 
recalling Ambassador Unger from Taipei, reducing U.S. troops on Taiwan, licens-
ing key technologies for exports to the Chinese, and selling U.S. grain to them. At 
the same time, Washington should sell arms to Taiwan.516 The fact that Oksen-
berg’s memorandum included arms sales to Taiwan shows that while he was a 
strong supporter of concessions towards the PRC, he also thought the United States 
should meet its obligations towards the regime in Taipei. Yet, it still needed a clear 
signal to the PRC leadership that the Carter administration was serious about nor-
malization. 
Senator Edward Kennedy’s (Dem-Massachusetts) trip to China presented a 
chance to send such a message. When the senator met Brzezinski in November 
1977 to prepare his voyage, he asked for confirmation about the administration’s 
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seriousness regarding normalization. He wanted to forward the White House’s in-
tentions to the Chinese. According to Oksenberg, the senator should also stress that 
China’s public actions and rhetoric on the matter would have an influence on 
Washington’s “capacity to pursue normalization.”517 The administration still faced 
the dilemma that it had to please different actors at home and abroad. 
In the meantime, the Chinese sent their own signals for a broadening of 
U.S.-China relations. Hua Guofeng’s opening address at the National People’s 
Congress in early 1978 appeared as a commitment to modernization, and the Chi-
nese leader wanted to accelerate this process by increasing contacts with western 
countries. The goal was to acquire modern technology from these nations.518 There 
were also other, less obvious signals. For example, Beijing allowed two separated 
families of Chinese Americans to reunite after an intervention by the DOS. The 
U.S. liaison office was offered a second compound in Beijing, and Chinese military 
attaches were allowed to have social contact with their American counterparts.519 
Finally, the mainland’s most important newspaper 人民日报 (People’s Daily) fea-
tured a story about U.S. journalist Edgar Snow on its front page of.520 All these 
actions indicated that the Chinese really endeavored to signal their desire for fur-
ther progress in the normalization process. 
This impression was reinforced by an analysis of the State Department writ-
ten by Culver Gleysteen, the elder brother of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
William H. Gleysteen Jr. Culver assessed Sino-Soviet relations to be worse than 
ever before due to border conflicts and ideological disputes that made any com-
promise between Moscow and Beijing difficult.521 It was exactly the kind of situa-
tion the Carter administration had hoped for when it developed PRM-24. 
However, as advantageous as this situation was, it also presented some di-
lemma for U.S. policy since it was in Washington’s interest to cooperate with both 
communist powers. According to Gleysteen, playing the Soviets and the Chinese 
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against each other was a very risky strategy. The diversity of U.S. interests forbade 
alienating either of the communist powers. Gleysteen questioned Brzezinski’s ideas 
to extend the security dimension of Sino-American relations in order to put pres-
sure on Moscow. Therefore, the memorandum argued that the Carter administra-
tion should deal with both, Chinese and Soviets, individually, keeping in mind the 
general triangular situation. Neutrality between those two was imperative. Selling 
arms and modern technology to China was very risky in Gleysteen’s opinion:  
“Such arguments [for selling arms to China] are only acceptable if one is 
comfortable about what policies the PRC may pursue ten or fifteen years 
from now and is unconcerned about the effect of such arms transfers on 
third countries which are either allies of the US or countries whose policies 
we are trying to bring into closer line with our own.”522  
Although Gleysteen agreed that normalization was still the best option for Wash-
ington to improve its relations with the PRC, his argument about arms sales and 
technology transfer was indeed valid. The administration could not know how Chi-
na’s foreign policy in general and Sino-American relations in particular would de-
velop over the long run, and how this would affect the balance of power in Asia-
Pacific.  
 The difficult question was whether better U.S.-China relations would help 
improving Washington’s relations with the Soviets, or whether it would lead to a 
deterioration of this relationship. The NSC’s and the DOS’s different position on 
this issue was the reason for the growing dissent between those agencies. On the 
one hand, the DOS favored a patient and realistic assessment of the situation at 
hand incorporating all variables that mattered in the context of normalization. 
Brzezinski and the NSC staff, on the other hand, reduced Washington’s relations 
with the People’s Republic solely on its significance within the realm of the Cold 
War.  
 The next meeting of the aforementioned Asia group reflected this disagree-
ment. The problems Brown, Brzezinski, and Vance were not able to solve during 
their discussion in April 1978, were how to proceed with normalization, to which 
technologies China should get access, and, above all, what kind of aircraft the U.S. 




could sell to Taiwan without provoking Beijing.523 But at first, they were occupied 
with the question of whether Congress could prevent normalization. In the DOS’s 
view, a Congressional blockade could have two reasons. The first was Senator 
Goldwater’s threat to challenge the termination of the MDT with the ROC legally. 
As Holbrooke said, the problem was that a law suit would “culminate in a debate 
on the Senate floor”. Brzezinski added that the administration would “be confront-
ed by the need to muster a majority” in the Congress.524 This would make the situa-
tion for the administration difficult. 
 The second problem was the way the administration would incorporate 
Capitol Hill into the development of U.S. relation with Taiwan after normalization. 
As Holbrooke pointed out the Congressional approval depended on the kind of 
security commitment to Taiwan that would replace the MDT. He suggested that 
following the announcement of normalization, the president could send legislation 
concerning future relations with Taiwan to Congress for approval. In this situation, 
the president had to underline that without this legislation any relations with Tai-
wan would be threatened.525 The administration eventually followed Holbrooke’s 
suggestion. Carter wanted to maintain the initiative on the whole matter of normal-
ization and the Taiwan issue.526 However, as the administration was to find out lat-
er, it was also the easiest way to alienate Congress because it left the legislative 
branch mostly out of normalization. 
While the Asia group was not able to anticipate the Congress’ reaction, the 
meeting made something else completely clear. No high level official of the Carter 
administration was of the opinion that the United States should sacrifice Taiwan for 
the sake of better relations with the People’s Republic. Secretary of Defense Brown 
put this commitment in words, saying: “But our relation with Taiwan will remain. 
The PRC is not going to get Taiwan back.” On the contrary, the administration saw 
Taiwan as future leverage vis-à-vis China for the time after normalization. This 
became clear when Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron asked if it was 
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not “useful to retain Taiwan as a way of securing leverage over Peking?”527 Indeed, 
Taiwan could still play an important part in America’s foreign policy and was ob-
viously still of strategic value. 
The group also discussed the question if normalization really had to occur 
in the latter half of 1978. The reason for “the rush” as Aaron expressed it was, ac-
cording to Vance, that both, the president and the vice president, believed normali-
zation could help the administration in its struggle with the conservatives in the 
Congress. Carter believed that since Capitol Hill saw any improvement of U.S.-
PRC ties as a means to weaken the Soviet Union, Congress would be more willing 
to approve other political decisions of the president. Brzezinski agreed with Carter 
as long as SALT would not work out with the Soviets. Otherwise the conservatives 
would see normalization as a weakness. Aaron indicated the Republicans would 
never support Carter on this issue. Therefore timing was important.528 
Brzezinski knew to use the dilemma of the right timing of normalization to 
his advantage. In a memorandum to the president that summarized the Asia group’s 
meeting, the APNSA asked Carter to decide if normalization should occur before 
the Congressional elections, soon after, or not until 1981. If Carter opted for one of 
the first two options, Brzezinski advised “that Leonard Woodcock should engage in 
quite, serious diplomacy soon after my trip.”529 Later, Carter emphasized in front of 
the press his approval of Brzezinski’s trip. The president made clear that the AP-
NSA’s visit was consultative and focused on “matters of common strategic con-
cern.” It would not incorporate any negotiations about normalization.530  
But Brzezinski asked Carter for permission to approach the high-level Chi-
nese leaders privately in order to discuss normalization without Woodcock or 
Holbrooke. Kissinger had done the same and “the really useful parts of his discus-
sions were the ones from which he [Kissinger] excluded members of his own dele-
gation […].” Brzezinski argued that “[o]therwise they [the Chinese] will not talk 
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frankly.”531 Carter eventually followed the APNSA’s advice, and Brzezinski’s trip 
became more than just an exchange of views on the international situation. It was 
the final probe that would allow the administration to demonstrate to the Chinese 
its seriousness about normalization, and as intended, the trip to Beijing gave 
Brzezinski more influence on the administration’s China policy. 
So far, Brzezinski had been able to convince the president of most of his 
ideas. Yet, it was up to Carter to decide the details of the next steps of his admin-
istration’s China policy. Brzezinski was not to have his way on all issues that were 
discussed in the Asia group’s meeting. This became clear on the matter of sales of 
dual-use technology to China. Brzezinski suggested more flexibility on technology 
transfers to China limited to fields such as agriculture, energy, medical service and 
mining. The APNSA argued that selling items to the PRC would not be the same as 
selling them to the Soviets. Also, the danger of any transfer from China to Russia 
would be negligible considering their bilateral relations. Moreover, Brzezinski in-
dicated that selling advanced technology to China would serve U.S. security inter-
ests.532  
The journalist James Mann argues that the readiness to sell dual-use tech-
nology to China demonstrated the Carter administration’s emphasis on using China 
to collaborate in the fields of military and intelligence against the Soviets.533 But 
Carter himself opposed such thinking. He was reluctant to sell any technology to 
China which could be later used for “military purposes.” He also wanted to prevent 
the impression Washington would favor the PRC over Moscow.534 It was another 
example that Carter saw the U.S. relation with China as part of a far greater 
scheme, which reached beyond the years of his first presidential term. 
As Brzezinski’s trip approached, Congressional interest and support for 
normalization grew. In different meetings with the Senators Jackson and Kennedy, 
the APNSA did not only get crucial advice. He was also told that the administra-
tion’s initiative to normalize relations with the People’s Republic gained support in 
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the Senate –even if it occurred within the framework of the Japanese formula that 
did not grant any kind of government-to-government relations between Washington 
and Taipei.535 Senator Kennedy argued that Brzezinski’s trip “will be counterpro-
ductive [sic] if I [Brzezinski] do not focus in some fashion on normalization.”536 
Reading through both memorandums and comparing them with other documents, it 
appears that Brzezinski used the Senator’s points of views to manipulate Carter. 
Either via skillful rhetoric or generous interpretation, he put his own suggestions 
and preferences into the mouth of the Senators Jackson and Kennedy. However, at 
this point, the president had not made any decision, and it needed a joint effort by 
Vance, Brzezinski and Brown to get Carter to define the goals of the APNSA’s 
meetings with the Chinese. 
Briefly before Brzezinski’s trip to China, he, Vance, and Brown sent a 
memorandum to the president, urging him to make a decision on the priority nor-
malization would enjoy among U.S. foreign policy goals at that moment. The right 
timing of normalization was important because its controversial character within 
the U.S. public made it difficult for the Carter administration to find unanimous 
acceptance for this policy. The memo’s authors presented different time windows 
from mid to late-1978 over mid-1979 to until after the elections of 1980, but stated 
the domestic political situation would be very difficult from late 1979 until the 
elections in 1980.537 This assessment indicated that the best timing for normaliza-
tion was the year of 1978, increasing the need for a successful Brzezinski trip. 
According to the memorandum, the APNSA should indicate the American 
willingness for serious talks without starting the negotiating process itself. The 
document further suggested that Ambassador Woodcock would soon thereafter 
begin negotiations in secret, assuring the Chinese that Washington would fulfill 
their preconditions but also formulating America’s terms. The timing would have 
to take into account the development of other policies like the SALT negotiations. 
In the meantime, Washington could reduce its troops on Taiwan, reveal arms sales 
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to the ROC regime, announce visits of U.S. officials to China, and let the President 
attend a Chinese cultural performance. 538  The document underlined that 
Brzezinski’s meetings should be only of preliminary nature in order to demonstrate 
earnestness about the start of negotiations. The National Security Adviser was not 
to detail the American position as this task was assigned to Woodcock. 
The memorandum asked Carter to decide whether negotiations were to start 
in the summer of 1978, and whether the process should be concluded by the am-
bassador or by higher U.S. officials. Further delay could lead to unforeseeable 
problems in the future as well as a general shortening of the “normalization win-
dow” which meant the time to deal with the Chinese and Congress concerning 
normalization. Moreover, if the administration did not move swiftly toward nor-
malization, the PRC government could improve its relations with the Soviet Union. 
Such a step would limit the strategic advantages of normalization. A postponement 
of normalization would also increase the incentives for China to improve its rela-
tions with other western countries. This would make it more difficult for the U.S. to 
get access to the Chinese market.539  
Carter’s aides also believed there were important advantages to be gained if 
the normalization process started soon. First, it would be complimentary to the 
SALT process as a demonstration that the U.S. was trying to improve its strategic 
position while also seeking cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese. Second, an 
early move toward normalization appeared beneficial since the state of U.S.-PRC 
relations would not have been better since the establishment of the Liaison Offices 
in 1973. Finally, despite a major setback for Taiwan, normalization would improve 
the U.S. position in Asia, by removing a major anomaly of U.S. foreign policy.540 
Vance, Brzezinski, and Brown deemed even the disadvantages to be mod-
est. While the negotiations could fail if the Chinese would not accept Washington’s 
minimum conditions, a failure “would be made more manageable” due to the fact 
that the negotiations were held “out of the glare of publicity.” On the domestic 
front, it needed a carefully planned strategy as the “die-hard supporters of the Re-
public of China could be expected to pull out all the stops” in order to prevent 
normalization from becoming legal. If the administration wanted Congressional 






support for its decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, it also had to 
“demonstrate not only that normalization would strengthen our global position, but 
also that it would lessen prospects for conflict in the area and, in the longer run, 
promote the continued well-being of the people of Taiwan.” The final problem was 
the necessity of legal adjustments that enabled the United States to deal with Tai-
wan after derecognition. As the memorandum concluded, this issue made any 
struggle with the Congress more problematic since the administration needed Con-
gressional support for such legislation.541 
As his instructions for Brzezinski suggest, Carter approved most points of 
the joint memorandum and followed Brown’s, Brzezinski’s, and Vance’s advice. 
The central point of Brzezinski’s trip remained the consultations with the Chinese 
concerning the international situation. The APNSA was instructed to express Chi-
na’s importance for the United States. He should also emphasize common Sino-
American interests and objectives. In addition, Carter wanted Brzezinski to make 
clear that the United States saw itself in a competition with the Soviet Union which 
would probably continue for some time. Nonetheless, the PRC government should 
be made aware that Washington was prepared to cooperate with Moscow in order 
to increase the level of international stability. On a bilateral level, Carter authorized 
the APNSA “[t]o reassure the Chinese that my Administration is serious in seeking 
normalization.”542 With this last remark, the president went beyond his advisor’s 
joint memorandum, essentially adopting Brzezinski’s point of view. 
While the joint memorandum suggested that Woodcock should present the 
details of the United States’ position to the Chinese after Brzezinski’s visit, Carter 
instructed his National Security Adviser to “reiterate U.S. acceptance of the three 
Chinese key points [preconditions] and reiterate the U.S. five points [made by Nix-
on].” Furthermore, Brzezinski should privately convey to the Chinese the basic 
position of the United States exploring “with the Chinese the possibility of devel-
oping ‘an American formula’ for a continuing non-diplomatic relationship with 
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Taiwan” that should include the sales of defensive military equipment to the is-
land.543  
Carter’s instructions gave Brzezinski what he wanted: an opportunity to di-
rect the administration’s China policy in the way he deemed necessary. 
Brzezinski’s gain of influence presented a great chance for Sino-American relations 
as he was a smart strategist. However, the APNSA’s heavy involvement also posed 
a risk to the broader framework of U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait. For the Cold 
War warrior Brzezinski was, he would do everything to gain an edge over the So-




In the Footsteps of Kissinger 
Brzezinski did not have the historically inimitable chance that his rival Kissinger 
had in the early 1970s when he secretly traveled to Beijing to conduct negotiations 
about Sino-American rapprochement. But Carter’s National Security Adviser could 
still help to bring a new dynamic into the ongoing process of normalization, which 
was exactly Brzezinski’s assignment. The relationship between Washington and 
Beijing had not only been stalling since Cyrus Vance’s visit in late summer 1977, 
but in fact since the establishment of Liaison Offices in 1973. 
 Thus, Brzezinski did not lose time as he conveyed Carter’s intentions to the 
Chinese as soon as possible. In the afternoon of May 20 after only a few hours of 
rest, he met Huang Hua in Beijing. Even before giving an extensive overview of 
the strategic position of the United States, and the White House’s plans concerning 
the Soviet Union and other foreign policy issues, the APNSA stated that the Carter 
administration was determined “to move forward with the process of normaliza-
tion.” Brzezinski said “on behalf of President Carter that the U.S. has made up its 
mind on the issue”, and “reconfirms the five basic principles enunciate by two pre-
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vious U.S. Administrations.” 544  Although he did not mention Taiwan directly, 
Brzezinski’s statement made clear that the Carter administration was willing to 
accomplish Beijing’s preconditions about this matter. 
 In their next meeting in the morning of May 21, Brzezinski and Huang ex-
changed their views on all the issues the National Security Advisor had presented 
the day before. Huang mainly reiterated his government’s criticism about détente, 
stressing the need for the Chinese and Americans “to work together to cope with 
the Polar Bear.”545 The Chinese did not understand why the United States tried to 
find a basis for cooperation with the Soviets, since, as Deng put it frankly, “[t]he 
main target of the Soviet Union is the U.S.”546 Hence, Huang Hua warned Wash-
ington not to “make China a pawn in your dealings with the Soviet Union, to divert 
the peril of the Soviet Union eastward […]”, and Brzezinski hurried to assure the 
PRC foreign minister that diverting the Soviet threat towards China “is not our in-
tention.” He elaborated that the United States was not weak and could handle the 
Soviets well enough: “The fact of the matter is that for the last 30 years we have 
opposed the Soviets and will continue to oppose it.“547 
 The exchange demonstrated that Beijing’s expectations about normalization 
with the United States had always been the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance, gain-
ing power at the cost of the USSR and improving China’s security. With regard to 
this, Chinese and Americans were able to leave their different ideologies and social 
systems aside. Even more important, the Soviet threat was the reason why the PRC 
leadership had been so patient with the United States on the matter of Taiwan. 
Therefore, the Chinese critique did not present anything new to Brzezinski and his 
companions. 
 However, when Huang moved to the topic of normalization, he revealed to 
the American delegation that for Beijing the major aspect of Sino-American rela-
tions “is the international issues and the minor one is the Taiwan issue, but they are 
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inter-connected.” It was the first time, a Chinese official made this point so bluntly. 
Huang even threatened that “[i]f the question of normalization is not solved, it is 
bound to affect the coordination of actions between our two countries in the inter-
national area to deal with the Polar Bear.”548 The foreign minister’s statement did 
not only indicate the PRC’s leadership’s belief that Washington needed Beijing 
more than Taipei, it also crushed all hopes Brzezinski and others were having that a 
tacit Sino-American alliance would be possible even without the completion of 
normalization. Huang made clear that any joint measure to counter the Soviet Un-
ion was linked to normalization, and normalization was linked to a change of the 
U.S. position on the Taiwan issue. 
 Thus, it was no surprise that the maximum concession the Chinese were 
ready to make to the Americans was the use of the Japanese formula –allowing 
economic and cultural people-to-people relations between the United States and 
Taiwan. The problem was that the Americans could not be sure if this formula ena-
bled them to sell arms to Taiwan. Moreover, it made a future involvement in the 
Taiwan Strait more difficult, limiting the scope of U.S.-Taiwan relations signifi-
cantly.  
 Knowing well that reunification would be much harder if the United States 
continued its protection of the KMT regime, the PRC wanted to prevent a strong 
U.S. role in the Taiwan Strait after normalization. Huang hence repeated the well-
known formula that Taiwan was “a matter of principle and on matters of principle 
there is no relaxation of China’s position or flexibility in China’s position.” 
Brzezinski responded noncommittally that the United States “recognize that this 
[Taiwan] is a matter of principle for you”, but that “a number of practical concrete 
issues which are complex, which are the product of historical conditions, which are 
intertwined with political complexities” would limit the Carter administration’s 
options on the matter. Brzezinski expressed his hope “that with good will and mu-
tual understanding these complexities can be overcome.”549 It was an attempt to 
move towards an “American formula” for the Taiwan issue because the Japanese 
formula would not calm down U.S. Congress and other supporters of the ROC re-
gime. 





 The only argument for Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s security 
which Beijing might understand was the necessity for the United States to remain a 
strong, reliable, and credible partner to its allies in Asia and the rest of the world. 
As Brzezinski explained to the Chinese, otherwise the Soviet Union could fill the 
voids left by the United States: “It is important for both the U.S. and China that the 
U.S. not be perceived as fickle and untrustworthy.” In that context, as the APNSA 
promised, Washington would consider how well the Japanese formula would fit 
the “historical needs and the complexities of a country which is not Japan.”550 
Since the Carter administration had already decided in internal discussions that it 
would not use the Japanese formula, Brzezinski’s promise was a delaying tactic. 
He would wait for his talks with Deng before forwarding the more daring points of 
his proposal. 
 Similar to the talks Cyrus Vance had held with the Chinese in August 1977, 
Brzezinski’s meetings with Huang Hua served purely as a platform for an exchange 
of views. Despite some harsh words and emotional outbreaks, the foreign minister 
did not make decisions or would alter the Chinese position. He should simply in-
form the Americans about the PRC’s point of view and demonstrate Chinese tenac-
ity on matters of principle. Having read many transcripts of meetings between Chi-
nese and American statesmen, Brzezinski was not surprised. He knew that his 
chance to soften the Chinese position would come when he was going to meet 
Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng. Still, learning about each respective side’s bar-
gaining approach was part of the process and the prelude to the more substantive 
discussions between Deng and Brzezinski. 
 When Deng and Brzezinski met on May 21, the National Security Advisor 
was more straightforward about the Carter administration’s conditions for normali-
zation. He revealed that due to domestic pressure Americans and the Chinese had 
“to find some formula which allows us to express our hope and our expectation 
regarding the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.” The vice premier replied his 
government would not oppose such a statement as long as China could state its 
own view on the matter as well. This was not what the Carter administration had 
exactly in mind since the issuing of parallel statements was “the beginning of the 
political problem at home” for the president. Thus, Brzezinski expressed the hope 




that the Chinese statement “would not be in direct contradiction” to the American 
one.551  
Brzezinski’s concerns left Deng skeptical if Carter was really willing to ac-
cept China’s conditions for normalization. He questioned the U.S. president’s 
commitment to start negotiations. Brzezinski hurried to assure the Chinese that 
“President Carter had made up his mind”, and then explained that “[o]ne can make 
up one’s mind but then the process of executing that about which one has made up 
his mind can be difficult.” The U.S. administration was ready to accept Beijing’s 
premises, and wanted Ambassador Woodcock to start serious negotiations in June. 
According to Brzezinski, Carter was “prepared to resolve this question as rapidly as 
it proves practical.” The USA had “no intention of artificially delaying…” the pro-
cess of normalization. In order to avoid leaks, the negotiations should be conducted 
in Beijing. Despite his skepticism and knowing full well that differences on the 
matter of Taiwan remained, Deng wholeheartedly accepted the American offer.552 
 Although Deng did not make any further concession to Brzezinski concern-
ing the Chinese statement about the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, the 
whole exchange took place in a much more conciliatory atmosphere than the previ-
ous talks with Huang Hua. Deng even demonstrated some understanding for the 
political situation which the Carter administration faced at home, and the need to 
take into account the reaction of American and Taiwanese people about normaliza-
tion. Therefore, the vice premier assured his interlocutor that the Chinese govern-
ment was not in a hurry to reunify Taiwan and the People’s Republic. Although 
Beijing’s patience was not endless, according to Deng, the PRC government had 
“stated in the past that if the U.S. was still in need of Taiwan, China could wait.”553 
While this was not the promise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue that 
the Carter administration had hoped for, it still was the farthest-reaching conces-
sion the Chinese had made yet, and it was not the only one.  
 According to the vice premier, Huang Hua was concerned that the Soviets 
could exploit an American withdrawal from Taiwan by approaching the regime on 
the island, and Taipei could even develop its own nuclear weapons. While such 
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concerns did not change Deng’s mind and he still would not concede to the Ameri-
cans more than close non-governmental and commercial ties with Taiwan, he was 
aware that continuing relations between Washington and Taipei would hamper any 
attempts by Moscow to get a foothold on Taiwan.554 Deng, hence, granted the U.S. 
side the need to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait although he was aware that 
this would make a reunification much more difficult. 
 Beijing needed Washington to remain close to Taiwan. Otherwise, the So-
viets could fill the security vacuum left by the Americans after the withdrawal of 
their troops as well as the termination of the U.S.-ROC defense treaty. An isolated 
ROC regime which would feel threatened could look out for an alternative alliance, 
replacing the one with the United States. Although Deng was confident that the 
PRC could deal with such problems on its own, Beijing let the U.S. continue to 
play a role in the Taiwan Strait as long as this role was linked to deterring the Sovi-
et Union. Chinese strategic considerations circled always around closing the rela-
tive power gap between China and the USSR. The PRC leadership perceived the 
Soviet Union as a much bigger threat to the People’s Republic than the United 
States. Closer relations with the United States thus helped China’s strategic posi-
tion. This is why Beijing granted the Americans more leeway on the matter of its 
post-normalization relations with Taiwan. In return, Washington had to fulfill the 
three preconditions. 
All of this allowed Brzezinski to draw a positive conclusion of his talks 
with Huang Hua and Deng Xiaoping. Although Deng had demonstrated the limits 
of Beijing’s patience and the PRC’s aversions to concessions, the National Security 
Advisor interpreted Deng’s statements about future U.S.-Taiwan ties in a particu-
larly positive way. In Brzezinski’s opinion, Deng’s statement about economic ties 
between the U.S. and Taiwan could be seen as a hint that, for the sake of keeping 
Soviet influence out of Taiwan, Beijing would accept arms sales: “Thus on the two 
subjects of concern to us -arms sales to Taiwan and a Chinese commitment not to 
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contradict our statement- we broke some new and intriguing ground. Woodcock 
shares that feeling.”555 
 In addition to Brzezinski’s talks with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and 
Huang Hua, some other members of the American delegation met with their Chi-
nese counterparts. While most of these meetings possessed a technical character 
and did not concern normalization or the Taiwan issue, Richard Holbrooke’s meet-
ing with the director of the Department for Oceanic and American Affairs of the 
Chinese foreign ministry Lin Ping touched the Taiwan issue in indirect fashion.556 
Holbrooke described to Lin the U.S. policy in Southeast Asia expressing Washing-
ton’s belief that the current balance of power in Asia should be maintained since 
any change could lead to instability.557 He used an argument developed in a Con-
gressional report written by China expert Robert G. Sutton who believed that 
Southeast Asian regimes like those in Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore viewed 
“the U.S. handling of the Taiwan issue as indicative of American intentions in the 
entire region, warning that a rapid withdrawal from the island will be seen as sig-
nalling a major decline in American interest in East Asia.”558  
 Holbrooke went beyond this regional perspective when he mentioned the 
four main powers in East Asia: the U.S., China, Japan and the USSR. Since, as the 
Assistant Secretary of State put it, “[t]he Japanese […] do not have a military role 
to play”, the four power constellation forced the United States to maintain its 
strong involvement in the region. Not once did Holbrooke talk about Taiwan, as his 
remarks about security and stability in Asia-Pacific were all directed at the Soviet 
Union. Yet, his explanations to Lin about the U.S. plans to strengthen the American 
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allies like the Philippines and Indonesia made it clear that the United States wanted 
to maintain their dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. 559  
 Although Holbrooke did not mention Taiwan, I argue, the island added to 
this dominance, by influencing the distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific region 
in Washington’s favor. The ROC regime’s mere existence weakened the mainland 
and kept the PRC from controlling important shipping lanes in East Asia. Moreo-
ver, Taiwan was a reliable trading partner and could provide U.S. forces with mili-
tary bases in the event of a conflict in the region. While no American representative 
could say it publicly, preventing the reunification of mainland China and Taiwan 
was in the interest of the United States. 
 The Chinese were aware of the American desire to maintain its dominance 
in Asia-Pacific. That was the reason why, in his conversation with Brzezinski on 
May 22, Chairman Hua Guofeng explicitly blamed the Carter administration for 
creating uncertainty about reunification through its arms sales. According to Hua, 
“arming Taiwan with military equipment” helped the creation of two Chinas. He 
further claimed that “the overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan, including a 
considerable number of military and political officers in the Chiang Ching-kuo 
government, desire reunification.” The U.S. policy just prevented “a quicker and 
better settlement of [the Taiwan] issue.” Therefore, as Hua distinctly expressed, the 
PRC government could not forgo the use of force since it was “responsible not only 
for the Chinese people on the mainland but also on Taiwan.”560 After Deng’s more 
conciliatory words, Hua’s open criticism was a warning to the U.S. administration, 
and a reminder of the constant vigilance of the PRC about the American involve-
ment in the Taiwan Strait. Still, it was a good sign that the Chinese press did not 
criticize the U.S. position, but instead underlined the common interests of the Chi-
nese and American governments.561 
 Brzezinski understood Hua’s critique as a kind of ultimatum for Carter: 
either the president wanted a statement about the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
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issue by Beijing, and the United State would stop selling arms to the island, or the 
administration would continue the arms sales without obtaining such a statement by 
the Chinese. In any case, Hua did not question the United States’ right to express 
its own point of view about the settlement of the Taiwan issue.562 Nor did he say 
anything the Carter administration had not known before. 
 Similar to Cyrus Vance’s visit in China, the PRC leadership had allocated 
different roles to their main representatives. Huang Hua presented China’s position 
and views, and discussed diplomatic and technical matters of the further proceed-
ing. Hua Guofeng played the part of the more critical interlocutor who is not really 
concerned about the outcome. The most important part fell to Deng Xiaoping who 
was the frank negotiator. He demonstrated some understanding of the U.S. position 
but was emphasizing the limits of Beijing’s willingness for concessions at the same 
time. It became obvious that Deng was the one defining the direction the whole 
process would go. The vice premier also seemed to be more eager to achieve nor-
malization than Hua. The whole Chinese leadership appeared tough but also seri-




Setting the Stage for Negotiations 
Back in Washington, Brzezinski was convinced his trip had been a success. In his 
report to Carter, the APNSA talked about new elements he had identified in the 
Chinese statements concerning normalization and the post-normalization ties be-
tween the U.S. and ROC. First of all, thanks to his presentation, the Chinese 
seemed to believe in the U.S. “willingness and ability to compete with the Soviet 
Union.” This belief enhanced the value the Chinese attached to their relationship 
with the United States, though such cooperation would not occur without normali-
zation. Second, although he had not talked about it directly, Brzezinski thought 
Deng and Hua understood the U.S. commitment to having economic and non-
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governmental ties with Taiwan including arms sales.564 For Brzezinski, that indi-
cated their understanding of what kind of relations the United States wanted to 
have with Taiwan in the future. Finally, Brzezinski admitted that despite a basic 
understanding for Washington’s need for a non-contradictory statement about the 
peaceful solution of the Taiwan question, it was obvious that Beijing was not going 
to demonstrate restraint on the matter.565  
 The Chinese concessions provided a basis for the upcoming negotiations. 
Moreover, they appeared very close to the minimum requirements of PRM-24 from 
a year ago. Since the White House had already confirmed the acceptance of Chi-
na’s three preconditions the chances for failure were minimized but still not eradi-
cated. Brzezinski, hence, concluded: “We are dealing with a capable and tough 
Chinese leadership but one which seems ready to do business with us.”566 
 Brzezinski did not express a particular affection for Deng Xiaoping in his 
report. He instead addressed Hua Guofeng’s behavior and charisma in a very re-
spectful manner. In Brzezinski’s opinion the CCP’s chairman possessed “the bear-
ing that a Chinese emperor is supposed to possess.”567 Surprisingly, in his memoirs, 
the APNSA praises the Chinese vice premier, and not Hua: “…Deng immediately 
appealed to me. Bright, alert, and shrewd, he was quick on the uptake, with good 
sense of humor, tough, and very direct. […] Here was a political leader who knew 
what he wanted and with whom one could deal.”568 Despite agreeing with his AP-
NSA’s opinion about Deng’s character, Carter believed he “had been seduced.”569 
 While Brzezinski had not lost sight of U.S. interests during his talks with 
Deng, he was made part of the Chinese negotiating tactic. As Richard Salomon 
explains the, PRC leadership had always been eager to find an interlocutor who 
appeared “helpful to their own objectives and who appeared likely to be ‘friend-
ly’.” The most important criterion for the Chinese choice was “a broad strategic 
and political outlook based on distrust of the Soviet Union […], and easy access to 
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the president.”570 Zhou Enlai had done it with Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s, 
and Deng did the same with Brzezinski. The more bureaucratic and guarded Cyrus 
Vance was not suitable for the role as a “Chinese friend”, while the National Secu-
rity Advisor appeared to PRC leaders not only as an obvious opponent of the Sovi-
et Union but also much more conciliatory toward the Chinese position. An article 
in the monthly magazine ᯠ华月报 (Xinhua Yuebao) echoed this positive attitude 
toward Brzezinski, praising his experience in international relations.571 As the Chi-
nese side was to find out, even Brzezinski’s influence and also his conciliation had 
their limits but for now the PRC leadership was content with their talks with 
Brzezinski. 
 The Chinese approach to signal their eagerness for normalization continued 
in June. As a report by David Aaron said, the government of the People’s Republic 
expressed publicly his satisfaction with the talks between members of PRC leaders 
and the president’s National Security Advisor. Beijing had also abstained from 
public criticism about U.S. foreign policy. According to the Deputy National Secu-
rity Advisor, the Chinese leadership even offered some assistance on other foreign 
policy issues and the Chinese rhetoric about the Taiwan issue appeared softer.572 
The soft line policy Beijing had started at the beginning of 1978 and which had led 
to Brzezinski’s trip to China continued. It was clear that the process of normaliza-
tion had entered a new phase in which both sides tried to avoid friction with each 
other, while they were finalizing their preparations before the negotiations could 
start. 
 In the meantime, the regime in Taipei tried to make the Carter administra-
tion aware that it still existed. In a meeting with Ambassador Unger on May 29, 
newly inaugurated ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo acknowledged the U.S. 
commitment to Taiwan’s well-being and security but criticized “that in normalizing 
relations with the Chinese Communists the US does great harm to the ROC and it is 
an action detrimental to ROC interests.” Nonetheless, the ROC was a loyal “ally of 
the US, situated in the Asian and Pacific region and dedicated to contributing to 
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peace and security in this part of the world.” Taipei’s policy toward the United 
States would not change. The latter aspect convinced Unger that the KMT regime 
was willing to have continued relations with the United States in any fashion per-
mitted by the U.S. government.573 Since Unger had no knowledge normalization 
negotiations were to start soon, he could not inform the Taiwanese leader about it. 
Again, Carter had decided to leave the ROC regime uninformed, deeming the risk 
of new disturbances too high. 
 Cyrus Vance had scheduled a meeting with Huang Hua for June 2, 1978. As 
the Secretary of State intended to inform Huang of the president’s reaction to 
Brzezinski’s visit in China, Carter wanted Vance also to convey to the Chinese that 
Ambassador Woodcock would contact the PRC government “to initiate confiden-
tial discussions with you [the Chinese] on normalization.”574 Vance did as he was 
ordered, adding on Huang’s request that Woodcock’s presentation would “be cov-
ering the whole subject of normalization.” Although the Chinese government wel-
comed the American suggestion, Huang still warned the U.S. administration not to 
“dabble in two China’s, one China and one Taiwan.”575 Despite Huang’s critical 




Conclusion and Discussion 
Although the administration had faced tremendous obstacles at the beginning of 
Carter’s presidential term in early 1977, it had developed a concise concept for its 
China policy by mid-1977 and was ready to seriously approach the Chinese con-
cerning the process of U.S.-PRC normalization. Still, National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski was not satisfied with the administration’s China policy desir-
ing a faster, more direct approach on the matter. The first top-level talks between 
high representatives from the People Republic and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
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were hence deemed important for the further progress on the matter of normal rela-
tions between Washington and Beijing. 
 Jimmy Carter shared this point of view but was also aware that his admin-
istration had to stand its ground concerning the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. He made clear that Vance should convey to the Chinese that despite a gen-
eral willingness to accept China’s preconditions for the beginning of negotiations 
about normalization, the U.S. executive intended to maintain some sort of security 
relationship with Taiwan after the withdrawal of all U.S. troops on the island, the 
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the diplomatic derecognition of the 
regime in Taipei. 
 When Vance stated Carter’s intention in his talks with Huang Hua, Deng 
Xiaoping, and Hua Guofeng, the Chinese reaction was dismissive. They interpreted 
the U.S. proposal as a setback for all efforts to normalize Sino-American relations. 
This view was emphasized publicly when Deng Xiaoping gave an interview to 
American journalists, harshly criticizing Vance’s proposal. 
 Deng’s public reaction leads many authors like Ralph Berger and Hao 
Yufang to the perception that the Secretary of State’s trip to China had been a 
complete failure since he did not achieve any progress on the matter of normaliza-
tion.576 Such a view is shortsighted. The Secretary of State’s visit manifested a 
probe rather than a real effort to start a negotiating process. The political window 
for normalization had always been more favorable in late 1978 than in mid- and 
late 1977. Vance’s lack of success in Beijing had more to do with China’s princi-
ples than with his approach. It was neither the first nor the last time that the Chi-
nese repelled U.S. attempts to gain concessions concerning U.S.-Taiwan post-
normalization ties. 
 According to the former U.S. diplomat and expert for East Asia Alan Rom-
berg, the White House had to present its maximum position at least once to the 
PRC although there was almost no chance to succeed.577 The strategy to propose a 
maximum demand served the legitimation of Carter’s China policy at home. 
Vance’s proposal was also necessary to make the Chinese aware of Washington’s 
own requirements for normalization. As the Chinese political scientist Li Gong 
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argues both sides had to learn about each other’s bottom line position.578 Cyrus 
Vance’s far reaching proposal served exactly this purpose, and even Deng Xiao-
ping admitted that the talks with the U.S Secretary of State helped both sides to 
gain a better understanding of each other’s position.579 Therefore, Vance’s presen-
tation was not, as Robert Ross claims, an attempt “to buy time” in order to post-
pone any serious negotiations about normalization until a more appropriate time.580 
The archival record clearly demonstrates that although Carter and his aides did not 
expect the Chinese to make any far reaching concessions, the White House aimed 
to achieve progress on the matter of normalization as soon as possible. It just did 
not want to give up its own conditions. 
 Still, Beijing’s reserved public reaction to Vance’s visit urged the Carter 
administration to double its effort to demonstrate its seriousness and good will to 
the Chinese. PRC officials were also keen to show publicly that China’s interest in 
further progress on normalization had not diminished. The climax of this develop-
ment occurred when Beijing invited Brzezinski to visit China for high level talks in 
spring 1978. The White House jumped at the chance to bring a new dynamic to the 
normalization process although Brzezinski’s intention to travel to Beijing led to 
some objections from the State Department. However, Carter was confident that his 
National Security Advisor was up to the task and permitted Brzezinski to go. 
 Patrick Tyler argues Carter’s decision demonstrated that Brzezinski domi-
nated the administration’s China policy, but this is not true.581 In fact, Carter had 
other plans for Vance. As he explains in his memoirs, one month before 
Brzezinski’s trip, he sent the Secretary of State to Moscow in order to demonstrate 
his administration’s willingness to improve its relations with both, China and the 
Soviet Union.582 It was a cunning move that did not only prevent Vance from feel-
ing downgraded but also demonstrated to the Chinese that the USA did not need 
Beijing to cope with the Soviets. 
 In the end, Carter granted Brzezinski considerable leeway in order to con-
vince the Chinese that his administration was ready to move towards normaliza-
tion. The APNSA should indicate that negotiations could begin as soon as possible. 
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However, the archival record also shows that no member of the Carter administra-
tion was willing to risk Taiwan’s security for the sake of normal relations with the 
People’s Republic –not even Brzezinski. Although the Chinese rejected the Ameri-
can demands for concessions on the matter, Deng Xiaoping indicated some under-
standing for the Carter administration’s needs in this context. He understood that 
the U.S president needed the support of the U.S. public and Congress in order to 
implement normalization successfully.  
 It was not much of an reconciliation, but it was considerably more than any 
U.S. administration had ever gotten before from a PRC leader. This gesture led 
Brzezinski and other U.S. officials to believe that Deng was their most important 
interlocutor concerning normalization. He was the man who would make the final 
decisions in the upcoming negotiation process. 
 A comparison between Vance’s and Brzezinski’s China trip suggests that 
the latter brought more visible results and was also more important for the further 
development of the normalization process. This is underlined by the fact, that only 
several weeks after the National Security Advisor had left Beijing, U.S. Ambassa-
dor Leonard Woodcock started negotiating with the Chinese. However, such a view 
underestimates the process-like character of normalization. The historical devel-
opment of the relationship between Washington and Beijing was characterized by 
highs and lows, rapprochement and alienation, stagnation and progress. On this 
scale, Vance’s visit does not even represent an extreme on this scale, although it 
did not improve the atmosphere of the relationship while Brzezinski’s visit laid the 
basis for further progress in the normalization process.  
 The U.S. and PRC governments had always struggled to stabilize their rela-
tionship, and the reason for this problem was their different interests on the Taiwan 
issue. Nonetheless, neither the Americans nor the Chinese had ever ceased to work 
on their relationship. In fact, Vance had not presented a line of argument to the 
Chinese that was fundamentally different from the one of Brzezinski. Without 
Vance’s visit and his straightforward presentation of Washington’s requirements 
for normalization, it would have been Brzezinski who would have faced the Chi-
nese leader’s opposition when confronting them with the U.S. administration’s 
point of view. 
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 There are four reasons why the Chinese accepted Brzezinski’s proposal 
instead of Vance’s. First, the Chinese leaders realized that the Carter administration 
would insist on a security relation with Taipei. If the PRC government aimed to 
soften this position, it could only do so via real negotiations. Second, while 
Vance’s proposal had indicated some kind of government-to-government relations 
between the United States and Taiwan, Brzezinski’s presentation did not include 
such a point anymore. Although the APNSA had used a relatively vague language 
to describe the U.S. intentions, everything he said had the character of non-
governmental relations between Washington and Taipei. Hence, Beijing could ac-
cept his proposal. Third, the Chinese could not risk “losing” the Americans. They 
needed them in order to counterbalance the Soviet influence in Asia. Thus, the 
Chinese realized that they had to make at least some concessions. 
 The most important reason for the change of Beijing’s attitude was that the 
PRC leadership around Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping had consolidated its 
power. Vance’s visit came only a few days after the 11th Party Congress of the 
CCP, when Deng had just been reinstated in his previous posts, still struggling for 
power. As Harry Harding argues, Deng’s political position at this time was not 
strong enough in order to make any concessions to the Americans. He could not 
afford to appear weak on a matter of principle for the Chinese.583 When Brzezinski 
came to Beijing, Deng was sufficiently established within the PRC leadership and 
strong enough to be more accommodating. Deng’s stable position and his believe 
that the PRC needed the United States to modernize its economy would help the 
upcoming negotiations about normalization. 
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Chapter V: Negotiating Normalization, June 1978-
December 1978 
 
The period between August 1977 and May 1978 was decisive for the relation be-
tween the Carter administration and the PRC leadership. Two visits by high offi-
cials from Washington in China, Vance and Brzezinski, helped both sides to con-
vey their respective positions to each other. The Chinese and Americans agreed 
that normalization was highly desirable, but were in obvious disagreement about 
the Taiwan issue. The PRC government insisted that the U.S. administration may 
only maintain unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan. The United States 
wanted to continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization, which was difficult to 
accept for the Chinese. In spite of this disagreement, both countries entered actual 
negotiations about normalization.  
 President Carter instructed the chief of the U.S. liaison office in China, 
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, to conduct these negotiations. The PRC was 
mainly represented by foreign minister Huang Hua, although it was Deng Xiaoping 
who finalized the normalization agreement in the decisive period of the negotia-
tions. All sessions were held in Beijing to provide secrecy. It did not take long until 
different notions about the future relationship between the United States and Tai-
wan became a problem. The Chinese tried to convince the Americans that their 
involvement in the Taiwan Strait made a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue 
more difficult. The Carter administration, on the other hand, conveyed to the Chi-
nese that the United States had to remain involved in the Taiwan issue in order to 
prevent domestic opposition to normalization. The U.S. position endangered the 
success of the entire process.584 
 This chapter describes the negotiations between the Chinese and Americans 
about normalization, and the problems both sides faced before they reached an 
agreement. It also explains why the PRC finally accepted continuing U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan, and why, as I am going to argue, this Chinese concession made the 
Carter administration the “winner” of the negotiations. Although both sides had 
very precise notions about the other side’s bottom line position concerning the 
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Taiwan issue, their different views and particularly the Carter administration insist-
ence to sell arms to Taiwan after normalization put the negotiations at risk. In my 
opinion, it was the Carter administration’s tenacity to maintain a security relation-
ship with Taiwan and the threat to let the negotiations otherwise fail that forced 
Deng to postpone any discussion about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to the time after 
normalization. 
 The negotiations which were conducted between July 5 and December 15 
were rather uneventful at the early stage. Both sides wanted their talks to gain some 
momentum before they started discussing matters of dissent. Hence, the first two 
sessions in July served to set the agenda of the actual negotiations. Then both sides 
presented their respective positions. The U.S. government’s implementation of the 
three preconditions concerning Taiwan (severance of diplomatic relations with the 
ROC regime, termination of the MDT, and the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from 
Taiwan) was of particular interest for the Chinese. 
 The meetings between Woodcock and different Chinese officials in Beijing 
were paralleled by some meetings of U.S. officials with representatives from the 
Chinese liaison office in Washington. These talks were an important part of the 
U.S. executive’s strategy to convey its position about the future of U.S.-Taiwan 
relations. As we will see, these meetings served the Carter administration as com-
plement to the negotiations in the Chinese capital, since they allowed U.S. officials 
including the president himself to be more candid about the administration’s inten-
tions concerning Taiwan. 
The Taiwan issue remained the most contentious point between Washington 
and Beijing. It did not take long until both sides spoke mainly about this problem –
in Beijing and Washington. Other differences were not going to play a prominent 
role in the normalization negotiations. The disagreement arose from the U.S. plans 
to continue its arms sales to Taiwan beyond normalization. The PRC leadership 
argued Washington’s intentions would make a peaceful solution of the Taiwan is-
sue more difficult. According to Deng Xiaoping, the continuation of arms sales to 
Taiwan would allow the ROC regime to reject talks with the PRC government. He 
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saw the U.S. administration’s insistence on arms sales as a contradiction to the 
American interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.585 
 The PRC’s complaints about the U.S. side’s intention did not change Presi-
dent Carter’s plans and his commitment to guarantee the security of Taiwan. Still, 
both sides reached an agreement about normalization on December 13, though 
some details like the exact wording of the joint communiqué had not been dis-
cussed yet. It certainly helped that the Carter administration accommodated the 
Chinese when they agreed not to conclude any new contracts about arms sales with 
Taiwan during the one year when the MDT would lapse in accordance with its Ar-
ticle 10.586 However, the Chinese side interpreted these concessions in a way that 
the U.S. administration would completely stop the sales of military equipment to 
Taiwan after normalization. 
 This misunderstanding which surfaced on December 15 led to panic actions 
on both sides in the following hours. The announcement of normalization was 
planned for the evening that same day. Any delay would embarrass Washington 
and Beijing. Still, the situation also demonstrated Carter’s adamant will to maintain 
a security relationship with Taiwan because the White House was not willing to 
change its position. Woodcock was therefore instructed to meet Deng in the after-
noon in order to explain the American position that the country would only abstain 
from new arms sales to Taiwan for the year of 1979. After this period of time, the 
United States insisted to resume the provision of military equipment to the ROC 
regime. As different officials of the Carter administration had previously stated to 
their Chinese counterparts, the U.S. public would not otherwise approve normaliza-
tion. The success of normalization relied on the last minute session between Wood-
cock and Deng to solve the problem. 
The Chinese vice premier was a shrewd and pragmatic tactician. Knowing 
the Americans would not budge on the arms sales issue, he relented to the U.S. 
position. Normalization served the PRC to gain a stronger position vis-à-vis the 
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Soviet Union, and Deng deemed the price for this achievement worth, even if it 
meant the continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. While Deng still criticized the 
American position harshly, he made the final concession during his meeting with 
Ambassador Woodcock, by suggesting postponing any further discussions about 
arms sales to the time after normalization. Normalization had grown into an im-
portant aspect of Deng’s reform strategy. He believed better relations with Wash-
ington were critical for the Chinese security because it put pressure on the Soviet 
Union. His concession at the negotiation talks removed the final obstacle, and with-





The Definition of the Negotiation Framework 
After the Carter administration had made the decision to open negotiations with the 
Chinese, it had to consider its approach. This process started with a Cyrus Vance 
memorandum for Carter that pointed out the major issues for the upcoming negoti-
ations and their desired result. Vance identified different assignments they had to 
accomplish. The administration had to work out how it wanted to conduct its future 
relations with Taiwan. Carter suggested the U.S. representation on Taiwan could be 
an “interest section”, a “trade mission”, or a “military mission” something similar 
to “what we have now with [the] PRC.” Vance also pointed out that the administra-
tion had to prepare its public statement about a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
issue while also making sure that the PRC would not contradict such a statement. 
Finally, the Secretary of State argued the administration had to state to the Con-
gress that arms sales to Taiwan would continue without provoking “a public coun-
terattack from Peking.”587 As Carter’s handwritten comments in the memorandum 
implicate, he expected the Chinese to accept future U.S.-Taiwan trade with “no 
restraint […] not single out arms or any other item.”588  
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 This position was tested a few days later when Chinese Ambassador Han 
Xu expressed his government’s concerns about possible sales of the F-4 fighter 
aircraft to Taiwan. In accordance with Carter’s position, Brzezinski replied that the 
White House’s acceptance of the Chinese three conditions for normalization would 
not exclude full economic relations between the United States and Taiwan.589 The 
administration used the potential opposition to normalization by U.S. Congress, the 
U.S. public, and U.S. allies to divert the PRC’s attempts to put pressure on the 
White House. Without the occasional demonstrations of support for Taiwan, the 
Carter administration had no chance to find domestic approval for normalization. 
U.S. arms sales to the island served this purpose. 
 A topic of disagreement between the president and his Secretary of State 
arose from the question of when the administration would inform U.S. Congress, 
Japan and Taiwan about its intentions to conclude normalization with the PRC. 
While Vance suggested “[c]onsultation with the Congressional leadership at appro-
priate times; and [n]otification to President Chiang and Japanese Premier Fukuda 
about three weeks before the announcement”, the president did not agree, urging 
Vance to be careful.590 Instead, Carter wanted to delay the involvement of Con-
gress as long as possible. Only a small group should be involved because, accord-
ing to the president himself, “[l]eaks can kill the whole effort.” His anxieties also 
included governmental agencies -even the White House. In the end, he ordered that 
neither Vance nor other members of the administration were allowed to give “pub-
lic hints of the degree of progress” of the normalization process.591 This attitude 
proved Carter’s growing anxiety that anyone could spoil his China initiative. 
Carter’s decision to keep the normalization negotiations secret proved to be 
his biggest mistake in the whole process. He ignored the Congress’ legislation (the 
Dole-Stone Amendment) on the matter, alienating many people on Capitol Hill. 
Moreover, the president’s refusal to inform Taipei or other U.S. allies of the out-
come of the negotiations with Beijing affected America’s credibility as an allied 
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nation.592 The United States did not lose any partners due to this behavior, but U.S. 
credibility still suffered in East Asia. Additionally, Carter’s secrecy made Congress 
and the ROC regime question the administration’s efforts to maintain a security 
relationship with Taiwan although these efforts enraged the Chinese and risked the 
success of the whole normalization process. On the contrary, as we will see in the 
next chapter, in the aftermath of normalization, Carter had to face heavy opposition 
from the U.S. public, Congress, and some of America’s most trusted allies in Asia. 
The president’s response to Vance’s memorandum also clarified his mini-
mum requirements concerning Taiwan, underlining that despite all efforts to leave 
Taipei in the dark the ROC’s security still mattered for Carter. The White House 
remained committed to the island, but had to accommodate the mainland in order 
to bring the negotiations to a successful ending. Probably for this reason, Carter 
agreed with Brzezinski on some changes in the instructions for Ambassador Wood-
cock who should approach the Chinese government for a meeting to start the actual 
negotiations. Brzezinski thought the administration should be more restrained 
about the question of the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, avoiding the im-
pression of “an explicit condition which […] the Chinese might feel compelled to 
refuse out of hand.”593 The negotiations should first begin and gain momentum 
before both sides would discuss matters of dispute.  
On June 22, Woodcock was instructed to set up a meeting with PRC foreign 
minister Huang Hua. His instructions did not demand a full presentation of the U.S. 
position towards normalization, but outlined the further proceeding of negotia-
tions.594 They also said that normalization including a joint communiqué was to be 
achieved until mid-December. Woodcock should convey to the PRC leadership 
that, due to this timeframe, Washington proposed an intensive negotiating process 
to follow with meetings every two weeks. The Chinese side should answer as soon 
as possible after each single issue between the two sides had been presented by 
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Woodcock. The U.S. would “prefer that there be maintained a mutual exchange, 
with equivalent responsibility on both sides for sustained progress.”595 
The American presentation was not to name the U.S. interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan issue and the intention to continue U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan. The presentation avoided any language which could provoke the Chinese. 
The ambassador was only to emphasize the necessity to reach an understanding on 
these issues since both sides needed to discuss “[t]he nature of the post-
normalization American presence on Taiwan”, the Chinese and American unilateral 
statements about normalization, U.S.-Taiwan trade relations, and the wording of a 
“joint communiqué and the modalities of normalization.”596 
The Chinese government responded to Woodcock’s request within a few 
days.597 On July 5, the first round of discussions about normalization took place. 
As Woodcock reported, Huang replied to the American proposal mostly with the 
same phrases that had outlined the Chinese position in all high level meetings be-
fore. Still, the U.S. ambassador felt the Chinese took his presentation seriously 
since they did not challenge the American statement that Washington would hope 
the Taiwan issue would be solved peacefully.598 The Chinese reaction to Wood-
cock’s proposal demonstrated that the Chinese leadership shared the White 
House’s idea that the negotiations should gain momentum before their different 
views would spoil the process beyond repair. 
The next meeting, on July 14, served the definition of the negotiation 
framework. Huang demanded the U.S. side to explain how it would seek the ful-
fillment of the three Chinese preconditions. Otherwise, both sides could not finalize 
the timetable for further negotiations. In addition, the foreign minister said his gov-
ernment preferred to schedule each meeting individually because that way both 
sides could respond easier to the progress of the negotiations. It was an attempt to 
put pressure on Washington because it allowed the Chinese to postpone any meet-
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ings if the Americans pursued a course of action that did not meet Chinese expecta-
tions. Woodcock tried to change Huang’s mind, arguing both sides had already 
expressed agreement on the Chinese preconditions, but the foreign minister insisted 
on his view. The U.S. ambassador was convinced that “the Chinese do not wish to 
deal with the issues one at a time but preferred to have us lay all of our cards on the 
table at once.”599 Gong Li explains the PRC government’s approach as means to 
gain time in order to develop its own strategy, while also staying as flexible as pos-
sible.600 It also served to put pressure on the U.S. side. If the White House wanted 




Approaching the Taiwan Issue 
The actual negotiation started with Woodcock’s and Huang’s third meeting on Au-
gust 3, 1978. The president’s instructions for Woodcock said that Washington 
would honor its commitment to Beijing’s preconditions. However, they also stated 
that U.S. foreign policy and U.S. relations with China were subject to the rule of 
law and constitutional constraints. Therefore Washington had to consider certain 
historical circumstances as well as the stability in East Asia, which would be close-
ly related to American credibility: “[W]e [the U.S.] must provide for our post-
normalization presence on Taiwan by taking into account American complexities 
and international realities.” Beijing had to accept the Carter administration underly-
ing a different rule to legitimize its policy than the CCP regime. While Deng and 
the other PRC leaders who supported normalization had only to convince a small 
group of high ranked officials within China’s bureaucratic and military apparatus, 
the White House needed Congressional and public support if it wanted to pursue 
other political goals in other areas; being reelected in the future was certainly an-
other concern for the president in this context. 
 Since the U.S. side did not want to provoke the PRC, Woodcock’s instruc-
tions also conceded that the American cultural, scientific and commercial relations 
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with Taiwan would continue on a non-governmental basis without official repre-
sentation and formal governmental contacts. Woodcock should also explain to 
Huang that the organization which would manage U.S.-Taiwan relations after de-
recognition would not have an official or diplomatic status, but would receive gov-
ernmental funds and have contacts to the U.S. executive in order to fulfill some of 
its technical and bureaucratic assignments.601 All these points indicated that the 
Carter administration had given up its desire for any special relationship with Tai-
wan, and was willing to settle for the Japanese formula. 
 The Carter administration still pursued its new approach that the negotia-
tions in Beijing should make progress before delicate matters came up. Thus, the 
White House instructed Woodcock not to reply to any questions from the Chinese 
about the MDT. American top officials and Chinese representatives would private-
ly discuss any kind of unexpected problems in Washington. These meetings 
worked complementary to Woodcock’s presentation in Beijing. On September 7, 
Richard Holbrooke met Han Xu, the deputy chief of the PRC liaison office, to dis-
cuss the issue of American arms sales to Taiwan. 
At the beginning of the meeting, Han expressed his concerns about newspa-
per reports saying the United States was planning to sell arms to the island. 
Holbrooke confirmed these reports, emphasizing that the United States would only 
sell defensive weapons to Taiwan. He added the U.S. administration had already 
turned down many requests from Taipei to honor U.S. agreements with China. 
Subsequently, he stressed the meaning of America’s global credibility. The United 
States intended to have full commercial relations with Taiwan. This included sell-
ing defensive weapons to the island, although the USA would do so with restraint 
and discretion. Such actions would not diminish the seriousness of President 
Carter’s pursuit of normalization. Any actions by the Carter administration were in 
accordance with the Shanghai Communiqué, and the White House’s willingness to 
accomplish China’s three preconditions. This approach was inevitable for the ad-
ministration, as Holbrooke put it: “My response to you today is an objective state-
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ment of certain realities with which the administration must deal if our efforts to 
complete normalization in the near future are to succeed.”602 
Han responded that continued arms sales violated the spirit of the Shanghai 
Communiqué and made normalization more difficult.603 The PRC government in-
terpreted the American intentions as the continuation of intervening in Chinese 
internal affairs.604 By contrast, the impression among U.S. officials was that the 
arms sales to Taiwan did not endanger the normalization negotiations.605 Oksen-
berg believed Holbrooke’s statement to Han Xu to be of utmost importance for 
future discussion about the issue. If the Chinese accepted the American desire to 
have full commercial relations with Taiwan including selected arms sales, the like-
lihood for successful negotiations about normalization would increase.606  
It was a clever move to use Holbrooke to introduce the arms sales problem 
to Chinese officials in Washington, while Woodcock talked about common inter-
ests in the bilateral relationship, not damaging his and other U.S. official’s positive 
image. This indirect approach also gave the Chinese enough time to realize how 
serious the Carter administration was about its intentions to continue U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan. Since Han Xu possessed a rather low rank within the Chinese bu-
reaucracy, he had to report this information to his superiors in Beijing. That made a 
direct rejection impossible, preventing the Chinese and Americans from quarreling 
about the issue. According to Ralph Berger, it also helped the United States that the 
strategic situation of the People’s Republic deteriorated due to increasing frictions 
with Vietnam during that period of time.607 
The American frankness concerning its intentions about U.S. post-
normalization relations with Taiwan was also a signal that also controversial topics 
should now become a part of the negotiations in Beijing. Woodcock’s new instruc-
tions for the next round of meetings in mid-September reflected this approach. The 
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ambassador was instructed to reveal to PRC officials that the U.S. unilateral state-
ment after the announcement of normalization would include the expression of the 
U.S. interest in a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. The statement would also 
point out that despite cutting all official ties with Taiwan including the termination 
of the MDT, the United States would maintain some sort of informal relationship 
with the island. These relations would not include government-to-government con-
tacts.608 Woodcock’s presentation reiterated the bottom line of the Carter admin-
istration’s position concerning the Taiwan issue, and the administration made sure 
that the Chinese were aware of them. 
Only a few days after Woodcock had conveyed this position to Huang Hua, 
President Carter reaffirmed his administration’s approach in a meeting with PRC 
liaison office director Chai Zemin. Beforehand, Brzezinski explained to Carter the 
delicate state of Sino-American negotiations. Carter had to repeat that the Chinese 
“must be prepared to tolerate continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and must not 
contradict our statement that we are confident the Taiwan issue would be settled 
peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” Otherwise, it was impossible for the Carter 
administration to agree to normalization “within the framework of their three points 
[preconditions].”609 Brzezinski’s words indicated that the Chinese had to under-
stand that Carter could not pursue normalization if he was unable to legitimize it in 
the United States. The APNSA’s urgency also underlines my argument of how im-
portant this matter was for the administration. 
The president’s statement about his administration’s intentions held a spe-
cial meaning. It demonstrated to the Chinese who highly value hierarchy that the 
United States was serious about not abandoning Taiwan. Even if normalization had 
its price, there existed a limit for Washington’s readiness to accommodate the 
mainland, and Carter made this clear when he met Chai. In return for the U.S. ac-
ceptance of China’s three preconditions, the USA expected the PRC “to honor the 
need of the United States to demonstrate its dependability, credibility, integrity, 
and resolve as we [the U.S.] change our relations with Taiwan and change our rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China.” Carter also remarked that the United 
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States “will continue to trade with Taiwan including the restrained sale of some 
very carefully selected defensive arms […].”610 This was the climax of the presi-
dent’s personal tenacity on the matter of Taiwan’s security and U.S. arms sale. This 
time, it was not one of his advisors who conveyed the U.S. position about arms 
sales but the president himself who made the bottom line position of the United 
States clear. 
In his statement to Chai, Carter was more frank and direct concerning the 
U.S. intentions to maintain involved in Taiwan’s security than ever before. He also 
exemplified which concessions the Chinese had to make. Brzezinski confirmed this 
view in a report to Carter, emphasizing that “[n]ever before has our [the Carter ad-
ministration’s] bottom line been as clearly spelled out…”611 Since early 1977, Bei-
jing had used Washington’s desire for normalization against the U.S., leaving it to 
the Americans to make concessions and to accept Chinese positions without further 
argument, but now it was the PRC leadership who had to decide how much normal-
ization was worth to them. 
In order to avoid frictions between the American and the Chinese govern-
ment that could lead to a stalemate in the negotiations, Carter virtually “blamed” 
domestic reasons for his administration’s continuing commitment to Taiwan: “The 
political realities –particularly the U.S. domestic political situation which arises out 
of our long association with Taiwan- require that difficult issue be dealt with sepa-
rately [sic] by you and by us.”612 The president also implied that without the United 
States as its protector, Taiwan could seek Soviet support or develop nuclear arms in 
order to bolster its own security.613 That was something the Chinese wanted to pre-
vent under any circumstances although, as we will see, they did not see this prob-
lem as a reason for a continued involvement of the United States in the Taiwan 
issue. 
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The Chinese desired normalization with the United States because it was an 
important part of their foreign policy strategy. As Brzezinski pointed out in a 
memorandum to Carter, Beijing attempted to create an anti-Soviet front, and the 
CCP regime wanted normalization therefore to happen as soon as possible.614 The 
National Security Advisor observed that since the second half of 1978, the People’s 
Republic had conducted a more active diplomacy in Asia trying to gain access to 
modern technology, but also to counter Soviet influence in the region. In his opin-
ion, Beijing’s activities could only help the Carter administration’s normalization 
efforts as it demonstrated their eagerness for closer relations with the United States 
and its allies.615 For this reason, Brzezinski writes in his memoirs that Carter’s 
meeting with Chai was very significant. In spite of his frankness about U.S. inten-
tions concerning Taiwan, the meeting served as the final hint for Beijing that the 
White House was serious about normalization.616 
Indeed, Chinese officials had already signaled distinctly on different occa-
sions that progress of normalization was too slow because the U.S. side did not 
change its position about Taiwan. First, Chai Zemin complained to Brzezinski that 
the U.S. administration had not gone far enough to accomplish the PRC’s precondi-
tions.617 Later in a meeting with Cyrus Vance, Huang Hua characterized the current 
proposal of the Carter administration for normalization as disappointing, since 
Washington would not “[…] make a clear statement on the crucial issues” between 
the two countries. The foreign minister wanted to know when and how the Ameri-
cans would “implement the severance of diplomatic relations [with Taiwan], the 
withdrawal of troops, and the abrogation of the Defense Treaty.” In Huang’s opin-
ion, the “new” American position would not be different from its former one. He 
firmly reiterated the meaning of the Taiwan issue as a matter of principle and an 
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internal affair. Therefore, as the foreign minister pointed out to Vance, the Japa-
nese formula represented a far reaching concession for the PRC government.618 
After Carter had repeated the U.S. position concerning the Taiwan issue and 
future U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chai’s and Huang’s remarks demonstrated a last dip-
lomatic effort to change the American posture. Carter and his aides had to realize 
that Chinese critique about the American commitment to Taiwan’s security would 
never cease for the simple reason that the Chinese officials had to save their face. 
Although they had always claimed that the Soviet factor was much more important 
for the development of Sino-American relations, the PRC leaders were not able to 
leave the Taiwan issue aside. Doing so would weaken the PRC’s leadership’s posi-
tion at home, costing vast political resources. Political opponents would accuse 
Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping to sell out Chinese interests since Taiwan was 
indeed a matter of national principle for the Chinese people. This confirms Thomas 
Christensen’s thesis that also authoritarian regimes have to legitimize their deci-
sions vis-à-vis domestic political opponents.619 
Additionally, China did not want any American long-term involvement in 
the Taiwan Strait. Here, two historical experiences had an impact on the CCP re-
gime’s attitude. First, the de-facto loss of China’s sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity during the age of imperialism was still in the minds of the Chinese people and 
their leaders, fueling Chinese nationalism. The PRC government was afraid that a 
foreign power’s intervention in internal Chinese affairs would weaken the country 
in the long-term. Second, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s had demonstrated 
that the U.S. would never allow the PLA to invade Taiwan, and the Chinese leader-
ship assumed that Taipei would never negotiate with Beijing if the U.S. protected 
the island. If the CCP regime was ever to achieve reunification, the U.S. engage-
ment in the Taiwan Strait had to end.  
Still, as the protocols of meetings between U.S. and PRC officials at this 
time suggest, the People’s Republic realized that it lacked leverage. Hence, the 
normalization negotiations were not the right place to keep the United States out of 
the Taiwan Strait. The Carter administration was not going to make a sudden 
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change of a position, which it had held since the beginning of the discussions about 
normalization. This realization and the traditional Chinese patience caused the PRC 
not to threaten stopping the negotiations if the Carter administration would not 




Negotiating the Joint Communiqué 
After Carter had revealed his minimum conditions concerning the Taiwan issue, 
the negotiations slowed down in the fall of 1978. The Chinese leaders had to find 
new ways to put pressure on the U.S. side. That was the moment when, according 
to Chinese author Li Jie, the common thinking of Brzezinski and Deng helped to 
keep the process alive. While Carter’s National Security Advisor signaled to PRC 
officials that both sides should make use of the window of opportunity opening 
after the Congressional mid-term elections in November 1978, Deng urged the Pol-
itburo to seize the initiative.620 Subsequently, the Chinese leaders stated that the 
PRC would favor those nations in trade which had already recognized the People’s 
Republic. If the United States wanted access to the Chinese market, they would 
have to finalize normalization. In addition, Deng gave an interview to the Ameri-
can columnist Robert Novak using this opportunity to express his interest in a visit 
of the USA after normalization.621 These actions proved how serious the PRC lead-
ership was about normalization. 
 The Carter administration perceived the Chinese efforts with interest, and 
was already preparing the next steps of the negotiations. Woodcock was instructed 
to present a first draft for a joint communiqué, if the Chinese would fully accept the 
American proposal about future U.S.-Taiwan relations. Carter was willing to alter 
the status of the liaison office in China immediately after the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations with the PRC and the announcement of the termination of the 
MDT. His legal advisor on the matter of the termination of the treaty, the attorney 
Herbert J. Hansell, assured the executive branch that the president had the right to 
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terminate a treaty with another state without consulting the Congress. Former pres-
idents had made use of this competence on several occasions in U.S. history.622 
 In the meantime, Woodcock wrote the draft for the communiqué which in-
cluded language from the Shanghai Communiqué. Carter approved Woodcock’s 
suggestions and set the date for normalization to January 1, 1979. Concerning Tai-
wan, the Carter administration was ready to provoke the Chinese with a language 
that was, according to Brzezinski, “hard for Peking to swallow.” The National Se-
curity Advisor referred to a paragraph that assumed the PRC government would 
pursue the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and be patient on this matter.623 
Such boldness could jeopardize further progress of the negotiations, but the admin-
istration had to take the risk. Woodcock should present the draft during the next 
session on November 2, 1978.624 
 The Chinese did not directly comment on Woodcock’s draft postponing 
their reply until the next meeting. They only asked some questions that Woodcock 
offered to answer in December. After his presentation, Woodcock sent a summary 
with his personal impressions and interpretations to the White House. The ambas-
sador was worried about the consistency of the wording of the American state-
ments. In his opinion, when the real discussions would start, the administration 
needed to chose its words very carefully as well as keeping the communiqué con-
sistent with former statements.625 
The White House met Woodcock’s concerns, drawing his instructions for 
the sixth session more precisely. The ambassador should answer all Chinese ques-
tions concerning the American presentation. Afterwards, however, the president 
wanted Woodcock to convey to his Chinese interlocutors that they “have heard 
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enough of our [the U.S.] position to begin to respond in a serious fashion.”626 
Carter and his aides were tired of answering Chinese questions and listening to 
their tirades. For the negotiations to make progress, it was time that the PRC gov-
ernment presented its own point of view. 
 Over the last couple of months, the group around Deng Xiaoping had 
gained more ground vis-à-vis the leftists in the Chinese leadership. Deng’s success 
was signaled by the removal of the, as Robert Ross puts it, “Cultural Revolution 
leftovers” Nancy Tang and Wang Hairon from the Chinese negotiating party at the 
beginning of December.627 This indicated that Deng was trying to bring himself 
and his aides into a position which allowed him to accept U.S. minimum condi-
tions, without losing ground to the leftists. The Chinese leadership knew by this 
time that the United States was not willing to give up the American involvement in 
the Taiwan Strait. Hence, it was important for Deng who was the main advocate of 
normalization among the PRC leadership to dampen any possible opposition before 
it could even arise. 
 Woodcock had to wait several weeks until the Chinese answered his request 
for a further meeting with Huang. He did not intend to ask again, since he believed 
Huang would see him as soon as it would please him.628 At this time he did not 
know that the PRC foreign minister had been admitted to a hospital. Thus, the Chi-
nese suggested a meeting in the afternoon of December 4 with Han Nianliong, the 
deputy foreign minister, who acted as foreign minister in Huang’s absence. Wood-
cock did not interpret Huang’s illness as a political maneuver because he was to 
meet the acting foreign minister and not one of the numerous vice ministers in the 
ministry.629 
 When it finally came to the meeting, the PRC objected to most of the points 
in the U.S. draft which concerned Taiwan. Han Nianlong reiterated that the United 
States owed the Chinese people a debt. Therefore, “the Japanese Formula is the 
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maximum concession the Chinese government can make, and the farthest it can go 
in accommodating the needs of the U.S. side.” Then, he criticized at length the 
Carter administration’s insistence on selling arms to Taiwan: “We [the PRC] have 
clearly stated our emphatic objection to the U.S. expressed intention of continuing 
its arms sales to Taiwan after normalization.” The PRC government did understand 
why this was necessary if “the U.S. side is going to establish diplomatic relations 
with China and change its former China policy, why must it continue to arm the 
Chiang clique […]?” The American fear that Taiwan could acquire nuclear weap-
ons was, according to Han, unnecessary as long as the “the U.S. side should stand 
by its own promise and refrain from letting the Chiang clique make or acquire such 
weapons.” Moreover, the PRC did not think this issue was “something for the U.S. 
to worry about”, because the PRC knew “how to deal with it.”630 
 The PRC government expressed some understanding for the U.S. position 
concerning the statement about the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. Thus, 
Han confirmed that the Chinese side would “refrain from raising objections to 
statements by U.S. government leaders’ expressing their hope to see a peaceful 
solution of the Taiwan issue.” From a Chinese point of view, the Carter administra-
tion had to understand that Sino-American relations would be strategic and politi-
cal, not just diplomatic. In this sense, both sides needed to consider their long-term 
interests.631 That was the reason why the Chinese were willing to let the Americans 
say what they deemed necessary to say in order to please their people at home. 
However, the Chinese draft for the joint communiqué aimed to make up for this 
concession. 
 Beijing’s draft also leaned heavily on the language of the Shanghai commu-
niqué, emphasizing that the United States and the People’s Republic opposed any 
attempts by a third nation to pursue hegemony in Asia-Pacific or any other region 
in the world.632 Such phrases were aimed against the Soviet Union and underlined 
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Chinese thinking that normalization served mainly as means to contain Soviet in-
fluence in Asia, proving the seriousness of the Sino-American partnership. 
The document also conveyed how important the Taiwan issue was for the 
Chinese, belying former comments in which they had claimed the strategic situa-
tion would be more important for U.S.-China relations than Taiwan. Consequently, 
the document included a paragraph aiming to signify that the Carter administration 
had accepted the PRC’s three preconditions. It was pointed out that no ambassadors 
would be exchanged before the U.S. side conducted the actions necessary to ac-
complish these conditions.633 The American confession should serve the PRC gov-
ernment’s legitimacy as the only Chinese government. They wanted to prevent any 
ambiguity, pointing out that the United States was only allowed to conduct people-
to-people relations with Taiwan. This would underline the non-diplomatic (from a 
Chinese perspective even illegal) character of U.S.-ROC relations, significantly 
downgrading the regime in Taipei. 
Woodcock saw the Chinese draft as the basis for further negotiations. In 
spite of some concessions due to U.S. needs, the document still included phrases 
every U.S. administration would have difficulties to agree with. One example was 
the phrase that stated Taiwan was a province of China. In order to avoid such pro-
voking phrases in the communiqué, he suggested keeping it as short as possible, 
and to express controversial aspects in separate unilateral statements.634 
It is true that the Chinese government made all concessions it perceived 
possible. At first glance that did not appear to be much. But the fact, that the Chi-
nese would only oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and would only state their own 
views about Taiwan’s status, yet not contradicting U.S. hopes for a peaceful solu-
tion, should be seen as a success for the Carter administration. The PRC govern-
ment had stood up to its principles, and did not give the United States a carte 
blanche to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait. However, the success of normali-
zation was more important for the Chinese leadership than its principles. China 
would always criticize U.S. arms sales to Taiwan but it would not endanger the 
success of normalization. Chinese officials had finally accepted that their own bar-
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gaining power was not strong enough to get more concessions from the U.S. con-
cerning the Taiwan issue. This insight enabled a compromise which led to a word-
ing of the joint communiqué both sides could live with. 
As the former U.S. diplomat and intelligence officer Richard Bush points 
out, in the end, the joint communiqué was able to clarify the U.S. positions about 
the status of Taiwan, which had previously remained unclear in the Shanghai 
Communiqué. The document was to state that the Carter administration only 
acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a 
part of China” and not the fact itself.635 In this context, Washington accommodated 
the PRC by accepting the Chinese word “chengren” (承认) which sounds stronger 
than the previously used word “renshidao” (认识到). In the Carter administration’s 
China experts’ view, the former also means, in the context of the joint communi-
qué, “to acknowledge” and not “to recognize”.636 Michel Oksenberg was aware that 
“chengren” was stronger but referred to the fact that Chinese and Americans had 
agreed to work “from the English text, which uses the same language as the Shang-
hai Communique.”637 Thus, the difference was not important for U.S. purposes and 
did not change the previous U.S. position on the matter. 
The wording of the joint communiqué appeared ambiguous, and served the 
U.S. interest to leave room for interpretations about Taiwan’s status. The reference 
in the communiqué that “Taiwan was a part of China” cannot only be understood in 
a political sense that would define Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic, but 
also in a cultural sense that appears much more diffuse. The approach to keep the 
language of the communiqué ambiguous fitted Carter’s previous instructions to 
Woodcock not to agree under any circumstance that Taiwan was a province of 
China. Such a clause would define the island as a part of the political entity “Chi-
na”, and subsequently as a part of the People’s Republic because with the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations, the United States recognized the PRC government 
as the sole legitimate government of China. The Carter administration, however, 
did not want to create the impression it would abandon Taiwan, leaving the island 
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at the mercy of the PRC. Therefore, the English version which clearly used the 
word “acknowledge” for this part was decretory for the Carter administration.  
 It is not clear if the Chinese side used the stronger verb “chengren” in the 
Chinese version in order to force the Americans to accept the PRC government’s 
view about Taiwan’s status. Not only had the Carter administration never agreed to 
express such a view, but the Chinese side had also previously confirmed that the 
English version was decretory for the normalization agreement. Therefore, it ap-
pears more likely that the choice for “chengren”, which can also have the meaning 
“to recognize” and not only “to acknowledge”, served to impress Chinese speaking 
people on the mainland and Taiwan. It was part of the PRC’s propaganda that 
aimed to shock the people on Taiwan, while also to strengthen the CCP’s legitima-
cy. 
 After both sides had agreed on the wording of the joint communiqué, the 
time to strike a deal had finally arrived. Therefore, at the end of the fifth session, 
Han told Woodcock that Deng Xiaoping would like to meet him soon. This request 
hinted to Woodcock that the Chinese wanted to move ahead quickly. According to 
him, this was the reason why they accommodated the Americans to a certain de-
gree.638 Deng’s involvement signaled that Washington and Beijing had reached the 




Deng’s Resurgence and the Need for Normalization 
After Cyrus Vance and later Zbigniew Brzezinski had traveled to China to speak 
with high level officials of the PRC government, they gained the impression that 
Deng Xiaoping was the most important interlocutor for the Carter administration. 
Deng did not only appear to be the most fervent advocate of normalization among 
PRC official, but he also emerged as the man who made the final decisions about 
the way China’s relations with the United State developed.639 As the previous chap-
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ter has shown, Brzezinski’s meetings with different Chinese leaders in May 1978 
underlined this impression. 
 However, at the beginning of Carter’s presidency, U.S. analysts were not 
sure which political faction was in charge in China, and how far it could trust Chi-
nese officials after Mao`s death and the purge of the Gang of Four. While Michel 
Oksenberg had expressed his belief that the then new leadership around Hua 
Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping appeared pragmatic, he also suspected different 
movements among the Chinese elite which did not all support closer relations be-
tween Washington and Beijing.640 Henry Kissinger argues in a book about China, 
Deng’s and Hua’s notions about the future development of China were very differ-
ent. While Hua was favoring “Soviet like methods” to improve China’s economic 
situation, Deng disapproved such an approach.641 These different views were the 
reason for the conflict between Deng and Hua that escalated in the early 1980s.642 
During the process of normalization, however, these differences did not play a ma-
jor role. 
As we have seen, the Carter administration had doubts about the Chinese 
leadership’s reliability. It therefore helped that the new leaders followed up on the 
path of the Four Modernization (四个现代化). The concept had been introduced 
by Zhou Enlai in the 1960s, and should modernize China in four areas (agriculture, 
industry, national defense, and science and technology) in order to improve China’s 
economic situation. However, the project had never been realized due to domestic 
political struggle until Deng Xiaoping was able to implement the necessary policies 
to start the process in 1978.643 
 One of the first signs for the serious attempt to pursue the Four Moderniza-
tions was the decision to send a delegation -called the China Government Econom-
ic Investigation Group- under Vice Premier Gu Mu to Western Europe from May 
to June 1978. Gu’s report started a development which demanded the opening of 
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China to the world. The National Planning Conference supported this development, 
recommending the abandonment of the PRC’s isolationist science and technology 
policy. The country should enter a dialogue about technological exchange with 
capitalist countries. This made normalization a high priority for the near future 
since the goal of the new policy was to develop an international environment fa-
vorable to China’s further modernization.644  
Brzezinski was convinced that Deng Xiaoping agreed with western theories 
on modernization which argued that development would need specialization, hier-
archy, and urbanization. Although this view would not be irreversible, in the AP-
NSA’s opinion, it was another sign that China was turning towards the West.645 
Indeed, modernization and technology transfer gained increased meaning in the 
PRC policy after Deng was restored in his offices. Deng himself had pointed out 
that China needed advanced science and technology to modernize itself. China had 
to learn from the advanced countries in the world.646 This was one reason why 
Deng argued in favor of improved Sino-American relations knowing well that Chi-
na needed the West for the project of the Four Modernizations to become a suc-
cess. 
But first, Deng needed a strong position among Chinese leaders in order to 
conduct the policy he deemed necessary to strengthen his country. After he had 
taken first steps to improve his position during the 11th Communist Party Congress, 
he was able to foster his leadership in late 1978.647 Deng was able to attack Wang 
Dongxing, the head of the Chinese security apparatus, and his followers, the Small 
Gang of Four. This success did not only weaken Hua Guofeng’s power basis, but 
also enabled Deng to set the agenda of China’s reform policy.648 An important part 
of this agenda was the normalization of relations with the United States since this 
would allow the PRC easier access to modern technology. 
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In his assessment of the power struggles in Beijing, Michel Oksenberg 
characterized Deng’s approach as a risky strategy. According to the White House’s 
China expert, the Chinese vice premier had “many balls in the air [...], and it would 
be dangerous for him to drop any of them.” Thus, Oksenberg suggested the U.S. 
administration should support Deng indirectly by encouraging western European 
states to provide China with new credits as well as modern technology and even 
arms.649 The State Department was more optimistic and believed Deng would most 
likely prevail without causing any instability in the Chinese leadership. The U.S. 
itself also benefited from Deng’s strong position, since it helped normalization to 
proceed. In the end, Deng’s growing power opened the opportunity for wider eco-
nomic relations with China because he was the driving force behind China’s course 
of modernization.650 Just two weeks later, Oksenberg changed his assessment when 
he observed that Deng had earned “a strong but not total victory” in the PRC’s 
leadership struggle. While Oksenberg did not expect heavy upheaval in the Politbu-
ro, it was clear that Hua Guofeng remained only chairman at Deng’s mercy. In 
Oksenberg’s opinion, Deng’s strong position meant good news for the normaliza-
tion negotiations, as the Chinese vice premier had previously revealed “an eager-
ness to move ahead rapidly and a desire to visit the United States…” The NSC staff 
member even argued that the administration could expect last minute concessions 
from Deng if he took over the negotiation process.651 This assessment confirmed 
what had become clear among Carter’s aides months ago: Deng was the right per-
son for the U.S. executive to conclude a normalization agreement. 
After restoring his influence, Deng pushed the Chinese leadership towards 
economic reforms. As mentioned above, the vice premier was worried that China 
would fall in terms of technological progress.652 Thus, he became responsible for 
scientific and educational programs and also influenced the economic plans of the 
PRC, announced by CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng at the 5th National People’s Con-
gress in 1978. Over the following period of time, Deng lobbied for increasing wag-
es, decentralizing production processes, and most importantly for a bonus system 
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which should reward effective and efficient workers.653 It was only the beginning 
of his reforms but it quickly became clear to him that the PRC needed the United 
States to achieve Deng’s reform goals. Further political events fueled this thinking. 
When Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and co-
operation on November 4, 1978, Beijing repeatedly signaled its readiness to nor-
malize Sino-American relations.654 The alliance between two regimes, that were 
hostile towards the People’s Republic and had both a massive number of troops 
stationed on China’s border, left the PRC in a strategic stranglehold. This devel-
opment made the modernization of the Chinese conventional forces a more press-
ing need. The PLA appeared to American observers outdated. As the conflict with 
Vietnam at the beginning of 1979 should prove, the PRC did not seem to be able to 
project power beyond its land borders. The Pentagon concluded it would cost the 
PRC up to 63 billion U.S. dollars to upgrade its forces in order to withstand a Sovi-
et conventional attack.655 
Deng knew that the weak Chinese economy would not be able to finance 
the modernization of the PLA. China needed to conduct profound economic re-
forms, and for this sake the country had to cooperate with the capitalist West to 
support the reform process that would help China’s development. The whole scope 
of reforms was announced during the third plenary session of the 11th Central 
Committee from December 18-22, 1978.656 Here, Deng was able to implement his 
reform ideas and to strengthen his political position. The prior announcement of 
normalization had certainly supported his plans. This was the reason why he be-
came so engaged in the normalization negotiations, making the final concessions 
that were to enable an agreement. 
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Removing the Last Obstacles 
Deng Xiaoping wanted a normalization agreement, and he was in the political posi-
tion to convince his fellow leaders in the CCP that they should make some conces-
sions to the Americans concerning Taiwan. The Chinese accommodation and rhet-
oric during the negotiations confirmed that the Carter administration had drawn its 
bottom line in a realistic fashion. The PRC would tacitly accept the continuation of 
the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait. This conclusion was supported by 
a statement by PRC Vice Premier Geng Biao when he met a delegation from U.S. 
Congress on December 6, 1978. During the exchange, he stated his belief that nor-
malization would be achieved soon. In his opinion, the Taiwan question was not an 
obstacle. Geng even expressed his understanding for the political situation in the 
U.S. and the influence U.S. Congress had on foreign policy decisions.657 It was a 
strong signal for Carter and his aides that it did not need much more negotiations to 
get a deal with the People’s Republic done. 
 Woodcock shared this conclusion. In a memorandum, he had sent to the 
White House only a day before Geng’s meeting, he pointed towards the substantial 
progress the negotiations had made over the course of the last sessions. The Chi-
nese did not exclude further discussions on matters of ongoing conflict between 
Beijing and Washington (e.g. arms sales to Taiwan), and especially Deng’s invita-
tion for a meeting should be seen as an attempt “to give momentum to the normali-
zation process.”658 
 The White House mainly agreed with Woodcock’s analysis. Although 
Vance and Brzezinski urged the ambassador to meet with Deng, he needed to delay 
such a meeting until they could prepare the instructions for him. A discussion with 
Deng would serve as final clarification if controversial issues such as future arms 
sales to Taiwan were able to prevent normalization. Woodcock should also use the 
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chance, and invite a Chinese leader to the United States.659 The ambassador agreed, 
but suggested that such a visit should be scheduled for the time after normalization. 
In the past, the Chinese had relayed repeatedly that no PRC leader could visit a 
country with an ROC embassy. Woodcock was also unable to predict who would 
come to the U.S. According to him, Deng likely wished to do so, but Hua Guofeng 
had the last word.660 
The Chinese were indeed very interested in a visit by one of their leaders, 
and Deng Xiaoping was eager to be the first PRC statesman to visit the United 
States.661 Liaison office chief Chai Zemin confirmed this impression during discus-
sions with Brzezinski mentioning a possible visit by Deng to the United States in 
January 1979.662 Michel Oksenberg later reported the Chinese liaison office’s polit-
ical counselor Zao Guisheng had asked about the president’s schedule in January 
when he visited Oksenberg’s office a few days after Chai’s and Brzezinski’s meet-
ing.663 It was another signal that the Chinese leadership expected the successful 
conclusion of the normalization process to happen very soon. 
 Washington reacted accordingly, and wanted all possible misunderstandings 
eliminated. The instructions which Vance and Brzezinski drew for Woodcock, with 
Carter’s approval, emphasized the seriousness and the progress already achieved in 
the negotiations. However, although Woodcock should underline the topics of 
agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic, there still existed 
disagreement on different issues. The White House wanted Woodcock to explain to 
the Chinese that the USA could not declare all treaties with Taiwan “null and 
void”. Beforehand, it needed some legal adjustments to maintain commercial and 
cultural relations with the island. Therefore, the administration needed some time 
to adjust U.S.-Taiwan relations for the time after the derecognition of the regime in 
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Taipei. This made it difficult to set the date for the establishment of embassies and 
the exchange of ambassadors, although the White House suggested a date not later 
than March 1, 1979.664 
The U.S. leadership hoped that Deng’s involvement could lead to further 
concessions about Taiwan. Woodcock was therefore instructed to point out the 
U.S. insistence on its fundamental position. Furthermore, the Carter administration 
intended to maintain some ambiguity in the language of the communiqué prevent-
ing any interpretation that would grant the PRC the right to use any force against 
Taiwan. Thus, the joint communiqué had to be adjusted in accordance with both 
sides’ needs. In fact, the new American draft which Carter wanted Woodcock to 
present to the PRC incorporated many points from the Chinese one. However, the 
draft did not include a phrase that called Taiwan a province of China, and the in-
structions underlined that Woodcock, under no circumstances, would agree to such 
a phrase. As stated above, the United States only acknowledged that the island was 
part of China without further elaborating what this precisely meant. In return, as 
Woodcock was to convey to the PRC officials, the Carter administration would 
terminate its diplomatic relations and the MDT with Taiwan as well as withdraw its 
military personnel within four months.665 
The Carter administration was certain that both sides were close to a nor-
malization agreement. Thus Woodcock received further instructions for his meet-
ing with Deng on December 13. The U.S. president wanted the ambassador to ask 
Deng if both sides could announce normalization simultaneously in Washington 
D.C. and Beijing on December 15 at 9pm (ET), and December 16 at 10am (CST), 
respectively. At the same time, they would announce Deng’s visit to the United 
States in the following month.666 
 In the end, Deng mostly agreed with the Carter administration’s draft for the 
joint communiqué and the suggestions about the way the U.S. side would handle 
the transition of its relations with Taiwan. He also accepted Carter’s invitation to 
the United States, and set the date for the exchange of ambassadors for March 1, 
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1979. The Chinese side even tolerated that the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from 
Taiwan would need four months, and they also granted the U.S. administration the 
period of one year to terminate the U.S.-ROC defense treaty in accordance with its 
Article 10.667 
However, the Chinese vice premier’s reconciliation had its price. The PRC 
government wanted the Carter administration to understand that it would not allow 
the United States to continue the provisions of the MDT while it had no official 
relations with the regime in Taipei. Such an attitude could lead to the impression 
that Beijing either allowed U.S.-Taiwan security relations, or accepted a two-
China-policy. Hence, Deng asked the U.S. officials not to quote the MDT in their 
statements. In addition, he insisted that, during the one year until the treaty with 
Taiwan would lapse, the United States would “refrain from selling weapons to 
Taiwan because it would cause a lot of trouble” as it almost meant for the Chinese 
that the United States would still “carry out the treaty provisions.”668 Carter accept-
ed. 
Another matter concerned Beijing’s insistence that normalization served to 
counter Soviet power. From a Chinese perspective, the joint communiqué had to 
express this purpose. Deng wanted to incorporate an anti-hegemony clause in the 
agreement, although this suggestion was difficult to accept for the Americans. As 
an alternative, he suggested, both sides could express the anti-hegemony clause in 
their respective statements. The White House saw this alternative also very critical-
ly.669 The United States did not want to be part of Beijing’s attempts to create an 
anti-Soviet front. 
The reason for U.S. reservations was that the Carter administration did not 
want the Soviet Union or anyone else to think normalization served exclusively to 
put pressure on the Soviets. While Washington had always been aware that closer 
U.S.-China ties could improve the American position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, 
forcing the Kremlin to concessions in certain areas of mutual interest, the Carter 
administration also wanted to prevent Moscow from blockading any cooperation. 
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The administration knew that the USSR was concerned about normalization. Only 
a few months before the announcement, in meeting with Carter, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko expressed that Moscow was “gaining the impression that 
the United States was trying to ‘play the Chinese card’ to the detriment of Soviet 
interests.”670 Since the White House was still working on an agreement with the 
USSR about SALT II, Washington did not want to alienate Moscow. Carter and his 
aides took the Russian concerns seriously. 
Therefore the White House agitated against the use of the phrase “China 
card” in a Time magazine article with the title “Playing the China Card” planned 
for the edition of November 6. In a letter to the editors, the National Security 
Council’s Associate Press Secretary Jerold L. Schecter opposed this expression and 
named the development of Sino-American relations “a central element of our [the 
U.S.] foreign policy, important not only in bilateral terms but in the context of pre-
serving global and regional peace and stability.”671 Though the article was pub-
lished without changes, the Carter administration’s reaction demonstrated its sensi-
tivity on the matter. 
It was Woodcock who presented a solution for the administration’s dilem-
ma about the anti-hegemony clause. He argued this issue should not spoil the nor-
malization agreement. In order to satisfy the Chinese demands while keeping its 
impact as low as possible, the ambassador recommended using a wording, which 
mimicked the Shanghai Communiqué.672 The president approved this idea, and it 
was incorporated in the normalization communiqué.673 
In spite of this difficulty, Woodcock interpreted Deng’s behavior as very 
accommodating, giving “a clear signal that he [Deng] would not let our position on 
arms sales to Taiwan block normalization.” Since Deng had “opted for movement 
rather than legalistic quibbling over details”, and had put so much effort and per-
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sonal prestige into the whole process, Woodcock suggested finalizing normaliza-
tion as soon as possible. Because the MDT would remain effective for one more 
year, Deng might face domestic pressure. Woodcock therefore concluded, the vice 
premier’s critical remarks concerning Article 10 and arms sales to Taiwan served 
to avert domestic critique.674 
In the next meeting, Deng agreed to Washington’s proposed timing of the 
announcement and the dates for his visit to the United States. He also suggested 
exchanging the unilateral statements in advance, so there would not be any contra-
dictions. Therefore, Woodcock met with vice foreign ministers Han and Chang to 
work out the final draft.675 The same day, he met Deng again, and presented the 
text of the joint communiqué. The vice premier approved the final version, and also 




A Misunderstanding in the Last Minute 
When the Chinese and Americans believed an agreement was nearly accomplished, 
a misunderstanding about the arms sales issue threatened to shatter all efforts made 
by the U.S. administration. The problem occurred when Brzezinski met Ambassa-
dor Chai Zemin the same morning the public announcement was scheduled for. On 
this occasion, the National Security Advisor explained to the PRC diplomat that the 
Carter administration could not avoid answering questions from the U.S. press 
about the future of arms sales to Taiwan. Chai was struck by this revelation be-
cause, as he claimed, the PRC government believed the United States had agreed 
not to sell any arms to Taiwan in the future.677  
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Now, it was Brzezinski who was struck by surprise. In his opinion, the rec-
ord clearly showed that Deng “understands our [the U.S.] position” concerning the 
arms sales issue. Additionally, he explained to Chai that the Carter administration 
had agreed to suspend additional arms sales only for one year until the MDT would 
lapse. Chai replied the liaison office “got a message that the U.S. will not sell arms 
after normalization”, but he also admitted not to be “very familiar with the course 
of the discussion in Peking.” It was a difficult situation, and all Brzezinski could do 
was to remind the Chinese of Hua Guofeng’s own argument that normalization was 
a “political” and not a “diplomatic” question. Hence, the PRC should think “politi-
cal” and not give their common “enemies [USSR] the opportunity to complicate 
what could be a historically important relationship.”678 The reference to the Soviet 
Union helped, but Brzezinski went a step further. 
It was this moment, when Brzezinski seemed to forget his strategic thinking 
and ignored all the advantages the normalization with the PRC would bring for the 
U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Precisely then, he became the most fer-
vent advocate of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. First, he reassured Chai that the U.S. 
side was “not trying to get you [the PRC] to change your position”, but he coolly 
added that “we will not change our [the U.S.] position”, either. Referring to the 
political situation in the United States, he even openly warned that “if we [the 
Carter administration] were to agree to a blockade of Taiwan, the normalization 
would collapse here.”679  
In my opinion, it was this threat that helped convincing Chai that the Amer-
icans were serious. Subsequently, the chief of the Chinese liaison office agreed to 
inform his superiors in Beijing about the U.S. views. Up to this point, Brzezinski 
had appeared to the Chinese as their closest ally among U.S. officials. If even he 
insisted that Washington could only agree to normalization if U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan would continue, the PRC leadership better considered how much normali-
zation was worth to them. Deng was the only Chinese official able to make such a 
decision, and therefore it was up to him and Woodcock to find a solution before the 
process would fail, after all. 





Indeed, Woodcock met Deng in the afternoon of the same day. From a Chi-
nese perspective, the continuation of arms sales left the impression that the United 
States did not disengage from the Taiwan Strait, questioning the value of normali-
zation in this regard. Hence, Deng tried to remind the White House about its own 
responsibility to make a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue possible. When 
Woodcock confirmed that the U.S. government intended to sell arms to Taiwan 
after 1979, the Chinese vice premier replied “we [the PRC] cannot agree to it” 
since continued arms sales meant “that the U.S. will still carry out the terms of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan […].” In Deng’s opinion, this prevented “Chi-
na from finding a rational and peaceful solution with Taiwan.”680 As Woodcock put 
it in his report, the vice premier asked the Americans “to act in ways compatible 
with peaceful reunification rather than obverse.”681 
In this situation, the Carter administration could not be sure how the vice 
premier would decide, but eventually Deng gave up the Chinese opposition to arms 
sales. Normalization was too important. He suggested postponing any discussions 
about the arms sales question “without affecting the issuance of the [normalization] 
communiqué…”682 With these words, Deng did not accept China’s defeat on this 
matter but demonstrated a good understanding of the U.S. position. The Carter ad-
ministration’s continuing tenacity had finally convinced him that the PRC’s bar-
gaining position was not strong enough to change the White House’s view.  
The Chinese authors Li Jie and Zhang Baijia claim Deng’s pragmatism ul-
timately opened the door for normalization.683 This conclusion does not give due 
credit to the Carter administration’s approach to the normalization process. As I 
have demonstrated in previous chapters, Carter and his aides had early on a very 
precise notion of their minimum requirements for normalization, never keeping this 
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position a secret from the Chinese. In the final hours of the negotiations, the Carter 
administration displayed great timing and a thorough understanding of the Chinese 
situation. While Washington had always been adamant that the United States 
sought to have a security relationship with Taiwan after normalization, it had also 
allayed the Chinese by indicating sympathy for the Chinese position. But, in the 
end, the White House chose the right moment to put pressure on the PRC. 
Two things were responsible for the Carter administration’s prevailing on 
the arms sales issue. First, in spite of all the criticism and even threats from the 
Chinese, Carter had remained tenacious and insisted that the United States would 
have a security relationship with Taiwan. The White House was not willing to give 
up its strategically useful relations with the ROC regime, even if they would have 
only an unofficial character after normalization. Second, in the right moment, the 
U.S. administration made use of its better bargaining position. Washington was 
convinced that the PRC needed normalization so dearly that Deng would make the 
final concession concerning the arms sales issue. China had put so much effort in 
emphasizing what a great threat the Soviet Union represented to the United States 
that Washington was certain that Moscow was a major concern for the PRC itself. 
Chinese strategic necessities, thus, helped the Carter administration’s success. 
After having made the necessary concessions, the Chinese side still re-
mained concerned about public discussions about the Carter administration’s inten-
tion to continue arms sales to Taiwan after the announcement of normalization. 
Therefore, Deng argued, both sides should “evade this question […] or the Presi-
dent may be very vague in his answer.” Deng also warned that if Carter discussed 
the question of continued arms sales with the U.S. press in detail, “we [the PRC] 
will immediately give a response.”684 Deng had no other choice than remaining 
adamant on this matter, because, as Woodcock had explained in an earlier message 
to the White House, “a direct statement by the President on arms sales would be 
seriously embarrassing to [D]eng and have potential political consequences in Chi-
na.”685 Therefore, according to Woodcock, “[D]eng will not give us [the U.S.] a 
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free ride” leaving both sides with only one choice: since Chinese and Americans 
could not “agree on the arms sales question […]”, they had “agree to disagree”, in 
the ambassador’s opinion686 
It was a solution in the spirit of Deng’s pragmatism, and the White House 
had no choice but to accept Woodcock’s formula. As Brzezinski and Vance argued 
in a cable to Woodcock, the president did not expect to be able to abstain from a 
statement about future arms sales because “this may be the very first question 
asked by reporters.” Moreover, if Carter was not to confirm the continuation of 
arms sales publicly, it “may induce the instability” in Taiwan, the administration 
wanted to prevent. The cable therefore instructed Woodcock to convey to Deng 
that the United States “recognize this [U.S. arms sales] is a sensitive issue for Chi-
na”, and the U.S. administration “understand[s] that you [the PRC] cannot publicly 
approve such sales.”687 There was no solution that could please both sides’ needs in 
an equal fashion. Accordingly, the U.S. side considered the problem solved. All 
that mattered to Carter and his aides was that this short episode of confusion and 
the Chinese misinterpretation about the continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
did not prevent normalization. 
From a historical perspective, the whole issue appears as a last attempt of 
the PRC leadership to get further concessions from the Carter administration con-
cerning the arms sales issue, and it does not matter in this context if the PRC had 
really misunderstood the U.S. side’s intentions. China wanted to make use of the 
subsequent confusion, and tried a “bluff” by exaggerating the problem. The attempt 
did not work out. The Carter administration remained unfazed and “called the 
bluff”. Washington referred to numerous meetings and exchanges with PRC offi-
cials where U.S. officials had reiterated the administration’s intention to sell arms 
to Taiwan after normalization. It was as Ambassador Woodcock stated: “There is 
no doubt in my mind that we have clearly put on the record our position with re-
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spect to arms sales.“688 Deng and his fellow comrades eventually accepted the fact 
that President Carter was not abandoning Taiwan. 
The Carter administration had stood its ground on the matter of arms sales, 
without jeopardizing the normalization agreement. As I have argued, this success 
was possible because, on the one hand, the administration accommodated Deng and 
the PRC leadership by being considerate of their needs, while, on the other hand, it 
demonstrated strength and tenacity by making clear that the USA could not agree 
to normalization if it could not sell arms to Taiwan after 1979. Documents suggest 
the Carter administration was caught by surprise by Chai Zemin’s revelations to 
Brzezinski in the morning of December 15.689 Therefore, Woodcock was instructed 
to clarify immediately the U.S. position, without alienating the Chinese so much 
that they would call off normalization.690 Then, on the other hand, the U.S. execu-
tive put pressure on the Chinese, threatening normalization would fail if the United 
States could not sell arms to Taiwan after the termination of the MDT.691 This ap-
proach worked, and both sides reached an agreement. 
The conclusion of the negotiations meant for the U.S. and PRC government 
a huge diplomatic success. After rapprochement in the early 1970s, normalization 
represented the next significant stage in the history of U.S.-China relations. How-
ever, the arms sales issue remained a problem, and Carter’s successor Ronald 
Reagan had also to deal with the issue, playing a double game with Chinese and 
Taiwanese which resulted in the so called “Six Assurances” to Taiwan from July 
1982 and a third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué signed in August 1982.692 In fact, 
both sides have not been able to resolve the issue until today. 
Yet, Taiwan was only one point of bilateral dissent. Other important aspects 
of Sino-American relations had not even been discussed during the normalization 
process, the two most significant were trade and human rights. If both nations 
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wanted to improve their commercial relations, it needed a trade agreement. The 
PRC wanted to have access to U.S. technology and the United States sought access 
to China’s incredibly huge consumer market. The negotiations about a trade 
agreement and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status should also become very 
difficult but were eventually successfully concluded on July 7, 1979.693 Due to Bei-
jing’s refusal to talk about human rights, this issue’s meaning for U.S.-China rela-
tions should grow over the next decade. At the latest, after the incident on Tianan-
man Square in May 1989, the United States made this topic a priority in its ap-
proach towards the PRC.694 Trade and the human rights issue have remained huge 
concerns for U.S. China policy since normalization. 
The issues of human rights and trade relations as well as the Taiwan issue 
have frequently led to friction in U.S.-China relations until today. In 1978, howev-
er, both sides deemed it more prudent to ignore these differences. Otherwise, 
Washington and Beijing had not been able to achieve normalization. Both govern-
ments knew about their differing views on many issues, bilateral ones like Taiwan 
as well as global problems like nuclear non-proliferation (NNP).695 However, these 
differences could not prevent normalization because they were not important 
enough at this time. With the exception of the Taiwan issue, neither of the afore-
mentioned difference prevented both governments from legitimizing their respec-
tive normalization policy at home. These issues were also not important enough for 
Washington and Beijing to forgo the strategic advantage and power gain they ex-
pected from normalization. Therefore, both sides remained patient about the way 
their future relationship would develop, accepting that some details had to wait 
until they had implemented normal relations. 
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 After six months of negotiations preceded by years of progress and setbacks 
in Chinese-American relations, mutual diplomatic recognition was finally 
achieved. At 9pm (ET) on December 15 (10am (CST) December 16 in Beijing), 
President Carter announced the normalization of the relations between the United 
States of America and the People’s Republic of China on TV.696 It was a historical 
occurrence. Although normalization was not as shocking as Nixon’s announcement 
of his trip to China in 1971, the world looked to Washington and Beijing on this 
day in mid-December 1978, wondering how the United States and China would 
handle the situation. Not all observers were happy, hopeful or excited. In Taiwan, 




Conclusion and Discussion 
National Security Advisor Brzezinski’s talks with Deng, Hua, and Huang in May 
1978 opened the path for serious negotiations about normalization. Both sides 
made final preparations before the chief of the American liaison office in Beijing, 
Leonard Woodcock, was instructed to request a meeting with Chinese official to 
start the negotiations. The first two sessions took place on July 5 and July 14, re-
spectively. However, they only served to set the frame of the actual negotiations. 
The Chinese wanted the American side to present their position before they would 
reply. Therefore, it took some time before the negotiations became more dynamic. 
Both sides pursued a strategy that would allow their exchange to gain momentum 
before they reached matters of discordance. However, it did not take long until the 
different views about the Taiwan issue became the focal point of the discussions 
between Chinese and Americans. 
 In numerous meetings between U.S. and PRC officials over these final one 
and a half years, both sides had learned their respective bottom line positions con-
cerning Taiwan. According to the PRC government, the framework for U.S. rela-
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tions with Taiwan after normalization had to be the Japanese formula allowing 
only cultural, scientific, and economic relations on a people-to-people basis. The 
Carter administration was willing to accept this condition, as long as it could have 
full economic relations with Taiwan which had to include arms sales. Furthermore, 
the U.S. side insisted that the Chinese would not contradict Washington’s unilateral 
statement about the wish that the Taiwan issue would be settled by peaceful means. 
 An important part of the American negotiating strategy during this stage of 
the negotiations was to schedule meetings with representatives of the PRC’s liaison 
office in Washington that took place parallel to Leonard Woodcock’s sessions with 
PRC officials in Beijing. These talks allowed the Carter administration to state con-
troversial positions before they were discussed in Beijing. The most significant of 
those meetings occurred when President Carter met Chai Zemin, the head of the 
Chinese liaison office, in September, 1978. Carter used this meeting to assure the 
Chinese of his serious intention to normalize U.S. relations with China. However, 
he also made clear that normalization could only occur if the PRC would tacitly 
accept U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  
It was important for Carter to state this position because it demonstrated his 
adamant will that the United States would remain involved in the Taiwan Strait. 
While this position should serve to calm down U.S. allies and the U.S. Congress, it 
was also, as we have seen in previous chapters, the expression of an honest concern 
about Taiwan’s security. Carter’s tenacity was the decisive factor for the Chinese 
government’s acceptance of the American position. In addition, the U.S. bargaining 
position was stronger than the Chinese one because Beijing needed closer relations 
with the United States in order to deal with the Soviet threat. 
In the end, PRC officials realized that the normalization negotiations were 
not the right place to solve the problem of the American involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait, and Carter’s statement helped them to come to this conclusion. The presi-
dent’s words about Taiwan held more weight as statement’s by lower ranked U.S 
officials such as Leonard Woodcock. From a Chinese perspective, Carter’s state-
ment made clear that the U.S. side was not willing to make further concessions on 
the matter. Otherwise, the U.S. president would lose his face -a concept the Chi-
nese had a good understanding of. However, Carter’s frankness did not prevent 
Deng and Huang from criticizing the American position. 
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Although not all differences about the Taiwan issue were cleared up, the 
next step in the negotiations was the formulation of the joint communiqué and the 
unilateral statements. The only disagreement between Chinese and Americans in 
the process of drafting the communiqué emerged about the insertion of an anti-
hegemony clause because the Carter administration did not want to leave the im-
pression, normalization served exclusively to put pressure on the Soviet Union. 
Nonetheless, after some discussion between the White House, the DOS and Leon-
ard Woodcock, the latter was able to convince his superiors in Washington to con-
cede the clause using the exact language from the Shanghai communiqué. 
The language of the communiqué should strengthen the CCP’s regime legit-
imacy in China and abroad, and was also closely related to Deng Xiaoping’s re-
forms. The announcement of normalization actually helped Deng to pursue his 
plans, and further strengthen his leadership. China experts Alan Romberg, Ezra 
Vogel, and Odd Arne Westad agree with this conclusion adding that the proposed 
“punishment” of Vietnam might have played also a role in this context since it 
helped stabilizing China’s strategic position.697 Robert Ross, in contrast, argues 
Deng was able to accept the non-settlement of the arms sales issue only because he 
already had the support of the Chinese elite who valued normalization out of stra-
tegic necessity.698 Although Deng needed a power base for his policy, it seems 
more likely that he still had to act cautiously. Unlike Mao he was not the unques-
tioned leader of the CCP.699 He was neither the CCP’s Chairman, nor its ideologi-
cal leader. Hence, he was aware that his policy was under close scrutiny, especially 
so shortly after his resurgence to the CCP leadership ranks. Many of his political 
opponents who did not dare to question Deng at the moment only waited for him to 
fail. That was the reason why, as the Chinese author Li Li concludes, he had to find 
a way to satisfy the Chinese minimal conditions concerning Taiwan while giving 
the Carter administration enough room to maneuver in accordance with their own 
needs.700 
There is no question that normalization still served Deng Xiaoping’s own 
political needs as well as China’s strategic position because it demonstrated to the 
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Soviet Union and Vietnam that the PRC was not isolated. Moreover, the diplomatic 
success lessened the opposition to Deng’s plans for modernization and reforms. 
This could only help the self-strengthening of the country. Finally, it opened the 
U.S. market to China, which could now sell Chinese products to America, and –
even more important- gained access to American technology. Therefore, when the 
Carter administration remained adamant on its position about future arms sales to 
Taiwan, Deng was forced to the aforementioned final concession, enabling normal-
ization. 
The normalization of relations with the People’s Republic meant for the 
Carter administration a fundamental success as it greatly improved the American 
position in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States had now official relations to 
all major powers in the region. Moreover, Taiwan was still inside the zone of influ-
ence of the USA, and could serve as a strategic hedge vis-à-vis the PRC for years 
to come. Although the Carter administration had not achieved more than its bottom 
line goals concerning Taiwan, it was still able to honor its commitment to the is-
land’s security. The American arms industry had still access to the Taiwanese mar-
ket, and the mainland knew that it could not pursue any aggressive tactics against 
Taipei without a harsh reaction from Washington. 
As my research illustrates, the Carter administration took a great risk when 
it insisted on arms sales to Taiwan after normalization. This approach is only ex-
plainable if we take Carter’s commitment to Taiwan’s security seriously. Other-
wise, the president would not have dared to endanger normalization. A failure here 
would have only cost him political prestige; it also would have put the United 
States in a bad position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In the worst case, a failure of 
normalization could lead to a new Sino-Soviet alliance.  
The result of the negotiations left the USA still in a position to guarantee 
Taiwan’s security. Of course, this commitment is not documented in the joint 
communiqué or the American unilateral statement, but the relationship between the 
United States (as the patron) with Taiwan (as the ward) had not changed. Giving 
U.S.-Taiwan ties the legal character of unofficial people-to-people relations did not 
alter this matter of fact. The PRC was not able to put an end to the U.S. involve-
ment in the Taiwan Strait. As Deng Xiaoping had stated earlier, however, Taiwan’s 
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liberation could wait.701 This leads me to the conclusion that the U.S. benefited 
more from normalization than the PRC because it was not only able to improve its 
strategic situation but paid also an “affordable” price. 
 Considering the history of the Taiwan issue, taking into account the role the 
United States has always been playing in this matter, and given the fact how sensi-
tive Beijing has always been about the American involvement, the content of the 
normalization agreement and the unilateral statement should not be surprising. Yet, 
Richard Bush and Robert Ross point out that the Carter administration had not been 
able to satisfy all of their needs concerning the Taiwan issue with these documents. 
First, in contrast to the demands of PRM-24, Washington had failed to get Bei-
jing’s commitment for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. Second, neither 
normalization document clearly stated that the U.S. would continue to sell arms to 
Taiwan.702 While at first glance Bush’s and Ross’ observation appears correct, we 
have to consider how different the interests and perceptions of Chinese and Ameri-
cans were about the matter of Taiwan. Furthermore, Bush’s and Ross’ critique does 
not give enough consideration to the fact that neither the Chinese nor Americans 
were in a position to achieve their maximum demands.  
 Archival and non-archival material shows that the Carter administration had 
to take a very careful approach if it was to satisfy its own requirements about Tai-
wan, without risking normalization. As I have demonstrated, it was not realistic 
that Carter and his aides could convince Beijing to accept a strong security lan-
guage in the normalization agreement or the unilateral statement. The course of the 
negotiations makes this evident. Both sides were only able to conclude the negotia-
tions successfully because they were willing to make compromises. In fact, as we 
have seen above, the Carter administration was able to gain far-reaching conces-
sions from the PRC leadership concerning Taiwan although it did not reflect the 
full scale of the White House’s maximum demands. 
As painful as the U.S. decision for normalization and derecognition of the 
ROC was for the people in Taiwan, Jimmy Carter corrected the mistake that the 
United States recognized the ROC regime as legal representatives of hundreds of 
millions of Chinese , although the KMT did not control the mainland. After dec-
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ades of mistrust and even hostility between two of the largest nations in the world, 
the White House made up for this mistake. Since China was too important in world 
politics to be ignored by the United States, the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between Washington and Beijing was a step towards the political realities of 
the present, away from the ideological grounds of the early Cold War. However, 
both sides were not able to solve all problems that existed between them. There 
was more than only the Taiwan issue. 
Both sides started to talk about a trade agreement in the months after nor-
malization, realizing that this was another topic of dissent. Even more surprising 
was that human rights did not play any role in the normalization process. The Chi-
nese had stated that they did not understand the concept the same way the Western 
World did. To them, the Carter administration’s approach did not fit the reality of 
the life in China.703 Since Washington had forced the PRC leadership to make con-
cessions concerning U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait, it might have been too 
much of a risk to include human rights in the negotiation process, as well. In addi-
tion, this matter and Sino-American commercial relations were not deemed im-
portant enough at this time. Instead, the next challenge for the Carter administra-
tion was now to gain domestic and international support for normalization. This 
meant for Carter to give up his secrecy, and to face the public and the U.S. Con-
gress. 
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Chapter VI: Promoting Normalization, December 1978-
February 1979 
 
In 1971, on July 9, Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing in order to start secret talks 
with China. These talks established the process of rapprochement which should 
eventually lead to the normalization of relations between the United States and the 
People’s Republic. However, neither Henry Kissinger, who engineered this pro-
cess, nor Richard Nixon, who had ordered Kissinger to do so, was able to achieve 
normalization. More than seven years after Kissinger had touched Chinese soil for 
the first time, it was the 39th President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, who was 
able to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations with communist China 
on December 15, 1978. Finalizing the negotiations with Beijing was only the first 
step. Carter and his aides now had to promote their achievement in the United 
States and in Taiwan. Otherwise, the administration would not be able to arrange a 
framework that allowed normalization to work. 
In this chapter I examine the domestic and international reaction to the an-
nouncement of normalization, and how the Carter administration tried to appease 
U.S. Congress, the American public and the regime on Taiwan. Carter faced criti-
cism from all sides, and had to find a way to convince at least parts of his critics of 
the prudence of his China policy. Otherwise, he would not be able to establish a 
legal framework that would allow future U.S. relations with Taiwan. Without such 
a framework, U.S. citizens and agencies could not conduct cultural and commercial 
relations with Taiwan. From the perspective of U.S. legislation, after derecognition 
of the ROC regime the island had no legal status that would allow cultural or com-
mercial exchange on the basis of U.S. law or international treaties. The legal 
framework would define this status for future U.S.-Taiwan ties. Moreover, the ad-
ministration had to demonstrate their ongoing concern about Taiwan’s security, and 
its willingness to continue arms sales to the island. To make the situation more dif-
ficult, Carter and his aides had to achieve these assignments without damaging the 




Another question, I try to answer in this chapter, is why and in which ways 
the American and Chinese governments worked together to promote normalization. 
As I argue, normalization was so important for the PRC regime that the Chinese 
leadership had to make sure that the agreement did not fail due to the domestic sit-
uation in the United States. The state visit of Deng Xiaoping, who was going to 
travel through the United States from late January to early February 1979, played a 
major role in this context as the Chinese leader’s popularity helped both, the Chi-
nese and the American governments, to gain public consent for normalization.  
Both sides knew that the domestic situation in the United States and the 
strong public support for Taiwan made it necessary to demonstrate the advantages 
of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. Since the major critique on 
normalization based on concerns about Taiwan’s security, it was imperative for the 
PRC leadership to make clear that they did not intend to attack the island in the 
near future. In contrast, Beijing made it publicly known that the PRC regime was 
very interested to open a dialogue with the regime in Taipei. While Chinese asser-
tions like this were not new, in early 1979, they rather aimed at the U.S. public than 
at Taiwan. The Chinese leaderships’ idea was to convey the picture of the peace-
loving, friendly Chinese nation, supporting the Carter administration in its effort to 
convince the American people that Taiwan’s security was not in jeopardy. In ac-
cordance with the argument from Neoclassical Realism that governments need to 
legitimize their policies at home, the Chinese statements must be seen in this con-
text, and as we will see, they really helped the Carter administration. 
The process of promoting normalization began right with its announcement 
to the U.S. public. In both, his announcement speech and the subsequent press 
briefing, Carter endeavored to calm down any concerns about Taiwan’s security. 
While diplomatic constraints forced the president to make use of indirect assuranc-
es for Taiwan, he hoped that both the American public and the people on Taiwan 
would believe in the honesty of his concerns and intentions. 
In truth, Carter’s assurances did not help to diminish the disappointment in 
Taiwan. Neither did sending Warren Christopher to Taipei. The president instruct-
ed the Deputy Secretary of State to set the frame for later negotiations about unof-
ficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, but the high ranking diplomat was not able to calm 
down the anxieties of the Taiwanese people. The KMT leadership harshly criti-
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cized normalization, but also realized that it had to cooperate with the Americans if 
it wanted to ensure its survival. Therefore, it resorted to typical measures of author-
itarian regimes like enforcing martial law. The result was the suspension of the 
upcoming elections on municipal level.704 
The reactions to Carter’s announcement abroad and in the United States 
were mixed. The western allies of the United States welcomed normalization as a 
natural step which could increase the stability in Asia. The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, saw normalization aimed at itself, and warned Washington to be care-
ful. As we will later see, the most critical voices, however, came from America’s 
allies in Asia. They were afraid that the termination of the defense treaty with Tai-
wan would mean the beginning of American disengagement from Asia-Pacific. The 
Carter administration could not ignore these concerns which were echoed in Wash-
ington itself. 
In the United States, Carter earned both, compliments and critique. Party 
boundaries did not play a role in this context. As expected, supporters of Taiwan 
criticized the White House for not getting a Chinese guarantee to solve the Taiwan 
issue peacefully. They also questioned the legality of Carter’s decision to terminate 
the Mutual Defense Treaty, a decision that fueled concerns about Taiwan’s securi-
ty. Facing these opinions, the Carter administration wanted to demonstrate its on-
going commitment to Taiwan, preparing sales of military equipment worth more 
than 340 million U.S. dollars. However, the White House deemed a more visible 
public relations effort to advertise normalization necessary, and Deng’s visit to the 
United States should serve as such an effort. Its success, however, did not lay in the 




The Announcement of Normalization 
Although Jimmy Carter felt the public reaction to his announcement very favora-
ble705 , the administration knew that the Taiwanese people as well as different 
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groups in the U.S. would be very critical of Washington’s decision.706 Thus, the 
president addressed in his announcement speech the people in Taiwan, assuring 
them that the U.S. would continue to have strong and close relations with them 
albeit “through non-governmental means”.707 Of course, such public statements of 
reassurance were not only meant for the people of Taiwan. Carter and his aides had 
to assure the U.S. public that their intentions to continue its support for the island 
were honest. 
One way to divert critique was to share the responsibility for the conse-
quences of normalization. A memo by Michel Oksenberg that dealt with possible 
disruptions through Henry Kissinger stated that the former National Security Advi-
sor and Secretary of State had negotiated “the framework for our [Carter admin-
istration’s] China policy” before Carter was even elected. The White House should 
make known that it was Kissinger who promised to Beijing the use of the Japanese 
formula and negotiated Nixon’s so called Five Points.708 
Carter emphasized that while normalization was the achievement of his ad-
ministration, he was not to blame for its costs. When he credited the former admin-
istrations of Nixon and Ford for the improvement of U.S.-PRC relations over the 
last decade, he also intended to make clear that their groundwork had set the basis 
for the Carter administration’s leeway during its negotiation with Beijing. Hence, 
in his public announcement, Carter pointed out every U.S. administration since 
Richard Nixon had accepted that the communist government in Beijing would be 
the one speaking for China as a whole: “Realistically, it [the PRC government] is 
the single government of China and our government must deal with it.” 709 It was 
this realism in the first place that had enabled the Carter administration to normal-
ize relations although it meant restraint on the Taiwan issue. 
In the context of Taiwan, the administration had to hope that the U.S. public 
would read between the lines. The U.S. side wanted to create the impression that 
the exiguous Chinese concessions were enough to guarantee Taiwan’s security. 
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Carter and his staff had already realized that they did not have much leeway on this 
matter, and that it was very difficult to accommodate every party. They knew that 
Beijing would publicly contradict and condemn any strong commitment concerning 
the security of Taiwan. Therefore, U.S. officials pointed out that the PRC govern-
ment had promised not to contradict the American unilateral statement about the 
U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement. During the press briefing after the an-
nouncement, Carter underlined that his administration was to credit for this conces-
sion.710 The White House hoped this would be enough to explain to the U.S. public 
the lack of public assurances for Taiwan. 
Neither the joint communiqué nor the unilateral statements could dare such 
blank boldness as to guarantee Taiwan’s security. Using mostly language from the 
Shanghai Communiqué, the joint communiqué included all points both sides had 
previously agreed upon.711 It was the least common denominator. As I have argued 
in the previous chapter, the Carter administration had to accept it because it had 
been impossible to achieve further going concessions from the Chinese than the 
White House had already achieved during the negotiations.  
The unilateral statements served both sides as a substitution, containing eve-
rything that would have prevented a normalization agreement. If both sides would 
have stated their respective views about the Taiwan issue in the communiqué, it 
would have never come into existence. But the unilateral statements offered Wash-
ington and Beijing an opportunity to express their disagreement. They still had to 
be cautious in order to not offend their interlocutor, but the Carter administration 
was still able to refer to its position that it “continue[d] to have an interest in the 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expect[ed] the Taiwan issue [would] be 
settled peacefully by the Chinese himself.”712 The delicateness of Sino-American 
relations forbade the U.S. president to demand such a resolution. 
The PRC leadership made clear in their own unilateral statement that it did 
not share Washington’s point of view, pointing out that the Taiwan issue was an 
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internal affair, and the Chinese alone decided how to solve the problem.713 The 
document leaves no doubt how far apart both sides really were on the matter of the 
Taiwan. In order to save Beijing’s face, Hua Guofeng emphasized that China ex-
pected the U.S. just to have unofficial relations with Taiwan as well as not selling 
military equipment to the island. Nevertheless, it seemed apparent that the Chinese 
side was realistic concerning the last point, since Hua also stated that despite differ-
ing views on the matter of arms sales, the more important thing was that normaliza-
tion finally had been achieved.714 Washington shared this sentiment.715  
The announcement and also the unilateral statements of both sides indicated 
how much they valued the achievement of normalization. It was clear that both 
sides could live with their differences for now, and cherished normalization more 
than insisting on their principle views about Taiwan. The public statements, thus, 
expressed the same kind of flexibility and pragmatism Chinese and Americans had 
demonstrated during the whole normalization process. Due to the opposed posi-
tions on the matter of Taiwan, the only formula both governments agreed upon was 




The Situation in Taiwan 
In spite of having many supporters in U.S. Congress, ROC leaders were completely 
unaware of the secret negotiations between Washington and Beijing about normali-
zation. Other than during Kissinger’s negotiations with Beijing, the Carter admin-
istration did not keep Taipei informed. Critique from members of the administra-
tion notwithstanding,716 Carter also opted for a short notice of Taiwanese officials 
prior to his announcement. Ambassador Leonard Unger was instructed to request a 
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meeting with President Chiang, just one hour before the announcement. Even 
Brzezinski had suggested giving Taipei notice twelve hours before Carter’s an-
nouncement.717 An earlier notification would have expressed respect and empathy 
for the ROC, but instead Carter opted again for secrecy because he was too con-
cerned about leaks. 
Despite the late timing of the notion, the Carter administration was sincere-
ly interested to comfort the KMT leaders as much as possible to avoid any kind of 
destabilization in Taiwan. When the ambassador wanted to see Chiang Ching-kuo 
in the middle of the night of December 16 (CST), Taiwanese officials seemed to 
know what he was going to say.718 In a note for ROC President Chiang, Jimmy 
Carter expressed his sympathy for the Taiwanese leader, and assured him of Wash-
ington’s intentions to work something out to ascertain the “peace, prosperity and 
wellbeing of the people on Taiwan.”719 It was an honest courtesy, but, as we will 
see, it came too late to prevent the Taiwanese public from being shocked. Over the 
next couple of weeks people in Taiwan panicked and blamed the U.S government 
to abandon the island. 
The late notice demonstrated Carter’s ambivalence about Taiwan and the 
way his administration treated the old U.S. ally. During the negotiations with the 
PRC, the U.S. administration had gone out on a limb to maintain involved in the 
Taiwan Strait and to be in a position to protect Taiwan beyond normalization. 
However, the White House had also avoided any far reaching communication with 
ROC representatives, reducing direct contacts to exchanges between lower rank 
officials. Even during the few meetings between U.S. and ROC diplomats, Ameri-
can officials refrained from strong commitments towards Taiwan’s security. The 
administration just did not trust Taipei to keep the commitments made in private a 
secret. The White House was always aware that strong public guarantees for the 
island’s security could lead to frictions with the People’s Republic. Therefore, 
Washington was reluctant to commit itself, neither in public nor in private. Carter 
gambled that some vague statements about his concerns about Taiwan, and the 
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willingness to sell arms to the island would be enough to calm down the critique 
from members of the Congress and Taiwan. As he states in his memoirs, he really 
believed to have always been honest and upfront to the Taiwanese since their well-
being had always been taken into account by his administration.720  
Since the ROC leadership had had almost no access to the Carter admin-
istration, it could not be sure if the U.S. president did really care for Taiwan’s secu-
rity. With the exception of Leonard Unger, no U.S. official had kept the ROC in-
formed over all the months before the announcement, and even these briefings 
were very short and superficial at best. As we have seen above, Brzezinski delayed 
a meeting with James Shen several times, while Cyrus Vance did not even offer 
such a meeting with the ROC ambassador. The president and vice president had 
also been never available.721 Moreover, the statement of reassurance that was sub-
mitted by Unger did not include any hints about continued arms sale, or any plans 
to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from the mainland.722 Even the most 
imaginative and optimistic Taiwanese leaders had no idea what the future of U.S.-
Taiwanese relations could look like. 
The Carter administration’s lack of openness and commitment left the Tai-
wanese side in the dark, and led to a feeling of insecurity in the whole society. It 
fueled the worst fears of the people on Taiwan who were simply afraid not be able 
to control their own future, anymore. Only a few days after the announcement, stu-
dents of the well-respected Taiwan National University collected money for the 
national defense. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker describes the situation in Taiwan during 
that period as “cautious”. The ROC government had to retain control, and Chiang 
even suspended the legislative elections due to a fear of rising instability.723 It was 
as if the Taiwanese leaders tried to freeze everything in order to prevent a crisis. 
In the end, a crisis never materialized, and the KMT regime was able to 
maintain its grasp on the island. In the short term, normalization and derecognition 
even helped Chiang and his aides after the regime’s legitimacy had started to 
crumble through the 1970s. The KMT’s claim to rule Taiwan was eroding as the 
success of the opposition movement “Dangwai” in the local elections in 1977 had 
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demonstrated.724 The threat of an imminent crisis, however, helped the KMT as it 
enabled the party to blame the United States for Taiwan’s problems. In addition, it 
allowed the ROC government to take measures that would oppress any political 
opposition. The two most notorious actions in this context were the aforementioned 
suspension of local elections and the extension of the rule of martial law. Nonethe-
less, Chiang still needed the U.S. to demonstrate some commitment to Taiwan’s 
security. In order to accomplish this goal, turning to Taiwan’s friends in U.S. Con-




The International Reaction to Normalization 
All over the world, governments were surprised about the sudden announcement of 
normalization. On December 6, only days before the announcement of normaliza-
tion, the German consulate general in Hong Kong sent a report to the Foreign Of-
fice in Berlin observing “that […] the establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween Washington and Peking is so to speak ‘just around the corner’, as some peo-
ple here claim, appears doubtful.”725 While this assessment was wrong, it demon-
strated that other countries were interested in how the relationship between the 
USA and PRC would develop. Unfortunately, no government close to the U.S. had 
any information about the status of normalization. The world was looking to Wash-
ington and Beijing. 
The international reaction to normalization mattered to the United States. 
Two weeks before the announcement by President Carter, the State Department 
had sent a memorandum to Brzezinski, concluding that the overall reaction would 
be rather positive. The DOS expected the western allies as well as New Zeeland 
and Australia to welcome the decision wholeheartedly, not drawing any parallels to 
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their situation. The Soviets, on the other hand, would probably react critically, im-
plying that “the U.S. playing its China card after having reached an impasse in its 
dealings with the USSR.”726  
Despite the expectation of rather positive reactions to normalization, Carter 
explained his decision for normalization in personal letters to the British, German, 
and French leaders, respectively. He described normalization as a step to promote 
peace and stability.727 In another letter, the U.S. president also endeavored to assure 
the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that normalization did not serve to put pressure 
on the Soviet Union. Carter also wrote that “[t]here is no greater priority in my 
government than the strengthening of relations between our [U.S. and USSR] two 
countries.”728 It was an attempt to align Washington’s efforts to have good relations 
with China with Carter’s attempts to make progress in the administration’s SALT 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
Such assurances were necessary as Moscow reacted as critical as expected. 
The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, conveyed a mes-
sage from his government to the Americans during a brief phone call to Brzezinski. 
The Soviets characterized normalization as “a natural thing”, but questioned the 
reasons for Carter’s decision since the PRC pursued an anti-Soviet policy. Thus, 
Moscow viewed the anti-hegemony clause from the joint communiqué as directed 
against itself warning the Americans that “the Soviet Union will follow most close-
ly what will be the practical results of the development of U.S.-China rela-
tions…”729 These words confirmed the conclusion of a report by the German For-
eign Office which suggested the Kremlin suspected that normalization served the 
development of an anti-Soviet axis in East Asia consistent of Beijing, Tokyo and 
Washington.730 
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The public reaction in countries of the Western European allies, on the other 
hand, also confirmed the State Department’s former assessment, since they saw 
normalization uncritical. Different newspapers across Europe described U.S.-China 
normalization as the acceptance of the political reality in Asia. Only some German 
journalists pointed to the possibility that one day the U.S. might abandon West Ber-
lin as well in order to achieve accommodation with the Soviet Union.731 
In Asia, leaders took a more problematic position. Since Washington had 
kept its negotiations with Beijing a secret, it could not appease its partners in the 
region in preparation of normalization. We have to be aware that Carter’s decision 
had a much bigger impact on the strategic situation in Asia than in Europe. Ameri-
can allies like Japan, South Korea, and most non-communist states in Southeast 
Asia appeared concerned that Sino-American normalization would mean an Amer-
ican disengagement from the Asia-Pacific region. These sentiments were echoed in 
the East Asian and Southeast Asian press. While normalization was generally ap-
proved, the way the U.S. treated Taiwan was interpreted as an abandonment of the 
island, and this behavior demonstrated America’s lack of reliability as an ally. Ac-
cording to some newspaper articles, the American decision would lead to a power 
shift in the region, favoring the PRC.732 Thus, Washington was aware that “many 
nations would expect the U.S.-ROC relationship to change just in form rather than 
in substance.”733 
The Carter administration knew it had to convince Taiwan and all other 
American partners in Asia that the stability of Asia-Pacific was an important con-
cern of U.S. policy in the region. In this context, I argue that U.S. security assur-
ances and continuing arms sales to Taiwan did not only serve to appease Taiwan –
or as mentioned before the U.S. public. The demonstration of commitment to Tai-
wan’s security was also important to restate the credibility of the United States as 
an ally. Without this credibility, the American security and structure of alliances in 
Asia-Pacific could erode, weakening the U.S. strategic position and influencing the 
distribution of power, resulting in a detriment to the United States. 
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Washington’s position in East Asia had to be stabilized. The United States 
needed the image as an Asian power, protecting its friends and allies. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had emphasized this necessity in a report to Harold Brown a month 
before the announcement of normalization. The generals saw normalization rather 
positive, as long as the Taiwan issue would be handled correctly. It would be im-
portant to have compensatory mechanics to guarantee Taiwan’s security. In such a 
case the termination of the MDT would be no problem. However, the U.S. admin-
istration’s position to provide Taiwan’s security on an unofficial basis would “have 
a positive impact on perceptions and [would] demonstrate US resolve to maintain a 
substantial and constructive influence in the Pacific.” As the JCS believed, a strong 
American position would be in the PRC’s interest since it would help the U.S. to 
counterbalance Soviet influence.734 Harold Brown took the JCS conclusion very 
seriously, and was assured that normalization, “managed properly”, could strength-
en U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region as long as it would provide security 
assistance for Taiwan.735 This attitude indicated that the decision-makers in the 
U.S. took such concerns into account. As the Carter administration’s tenacity dur-
ing the normalization negotiations had showed, any relationship with Taiwan, 
whatever legal character it might have, had to incorporate some kind of American 
security assistance for the island. Due to diplomatic considerations towards the 




The Critique on Normalization in the United States 
The reaction at home was even more critical for the success of normalization. Right 
from the beginning, the Carter administration had to be aware that, as the political 
scientist Leonard A. Kusnitz argues, throughout the whole 1970s the U.S. public 
had a more favorable view of Taiwan than of the PRC. In 1977 for example, polls 
showed that only 26% of the respondents stated to have a favorable image of the 
People’s Republic, while 56% of them had one of Taiwan. This view translated to 
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the MDT. According to Kusnitz, only a few months before the announcement of 
normalization, in September, a poll asked if the United States should continue or 
should terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan. A vast majority of 64% wanted 
the treaty to continue while only 19% favored its termination.736 Even before the 
successful conclusion of the negotiations in Beijing, the administration was aware 
of these concerns, as a memorandum from Richard Holbrooke to Cyrus Vance in-
dicated. Holbrooke explained that the American people preferred the status-quo in 
the Taiwan Strait, not wanting Washington to assist China in becoming a great 
power. The polls also made clear, that even in the event of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, the U.S. should ascertain Taiwan’s security.737  
These polls did not prevent Carter from normalizing relations with the PRC, 
and in fact, normalization itself was not questioned by the U.S. public. The presi-
dent, however, had to know that the support for his achievement was fragile. The 
American public was very ambivalent about U.S. China and Taiwan policy. As 
polls conducted by CBS network between 1977 and 1979 indicated, a slight majori-
ty of U.S. citizens approved Carter’s decision for normalization, although public 
endorsement dropped significantly, as soon as the polls linked normalization to the 
derecognition of Taiwan.738 This connection did not change over the following pe-
riod of time. One month after Carter’s announcement, 57% of the interviewed per-
sons approved the president’s decision, while only 23% did not, but 48% of them 
thought normalization “was not an ‘important enough reason to break off diplomat-
ic ties with Taiwan’.” In February, 44% of U.S. citizens were even opposed to 
normalization at the cost of the MDT, while only 40% agreed with such a deci-
sion.739  
 Some of the Carter administration’s political opponents tried to make use of 
the U.S. public’s ambivalence. They criticized the consequences of the Carter’s 
decision concerning Taiwan. One of these critics was Henry Kissinger. The nature 
of his criticism does not become clear from the archival record, as a report by 
Michel Oksenberg only stated that “Kissinger is beginning to hit us on China poli-
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cy.”740 As the architect of rapprochement policy, the U.S. public would take Kis-
singer’s criticism seriously. This could damage the administration’s plans. 
The White House, however, was not willing to let Kissinger get away with 
his critique. Oksenberg suggested a call by Brzezinski, reminding Kissinger that 
the administration had always been very gentle with him concerning his China pol-
icy. Oksenberg pointed out that so far they did not plan to mention his promises to 
China concerning Taiwan which had set the frame for the whole normalization 
process, and had limited the Carter administration’s scope of options enormously. 
However, Oksenberg suggested that Brzezinski conveyed to Kissinger that this 
attitude could change.741 The threats must have affected Kissinger since he re-
frained from further public criticism. Still, he was just one former dignitary to wor-
ry about. 
An even bigger concern was the reaction of the former Presidents Nixon 
and Ford. Hamilton Jordan suggested, the president should call Nixon convincing 
him to support normalization like Gerald Ford had already done.742 In order to ex-
press the Carter administration’s respect for the achievements of Nixon’s China 
policy, Michel Oksenberg briefed him in a personal meeting. The former president 
was not as critical as expected. Instead, he expressed his belief that Taiwan would 
survive normalization. The administration should entertain a Senate resolution by 
someone it could work with “which the Administration might indirectly encourage 
but which openly the Administration might only grudgingly accept or even some-
what disown.”743 
Nixon also had some critical words for the president. In a letter to Jimmy 
Carter concerning normalization, he expressed three major concerns. First, there 
were still no guarantees for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. Second, the 
termination of the MDT questioned U.S. credibility as an ally. Finally, Carter’s 
ability to gain public support for future foreign policy initiatives suffered because 
he was going to face heavy critique from the Senate whose support he needed in 
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foreign affairs. Nixon repeated his idea that the administration could leave the mat-
ter of further security guarantees to the Congress in order to protect its relationship 
with Beijing. This way, the United States was still able to stand by its security 
commitments to Taiwan. In Nixon’s view, that was important because if China was 
going to become more powerful, Taiwan would become more important for the 
U.S. position in East Asia in the future than some people realized. In any case, as 
the former president put it, the pro-Taiwan fraction would be “a fact of American 
political life”, and the White House had to account for it.744  
Nixon’s warning of the Congressional reaction proved to be correct. Just a 
few days after the announcement of normalization, some Congressmen wrote to the 
White House. The critique was not aimed at normalization itself but went it differ-
ent directions. One group of Congressman just requested the president to meet 
ROC Ambassador James Shen before his departure on December 29. They ex-
pected the president to show some respect for the people in Taiwan. Carter de-
clined this request because he did not want to send the wrong signal to Beijing.745 
Other letters saw a danger for U.S. credibility as an ally, claiming a better deal 
from the Chinese had been possible. Others questioned the legality of Carter’s ac-
tions and pointed out that the president had ignored Congressional legislation (the 
aforementioned Dole-Stone amendment), by not informing Capitol Hill about the 
upcoming changes in the U.S.-Taiwan relations. 746  A considerable amount of 
members of the Congress, who approved normalization in general, criticized that 
Carter’s decision would have come at the cost of the people on Taiwan –a senti-
ment that was shared by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.747  
Concerned about Taiwan’s security, different Congressmen wanted a strong 
commitment to keep the island safe. Such demands came from members of both 
parties in the Congress. The Democrat Antonio B. Won Pat from Guam for exam-
ple stressed the significance of Taiwan for the strategic position of the United 
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States in the Asia-Pacific region.748 The Carter administration could not ignore the 
aforementioned polls and the critique by numerous Congressmen if normalization 
was to find broad political and public support in the United States.  
The president needed to strengthen his position vis-à-vis his critics at home. 
The first step for the White House was to inform Congress about its intentions to 
maintain a close relationship with Taiwan, and to remain involved in the Taiwan 
Strait. The president wanted to emphasize his ongoing concern for the island and 
its people. The preparation documents for the Congressional briefing about normal-
ization, therefore, indicated that U.S.-ROC relations were not to change in sub-
stance but only in their legal status.749  
With the exception of the MDT, the White House planned to leave all bilat-
eral treaties and arrangements with the ROC effective. This decision served as 
much practical as political goals because observers in Washington including the 
political opposition had to be convinced of Carter’s benevolence towards Taiwan. 
Carter’s directive “for all departments and agencies” should convey the impression 
that Taiwan was virtually treated as a state: “…whenever any law, regulation, or 
orders of the United States refers to a foreign country, nation, state, government, or 
similar entity, departments and agencies shall construe those terms and apply those 
laws, regulations, or order to include Taiwan.”750 In this fashion, the Carter admin-
istration proved how serious the president was to develop a framework that allowed 
the United States future dealings with Taiwan. Despite this gravity, all statements 
and public documents concerning Taiwan expressed that the White House deliber-
ately failed to include any security component in their legislation draft. 
The only hint for the Carter administration’s commitment to guarantee Tai-
wan’s security was the White House’s stressing of its intention to continue arms 
sales to Taiwan. These sales were the most obvious proof for the ongoing Ameri-
can support of the island. We have to be aware that as long as the ROC forces had 
access to U.S. military equipment, the PRC knew that the United States still acted 
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as Taiwan’s protector. Carter’s approval for increased sales of military equipment 
to Taiwan in the second half of 1978 underlines this point of view.  
In addition to tighten U.S.-Taiwan commercial relations, the regime in Tai-
pei recognized a chance to use arms purchases from the United States as an instru-
ment of policy. Subsequently, Taiwanese orders for military material climbed to 
over 340 million U.S. dollars.751 These orders did not only serve the purpose to 
strengthen Taiwan’s military forces. They should also remind the United States that 
the American arms industry benefited from the ROC’s security needs. Since the 
arms industry has always been an influential pressure group, the president had a 
political interest to consider their needs. To Taipei’s relief, many American arms 
manufacturer like Northrop Grumman or McDonald Douglas/Boeing had an inter-
est to sell their military systems to Taiwan. 
Still, the Carter administration’s biggest problem remained, finding a bal-
ance between diplomatic and domestic considerations. On the one hand, arms sales 
to Taiwan should not offend the PRC too much, while on the other hand, Washing-
ton had to make sure that the ROC’s defensive capabilities would be strong enough 
to deter any coercion from the mainland. Although Carter was willing to consider 
Beijing’s objection to arms sales insofar as he partially abstained from selling state-
of-the-art equipment to Taiwan, the president and his advisors fully knew that no 
American government could afford to cease selling arms to Taiwan if it wanted to 
find domestic support for their China policy. Arms sales would not only appease 
Taipei. It would also appease Congress, and all U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion who were afraid of an American disengagement.  
As the normalization negotiations had already proved, the arms sales issue 
should remain a tightrope walk for Carter. The decision about the sale of all-
weather aircraft to Taiwan in the summer of 1978 provides a good example for this 
dilemma. Taiwan’s air force lacked the capability to counterattack airstrikes in bad 
weather as the old version of their Northrop F-5 fighter aircraft did not possess the 
necessary equipment to be active under such conditions. The F-4 Phantom from 
McDonald Douglas, which represented the most sophisticated all weather fighter 
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aircraft at the time, could solve this problem.752 The U.S. Department of Defense 
favored the sale of F-4 because the state-of-the-art jet and his sophisticated systems 
could foster Taiwan’s air defense for decades to come.753 The DOS, on the other 
hand, recommended that the USA should not sell the F-4 to Taiwan because it 
could alienate the PRC. According to Cyrus Vance, the Chinese would interpret 
this “as a hostile diplomatic signal.”754 Instead, the State Department suggested that 
Taiwan should get an upgraded version of the F-5 (the E-version) which also pos-
sessed the all weather capabilities the ROC air force needed. The F-5 would be 
rather acceptable for Beijing than a state-of-the-art jet like the F-4.755 
The DOS’s view prevailed, but their considerations were futile. After the 
Chinese government learned about the sale of the F-5E, they complained that this 
decision would “raise obstacles to the normalization of relations between […]” the 
PRC and the United States. In a conversation which took place briefly before both 
sides reached the normalization agreement, Richard Holbrooke argued to the Chi-
nese the sale of the F-5E was “a continuation of something that has gone on for 
several years.”756 The sub-text of Holbrooke’s reply was that arms sales to Taiwan 
would continue, no matter how much the Chinese would complain about it. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the PRC finally accepted the Carter administra-
tion’s position. 
Another hint, that the United States would sell arms to Taiwan after normal-
ization, came from Brzezinski. The APNSA sought to use arms sales to Taiwan in 
order to satisfy U.S. supporters of the KMT regime. Therefore, he suggested to 
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postpone the sales of anti-ship Harpoon launchers and missiles to Taiwan, bundling 
the deal together with the sale of the F-5E for a time when the Carter administra-
tion “will have to demonstrate later our [the American] dedication to Taiwan’s de-
fense.” The APNSA had always appeared as the most eager advocate of normaliza-
tion among Carter’s advisors, also at the cost of Taiwan. As an immigrant of Polish 
birth, Brzezinski was a fierce Cold War warrior always searching for ways to coun-
terbalance the Soviet Union. Normalization had always appealed to him as an in-
strument to put pressure on the USSR. However, Brzezinski was also aware that 
normalization could not work out if the U.S. would not maintain a security rela-
tionship with Taiwan. Otherwise, Congress would not support normalization.757 





The Christopher Mission 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was Carter’s choice to be the first 
U.S. top official to go to Taiwan after derecognition of the ROC. Christopher, a 
career diplomat and former U.S. Deputy Attorney General, should speak about a 
framework with Taipei that would enable Washington to maintain close relations 
with Taiwan without alienating the PRC. He was also, together with David Aaron, 
chairman of the administration’s special ad-hoc group that should help to coordi-
nate the implementation of normalization in Washington’s bureaucratic appa-
ratus.758 As one of the highest ranking U.S. diplomats, Christopher had a profound 
knowledge of the normalization process. Moreover, due to his experience in the 
field of jurisdiction, he was perfect to overcome any legal difficulties. Christo-
pher’s rank in the State Department was also important. As Deputy Secretary of 
State he was important enough to please U.S. Congress and the regime in Taipei 
but his rank would not offend the PRC. 
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On December 27, Christopher arrived in Taipei. He and his companions 
were greeted by a mob of thousands of disappointed Taiwanese. The demonstrators 
threw tomatoes and other waste at the U.S. delegation’s motorcade, forcing Carter 
to offer to Christopher to call off the mission. However, the Deputy Secretary in-
sisted to stay in Taipei as long as the KMT regime would ensure his and his delega-
tion’s security. When he met Chiang Ching-kuo soon after the incident, the ROC 
president assured the Americans to be safe for the rest of their visit to Taiwan. De-
spite disappointment and a feeling of betrayal, the Taiwanese were still willing to 
cooperate with the U.S. government realizing “the need to foster future ties with 
the United States.”759 
Christopher characterized his first meeting with CCK as positive and con-
structive.760 During several sessions, ROC officials argued the regime needed gov-
ernment-to-government relations to the U.S. due to legal matters.761 This claim was 
echoed in Taipei’s five principles about future U.S.-Taiwan ties. The first was “re-
ality”, and meant that the existence of the ROC was an immovable fact. The second 
was “continuity”. U.S.-ROC relations had continuously to improve. The third one 
dealt with Taiwan’s “security” that Washington had to guarantee via ongoing sup-
port and arms sales. The fourth principle was “legality”, emphasizing the need for a 
legal framework in order to have economic and cultural relations after derecogni-
tion. Finally, the ROC insisted on a certain degree of “governmentality”. CCK be-
lieved it would need government-to-government relations in order to handle issues 
like arms sales.762 These demands demonstrated that Taipei was not unprepared 
and had its own ideas how the relationship with the Unites States should look like 
in the future. Christopher was too experienced a diplomat to guarantee for anything 
of the above. He left Taipei without any agreement as both sides should negotiate 
about this topic later in Washington. Still, his mission was vital for the U.S. admin-
istration to learn how CCK and his aides imagined the future of unofficial U.S.-
Taiwan relations. 
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This impression leads me to contradict Nancy Bernkopf Tucker’s interpreta-
tion that Christopher’s mission was proof for the Carter administration’s estrange-
ment from Taipei. According to Bernkopf Tucker, Christopher and his delegation 
provided the Taiwanese public only with a target for their anger and disappoint-
ment, without achieving anything of substance.763 This assessment underestimates 
the meaning of Christopher’s trip for the exchange of views between the ROC and 
the U.S. The Deputy Secretary’s talks with the ROC leadership provided both sides 
with information how the framework for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations could 
look like. Moreover, the U.S. administration demonstrated its commitment to find a 
solution suiting Taipei’s and Washington’s needs. It was a final act of official di-
plomacy between the two governments, and as I will show, it kept the channels of 
communication between Washington and Taipei open. 
Still, it is true that the Carter administration was not aware of the Taiwanese 
people’s anxieties. All the delaying tactics to avoid a meeting with James Shen and 
other ROC officials in Washington led to a lack of comprehension for the situation 
of the people on the island. The Carter administration was all too certain that the 
KMT regime had no other choice than cooperating with the United States. The lack 
of options for CCK led Washington to dictate the conditions of the future relation-
ship. One example of this dominance was Washington’s refusal to issue a joint 
communiqué at the end of Christopher’s trip although the ROC government had 
sent a draft to the Deputy Secretary. The ball was in Washington’s court, and Tai-
pei had to wait for “their pass”. 
While it was understandable that the ROC wanted as much official com-
mitment from the U.S. as possible, the drafted communiqué also demonstrated why 
Washington had to be so careful in its dealings with Taipei. ROC officials could 
not only be indiscreet in order to publicly prove Taipei’s close relationship to the 
United States. They also tended to exaggerate their demands when their options 
were narrowed down. So it was not surprising that the proposed draft for a final 
U.S.-ROC joint communiqué did not only include the guarantee for further arms 
sales to the island. It also contained phrases that would have meant the de facto 
independence of Taiwan: “The United States government recognizes the state and 
government of the Republic of China as de jure [underlined by author] entitled to 
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exercise governing authority in respect of the territories presently under its con-
trol.”764 These words demonstrated that Taipei was overestimating its own options. 
After normalization, Washington could not accept a Taiwanese proposal that used 
words like “government of the Republic of China” and “de jure” in the same sen-
tence. Agreeing to such a formula could lead to significant damage for U.S. rela-




Pleasing the U.S. Public 
The administration’s next assignment was to convince the U.S. public of normali-
zation. Therefore, the first three months of 1979 were crucial for the long-term suc-
cess of Carter’s China policy. While the president seemed certain that the majority 
of the American people and the political circles in Washington accepted his deci-
sion for normalization, his aides were aware that the administration had to do more 
in order to convince U.S. public of the benefits of normalization. A first step was to 
make important pressure groups such as business associations aware of the vast 
potential that trade with China represented. Closer trading relations with China 
would create new jobs in the United States, and that would please many Congress-
men. However, before commercial relations with China could grow, both nations 
had to agree on a trading agreement. In addition, the PRC needed the MNF status. 
Both negotiation processes needed time. Nonetheless, early contacts between U.S. 
business men and Chinese officials helped the future of Chinese-American trade, 
and would stabilize the relationship in general.765 
Another reason to gain public support for normalization lay in the political 
situation in Washington. Public support for normalization made it easier to con-
vince Congress to approve the upcoming Taiwan legislation, as many senators did 
not want to act against the will of their voters. The administration had already 
learned that there existed some groups in Congress which did not endorse Carter’s 
decision. But, as Cyrus Vance pointed out in a memorandum for the president, 
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Congressional approval was very important for the White House’s proposed Tai-
wan legislation.766 In accordance with Neoclassical Realism, this legislation was 
the ultimate test if the administration was able to find acceptance for its policy and 
could legitimize derecognition of Taiwan. If the executive branch failed in this re-
gard, Carter would lose political resources that could later be missing to conduct 
other political goals like the SALT II treaty. Furthermore, a failure of the Taiwan 
legislation would damage his prestige. 
Special Assistant to the President for Public Outreach, Anne Wexler, devel-
oped a number of goals the administration should pursue in the short-term. In 
Wexler’s opinion, the administration had to enhance the public knowledge about 
the ongoing changes in China. This would improve the PRC’s image in the United 
States. Simultaneously, the White House needed to demonstrate U.S. support for 
Taiwan in order to minimize the concerns about the island’s security. The admin-
istration should also make the Congress aware that there already existed broad pub-
lic support for normalization. In order to further increase this support, Wexler 
wanted to approach and cooperate with any important group of the American socie-
ty that could have any dealings with China in the future -mainly businessmen, 
journalists, and academics.767 
On the basis of Wexler’s arguments, Brzezinski suggested two events to 
promote normalization among potential players in future U.S.-China relations. One 
should be a reception with a briefing for more than 600 members of the National 
Council for U.S./China Trade and the USA/Republic of China Economic Council. 
The second event was a briefing for 50 foreign policy and China experts from dif-
ferent universities, think tanks, and the media. Carter opted against the reception 
for the trade council members. The president thought this plan involved too many 
people, claiming it would be “overkill”. Moreover, an attempt to please so many 
people could appear “desperate”. It could lead to the public impression that the 
Carter administration was in dire need of approval for its China policy. Carter did 
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not want to take the risk to leave such an impression, and only allowed the briefing 
of the 50 experts.768 
Carter’s reaction revealed how ambivalent the administration was about 
gaining support for normalization. While his advisors saw an obvious necessity to 
advertise the president’s decision as a chance to improve the economic, strategic, 
and diplomatic situation of the United States, Carter himself was more restraint on 
the matter. His handwritten remarks on Wexler’s memorandum indicate that he did 
not want to create the impression he was cajoling for public support. In the presi-
dent’s opinion, this behavior conveyed political weakness. Carter was convinced 
that he had made the right decision with normalization. This conviction, which was 
fueled by the congratulations of his political allies, forced the president to ignore 
the problems his administration faced when they had to deal with the consequences 
of normalization.769  
Due to Carter’s lack of empathy, Deng Xiaoping’s proposed visit in early 
1979 gained even more importance, as it provided a chance to promote normaliza-
tion to the U.S. public, and broaden the basis for cultural and economic relations 
with the PRC. As Michel Oksenberg put it in a memo for Carter’s interview with 
the journalist John Chancellor on January 13, the administration faced difficult 
questions about the timing, the benefits, and the reversibility of normalization, as 
well as about the future of Taiwan. According to the White House’s China expert, 
the president should make clear that the timing of normalization had been crucial in 
order to develop Sino-American relations simultaneously to the American relation-
ship with the Soviet Union. The advantages of Carter’s decision meant a better 
overall position for the United States in East Asia increasing the level of peace and 
security there. Normal relations with China should help to integrate the country 
into the international community. This, in addition to the continuing military pres-
ence of the United States in the region would finally prevent Beijing from the use 
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of force against Taiwan.770 The Carter administration did not want to hurt Chinese 
sentiments concerning the Taiwan issue, and was still opting for restrained state-
ments about U.S. intentions concerning Taiwan. 
The Carter administration thought it could afford to leave any security guar-
antees for Taiwan out of its statements, because Carter and his aides were con-
vinced that the PRC would abstain from using violence against Taiwan in the fu-
ture. The DOS believed the PRC had a strong interest to find a peaceful solution 
for the Taiwan issue because, otherwise, Beijing was going to risk its good rela-
tions with the U.S. and Japan –something the Chinese needed in order to put pres-
sure on Moscow. Moreover, the PLA lacked the “military capability to take Taiwan 
by force”, and the State Department did not expect this fact to change soon. Final-
ly, the recent end of the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu was seen as a demon-
stration of Beijing’s good will. Citing an official statement from the PRC from 
January 1, 1979, the report elaborated that “the PRC pledged to ‘respect the statuts-
quo on Taiwan’[…].”771  From an American perspective, such statements made 
clear that a forceful reunification was not imminent in the foreseeable future.  
The PRC had its own reasons for accommodating Taiwan. On the one hand, 
the PRC leaders were really interested to open a dialogue that could lead to reunifi-
cation, or would at least help to establish a functioning working relationship with 
the KMT regime. On the other hand, Beijing wanted normalization to gain world 
wide support, and particularly in the United States. The Chinese government need-
ed normalization even more than Washington. The regime in Beijing could not 
afford any kind of international isolation, as it had experienced during the years of 
the Cultural Revolution. Being belligerent towards its “renegade” province did not 
serve China’s interest to gain more international prestige and easier access to mod-
ern western technology. Therefore, the PRC was wager to appear patient on the 
matter of Taiwan, and Deng Xiaoping got never tired to convince foreign politi-
cians of China’s patience. One example for Deng’s approach was his meeting with 
Congressman Thomas L. Ashley. The American politician reported back in Wash-
ington how impressed he was by Deng and his frankness about Taiwan because the 
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vice premier had stressed how patient China was on the matter.772 He wanted to use 




Deng’s State Visit: Chinese and American Expectations 
Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States was very important for the U.S. and 
PRC government. It should demonstrate the strength of the relationship between 
Beijing and Washington, and, particularly from China’s point of view, should deter 
the Soviet Union. In addition, the trip served Chinese and Americans to promote 
normalization. Both sides put a lot of prestige into it, making the trip an enormous 
public relation effort. The goal was to find international and domestic approval for 
normalization, so that the Taiwan issue and derecognition of the ROC regime 
would fade into the background. Especially the U.S. public should learn more 
about Deng and his country to improve China’s image in the United States. 
 The PRC vice premier wanted to use his journey through the United States 
to convey China’s love for peace, making clear that the People’s Republic was not 
going to use force against Taiwan. The idea was that an improvement of China’s 
image would help normalization. The less aggressive the PRC appeared to the U.S. 
public, the better its image would be. U.S. officials shared this view and, as we will 
see, welcomed Deng’s efforts in this regard. 
Deng also hoped to foster his position in the Chinese leadership with this 
trip. Since he had made the decision to tacitly accept U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, he 
had bound his personal prestige to the success of normalization. The Chinese peo-
ple should learn about his efforts in the United States which served China’s mod-
ernization and this way also the improvement of their standard of living. Therefore, 
the China Central Television (CCTV) reported about this trip more than about any 
other state visit by a Chinese statesman before. The pictures from America should 
also make the Chinese people aware of how backward their country was.773 In 
preparation of Deng’s trip, CCTV broadcasted an interview by the Chinese journal-
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ist Zhao Zhonxiang with Jimmy Carter.774 Later the channel even produced a doc-
umentary about the Deng’s visit with the title “The Spring of Friendship”.775 Alt-
hough not many Chinese people had access to television, such publicity helped 
Deng greatly to strengthen his position. Of major importance was also that the par-
ty elite would see how Deng presented himself as a statesman of international 
grandeur. 
Another goal Deng pursuit was gaining access to American technology and 
investments. Thus, as Henry Kissinger puts it, the whole state visit did not only 
serve diplomatic and political means but also economic interests.776 As we have 
seen, the PRC leader was convinced that China’s modernization also needed pro-
gress in the area of science and technology. Thus, he sought for ways to get in 
touch with U.S. companies which could provide China with modern technology 
and know-how. That was the reason why he visited places like the Johnson Space 
Center in Houston, the headquarters of Coca Cola in Atlanta, and the facilities of 
Boeing in Seattle. 
The Carter administration had great expectations for Deng’s visit. The 
White House hoped for a positive public relations effect to gain support for normal-
ization. Deng’s visit needed to become a success. In the best case scenario, the 
Chinese statesman’s trip through the United States would trigger a similar effect as 
Richard Nixon’s trip to China had in 1972.777 Normalization should find unani-
mous support in the United States, and Carter should appear as an astute statesman 
with vision and self-assertion. According to a memorandum by Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, the administration embraced Deng’s help to gain Congressional and 
public support for normalization, and encouraged the broadening of Sino-American 
relations. In order to bolster the vice premier’s political position at home, the Unit-
ed States had also an honest interest in the success of Deng’s reforms and China’s 
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modernization because this could increase the degree of China’s involvement in 
international affairs.778 
However, the U.S. side did not share all of Deng’s objectives. In the same 
memorandum, Vance argued, was not interested in an anti-Soviet alliance, as the 
Moscow was too important for the solution of international problems like in Soma-
lia, Cambodia, or Afghanistan. Thus, ignoring or alienating the Soviet leadership, 
as the Chinese suggested, was too costly. Guessing that the PRC could ask Wash-
ington to support any actions against Hanoi due to Vietnam’s aggressive course in 
Cambodia, Vance also criticized the Chinese attempts to maximize U.S. hostility 
towards the Southeast Asian communist regime.779 The Secretary of State wanted 
to avoid the impression the Chinese could exploit the new character of its relation-
ship with the U.S. at the cost of Washington’s further political goals.  
Brzezinski widely agreed with Vance but emphasized the need to contain 
Moscow’s influence. Hence, the APNSA wanted the PRC to be strong enough to 
resist any threats or offers from the Soviet Union, and considered even Chinese 
arms purchases from western European allies.780 Carter rejected this idea because 
he did not want to provoke the Soviets with such an initiative, as he made clear in 
an interview with different members from U.S. media. Although the president con-
ceded that U.S. “allies are independent, sovereign nations, and they would resent 
any intrusion by us into their weapons sales policies”, he still hinted that he saw 
such arms sales critical if the weapon systems would have offensive quality: “Our 
[U.S. administration] publicly expressed and privately expressed advice to the oth-
er nations is that the sale of any weapons should be constricted to defensive weap-
ons…”781  These clear words indicated Carter’s unwillingness to build an anti-
Soviet alliance. 
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The Deng Show 
Between January 29 and February 4, Deng Xiaoping visited Washington D.C., At-
lanta, Houston, and Seattle in an effort to show the American people that the peo-
ple of China wanted to be their friends. The visit was so important for China that 
the newspaper 人民日报 (People’s Daily) reported about his arrival on its front 
page.782 He should go on to give the performance of a life time, and the whole 
United States was Deng’s stage. His visit should become the perfect public rela-
tions event for normalization. 
The preparations for Deng’s arrival went well, and a number of important 
groups saw the visit very positive. The Chinese leader was invited to different 
luncheons and dinners in his honor such as from the Foreign Policy Association 
which contacted both Deng himself and the White House in order to make the nec-
essary arrangements.783 Members of Washington’s political circles were also eager 
to meet Deng and arrange meetings for their acquaintances.784 Other Congressmen 
contacted the Chinese directly, advertising their districts or states as places Deng 
Xiaoping should visit.785  The public interest for Deng was enormous, and the 
White House welcomed the situation wholeheartedly. The Chinese leader was very 
popular. His plans to change and modernize his country for example had impressed 
the editors of the Time magazine so much that they made Deng the “Man of the 
Year” for 1978 even before he had touched American soil.786 The interest on Deng 
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and his popularity showed that the American attitude towards the PRC was chang-
ing. The establishment of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations had already tremendously 
improved China’s image in the U.S. 
The whole state visit started with some private talks between Deng and 
Carter. The latter was aware that Deng Xiaoping’s visit and statements in front of 
the whole country would influence the public reaction to any further steps taken by 
the administration in their China policy. This included the upcoming legislation on 
Taiwan. Therefore, Carter asked Deng to exercise restraint concerning Taiwan, as 
the PRC vice premier should only repeat his earlier statements about China’s pa-
tience in public:  
“I think we have negotiated long enough to understand the attitude of each 
other [concerning the Taiwan issue] and as far as our public approval for 
normalization and the approval by Congress of necessary legislation, any 
reference to patience or peaceful resolution on your part to the Congress or 
to the public would be very helpful. Just to repeat the statements that the 
Vice Premier has made since our announcement would be completely ade-
quate. They are very fine, very constructive statements.”787 
It was the most important pledge Carter made towards Deng. 
The Chinese vice premier reacted positively to Carter’s wish. On January 
31, 1979, Deng gave an interview which was hosted by reporters from different TV 
stations (Walter Cronkite/CBS, James Lehrer/PBS, Frank Reynolds/ABC, David 
Brinkley/NBC). The Chinese leader expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to 
speak in the American television. While the interview centered on questions about 
the Soviet Union and the security of China and the United States, there was also a 
question about the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. Deng answered cautious-
ly, and stated: “We try our very best by peaceful means to bring about the return of 
Taiwan to the Mainland and to complete our reunification.”788 Beforehand, in his 
talks with Carter, Deng had even conceded the U.S. could deliver the weapons it 
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had already promised to Taiwan, although the PRC government hoped Washington 
would be discrete, careful and prudent on the matter in the future.789 
Deng understood what the U.S. president needed in order to gain support 
for normalization but he still had to consider his own political situation. Therefore, 
he made clear that the PRC’s patience on the Taiwan issue had its limits. He sug-
gested that the United States and Japan urged Taipei to start negotiations with the 
mainland. Washington should abstain from encouraging Chiang Ching-kuo to re-
fuse talks with Beijing. Otherwise, the PRC would run out of options to deal with 
Taiwan and the matter of reunification. He assured Carter that just two conditions 
existed under which the mainland would forgo peaceful means. Either Taipei re-
fused any kind of negotiations over the long-term, or the Soviet Union gained polit-
ical and military access to Taiwan.790 Since the Carter administration knew this 
position already, Deng’s revelation did not present a problem for them, and it did 
not shock the U.S. public. 
The PRC could not publicly commit to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully. 
As I have argued in previous chapters, it needed a certain degree of deterrence 
against Taiwan in order to prevent the island from declaring independence –though 
this was unlikely as long as the KMT ruled Taiwan. Therefore, the PRC govern-
ment needed to provide a credible threat against the island. The Chinese insistence 
also served the cultural attitude of saving face.791 The communist leadership had 
always claimed Taiwan was a province of China. Since the communists had also 
always propagated to unify all of China in order to lead it to its past glory, it could 
not loose Taiwan. It could not even allow any impression to soften its claim on the 
island. Doing so would damage the CCP’s credibility as the ruling party of China, 
and mean the loss of the Chinese leaders’ faces. This attitude based on more than 
only pride. Showing weakness and losing face can mean the end of a political ca-
reer in China. Thus, it was politically and culturally impossible for Deng to make a 
concession that would question the credibility of Beijing’s demands towards Tai-
wan. Demonstrating patience and restraint was one thing, giving up a vital position 
of Chinese politics another. Washington seemed to accept this fact. 
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The Carter administration felt that Deng’s statements about the Taiwan is-
sue were very accommodating. That was one of the reasons why Carter refrained 
from a fierce reaction to China’s aggression against Vietnam.792 Another reason 
was that the DOS did not believe that the United States was in a position to alter 
Beijing’s course of action.793 James Mann criticized this reaction, claiming that 
even some of the Carter’s aides conceded the Chinese could not have hoped for 
less critique.794 Henry Kissinger argues that Deng used this moment to sell the im-
pression the U.S. administration would sanctify Beijing’s decision to invade its 
southern neighbor. Using this kind of “psychological warfare”, as Kissinger puts it, 
the Chinese Premier wanted to deter the Soviet Union from any intervention on 
behalf of the Vietnamese.795 
Mann’s and Kissinger’s criticism does not take into account what a diplo-
matically difficult situation the president faced. I argue that the White House’s re-
action represented a quid-pro-quo between Washington and Beijing. While Deng 
abstained from threatening Taiwan in front of the American people, Carter ab-
stained from scolding the Chinese for invading the north of Vietnam. Nobody in 
the administration was willing to risk tensions in Sino-American relations.796 In the 
end, the whole Vietnam issue was a test for the fragile relationship between Wash-
ington and Beijing. A public argument with the Chinese about Vietnam would have 
spoiled Deng’s visit, denying the Carter administration a chance to promote nor-
malization. Even the Chinese press did not focus its coverage on the Vietnam issue. 
The People’s Daily only mentioned on its front page that Deng and Carter had re-
sumed their political talks.797 
In his memoirs, Carter admits that China’s “punitive strike” against Vi-
etnam bore some risks for his administration because the invasion was a threat to 
the stability in Asia which was one of the main arguments in favor of normaliza-
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tion. 798  Moreover, the PLA’s attack could damage Deng’s credibility, and the 
American people could start to question if the Chinese patience concerning Taiwan 
was honest. The history of the last 30 years had demonstrated to the U.S. public 
that the PRC was not shy to resort to belligerence and aggressive measures in their 
foreign policy. However, these concerns were unfounded, as Deng was able to 
convince the U.S. public that China’s invasion of Vietnamese territory was a purely 
defensive measure.799 While Carter’s behavior appears ethically questionable, it 
was diplomatically prudent, especially considering the outcome that the U.S. public 
did not blame Deng for the Chinese attack. 
Carter’s decision paid off, and Deng Xiaoping’s visit became the success 
the administration had hoped for. Deng was impressed with what he saw in the 
U.S., and he wanted his country to benefit from the same experience. Thus, it was 
not surprising that he was willing to discuss possibilities for an institutionalization 
of cultural exchange between the PRC and the United States. One way to do so was 
to grant journalists from the United States access to China. Another one, the more 
intriguing for Deng, was to exchange students.800 As Deng had expressed it him-
self, in June 1978, the PRC wanted its young people to go to the West and Japan in 
order to learn from these nations.801 Deng’s own experience of working and study-
ing abroad helped him during his political life. It was only logical that he believed 
the same experience would be good for other young Chinese, helping China’s 
modernization. 
The pictures from the United States should indeed stimulate the curiosity of 
young Chinese about this country, becoming an important impetus for Deng’s re-
forms and the modernization of China. Within ten years, the number of Chinese 
exchange students to the U.S. grew from 22 in 1974/75 to more than 10,000 in 
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1984/85.802 Deng’s visit led in China to similar results as Richard Nixon’s visit had 
in the United States in 1972. Like the Americans in the early 1970s, the Chinese 
people looked at the television, read the newspapers, or accessed other media to 
learn the news about their political leader’s visit to another country, and they were 
fascinated by the completely different world they found. Indeed, as Deng had en-
visaged, his visit opened the eyes of the Chinese people, and helped to pave the 
way for modernization. 
Jimmy Carter was “favorably impressed with Deng.”803 The Chinese’s pub-
lic appearances during his trip through the United States made U.S. citizens believe 
in the legitimacy of normalization. An article of the Washington Post said one day 
after an entertainment show in honor of the vice premier in the Kennedy Center in 
Washington D.C.: “For although the show was technically put on for his benefit, he 
[Deng], in fact, was the show.” The author of the article praised Deng’s appeal and 
his presence which led to the success of the whole evening.804 It was just one of 
many occasions where Deng exuded his charisma. Time and time again, Deng was 
able to show his human side, winning over America’s hearts. Once, he was moved 
to tears when some children sang one of his favorite Chinese songs. Another time, 
he curiously took the driver’s seat of the Lunar Rover when he visited the Johnson 
Space Center. Then, attending a rodeo show in Texas, he excitingly swung around 
a huge cowboy hat to the crowd. His self-assured, calm, humble, and genuine atti-
tude helped his country’s image more than words could ever have.805 In fact, Deng 
Xiaoping’s visit was going to bring the popularity of China in the United States to 
new heights. 
A news segment by Jim Laurie for ABC News echoed the praise for Deng 
Xiaoping’s public appearances, indicating that his performance had led to “a new 
image for communist China’s leading man [Deng].”806 Even political opponents of 
the diplomatic recognition of the PRC had to admit the success of Deng’s perfor-
mance and its positive influence on U.S. public opinion.807  Public polls which 
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asked U.S. citizens about their opinion about China reflected this conclusion. 
While in spring 1978, only 21% of the polled people had a favorable opinion about 
the PRC, in October 1979, this number grew to 64%. In 1980, this number dropped 
again to only 42%.808 Although there do not exist any polls about Deng’s personal 
image in the U.S. public at this time, it appears logical to link the improvement of 
U.S. public opinion about China in 1979 to Deng’s performance during his visit in 




Conclusion and Discussion 
The announcement of normalization was a huge foreign policy success for Jimmy 
Carter. Normalization should demonstrate to the U.S. public that the administration 
was able to improve the strategic position of the United States on a global (Cold 
War) and regional (Asia) scale. Moreover, official relations with China also offered 
the promise for a larger amount of bilateral trade in the near future. This idea was 
encouraged by the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reform course in China. Alt-
hough normalization was the result of difficult negotiations that had demanded 
hard compromises from both, the American and Chinese governments, the U.S. 
president and the Chinese leadership concluded that the result had been worth these 
concessions.  
Most members of Congress and also a majority of the American people had 
a positive view about normalization, but there still remained some concerns about 
Taiwan which led to open critique about Carter’s decision. After the difficult nego-
tiations with China, this meant a new struggle for the White House. Now, the 
Carter administration had to explain to the American public, the U.S. Congress, the 
regime in Taiwan, and U.S. allies why normal relations with Beijing did not mean 
the abandoning of Taiwan, and a disengagement from Asia-Pacific. The first 
chance for Carter to make this clear was the announcement of normalization on TV 
on December 15. 
 Carter stated that normalization was a great achievement and an important 
asset to the global position of the United States. Since he was aware that the derec-
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ognition of the ROC and the termination of the MDT would lead to heavy critique 
from different sides, he also endeavored to calm down any concerns that the United 
States would abandon Taiwan and disengage from East Asia. To underline this 
position, Carter referred to the administration’s plans to install a framework that 
would allow the United States to conduct unofficial relations with Taiwan. Howev-
er, as a result of the concessions, the White House had to make to the Chinese, nei-
ther the normalization agreement nor the U.S. administration’s unilateral statement 
included any future security guarantees for Taiwan. 
Yet, the lack of security guarantees was not Carter’s biggest mistake in his 
approach towards normalization. The aforementioned concessions were part of his 
diplomatic approach and a necessity if normalization should be successful. Instead, 
the president’s most costly mistake was to leave Congress in the dark about the 
administration’s negotiations with Beijing. This decision ignored the injured pride 
of many members of the Congress who did not want to lose their influence on U.S. 
policy about China and Taiwan. Subsequently, Carter’s decision damaged the ad-
ministration’s relationship with the legislative after the Stone-Dole amendment had 
asked the executive branch to inform the Congress about any upcoming changes in 
the U.S. relations with Taipei. Still, Carter saw the decision for normalization as a 
“presidential prerogative”, and thus not only legal but also irreversible. In his opin-
ion, threats from Congress would only endanger the possibility for unofficial rela-
tions with Taiwan.809  
While Carter’s view suggests something like a presidential omnipotence in 
the realm of U.S. foreign policy, his denial to involve Congress in his China policy 
underestimated the legislative branch’s possibilities and vigor. This appears as a 
contradiction because, as previous chapters showed, the president and his advisors 
knew that they needed Congress for legal and political matters. The legal matter 
was the passing of the Taiwan legislation which should enable future U.S.-Taiwan 
ties. The political matter was the need to legitimize Carter’s China and Taiwan pol-
icy. If he wanted Congressional support for his administration’s future projects, he 
could not afford to damage the White House’s relations to Capitol Hill beyond re-
pair. The representatives in Congress wanted to remain involved in the China poli-
cy, and, as the former Georgian peanut farmer Carter had to learn during the up-
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coming legislation process of his Taiwan initiative, they would find a way to have 
their way.  
In the meantime, the Carter administration had to convey to the KMT re-
gime in Taipei that the United States was still interested in close relations with 
Taiwan. The reasons for this interest were of political, economic, and strategic na-
ture. As we have seen, the Carter administration needed good relations with Tai-
wan in order to calm down public critique at home. There was also a large group of 
U.S. companies –including the American arms industry- which was doing good 
business in Taiwan. Finally, the island still held strategic value for the United 
States. As President Nixon had expressed to officials of the Carter administration, 
Taiwan could always serve as a strategic hedge vis-à-vis the People’s Republic if 
the relationship between Washington and Beijing would ever deteriorate. The latter 
argument should play an important role in the discussions about the upcoming 
Taiwan legislation, but beforehand Washington needed to set the frame of future 
U.S.-Taiwan relations with the regime in Taipei. 
For this purpose, Carter decided to send Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to Taiwan. He should make the Taiwanese understand that Washington 
did not intend to abandon the regime and its people. It was an important decision, 
because it allowed both sides to inform each other about their conditions for the 
framework of future unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. However, as 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues this mission indicates the Carter administration’s 
estrangement from Taipei, as she correctly points out Carter underestimated the 
Taiwanese people’s anger and disappointment.810 
Indeed, a diplomatic delegation could not lower the level of frustration in 
Taiwan. Thus, Carter’s approach appeared almost naïve. Yet, the regime in Taipei 
was so dependent on U.S. support that CCK had to accept most of the American 
conditions for the development of future relations. Even the disappointed Taiwan-
ese public accepted this fact. From the Carter administration’s point of view, War-
ren Christopher’s mission was therefore a complete success because it demonstrat-
ed to the U.S. public Carter’s commitment to the people of Taiwan. Moreover, 
Christopher let Taipei know what character the future relationship would have. 
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Finally, the KMT regime signaled that it would agree with these notions because 
they had no other choice. 
The next step in promoting normalization was the announced visit of Deng 
Xiaoping in late January 1979, only a month after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Washington and Beijing. The Carter administration needed 
Deng’s visit to become a success. The best case scenario was that Deng’s trip 
through the United States would trigger a similar effect like Richard Nixon’s trip to 
China had in 1972.811 The expectations were high as both sides wanted to advertise 
normalization in the U.S. and in China. Simultaneously, Deng sought to strengthen 
his own position in the CCP’s leadership and gain U.S. support for a Chinese attack 
on Vietnam.812  
As Carter and his aides realized, especially the last of Deng’s intentions 
could lead to frictions between Chinese and Americans, and to protests in the U.S. 
public which would run counter to the U.S. goal of promoting normalization. It was 
a difficult situation, and Carter solved it masterfully. Other than James Mann ar-
gues, Carter did not give “a green light for the Chinese invasion” of Vietnam, when 
Deng informed him about the PRC’s plans.813 Instead, Carter made clear that the 
USA did not sanctify the attack because it damaged the stability in Southeast Asia. 
It is true that the U.S. president refrained from a harsh public condemnation, but 
Carter acted with diplomatic vision, understanding that U.S. critique on Beijing’s 
plans would not change anything, and could only lead to frictions in their relations. 
Additionally, his accommodation on this matter served to gain Deng’s promise to 
emphasize in public that Beijing intended to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully if 
possible, instead of threatening to reunify China by military means. 
In the end, the U.S. public gained a very positive impression of the Chinese 
leader and his country. Besides the humble and likeable appearance of the vice 
premier one reason for this impression was Deng’s eschewal of threats against 
Taiwan. As I have argued, this was a success for Carter. The Taiwan issue was still 
an internal affair for the PRC government. It was therefore a huge concession that 
Deng did not reiterate his government’s view that it was up to the PRC how it 
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would settle the Taiwan issue. We have to be aware that committing to the peaceful 
solution of the Taiwan issue was impossible for the CCP regime. Beijing still need-
ed a certain degree of deterrence to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. 
Thus, Deng’s restraint helped the promotion of normalization, although it did not 
help the Carter administration in its struggle with the U.S. Congress and the Amer-
ican public. 
In spite of Deng’s successful visit, the public opinion about the Taiwan is-
sue in the United States did not change. The reason for this problem did not lay in 
the image of China which was greatly improved after the vice premier’s visit. The 
first reason for this problem lay within the political system of the United States, 
and different notions how foreign policy should be conducted. The Carter admin-
istration’s secrecy before the announcement alienated the U.S. Congress and made 
it more difficult to gain support for Carter’s legislative plans about future U.S.-
Taiwan relations.  
The second reason is a mix of strategic and cultural considerations due to 
the traditional security relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The 
close U.S. ties which had been developed through the first decades of the Cold War 
had created a bond between the people in the United States and Taiwan. This bond 
left the American people wondering, if the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with a communist country as alien as China, was really worth risking the security 
of the Taiwanese people. Not only did the island and its seventeen million people 
appear as an underdog compared to the mainland with its almost one billion people. 
Many Americans liked Taiwan and also believed to share important values like 
democracy, human rights and capitalism with the Taiwanese.814 Thus, the Carter 
administration had to find a way to maintain a security relationship with the regime 
in Taipei. However, without Congressional support, laying the foundation for the 
continuation of the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait was difficult to 
achieve. 
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Chapter VII: Preserving U.S. Involvement, January 1979-
April 1979 
 
After the announcement of normalization, the White House had tried everything to 
make it palatable to Congress and the U.S. public. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the 
United States was a huge public relations success, but still it did not look as if the 
administration would face less opposition to its plans for the Taiwan legislation. 
Normal relations with the People’s Republic had demanded cutting all official ties 
with the ROC. The United States could only conduct people-to-people relations 
with Taiwan, and it required a legislative frame for U.S. agencies to conduct cer-
tain actions -especially arms sales- with the Taiwanese. It was a complicated situa-
tion, and Carter hoped to get the legislation done quickly and without Congression-
al intervention. However, he underestimated the Congress’ desire to play a more 
prominent role in the creation of future U.S.-Taiwan relations, leading to heavy 
opposition to the White House’s Taiwan Omnibus bill. 
 The following chapter deals with the legislative process and the subsequent 
debate about the new Taiwan legislation that should enable the United States to 
conduct unofficial relations with Taiwan. The administration hoped that Congress 
would pass its draft as quickly as possible because it could otherwise come to com-
plications in the cultural and economic exchange between Americans and Taiwan-
ese. Therefore, the Taiwan Omnibus bill had a pure technical character. Moreover, 
it contained no security language –and no direct hint at arms sales- in order to 
avoid friction with the PRC.  
The administration’s legislation failed because as different Congressional 
hearings made clear many members of Senate and House insisted on inserting 
some sort of security language. However, comments by different members of the 
Carter administration during the hearings as well as some public statements by 
Carter himself also indicated that the White House did not oppose security guaran-
tees. They just insisted that the legislation would not contradict the normalization 
agreement with the PRC. 
The argument I want to advance here is that the administration did not give 
in to the Congress, but rather left it to the legislative branch to secure the perma-
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nent U.S. involvement in Taiwan’s security. The White House still saw the island 
as strategic useful although normalization had changed the overall situation in 
Asia. The U.S. government had a multitude of reasons why they did not want to 
lose America’s influence on Taiwan. It could still serve to put pressure on the PRC 
if Sino-American relations were to deteriorate. All it needed was to prevent a solu-
tion of the Taiwan issue in Beijing’s favor. Taiwan was also an important piece for 
the United States’ position in Asia-Pacific as the regime in Taipei was highly de-
pendent on Washington’s benevolence, and thus very loyal. Furthermore, since the 
island lies right on the shipping routes that provide Japan and South Korea with 
goods and raw materials and also protects Japan’s southern flank, it is very im-
portant for the security of Japan which has always been the most important ally of 
the U.S. in the region. Finally, a real American disengagement from Taiwan would 
lead to questions about the United States’ credibility and reliability as an ally. At 
the height of the Cold War, no American government could allow this to happen. 
Emphasizing the security dimension of U.S.-Taiwan ties was therefore in the inter-
est of the administration. 
The Taiwan Relations Act provided the United States with the opportunity 
to maintain an active role in the Taiwan Strait. We have to understand that it was 
an expression for America’s aspiration to remain the most powerful actor in Asia-
Pacific. The character of the TRA was not only a commitment to Taiwan’s security 
but also a political message to the Chinese and Taiwanese regimes that the United 
States would be watching the further development of the Taiwan issue. As a U.S. 
law the TRA stood outside of any diplomatic constraints, so that the Carter admin-
istration was going to shrug off any Chinese protests. The most important aspect of 
the act, however, was that it allowed the United States more leeway in the decision 
about how it would conduct its role as a protector for Taiwan. In contrast to the 
times of the MDT, it was now completely up to Washington to decide whether or 
not and in which way the United States would intervene in the Taiwan Strait. This 
provision should help to restrain Taipei from provoking the PRC, for example, by 
declaring Taiwan’s independence. 
As I will demonstrate, the TRA provided the perfect tool for the United 
States to keep Taiwan as an informal ally, without giving the PRC enough reason 
to call off normalization. This cunning move was only possible due to the character 
of the political system of the United States which allows the executive and legisla-
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tive branches to play different but equally influential roles in foreign policy deci-
sions. In the case of the Taiwan legislation, the executive had to make sure that 
diplomatic constraints would be honored, while the legislative could ascertain that 
the American interest in Taiwan’s autonomy and security was taken into account. 
The new law represented the perfect compromise between the American interests 
to have full diplomatic relations with the PRC, and to preserve U.S. involvement in 




The Administration’s Taiwan Omnibus Bill and the Conflict with U.S. Congress 
The U.S. administration agreed in the normalization negotiations to cut all official 
ties between the United States and the Republic of China. This included accepting 
that the government of the People’s Republic was the only legitimate government 
of China. Although Washington had not agreed that Taiwan was part of the politi-
cal entity China, the White House could not have official government-to-
government relations with the regime on Taiwan. Instead, the United States could 
only seek unofficial people-to-people relations. 
 This presented a problem for the continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
Carter stated publicly that the United States would continue to sell arms to Taiwan 
after the self-proclaimed moratorium of 1979.815 Since U.S. laws heavily limited 
commercial arms sales on a non-governmental level outside of the NATO, Carter’s 
legal advisor, Herbert Hansell, mentioned two requirements for arms sales to Tai-
wan after derecognition. First, the U.S. administration had to clarify “Taiwan’s 
ambiguous status as a country, nation, state etc.”, and, second, the USA needed an 
intermediary that would serve as the seller instead of the U.S. government because 
the PRC could object to any governmental involvement. 816  Both requirements 
needed a legislative framework in order to succeed. 
 The Carter administration opted to write a legislation draft, the Taiwan 
Omnibus bill, and planned to ask Congress to pass the bill as soon as possible. This 
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kind of legislation was unprecedented in American history because it created a 
framework for state-like-relations with an entity that the United States did not actu-
ally recognize as a state. The concomitant complexity of the projected legislation, 
as President Jimmy Carter and his aides realized, made it necessary to gain as much 
support from U.S. Congress as possible. 
 Congressional interest in U.S. China policy and the Taiwan issue was noth-
ing new. The Congress had dealt with these topics many times during the presiden-
cies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and also did so during Carter’s term long 
before the White House actually reached an agreement with the People’s Republic 
on normalization. In fact, as the Chinese historian Xu Guangqiu claims, the Con-
gressional hearings about U.S.-China relations from September and October 1977 
had been the first of their kind which dealt with concrete measures of how and 
when the United States could realize the normalization of relations with the PRC, 
and not whether this step was even possible. The hearings also discussed how the 
United States should deal with the American commitment to the security of Tai-
wan, and how the U.S. executive could achieve normalization without ending the 
American involvement in the Taiwan Strait.817 These were exactly the same prob-
lems that defined the upcoming public discussion about Carter’s legislation con-
cerning unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan in early 1979. 
 The Carter administration had been aware that the Congress was not only 
interested in the normalization process and its consequences for U.S. relations with 
Taiwan but also wanted to be informed about any changes in the nature of the 
MDT. The Congress had expressed these expectations explicitly in the previously 
mentioned Dole-Stone amendment from September 1978. Of course, the amend-
ment did not give a precise note how much information the White House had to 
convey to Congress, leaving room for interpretations. As long as the U.S govern-
ment had not concluded a deal with the PRC about normalization, no changes of 
the MDT were imminent, allowing the executive to maintain its secrecy about the 
course of the negotiations in Beijing. 
 Officials within the executive were not unanimous on the question how 
much Congress should learn about the negotiations with the PRC. Cyrus Vance 
argued to keep Congress informed on a regular basis, and wanted to assign Richard 
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Holbrooke to this task.818 Carter, however, opted for secrecy, because he wanted to 
avoid any leaks. Moreover, he did not trust Congress. In his opinion, if some of its 
members would learn about the administration’s plans, it was only a matter of time 
until they would initiate steps against normalization.819 As China expert Robert G. 
Sutter states, Carter’s decision to leave the Congress uninformed would haunt him 
during the legislative process of the White House’s Taiwan Omnibus bill.820 
Although Carter’s decision was a mistake because it cost him Congressional 
benevolence, it was understandable. We have to consider how much critique he had 
faced for his normalization plans in the early period of his presidency. In 1978, the 
negotiations with the PRC had to gain some momentum before the administration 
could risk a public debate at home. An early Congressional involvement would 
make such a debate much more likely since many members of Congress were sym-
pathizing with Taiwan, increasing the domestic pressure for Carter, and tremen-
dously limiting the U.S. administration’s leeway in the negotiations. A public de-
bate in favor of Taiwan would have forced the White House to find a way to gain 
considerable security guarantees for Taiwan from Beijing. Since it was highly un-
likely to get these, the normalization process would have stalled or even completely 
failed. 
The White House also faced another dilemma. Washington had to demon-
strate commitment to one of its traditional allies in Asia. Other U.S. allies would 
question their partnership with the United States. In addition, it was important to 
honor a new diplomatic agreement. On the one hand, the U.S. government had to 
provide a legal basis for the United States to deal with Taiwan on a broad range of 
issues. On the other hand, it could not violate the normalization agreement with the 
PRC. Both aspects were important for the American credibility in the world. In the 
middle of the Cold War, the United States could not afford to appear unreliable, 
making U.S. efforts like reviving détente with the Soviet Union more difficult. 
Normalization strengthened America’s position in the world while the Taiwan leg-
islation had to make sure that Washington’s position in East Asia remained un-
changed, calming down any concerns by other U.S. allies in the region. 
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The U.S. administration was therefore aware how urgent and delicate legis-
lation about Taiwan was, and made this clear to the U.S. public. In a press briefing 
after the announcement of normalization, an U.S. official explained that the current 
legal situation denied many of the proposed activities between the people of the 
United States and Taiwan e (e.g. Ex-Im Bank loans, arms sales etc.) since U.S. law 
allowed the U.S. executive to conduct these interactions only with other states or 
state-like entities.821 The White House did not want to spread panic, but aimed to 
put some pressure on the legislative branch with this statement in order to urge 
Congress to cooperate with the White House on the matter. The goal was to avoid 
any procrastination for the Taiwan legislation. 
Carter believed the urgency of the matter helped him to control the upcom-
ing legislation process because his administration was “in the driver’s seat.” The 
only obstacle Carter indentified was “a group  of highly motivated right-wing polit-
ical-action groups” that wanted “a law that would reverse the action I [Carter] had 
taken in recognizing the People’s Republic of China…”822 In order to avoid public 
scrutiny, the administration entertained the idea to limit Congressional jurisdiction, 
trying to keep the matter on the level of the Foreign Relations Committee.823 Cling-
ing to the conviction that leaving the Congress uninformed was his right as U.S. 
president and underestimating Congressional persistence on the matter of Taiwan, 
Carter still aimed to limit the Congress’ role in the Taiwan legislation as much as 
possible. 
Not all of Carter’s aides shared his view. Especially the State Department, 
knew the administration needed the cooperation of Congress in order to pass the 
legislation. The experts there were aware that it was not easy to gain broad Con-
gressional support, as they had been following the Congressional debates about 
Carter’s China policy. Hence, the DOS concluded that the administration would 
“be accused of inadequate notification” about the administration’s course of action 
concerning normalization and the Taiwan issue.824 Another report argued that even 
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supporters of the president’s decision could ask for clarification on the three most 
controversial points: Congressional consultation prior to normalization, security 
guarantees for Taiwan and diplomatic privileges for the authorities on Taiwan.825  
Indeed, the executive did not have to wait long before Congress criticized 
the lack of information the administration had forwarded to the legislative about 
the course of the normalization negotiations. Congressmen like Jonathan B. Bing-
ham’s (Dem-New York) who felt adequately consulted by the administration con-
cerning were in the minority.826 Lester L. Wolff (Dem-New York), Chairman of the 
Asia & Pacific Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, was the first who 
harshly criticized the administration for its secrecy.827 Senator Charles Percy (Rep-
Illinois) who basically agreed with Carter’s decision warned the administration that 
the Senate would postpone any legislative actions or would even aim to rewrite the 
executive branch’s bill.828 Percy’s statement left no doubt, the administration had to 
bring in the Congress to a certain degree. 
The White House opted for a very technical legislation. The former ROC 
diplomat David Tawei Lee states the core of the administration’s bill was the in-
stallation of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) which should manage the un-
official relationship between the United States and Taiwan.829 In the sense of Han-
sell’s advice, the institute could also function as intermediary for the arms sales. 
From a legal standpoint, the AIT was a private institution although U.S. Congress 
would fund it, while the U.S. executive would provide its personal staff. According 
to experts from the State Department, there was “no alternative to the nominally 
‘private’ corporation approach to continue U.S./Taiwan relationships.”830 Any at-
tempt to give the institute a semi-official character would offend the PRC. 
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As the Department of Justice argued the creation of the Taiwan Omnibus 
bill was very complex due to the unique issue it dealt with. After the United States 
had deprived the ROC of recognition, Taiwan did not possess a status that allowed 
U.S. agencies to have relations with the ROC regime and its agencies. Thus, the 
administration’s draft provided that U.S. officials could conduct interactions with 
Taiwan like with a “foreign country, nation, state, government or [a] similar enti-
ty.”831 This notion in section 102 of the bill also enabled the sales of arms to Tai-
wan.832 There was no kind of security language in the draft, and the administration 
also endeavored to avoid any kind of language which could be interpreted as secu-
rity guarantees for Taiwan. The risk of alienating the PRC was too high. 
The White House tried to make Congress understand that the Taiwan legis-
lation had to be acceptable for the PRC government. Far reaching security guaran-
tees or demands for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue would damage U.S.-
China relations and even endanger the normalization agreement. The PRC had 
made clear that it did not accept the new framework of U.S. relations with Taiwan 
to exceed the Japanese formula. As we have seen in previous chapters, different 
Chinese officials had stated that this was the farthest reaching concession they 
could make.  
President Carter was not willing to risk frictions with China, and the admin-
istration made this view clear in its comments on different Senate resolutions. The 
executive branch would not allow government-to-government relations with Tai-
wan, also excluding the idea of a liaison office in Taipei. In a memorandum which 
analyzed all suggestions by members of Congress for changes in the Taiwan Om-
nibus bill, the administration even claimed any kind of official recognition of the 
government on Taiwan, as demanded for example by resolution S. Res. 11 intro-
duced by Senator Dennis DeConcini (Dem-Arizona), “could jeopardize the U.S. 
interest in the continued peace in the Taiwan area and threaten the well-being of the 
people on [sic] Taiwan...” The authors of the analysis also tried to explain why the 
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Carter administration did not pursue a stronger public commitment to Taiwan’s 
security. They argued that since the PRC tacitly acknowledged U.S. interest in a 
peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, any stronger commitment to Taiwan’s secu-
rity, as demanded e.g. by S. Res. 12 by Senator John C. Danforth (Rep-Missouri), 
could “likely be regarded by the People’s Republic of China as provocative, and 
serve to raise tensions and to undermine the prospects for peace in the Taiwan ar-
ea.”833  
The record does not explain if Carter ignored Congressional objections be-
cause he was convinced that his decision and behavior had been flawless concern-
ing Taiwan, or if he hoped Congress would insert a stronger security language into 
the Taiwan legislation because the president was not able to do so with regard to 
diplomatic considerations. As stated above, Carter seemed certain that the Con-
gress would approve the bill, not risking the smooth transition of U.S.-Taiwan rela-
tions. Thus, the administration decided to adhere to their draft, and Senator Frank 
F. Church (Dem-Idaho) introduced the Taiwan Omnibus bill as S. 245 to the Senate 
on January 29, 1979. The same day, Representative Clement Zablocki (Dem-
Wisconsin) introduced the bill as H.R. 1614 to the House of Representatives. 
The bill’s restraint on security matters served to appease the PRC after the 
Chinese leadership had made considerable concessions during the normalization 
negotiations. The Carter administration did not want to push its efforts to ensure 
Taiwan’s security too far, so that the PRC would take offense. The avoidance of 
any security language in the legislation draft should therefore also help to prevent 
friction in the Taiwan Strait. However, the previous behavior of Carter and his 
aides towards Taiwanese officials did not suggest that the administration had al-
ways acted in the best interest of Taiwan. 
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Downgrading U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
Right from the beginning of Carter’s presidency, the administration took measures 
to downgrade U.S. relations with the ROC. This decision was not only technical in 
nature, but, from the U.S. point of view, a diplomatic necessity. The Carter admin-
istration had to demonstrate its commitment to normalization. It was important to 
show Beijing how serious the White House took Chinese concerns about the rela-
tionship between the U.S. and its “renegade” province. Moreover, Carter and his 
aides knew that the Taiwan legislation would test the PRC leadership’s patience, 
anyway. Downgrading U.S. relations to Taiwan and restraint in the Taiwan legisla-
tion was the price the Carter administration had to pay for Beijing’s concessions, 
although it was clear that this course of action would provoke criticism from Tai-
wan and U.S. Congress. 
The first step of the administration’s downgrading tactic was to keep the 
communication level with the regime in Taipei and its representatives in the United 
States as low as possible. ROC Ambassador James Shen was not allowed to meet 
any high U.S. official.834 This avoidance strategy reached its point of culmination 
when National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski indefinitely postponed a 
meeting with Shen to inform him about his upcoming trip to China, and ordered his 
aide Michel Oksenberg to meet the Taiwanese diplomat instead.835 Even after the 
DOS and Oksenberg had urged the APNSA to talk to Shen, Brzezinski refused.836 
This behavior led to friction between the executive branch and parts of the Con-
gress, although the State Department remained in contact with ROC officials reas-
suring Taiwan of American support.837 
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The idea behind Carter’s and his aides’ avoidance strategy was to accom-
modate the PRC by demonstrating the Carter administration’s seriousness to start 
the normalization process. However, the regime in Taipei had proved a lack of 
trustworthiness and discretion in the past, using every encounter with U.S. officials 
to emphasize the tight relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Such 
posturing hurt the president’s efforts to normalize relations with the People’s Re-
public, since it did not only offend the PRC leaders but also let them question 
Carter’s seriousness to accept the previously mentioned three Chinese precondi-
tions. 
However, reducing the communication with the Taiwanese was only one 
part of the U.S. administration’s attempts to downgrade the relationship. At the end 
of 1977, the president ordered the reduction of the diplomatic personal in Taiwan, 
and Ambassador Leonard Unger, who assured Carter of his devotion to U.S. inter-
ests, promised to reduce the staff of his embassy as much as possible.838  Any 
American with an official assignment on the island was on the retreat, and the 
White House had not even finished the downgrading.  
Another step was the reduction of U.S. troops on Taiwan to fewer than 500 
soldiers. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the remaining units on 
Taiwan needed around 660 soldiers to remain operative. Brown argued a reduction 
was only possible after the development of a contingency plan.839 At first, Carter 
postponed his decision until after the vote about the Panama Canal Treaty because 
he did not want to provoke a conflict with Congress.840 In May 1978, however, he 
approved the reduction to 660 soldiers.841 The reduction of the diplomatic and mili-
tary personnel was the last proof that the White House was cutting off any basis for 
a government-to-government relationship with the ROC. 
The U.S. administration did not even back off from offending the regime in 
Taipei. As James Shen describes in his memoirs, the ROC leadership asked to 
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postpone Brzezinski’s arrival in Beijing on May 20, 1978 because it was also the 
day of Chiang Ching-kuo’s inauguration as president of the ROC. The unfortunate 
scheduling was presumably a coincidence, but Brzezinski’s visit to Beijing on the 
same day as Chiang’s inauguration would mean a huge insult to the ROC regime. 
Eventually, the White House denied Taipei’s request, and Brzezinski touched Chi-
nese soil only hours before Chiang Kai-shek’s son followed the footsteps of his 
father, a man who had been an important ally in the early years of the United 
States’ struggle against global communism. It was just another demonstration that 
the Carter administration for all its honest concerns about Taiwan’s security lacked 
respect for the ROC leadership and did not care about their feelings. James Shen 
admits that this offence was the final proof for the KMT regime that the White 
House was not considering its needs anymore. For Taiwanese leaders, the time to 
approach Taiwan’s friends in the United States had finally come.842 
U.S. Congress and also the American people were concerned about the con-
stant downgrading of U.S.-ROC relations, and the administration was aware of this 
sentiment. Richard Holbrooke reported in a memo to Cyrus Vance that the Ameri-
can people would oppose any abandonment of Taiwan. Holbrooke elaborated that 
numerous polls indicated they preferred the current status-quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
A majority of interviewees also expressed concerns that the U.S. helped China to 
become a great power. As the polls also made clear, the USA should ensure Tai-
wan’s security if the administration would indeed normalize U.S. relations with the 
PRC.843 The process of the Taiwan legislation in early 1979 demonstrated that the 
Congress was much more willing to fulfill the wishes of the American citizens than 
the Carter administration who appeared to a lot of Americans just too eager to ac-




Discussing Normalization and the Security of Taiwan 
The Congress started to discuss the matter of security guarantees for Taiwan offi-
cially in different hearings in February 1979 which gave the administration signifi-
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cant information about what they had to expect. It also offered administrative offi-
cials a chance to explain the decisions the government had made in order to 
achieve normalization. Normalization itself was not criticized as a report by the 
Democratic Study Group (DSG) of the House of Representatives stated that “there 
has been little controversy over the merits of normalizing relations with the PRC. 
Most people view it as a long overdue move to conform to international reali-
ties.”844 Even Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep- Arizona) who was a keen supporter 
of Taiwan did not oppose normalization in general because he knew “that that is 
coming. We have all known that it is coming. We have known it for years.”845 
However, Goldwater and other Senators believed it needed a stronger com-
mitment to Taiwan’s security, a commitment that Carter and his aides had failed to 
make in their Taiwan Omnibus bill. Characterizing the administration’s draft as “a 
guarantee that says little and means little”, Senator Robert Dole (Rep-Kansas), an 
ally of Goldwater on the matter of Taiwan, insisted on using language from the 
MDT in the Taiwan legislation in order to assure the Taiwanese people of U.S. 
support for its defense.846 Senator John Glenn (Dem-Ohio) who elaborated such 
concerns from an institutional point of view echoed this skepticism. In his opinion, 
the proposed AIT would not be able to handle a real crisis if the PRC were to 
threaten Taiwan. In such a situation “it becomes very, very difficult to deal through 
an institute like this, so perhaps if that ever occurred, things would be deteriorated 
to such a point that it would become academic at that point anyway.”847  
Observers outside the legislative branch shared these worries. The President 
of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, Robert P. Parker, for example 
also demanded a clear statement that would guarantee Taiwan's security. Such 
guarantees would be good for U.S.-Taiwanese trade because “[p]art of doing busi-
ness, and doing it successfully, is having certainty […] and no element of certainty 
is more important than one's political security.” Therefore, Parker argued Taiwan 
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needed a “strong security resolution […] from Congress.” Otherwise, the people on 
Taiwan could become the victim of “economic coercion.”848  
 The administration had to take concerns from the Congress and business 
associations seriously because both groups were able to increase the political pres-
sure on Carter. The president still needed a Congressional majority to vote for the 
executive’s Taiwan Omnibus bill, which continued to be very unspecific on matters 
of security in order to avoid frictions with the PRC, and this led to broad opposition 
against Carter’s legislation. 
The discussion about Taiwan’s security circled around the question of 
whether or not the PRC posed a real threat to the people on Taiwan at the moment. 
The administration assessed Taiwan to be in no danger. Since the beginning of 
1979, the PLA had ceased their regular bombardment of the ROC outposts on 
Quemoy and Matsu. Additionally, Beijing had expressed its readiness to start nego-
tiations with Taipei about reunification. 849  The administration believed China 
would refrain from violence against Taiwan because the Chinese government did 
not want to risk the good relations the PRC had developed with the United States 
and other industrialized nations over the last years.850 U.S. Congress and other peo-
ple critical of the administration’s previous behavior concerning Taiwan shared this 
view.851 China could not risk its relations with the West because this would limit its 
access to modern technology and foreign investments. 
The different China experts speaking in front of the Congressional commit-
tees were divided in their assessment of Taiwan’s security. Former member of the 
NSC and professor for political science at Swarthmore College Kenneth Lieberthal 
agreed with the administration, and explained that a Chinese attack on Taiwan did 
not appear as an imminent danger, arguing that China needed a stable East Asia to 
pursue its current course of modernization. He also stated that the PLA lacked the 
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capabilities to conquer Taiwan without significant casualties.852 The well-known 
China expert and Harvard professor John K. Fairbank agreed, and tried to draw 
Congress’ attention to the fact that Taiwan was the only Chinese province which 
was completely surrounded by water. This made the island easy to defend as long 
as the ROC was provided with defensive weapons.853 Former U.S. Navy Admiral 
and head of the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) Edward K. Snyder, however, 
believed that the Taiwanese air force and navy would be no match for the huge 
amount of PLA forces that Beijing could send against Taiwan.854 This statement 
echoed Congressional concerns. 
Congress thought it needed a stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s securi-
ty because many of its members like Senator Ed Muskie (Dem-Maine) doubted 
Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.855  Neither the administration nor experts like 
Fairbanks were able to convince Congress that Taiwan was in no imminent danger. 
Even Richard Nixon who declined the Senate’s wish to participate in the hearings 
made clear that Taiwan would have to be protected in some way in order to save 
U.S. credibility.856  Hence, Congress expected the White House to give Taiwan 
some sort of security guarantee. 
The U.S. executive, on the other hand, was convinced that continuing arms 
sales would ensure that the Taiwanese forces would remain strong enough to repel 
any aggression from the mainland.857 The Carter administration had made sure dur-
ing the normalization negotiations that arms sales to Taiwan would not stop. Ac-
cording to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. administration had three reasons to insist 
on the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan. First, an end of these sales would have 
had a negative psychological impact on the Taiwanese people. Second, ceasing the 
sales of arms could create instability in the region. Third, no other nation would 
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sell enough arms to Taiwan: “Over the years, the United States has provided Tai-
wan the bulk of its defensive equipment through foreign military sales and com-
mercial channels. We will continue to extend [sic] such access.”858  
Since the attempt to show that Taiwan was in no imminent danger had 
failed, the Carter administration aimed to underline the benefits of normalization 
for the United States. According to the administration’s main speaker in the hear-
ings, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, normalization opened a wide 
range of political and economic opportunities. As he emphasized in his written 
statement normalization “will permit us to encourage an outward-looking China to 
play a constructive role in the world generally.” Moreover, Christopher saw a pos-
sibility for “American business to deal on an equal footing with other suppliers as 
China moves toward modernization.”859 Later, Richard Holbrooke further elaborat-
ed the administration’s position. Holbrooke pointed out that thanks to normaliza-
tion, the United States had friendly relations with all countries in East Asia except 
Vietnam and North Korea. Of particular significance was that Washington enjoyed 
good relations with “the two giants of Asia”, Japan and China. Holbrooke argued, 
good relations with China were the best way to assure Taiwan’s security because 
Beijing was aware of America’s “important interest in the Taiwan region.”860 Such 
statements made clear that the administration saw no alternative to normalization. 
China was too important in the world for the American position to be ig-
nored. Therefore, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown claimed good relations with 
the PRC were indispensable in order to deal with China’s status as a rising power. 
In Brown’s words “China is an emerging power which will exercise increasing 
influence on world events. That is a fact, not a consequence of normalization.” As 
the Secretary further argued, better relations with China had led to “an Asia much 
less menacing to the United States than it appeared, and was, in the 1950's, when 
the Soviets and the Chinese acted in concert.”861  
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All these comments by Carter’s aides summed up the strategic considera-
tions the administration had taken into account when it made the decision to push 
for normalization. The United States benefited from closer relations with the Peo-
ple’s Republic because it improved the American global position. In accordance 
with Neorealist conclusions, the tacit alliance with the PRC increased U.S. power 
and prevented the reemergence of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In addition, good U.S.-
China relations put pressure on the Soviet Union, facilitating U.S. cooperation with 
Moscow on matter such as SALT. But the United States would not only gain ad-
vantages for its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union from normalization. In 
the Carter administration’s view, normalization should also help to strengthen the 
U.S. position in Asia-Pacific. The perception was that closer U.S.-China ties influ-
enced the distribution of power there in Washington’s favor. In his talks with the 
Chinese in August 1977, Vance had already stated that the U.S. wanted “to stabi-
lize our [the U.S.] position as a Pacific power. There should be no doubt that we 
will continue to play a key role in contributing to regional peace and stability.”862 
Not only closer relations with the PRC were helpful in this regard, but also a con-
tinuing security relationship with Taiwan. 
The administration cared for Taiwan’s security. The normalization negotia-
tions with Beijing had demonstrated as much, and U.S. officials reiterated this view 
during the hearings several times. As Michael Armacost from the DOD empha-
sized normalization served the purpose of stability in the Far East because it actual-
ly prevented China from using force against Taiwan.863 A stable East Asia would 
allow Washington to use its means elsewhere. The question was not whether the 
White House was willing to support Taiwan by selling arms, but whether U.S. 
Congress and the American public deemed that to be enough for the island’s secu-
rity. The answer was no. They wanted a more visible commitment. 
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Taiwan‘s Strategic Meaning 
As history proved, a close security relationship with Taiwan has strengthened the 
U.S. position in East Asia. During the Cold War, U.S. relations with Taiwan were 
almost as significant for the American position in the region as the relations with 
Japan and South Korea because as close U.S. allies they added to the United States’ 
political weight in the region. All three actors were major trading powers in East 
Asia, and absolutely dependent on the United States concerning their security. That 
made all three regimes highly loyal. In the event of a conflict in East Asia, the geo-
graphic position of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan also allowed the stationing of 
American troops in a strategically advantageous position. 
Different documents indicate that the Carter administration underlined the 
character of the United States as a Pacific power. Taiwan was a piece in Washing-
ton’s strategic make-up in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the end of the Chinese 
Civil War, the island and its people had served as a stronghold in East Asia, even if 
no U.S. troops were stationed there. The administration argued that the United 
States did not need to have a garrison on Taiwan anymore because the situation had 
changed since the 1950s.864 An attack from the mainland was no longer imminent. 
However, the Taiwan Strait was too important as a regional trade route, and Tai-
wan’s security was connected to the safety of the shipping lanes there. Moreover, 
assuring Taiwan’s security, and deterring the mainland from any forceful actions, 
also served the U.S. interest of a stable region. 
The record of the normalization negotiations indicates that the Carter ad-
ministration was not willing to leave Taiwan to the mercy of the PRC. Now, Chris-
topher made it publicly known that “[i]n normalizing relations with the People's 
Republic of China, we [the U.S. government] have not, by any means, abandoned 
our role as a Pacific power or our interest in the peace and security of Taiwan.”865 
According to the Deputy Secretary of State, the U.S. administration was ready to 
take measures if the PRC took “the kind of action that you [Jacob Javits] imply in 
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your statement -that is, the use of force or threat of the use of force […]” against 
Taiwan. The Carter administration was “determined to play a proper role to try to 
insure the peace and security of that area”, and they “would, in consultation with 
the Congress, take the action necessary to protect our interests there in trade, our 
investment, our interest in the investigation in those waters.”866 
Christopher’s statement was very important, because it demonstrated Wash-
ington’s resolve to protect Taiwan and maintain the dominant position of the Unit-
ed States in the region. With regard to the strategic meaning of Taiwan, it was more 
direct than any previous public statement of a member of the Carter administration. 
The White House saw the United States not only as a nation with vital interests in 
Asia-Pacific but as the most powerful actor in this region, a hegemon. Preventing 
regional instability or a power shift was therefore in the interest of this hegemon. 
Normalization served exactly this purpose, and the protection of Taiwan against 
any kind of aggression from the PRC did so, as well. 
The leadership of the U.S. military agreed with Christopher’s view. General 
David Jones, Chairman of the JCS, was sure that normalization would mean more 
stability in the Far East as long as the United States guaranteed Taiwan’s security 
and survival. The United States had a strategic interest in Taiwan that would ex-
ceed moral consideration about the well-being of the people there. While Japan, 
South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand might have been more important for 
U.S. interests at the time, the General still admitted “that an attack on Taiwan 
would be not only of grave concern but would impact [sic] on our security inter-
ests. There is no question about it.”867 The General made clear that the United 
States did not need troops on Taiwan for the island to have a meaning to America’s 
strategic interests. 
In the minds of many U.S. officials, Taiwan still held some strategic value 
to the United States, and the Senate agreed. According to Senator Jacob Javits, the 
Congress wanted plain and simple, “Taiwan pretty free for strategic and military 
and security reasons.”868 One reason for this interest was Taiwan’s location on the 
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aforementioned shipping lanes between Japan and the Philippines.869 A variety of 
experts outside of the political circles in Washington confirmed this perspective. 
They characterized Taiwan as a strategic asset, guaranteeing the United States an 
important ally in the region, in the event that either the Soviet Union or the Peo-
ple’s Republic would threaten American interests in Asia-Pacific. The former head 
of the TDC Snyder equated “Taiwan to about 10 aircraft carriers” and thought the 
island represented “a hub of our [U.S.] communications system in the Far East.”870 
 In addition, Taiwan was central for Japan’s security. Japan was the most 
important American ally in East Asia. The previously mentioned reaction in Japan 
after Carter had announced normalization indicated Japanese anxiety the United 
States could gradually disengage from East Asia. Moreover, if Taiwan fell into the 
hands of a hostile power, Japan’s southern flank would be threatened. As Senator 
Danforth pointed out “Japan is the centerpiece of our security position in Asia.” 
From Danforth’s perspective, Taiwan served the protection of South Korea and 
Japan, and “a very serious change in the condition of Taiwan […] would seriously 
complicate the defense arrangements and requirements between Japan and our-
selves…”871 Admiral Snyder went even further explaining that Taiwan “sits astride 
of the oil routes from the Middle East to Japan. Interruption of this oil could bring 
Japan to its knees very quickly.” Therefore, he considered “Taiwan a very im-
portant military asset.”872 The United States could not allow that to happen because 
it needed Japan in its struggle against the Soviet Union, and thus, it still needed 
Taiwan. 
Some experts were convinced that the Soviet Union was trying to establish 
hegemony in East Asia, and one way to achieve this goal was to approach Tai-
wan.873 The U.S. administration conceded that a military basis on Taiwan would 
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give the Soviets an immense advantage.874 However, the Carter administration did 
not believe the ROC leadership would approach the Soviets. Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State Roger Sullivan emphasized that by “continuing on in maintaining an 
unofficial relationship with the United States and not changing his claim to be the 
president of the sole legal government of China […]”, Chiang Ching-kuo had cho-
sen exactly the political option the DOS had foreseen. Sullivan further explained 
the Taiwanese leadership had “very authoritatively […] rejected the Soviet option 
in an address to the Central Committee plenary session on the 18th of December, a 
couple of days after the announcement.”875 In addition, the PRC had already threat-
ened that it considered a Soviet-Taiwanese alliance to be a direct threat to China’s 
security, leaving the PRC no other choice than a military response.876 Furthermore, 
as the result of Christopher’s mission to Taipei in late December had already illus-
trated, Taiwan was just too dependent on the United States to risk Washington’s 
benevolence. The PRC’s threat, the strong anti-communist attitude of Chiang, and 
the high degree of dependency on the United States made a USSR-ROC alliance 
very unlikely. It was therefore no concern for Carter and his aides. 
The U.S. administration also had no interest in the regime in Taipei declar-
ing Taiwan’s independence as this could lead to instability in East Asia due to the 
likely military reaction from the PRC. However, U.S. officials were sure CCK 
would refrain from such a step for two reasons. First, he and the rest of the leader-
ship in Taipei were aware that the declaration of independence would provoke an 
attack from the mainland, and secondly, the KMT regime’s legitimacy depended on 
its claim to represent whole China and not only the people in Taiwan.877 From the 
White House’s point of view, Taipei’s attitude left reunification as the only way to 
solve the Taiwan issue. 
Since the U.S. could feel assured that the regime in Taipei did not intend to 
accept the PRC’s offer for negotiations any time soon, the United States enjoyed a 
very comfortable position. The Carter administration followed the official line that 
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the Taiwan issue was an internal affair of the Chinese. The United States only ex-
pected a peaceful settlement of the issue. It became clear, however, that the admin-
istration saw the unresolved Taiwan issue and the U.S. role in this quarrel as a stra-
tegic asset.878 Therefore, the United States had no interest in a quick solution, as 
Richard Holbrooke admitted in the Hearings of the House of Representatives a few 
weeks after the Senatorial hearings. While Holbrooke reiterated the official U.S. 
position that it was up to the Chinese and Taiwanese how they would settle the 
Taiwan issue, he also stated his personal opinion that he had “no problem with see-
ing the present situation on Taiwan and the mainland continue [sic] indefinite-
ly…”879 
Holbrooke did not elaborate his position, but he would not have expressed 
such a view, if his superiors had not approved it. The Assistant Secretary of State’s 
words emphasized what previous actions and comments from members of the 
Carter administration like Harold Brown had already indicated.880 The administra-
tion had no interest in Taiwan becoming a part of the PRC because this would 
mean the definition of Taiwan’s legal status. In the long-term, this could lead to the 
end of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait as the PRC would then possess legal 
and political means to keep the United States out of Taiwan, weakening the U.S. 
position in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, if we believe that Taiwan influenced 
the Asian-Pacific balance of power in Washington’s favor, a reunification of Tai-
wan and the PRC would weaken the U.S. position vis-à-vis the People’s Republic. 
After all, U.S.-Taiwan relations could serve as means to put pressure on the regime 
in Beijing. In the event of friction with the PRC, Washington could opt to increase 
its military, political, or economic support for Taiwan.  
One example for this approach occurred in 1992 when Washington wanted 
the PRC to change its approach to arms sales and foreign trade, resulting in U.S. 
support for Taiwan’s membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(better known as GATT) and the sales of 150 F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter aircrafts 
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to Taipei.881 An even more serious intervention occurred in 1996. After the PRC 
had conducted missile tests close to the Taiwanese main island to disrupt the presi-
dential election in Taiwan, the United States sent the aircraft carriers U.S.S. Nimitz 
and U.S.S. Independence to Taiwan in order to deter Beijing from any further 
provocations.882 Such events illustrate, why the United States had a significant in-
terest in making sure it could influence the situation in the Taiwan Strait. 
The American attitude also suggests that the United States saw the PRC on-
ly as a tacit ally, not worthy of Washington’s full trust. Neither the administration 
nor a variety of other U.S. politicians (e.g. Senator Jesse Helms [Rep-North Caroli-
na]) and China experts (e.g. Prof. Robert Scalapino, Dr. Ray Cline) were so naïve 
as to believe that the PRC would accept America’s leadership in Asia in the future. 
For the Berkeley professor Scalapino it was only a matter of time until Beijing 
would develop “certain regional interests that may diverge from ours [Ameri-
can].”883 A few weeks later, the Senatorial committee appropriated these concerns 
in its report. The committee emphasized that China could alter its foreign policy in 
the future, and, hence, could thwart interests of the U.S. and its allies in the re-
gion.884 This was something the executive could not state in public due to diplo-
matic reasons but it is telling that no member of the administration criticized or 
contradicted the committee’s report. 
Some members of Congress were even more explicit about the probability 
of a future rivalry between the People’s Republic and the United States. Senator 
Helms for example emphasized that Taiwan was of strategic value to the U.S. and 
its allies in Asia-Pacific pointing out that “Taiwan served as an important intelli-
gence resource” against mainland China. According to Helms, the PRC still saw 
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the relationship with the U.S. as “an adversary [sic] one over the long haul, as even 
top China hands in the Carter administration are quick to admit.”885  
Accordingly, Taiwan had to be as autonomous as possible from China. Oth-
erwise, it was not useful for the United States. As Congressman William Broom-
field (Rep-Michigan) put it, Taiwan’s security was not only important but deemed 
vital to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.886 Some observers like Senator 
Jacob Javits even argued this logic made the island essential for American security 
itself. Javits did not believe “that because of Vietnam the American people have 
lost their marbles or failed to perceive the threat to their own security as a threat to 
the security of Taiwan.” The Senator was certain that the American people would 
be willing to bear the costs of the effort to keep Taiwan safe.887 As we have seen, 
public polls supported this view. 
 The administration agreed with this view, and did not exclude an interven-
tion on behalf of Taiwan’s security. Roger Sullivan pointed out that Chinese ag-
gression against Taiwan would present a threat to the U.S. security interest.888 Re-
ferring to the strength of the U.S. Navy, Michael Armacost confirmed that the ad-
ministration reserved the right to intervene if the Chinese attempted to blockade 
Taiwan: “[I]n relationship to the naval blockade [of Taiwan], the U.S. Navy con-
tinues to be a very powerful force in the Pacific […and] [t]he Chinese Navy is not 
the most, powerful navy in the world.”889 The United States would be ready and 
able to intervene in the Taiwan Strait if necessary. 
 Richard Holbrooke became even more explicit than Armacost. He was cer-
tain that the president was not restricted from taking any military action in the Tai-
wan Strait if the situation demanded it, even after the termination of the MDT.890 
Jimmy Carter had confirmed this position a few days before: "And there is certain-
ly nothing to prevent a future president or Congress from even going to war, if they 
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choose, to protect the people of Taiwas [sic] or to protect any other people... that 
we look on with favor."891 Warren Christopher did not even exclude the possibility 
that the administration would break up its diplomatic ties with the PRC if the PLA 
attacked Taiwan.892 
 Such comments were as frank as the Carter administration could be about 
Washington’s intention to continue its protection of Taiwan, without openly ques-
tioning the normalization agreement. We can conclude that as important as normal 
relations with Beijing were, stability and America’s preponderance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific region were more important for the White House. These statements 
also represented a warning to the PRC who had to think twice if it would risk ten-
sions in its relations with the United States. This put a lot of diplomatic pressure on 
Beijing for the future. Finally, the administration’s comments demonstrated that the 
Carter administration kept all its options open when it came to the security of Tai-
wan. It is really doubtful that Carter or any of his aides would have stated their atti-
tude towards Taiwan’s security so plainly if the president had not attached a great 
strategic value to Taiwan. 
The Carter administration obviously had the political will to make sure that 
the status of Taiwan would not change in the future. Of course, there was a political 
question of whether the United States would use of force to deter the PRC from 
attacking Taiwan, but, in the event of a crisis, Congress and the U.S. public would 
be able to force the president to protect the island, although this promise did not 
concern Quemoy and Matsu. Although, as Christopher confirmed, these small is-
lands belonged to the “people on Taiwan” in a cultural and economic sense, they 
were not incorporated into any security commitments.893 This was nothing new 
since Article 6 of the MDT had not included the ROC outposts, either, speaking 
only of the Taiwanese main island and the Pescadores. Arms sales, however, as 
Secretary of Defense Brown added, did not underlie any “geographic restriction as 
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to where arms sold to Taiwan are placed.”894 The United States would ensure the 
security of Quemoy and Matsu via arms sales. 
In spite of the aforementioned frank comments, the Carter administration 
was still not in a position to make a strong public statement about U.S. guarantees 
for Taiwan’s security because they had to consider diplomatic requirements. The 
executive branch was afraid that the PRC would not only object to anything that 
would exceed the unilateral statement from December, but that Beijing would 
question the normalization agreement in general if Washington dared to substitute 
the MDT for something comparable to a bilateral defensive treaty.  
Therefore, the executive appeared open to the idea of Congress clarifying 
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security because Christopher admitted that “it 
may be that in the resolution that you [the Senate] propose, some language to give 
more assurance on that point [U.S. readiness to intervene in the Taiwan Strait] can 
be worked out.”895 The Congress only had to make sure that such a resolution 
would not “give an official character to our relations with Taiwan [which] would 
contradict the basis of normalization.” Furthermore, the security language should 
not “reestablish a mutual defense arrangement between the two countries…”896 The 
administration could not oversee the diplomatic requirements vis-à-vis the People’s 
Republic. 
In hindsight, the White House had counted on Congress to express the con-
cerns about Taiwan’s security in public. That way, Congress’ frankness also 
opened a path for Taiwan to play a more prominent role in the future of U.S. poli-
tics in East Asia. It was like a theater piece about an orphan who had lost his par-
ents in a terrible accident. Taiwan was the orphan who looked for safety. The ad-
ministration played the role of the ignorant aunts and uncles who meant well but 
were not able to help in the way necessary because they were occupied with other 
requirements, while the People’s Republic was the mean director of the orphan 
asylum abusing his wards if given the opportunity. This setting gave Congress the 
opportunity to play the role of the hero, the young couple who comes to the or-
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phanage and rescues the child in the end, by giving him a home. This way, Con-
gress eventually constituted the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. 
On the other hand, the public debate about Taiwan’s security increased the 
political pressure on the Carter administration. It was clear that the American peo-
ple, many important pressure groups from business and academic circles, and espe-
cially Congress demanded a commitment to Taiwan’s security. Thus, the admin-
istration did not seem to have another choice but to prepare for discussion about 
what this security commitment could look like. Since it became obvious that Con-
gress would not accept the Taiwan Omnibus bill in the form it had been introduced, 
Carter and his aides had to make sure that the new inserted security language 
would not contradict the normalization agreement with the PRC. 
Indeed, Congress did indeed not accept the administration’s Taiwan Omni-
bus bill as further legislation process on it was postponed indefinitely. According to 
the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs’ report, the reason for this reaction 
was that “the nonadministration [sic] witnesses agreed that the original proposals 
outlined by the administration failed to address the security concern” about Tai-
wan. The administration’s draft also did not satisfy “the needs of the people on 
Taiwan, or of the private, commercial interests which were to form the bedrock of 
the new, unofficial United-States-Taiwanese relationship.” 897  These arguments 
indicated the meaning of the statements of the different experts whom the commit-
tee had asked to testify. In the end, the Taiwan Omnibus bill was just not able to 
create a framework that satisfied Congressional notions about unofficial U.S.-
Taiwan relations. 
Congress demanded adjustments. Thus, other legislative reports by the Sen-
ate’s Committee on Foreign Relations and the House of Representatives’ Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs from early March characterized a U.S. commitment to Tai-
wan’s security as important for U.S. credibility as well as America’s global and 
regional position in Asia. Therefore, the United States should assure the people on 
Taiwan that it would still care about their security. The committee concluded that 
the U.S. should not only provide Taiwan with defensive arms, but should also em-
phasize that any attempt by the PRC to solve the Taiwan issue non-peacefully was 
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deemed as concern for the United States, and would lead to an appropriate re-
sponse.898  
Although members of the executive had indicated during the Congressional 
hearings that the administration still had a great interest in Taiwan’s security for a 
multitude of strategic reasons, but could not commit to security guarantees due to 
diplomatic constraints, Congress did not approve the White House’s legislation 
draft. It became clear that, in the opinion of Congress, the Taiwan legislation need-
ed a completely different form than the Carter administration had in mind. Any 
new legislation draft would now include some sort of security guarantee for Tai-
wan. The White House had to make sure that this draft would not damage its rela-




Negotiating the Character of Unofficial U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
When the administration realized that it could not prevent Congress from altering 
Carter’s proposed Taiwan legislation in a way that would exclude an American 
commitment to Taiwan’s security, it led to a sudden change in the White House’s 
attitude. While the president was still questioning the necessity of a resolution that 
guaranteed Taiwan’s safety, he underlined that he had “never said that I [Carter] 
would not accept any resolution from the Congress.”899 Furthermore, he empha-
sized his concerns for the people on Taiwan and demonstrated his willingness to 
discuss the island’s security in public.900 
Warren Christopher had already explained that any security language in any 
Taiwan legislation draft Congress might create had to be compliant with the nor-
malization agreement the United States had concluded with the People’s Republic 
of China. One formal restriction the administration had to make was to exclude the 
creation of a liaison office in Taiwan that would replace the U.S. embassy there. 
                                                 
898 Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3/1/1979, Library of Congress, 
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899 News Conference, Jimmy Carter, 02/12/1979, The American President Project, “The President's 
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Since the general public did not understand why the United States had a liaison 
office in the PRC but could not have one in Taipei, Christopher elaborated that 
China’s case had a very unique character. Washington had always intended to es-
tablish normal relations with the PRC, and the liaison office had been very helpful 
to achieve this cause. However, since the U.S. was not going to seek diplomatic 
relations with the ROC anymore, an official U.S. representation in Taiwan was not 
necessary anymore. The AIT would be sufficient to fulfill any task necessary to 
conduct unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan.901 
 Government-to-government relations were indeed not necessary since the 
United States would be able to assure Taiwan’s well-being, without taking any dip-
lomatic risks by installing a liaison office in Taipei. U.S. officials knew that Bei-
jing would never accept any arrangements that left U.S.-Taiwan relations with a 
semi-official or even official appearance. As Carter emphasizes in his memoirs, he 
was not willing to risk his diplomatic success for the sake of official relations with 
Taiwan.902 There were other ways to ensure Taiwan’s security, and enable U.S.-
Taiwan trade and cultural exchange. 
 Carter also made clear that any addition or alteration of his administration’s 
legislation draft was subject to restrictions. Otherwise, as he indicated, he would 
make use of his presidential veto that could stop any legislative process. A veto 
would postpone the establishment of a legal basis for U.S.-Taiwan relations, com-
plicating cultural and economic exchange between Americans and Taiwanese. The 
White House hoped the legislative branch was aware of this problem and would not 
pass a law, granting Taiwan a de-facto status as an independent nation. The admin-
istration knew the PRC government would never accept this, and that would lead to 
frictions in Sino-American relations.  
 It was imperative for Carter to prevent problems in Washington’s relation-
ship with the PRC. Serious tension could threaten the stability in East Asia and 
damage the strategic position of the United States which was just improving due to 
to the Carter administration’s effort to normalize the relations with China. Accord-
ingly, Carter stated during a press conference in February that he would “not accept 
any resolution or amendment to the legislation that would contradict the commit-
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ments that we [the U.S.] have made to the Government of China, on which is pred-
icated our new, normal relationships.” He made clear that his reservation aimed 
especially at any security guarantees for Taiwan.903 
 These restrictions set the conditions which Congress could work out its own 
Taiwan legislation. Congress wanted a clear commitment to Taiwan’s security, and 
the White House needed a law that would not risk the achievement of normaliza-
tion. Since both sides basically agreed that the United States had a profound inter-
est in a secure Taiwan and the continuation of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait, the whole issue became one of finding the right language for the Taiwan 
legislation. If the members of the House and the Senate wanted to prevent the post-
ponement of their legislation, because this would lead to a stalemate in U.S.-
Taiwan relations, they had to respect the president’s position regarding the security 
commitment to Taiwan and diplomatic requirements towards China. In this situa-
tion, the relationship between the American executive and legislative that the Ger-
man political scientist Kurt L. Shell characterizes as an “antagonistic partnership” 
demanded the search for a political compromise that would satisfy all sides.904 As I 
argue, this was the foundation for the labor division between legislative and execu-
tive branch, resulting in the TRA. 
The first attempt at a compromise failed. A small group around the Repub-
lican Senators Howard H. Baker (Rep-Tennessee) and Jacob K. Javits and the 
Democrat Frank F. Church offered a draft that Carter’s aides deemed unacceptable 
for Beijing, and hence unacceptable for the administration. In a memorandum to 
the Oval Office, Frank Moore stated that it needed language in the draft that would 
allow Carter not to veto Congress’ approach. The president conveyed this position 
to Senator Church in a meeting on February 8.905 Indeed, Carter convinced Church 
that the administration could not accept the resolution, and the Senator “distanced 
himself from the Javits draft”, characterizing it as “a tentative proposition […] 
hastily drawn up.”906 This incident demonstrated that Congress was all but unani-
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mous on the question of how far the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security should 
go. Many Congressmen did not want to risk normalization, and took Carter’s veto 
threat seriously. 
A draft by Representative Lester L. Wolff and the Senators Ted Kennedy 
and Alan M. Cranston (Dem-California) brought the solution, and became the 
blueprint for the final legislation on Taiwan. It found more than 100 cosponsors in 
the House of Representatives and more than 25 in the Senate. Although Kennedy 
did not agree with Carter’s China policy in all details, the Senator was nevertheless 
one of the most fervent supporters of normalization as his speech in Boston on Au-
gust 15, 1977 had demonstrated.907 Thus, the White House considered him a politi-
cal ally in the whole process.908  
Kennedy was also an advocate of the necessity for the country to find a way 
to protect Taiwan. Therefore it made sense for the Carter administration to ask him 
for support after the executive’s draft had failed. Kennedy had enough influence in 
Congress, among Democrats and Republicans, to achieve the necessary adjust-
ments that would allow the executive and legislative branches to find a compro-
mise. The result was resolution S. J. Res. 31 with the intricate title “A joint resolu-
tion regarding the peace, prosperity, and welfare of the people on Taiwan, and the 
Pescadores, and for other purposes” from early February, 1979. Democratic Sena-
tor Alan M. Cranston who supported Carter’s decision for normalization introduced 
the resolution, claiming that it would “correct any misperception that recognition of 
the Peking government is automatically translated as abandonment of Taiwan” be-
cause as a Congressional draft it could spell “out what the United States-China 
agreement implies, but leaves unsaid.” 909 The same draft was introduced as H. J. 
Res. 167 to the House of Representatives by Lester L. Wolff. 
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While Wolff, Cranston and Kennedy saw their resolution as complementary 
to the administration’s Taiwan Omnibus bill, the legislation should also make sure 
that the Congress would be involved in America’s Taiwan policy in the future, es-
pecially in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The Senators favored “devel-
oping a single package with both security and non-security elements, which incor-
porates the Administration’s proposal as well as our own.” While the White 
House’s draft took care of the technical aspects of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, 
the Cranston-Kennedy-Wolff initiative made sure that the United States could pro-
tect Taiwan “in accordance with our [U.S.] Constitutional processes and legislative 
requirements, including the War Powers Act.”910 The resolution aimed to empha-
size the continuing U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. It 
should also guarantee the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan. Of great im-
portance was also that executive and legislative branches should have consultations 
if a danger to the well-being of the people on Taiwan would emerge.911 
Considering Christopher’s comments during the hearings about normaliza-
tion and the Taiwan legislation, it was clear that the Carter administration could 
live with the result of the Congressional intervention if the Cranston-Kennedy-
Wolff initiative was to pass the Congress. The Deputy Secretary of State under-
lined this position when he conceded that this resolution did not contain any lan-
guage that was not compatible with the normalization agreement.912 Of course, the 
White House still had to reject many Congressional drafts for a new Taiwan legis-
lation because they went too far in their security language, or granted Taiwan a 
status not in accordance with the normalization agreement. As the Congress’ DSG 
therefore supposed in a report, the resolution by Cranston, Kennedy and Wolff al-
beit not directly supported by the administration, served to counter any proposals 
which could violate the agreement with the PRC.913 
                                                 
910 This refers to the The War Powers Resolution of 1973 which limited the President’s power to 
decide whether or not the United States should enter an armed conflict. For further reading about the 
political and legal details of the act, see: Donald L. Westerfield, War Powers: The President, the 
Congress and the Question of War (Westport: Praeger, 1996). 
911 Statement of Edward Kennedy in: Hearings “Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act: Issues 
and Concerns”, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Rela-
tions, House of Representatives, 02/14/1979, Library of Congress, 3. 
912Statement of Warren Christopher in: Hearings “Taiwan Legislation”, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 2/7/1979, Library of Congress, 16. 
913Special Report, Democratic Study Group, 2/8/1979, “PRC [People’s Republic of China]/Taiwan, 
2/1/79-3/20/79” folder, Box 167, Office of Congressional Liaison Francis, Jimmy Carter Library. 
306 
 
Indeed, the Cranston-Kennedy-Wolff resolution was modest enough in its 
claim to guarantee Taiwan’s security, and went as far as possible without question-
ing or even violating the normalization agreement because it neither granted Tai-
wan any official status, nor did it question the One-China-principle. By referring to 
these facts, Washington was in a position to counter any upcoming Chinese criti-
cism. On the other hand, Congress assured future involvement of the United States 
in the security of Taiwan –something the Carter administration had never been op-
posed to- and forced the administration to let the legislative play its part in the pro-
cess of normalization and the composition of the future unofficial relationship be-




Bringing the Taiwan Relations Act into Life 
In the end, the Cranston-Kennedy-Wolff resolution was not enacted but referred to 
Congressional committees for further discussions. The draft still served as the basis 
for the Congressional legislation about Taiwan. According to David T. Lee, after 
the hearings in Congress had made clear that changes in the administration’s legis-
lation draft were necessary, and that the Cranston-Kennedy-Wolff resolution was 
presenting an option for the final legislation, it came to extensive negotiations be-
tween the State Department and the Congressional committees in mid-February. 
The Democratic Chairman of the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee Clement 
Zablocki saw himself responsible to find a quick solution that would be acceptable 
for Congress and administration alike. Otherwise, U.S.-Taiwan relations would 
enter an even more complicated state than they were already in. Since Congress 
was demanding so many adjustments that changed the make-up of the administra-
tion’s original Taiwan Omnibus bill, Zablocki eventually decided to reintroduce the 
whole legislation as a new, clean bill which incorporated all the necessary chang-
es.914 
The vote on the final resolution demonstrated agreement beyond party 
boundaries about the general direction America’s future involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait should take. H.R. 2479 passed the House by a vote of 345 “ayes” to 55 
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“nays” on March 13, 1979. The Senate, on the other hand, passed its own bill, the 
“Taiwan Enabling Act” (S. 245), which slightly differed from the House’s draft by 
a margin of 90 to 6 votes one day later. The result made clear that members of both 
parties, Republicans and Democrats, approved the law. However, it still needed a 
consensus between the House and the Senate in order to reach a final version of the 
Taiwan legislation. Congress eventually reached this consensus expressed in a con-
ference report from March 24 which found approval in both Chambers on March 
28 and March 29, respectively.915 Now, Congress could submit the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act to the president. 
 The broad support for the new law made it much harder for the president to 
veto it. Although the PRC leadership criticized the resolution even before the final 
Congressional approval, the president signed the law with the ID “Public Law 96-
8” on April 10, 1979.916 Even if Jimmy Carter was opposed to its final version, the 
political constraints in Washington did not allow him to veto the TRA. It was obvi-
ous that a great majority of Congress favored it. The new law set the frame for un-
official U.S.-Taiwan relations, and assured American involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait in the future. While the PRC did not like the outcome of the U.S. legislation 
process, it had to accept it because the wording of the TRA did not contradict the 
normalization agreement. 
 In fact, most of the TRA’s sections (sections 4 to 18) did not provoke cri-
tique from the PRC because they mainly set a framework of legal rules for U.S.-
Taiwan relations. Most paragraphs remained as technical as in the administration’s 
Taiwan Omnibus bill, and aimed on cultural and economic aspects. Section 6 was 
of particular importance since it constituted the American Institute on Taiwan as 
the entity that would conduct and carry out programs, transactions and related is-
sues for the government of the United States and its agencies on Taiwan. It should 
also administer consular services for U.S. citizens there.917 The PRC could live 
with such a framework because it reflected the spirit of the Japanese formula. 
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 Sections 2 to 3, on the other hand, exceeded the Japanese formula as these 
paragraphs made clear that the United States did not intend to give up their active 
role in the Taiwan Strait -only the legal basis for this involvement would change. 
Since the United States had broken up its official diplomatic ties with the ROC, the 
relationship did not fall under the rules of international law –especially since the 
MDT was to expire on January 1, 1980. This offered some new opportunities for 
the United States. 
The TRA itself was an American law, and that made it far more binding for 
any U.S. president than any international ruling could. The White House was aware 
of this fact. The reason is quite simple. It is possible to go to an U.S. court in order 
to enforce a law passed by U.S. Congress, while it is much more difficult or even 
impossible to do the same with international laws. There is usually no agency to 
enforce them, and the character of international laws is often abstract and only 
binding on the basis of a wide range of interpretation. Furthermore, no U.S. presi-
dent could risk the U.S. Congress’ and also the American public’s anger if she or 
he ignored U.S. law. The political damage could be tremendous, aside from any 
legal consequences. Barry Goldwater’s law suit against Jimmy Carter concerning 
the abrogation of the MDT provides a good example for this.918 It not only demon-
strated that at least certain circles took American interests on Taiwan very serious-
ly, but also aimed to diminish at Carter’s political prestige. 
The United States had no interest leaving Taiwan to itself, and the Taiwan 
Relations Act underlined this position. Washington also did not want to see a set-
tlement of the Taiwan issue in the near future. Thus, it was no surprise that the 
TRA considered “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peace-
ful means, including by boycotts or embargoes […] of grave concern to the United 
States” because it would threaten the stability of Asia-Pacific.919 As mentioned 
before, it was a warning to Beijing that the United States would watch the situation 
in the Taiwan Strait carefully. The statement also indicated the superpower would 
maintain its capabilities in East Asia to pursue American interests in the region. 
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The continuing interest about the Taiwan issue also fit Washington’s self-
perception as a Pacific power, as U.S. officials had explained several times during 
the aforementioned Congressional hearings. The United States would never stop 
playing an active role in East Asia, not only to counterbalance the Soviet Union but 
also to counterbalance any other power that would strive for hegemony there. Thus, 
the TRA also authorizes the president “to maintain the capacity of the United States 
to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the 
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”920  
The provision of defensive military equipment remained the favorite in-
strument to demonstrate U.S. resolve to support Taiwan. The TRA clearly stated 
that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and 
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain 
a sufficient self-defense capability.” The White House had to consult Congress to 
“determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based sole-
ly upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures es-
tablished by law.”921 Since it was possible that the United States would succumb to 
pressure from the PRC in the future, these few lines should ensure Taiwan’s access 
to modern equipment which would strengthen the ROC Armed Forces.922 
However, the arms sales were not only intended to improve the defensive 
capabilities of Taiwan but also served political and strategic means. Above all, the 
provision with U.S. arms should demonstrate that the United States was not willing 
to leave Taiwan to the mainland’s mercy. Such an impression could lead to ques-
tions among other U.S. allies about America’s credibility and reliability. As the 
rivalry with the Soviet Union was continuing, the USA could not afford to lose the 
support of their allies worldwide. In addition, in spite of public confirmations that 
the Taiwan issue was an internal affair, Washington was not ready to forgo its in-
fluence on Taiwan because this would weaken the U.S. position in the Far East. 
In fact, the U.S. situation had drastically improved through the means of the 
TRA because it left the initiative about an intervention on behalf of the people on 
Taiwan to U.S. authorities and not to diplomatic constraints. As the history of the 
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Chinese Civil War had taught the White House, this was necessary in order to pre-
vent the regime in Taiwan from provoking a conflict with the PRC. If the decision 
for an intervention was completely up to the United States, and not imposed by a 
defense pact like the MDT, Taipei had to be more careful and accommodating to-
wards the mainland. While, in provision with Article 5, the MDT had forced the 
United States to intervene in the Taiwan Strait in the event of armed conflict, the 
U.S. government could now choose if it was in its interest to do so. As section 3302 
(c) of the TRA stated, if a “threat to the security or the social or economic system 
of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States” were 
to arise, the president and Congress “should determine […] appropriate action by 
the United States in response to any such danger.”923 The United States created a 
loophole by writing a law that left it to the U.S. itself what measures the nation 
would take if American interests in the Taiwan Strait were threatened. Of course, 
Congress wanted the president to consult with the legislative branch before taking 
any actions, but it is possible that in the event of a new crisis, the president would 
be the one to determine whether or not U.S. interests were threatened.924 
In the set up of the Taiwan Relations Act, all variables of this study’s theo-
retical frame manifest. The new law served the legitimization of normalization, by 
setting a frame in which U.S.-Taiwan relations could still work, changing only their 
form but not their substance. Since the character of Washington’s relationship with 
Taiwan would not change, the island still served U.S. strategic interests, namely the 
preservation of U.S. dominance in Asia-Pacific and vis-à-vis the PRC. According 
to the perceptions of U.S. policy makers, an unofficial de-facto alliance with Taipei 
kept Taiwan out of Beijing’s grasp, weakening the mainland, and offering the 
United States the option to use Taiwan as leverage against the PRC in the event of 
future friction. Historical experiences with the PRC implied that, sooner or later, 
tension between the United States and China would emerge. Thus, as Neo-realist 
thinking suggests, the TRA and the preservation of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
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Strait was an attempt to affect the balance of power in America’s favor, increasing 
U.S. power and, hence, U.S security beyond the Cold War. 
The ROC regime reacted with mixed feelings. A document by the MOFA 
indicated that, on the one hand, the Taiwanese were “[…] not satisfied with it…” 
but “…appreciate[d] the intense support and endeavor of the U.S. Congress and 
U.S. public.” Taipei understood that the TRA did not replace the MDT, although it 
included the security guarantees, the Taiwanese leadership had hoped for. It was no 
carte blanche that the United States would intervene in the Taiwan Strait no matter 
the circumstances. Instead, the KMT regime had to be more careful in its future 
posture towards the mainland, preventing any kind of provocation. Since the TRA 
was not a treaty between the United States and Taiwan, the ROC could not force 
Washington to an intervention on its behalf. In its dealings with the PRC, Taipei 
had to take into account that the United States wanted stabilization in the Taiwan 
Strait. Still, under the given circumstances and after the shock of derecognition the 
KMT regime had no reason to complain. A statement by the regime’s representa-
tive to Japan attached to the aforementioned MOFA document summarized the 
thinking of CCK and his aides. While the TRA did not give U.S.-Taiwan relations 
the formal status the relationship deserved, from Taipei’s point of view, “the Act 
still constituted the best unofficial one.”925 The TRA assured U.S. support for Tai-
wan. 
The PRC government protested against the Taiwan Relations Act. A de-
marche from March 16 submitted by Huang Hua expressed the Chinese disap-
pointment that the new legislation presented “in essence an attempt to maintain to a 
certain extent the U.S.–Chiang joint defense treaty and to continue to interfere in 
Chinese internal affairs and to give an official status to the U.S.–Taiwan relation-
ship.” While such a critique was to be expected, the PRC seemed convinced of the 
Carter administration’s involvement in the development of the Taiwan legislation 
because the Chinese perceived that “the bills concerned had the close cooperation 
of the U.S. Government (sic).” In an attempt to put pressure on the U.S. president, 
the People’s Republic warned that “great harm will be done to the new relationship 
that has just been established between China and the U.S.” leading to the threat that 
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“China would have no alternative but to make the necessary response”, if the legis-
lation became law.926  
The message did not specify what form the Chinese response would have. It 
also failed to pinpoint what phrases of the TRA were, in the PRC’s opinion, in-
compatible with the normalization agreement. Therefore, the whole telegram ap-
peared more like the usual complaints about principles than an actual diplomatic 
objection. To a certain degree, the Chinese leadership had to protest against the 
TRA out of habit. Otherwise, the PRC leadership would have lost its face, but Bei-
jing did not intend to question normalization. A report by Ambassador Woodcock 
indicates as much, claiming the protest served mostly to impress the Chinese pub-
lic.927 Instead, the demarche contained a hint that Beijing still valued the new U.S.-
PRC relationship enormously as it stated that there was “growing evidence of the 
far-reaching impact of normalization and of the visit by Vice Premier Deng Xiao-
ping to the U.S. on the furtherance of friendly relations and cooperation between 
our two countries....”928 
 In spite of Chinese protests, Jimmy Carter did not see the law itself as a 
problem. In his opinion, it did not violate the agreement with the PRC. Moreover, 
he was certain the people on Taiwan would benefit from it. In his memoirs, Carter 
even claims the TRA was in no small part the result of his administration’s efforts, 
claiming he had “finally prevailed” to create a legislation that allowed U.S.-Taiwan 
relations to continue. From this perspective, it seems that his critique of the whole 
matter did not refer to the Congress’ idea to insert security language into the Tai-
wan legislation, but had other reasons. First, as earlier remarks had indicated, 
Carter lacked a general confidence towards the U.S. legislative.929 The comfortable 
Democratic majority in Congress (277 to 158 in the House; 58 to 42 in the Senate) 
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did not change this attitude.930 Second, parts of Congress dared to question Carter’s 
decision-making concerning normalization in general, and his honesty about his 
concerns for the well-being of the Taiwanese people. 
 Indeed, as the negotiations with the Chinese had proved, the Carter admin-
istration put a lot of effort into ensuring future opportunities to support Taiwan. In 
the end, Congress and the administration were pursuing the same goals, albeit 
through different means. As we have seen, it was a problem of means and language 
not of different political convictions or differing strategic views. The White House 
believed Taiwan to be secure, while Congressmen wanted explicit security guaran-
tees. The administration saw the whole Taiwan issue very pragmatically, assuming 
it could ensure Taiwan’s security without any public commitment except the prom-
ise to sell a sufficient amount of arms. The experience of the last minute conces-
sions concerning arms sale by the Chinese leadership during the negotiations, left 
the Carter administration convinced that the PRC was too dependent on its rela-
tionship with Washington to risk any true struggle. The White House had to act 
carefully on the matter of Taiwan and, eventually, Congress had to accept the gov-
ernment’s position because anything else would lead to a presidential veto. 
Normalization led to important advantages for the regime in Beijing like the 
improved strategic situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and access to western tech-
nology that would help China’s Four Modernizations. This outweighed the feeling 
of betrayal the Chinese leaders might have had in the course of the TRA. At least, 
there did not seem to be any long-term damage, as only a few days after the critical 
demarche, Leonard Woodcock reported that Deng Xiaoping had expressed his hope 
for Sino-American trade to quickly increase. China needed U.S. technology and 
foreign investments. Postponing the necessary steps to get both would hurt China 
more than the United States. Thus, Woodcock considered “it unlikely that the Chi-
nese would react to the Taiwan legislation in ways that would fundamentally dam-
age our new relationship”, because, as he continued, it would hurt the Chinese 
“economic interests in their relationship with us.”931  
Political and diplomatic constraints still forced the Carter administration to 
accommodate the PRC, although the TRA did not contradict the White House’s 
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condition that the Taiwan legislation must not violate the normalization agreement. 
Woodcock suggested pointing out to the Chinese that the Taiwan legislation would 
neither weaken Washington’s commitment to the normalization agreement nor be 
incompatible with it.932 Carter concurred. The DOS should take the necessary steps 
in order to avoid deeper frictions.933 It was also a chance to convey to Beijing that 
the new law was still compatible with the normalization agreement. 
Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrook met China’s ambassador, Chai 
Zemin, on March 27, 1979. Both emphasized that the presidential administration 
did not consider the upcoming Taiwan legislation inconsistent with the normaliza-
tion agreement. In addition, Christopher disagreed with Chai’s view the legislation 
appeared like a substitution for the MDT. As the Deputy Secretary explained to his 
Chinese interlocutor, a “better bill [than the TRA] could not be obtained [from 
Congress]” since it was more likely to get “a bill less favorable to normalization 
[…]”, if Carter was to veto the TRA.934 Christopher had made a convincing case, 
and the Chinese had no choice but to accept this line of argument. The TRA did not 
contradict the normalization agreement, or at least not enough that the Chinese 




Conclusion and Discussion 
The normalization agreement with the PRC made it necessary for the Carter admin-
istration to derecognize the Republic of China. Therefore, the United States could 
only conduct unofficial people-to-people relations in the future. In order to conduct 
full cultural and economic relations with Taiwan that also included the possibility 
for arms sales, the Congress had to pass legislation that granted Taiwan the status 
as a de-facto nation. As David Lee suggests, such a case was unprecedented in U.S. 
history, and the task, accordingly, very complex and complicated.935 Therefore, the 
administration needed the support of Congress in order to pass the legislation as 
quickly as possible. 
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 The administration’s Taiwan Omnibus bill forwent any security language 
concerning Taiwan. It also did not directly mention provisions for arms sales alt-
hough the character of the bill made clear that future arms sales were possible. It 
was a very technical draft that had to be acceptable to the People’s Republic. In 
order to demonstrate its commitment to normalization, the Carter administration 
was not in a position to use any security language in the Taiwan legislation. This 
decision served the White House’s approach to allay the PRC as much as the con-
stant downgrading of U.S.-ROC relations. In addition, the Carter administration 
was convinced that the people on Taiwan were in no imminent danger from the 
mainland. Thus, the ROC regime did not need any security guarantees. 
 Congress and the U.S. public disagreed with this assessment. Especially the 
Congressional hearings made clear that many Congressmen wanted a more visible 
commitment to the security of Taiwan in the new legislation. This had not only 
humanitarian reasons but also strategic ones. As a variety of China experts and also 
some Congressmen stated and different officials of the Carter administration admit-
ted, Taiwan and its location on the important shipping lanes in East Asia made the 
island strategically importance for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, 
an end of the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait would weaken the U.S. 
position in the region. Washington’s position vis-à-vis the People’s Republic could 
also suffer because the United States’ relationship with Taiwan was useful to put 
pressure on the PRC if Sino-American relations were to deteriorate. China’s recent 
attack on Vietnam had demonstrated that the PRC could quickly become a trou-
blemaker in the region. A reunification under the leadership of the PRC regime 
was, thus, not in the interest of the United States. 
 After the president left out Capitol Hill for so long, the diplomatic con-
straints which limited the White House’s options concerning the Taiwan legisla-
tion, allowed Congress to play a more significant role in the nation’s China policy. 
Jerome A. Cohen and Xu Guangqiu claim that members of the Congress played an 
important role in U.S. China policy.936 At least for normalization process, this is 
not true. Until early 1979, Congress had not contributed much to normalization. 
Even Senator Kennedy, who was one of the most involved members of Congress in 
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the normalization process, does not agree with Xu’s and Cohen’s assessment.937 
While single Congressmen served occasionally as messengers for the American 
and Chinese side, Carter’s mistrust of Capitol Hill prevented any significant role 
for Congress in the whole process. Only the necessity of a Taiwan legislation al-
lowed Congress to have a significant impact on U.S. China policy in aftermath of 
normalization. 
 Carter made clear that Congress had to be careful with its adjusted Taiwan 
legislation because he would not accept a resolution that was not compatible with 
the normalization agreement. Congress and the White House needed to find a com-
promise. Capitol Hill had to respect the nation’s diplomatic obligations towards the 
PRC, and the administration had to cooperate in order to strengthen the security 
language in the upcoming Taiwan legislation. The result was the rather modest 
Cranston-Kennedy-Wolff resolution that set the basis for the eventual Taiwan Re-
lations Act which found broad support beyond party boundaries and a significant 
majority in both chambers. 
As David Lee states, the legislative process of the TRA is the perfect exam-
ple for the need of compromise in the political system of the United States due to 
the strained relationship between the executive and legislative branches.938 On the 
one hand, Congress was able to pass a law that would bind the executive branch to 
a certain code of behavior in its dealings with Taiwan. If the Carter administration 
did not want to risk political damage at home, it had to play to these rules. On the 
other hand, Congress also had to consider the possibility of a presidential veto, 
which could lead to a stalemate in the whole legislative process, which could lead 
to problems for Taiwan. Since this was not in the interest of Congress, Capitol Hill 
eventually took Carter’s conditions seriously. While the TRA went beyond the 
Japanese formula which was seen by the Chinese as the farthest reaching conces-
sions they could made, it was still compatible with the normalization agreement.  
The new law made clear that the United States continued to protect Taiwan 
and would remain involved in the Taiwan issue. Taiwan’s strategic position, the 
historical meaning of the relationship between the American and Taiwanese peo-
ple, and especially the uncertain future of U.S.-China relations made it highly de-
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sirable for the United States to maintain the capability to intervene in the Taiwan 
Strait on behalf of American interests. In short, the TRA and the continuation of 
close U.S.-Taiwan security ties made the United States more powerful and fostered 
the country’s position as hegemon in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, Chinese authors like 
the former PRC diplomat Han Nianlong see the TRA as directed against the Peo-
ple’s Republic.939 In addition, the law made U.S. Taiwan policy more flexible be-
cause now it was Washington that could decide under which condition the United 
States would intervene in the Taiwan Strait.  
From this point of view, the TRA served as a warning to Beijing and also to 
Taipei. Both sides had to be aware that Washington wanted stability in East Asia. If 
the PRC or the ROC acted against this U.S. interest, this could not only lead to an 
American intervention in the Taiwan Strait but also to heavy damage to both re-
gimes’ relations with the United States. It was this aspect that made the TRA not 
only a strategic instrument but also a diplomatic one. Washington gained more 
flexibility in its China and Taiwan policy and was not limited to the role of Tai-
wan’s protector, serving the long-term stability in the Taiwan Strait and eventually 
encouraging Beijing and Taipei to settle their disputes by peaceful means.940 
In the particular case of the TRA the Congress played a very important role 
to create a framework for “a workable new relationship” between Americans and 
Taiwanese, as Jacob J. Javits states.941 This is a fair assessment, as the role of Con-
gress was complementary to the government’s one, enabling the United States to 
remain an active actor in the Taiwan Strait. The independence of U.S. Congress 
allowed U.S. officials to point out to the Chinese that the American government 
could not control Congress, and had to accept the outcome of the legislative pro-
cess.  
In my opinion, this approach was a kind of double-crossing. In hindsight, 
the White House let Congress do what Carter and his aides were not able to do due 
to the aforementioned diplomatic constraints. This led to some sort of interplay 
between the executive and legislative branches with regard to Taiwan. The Carter 
                                                 
939 Han, “Diplomacy”, 287. 
940 For an introductory reading about PRC-ROC cross-strait relations, see: Nina Halpern/Samuel P. 
S. Ho, “Introduction: Cross-Strait Relations” in: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, (Winter, 1999-
2000). For a more detailed reading, see: Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-
Taiwan Relations (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013). 
941 Jacob K. Javits, “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act” in: Foreign Af-
fairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), 62. 
318 
 
administration might not have been able to control this interplay, but the Congres-
sional reaction was neither unexpected nor unwelcomed. It rather appears as if the 
administration had counted on Congress to express concerns about Taiwan’s secu-
rity and to include a stronger security language in the Taiwan legislation.  
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker questions whether the White House left filling the 
security gap to Congress because “in all the years since 1979 and despite all that 
has been written, no member of the Carter administration has presented this as jus-
tification.”942 While it is true that the archival record does not include any direct 
statements about this, it is also clear that no official from the Carter administration 
could dare to state something like this in an official document. Instead, we find an 
indirect confirmation for my argument about the labor division between legislative 
and executive branch in the statements of U.S. officials during the Congressional 
hearings. Here high ranking members of the administration like Christopher, 
Holbrooke, and Armacost suggested the administration’s readiness to accept a leg-
islation draft by Congress which would include security guarantees for Taiwan. 
Michel Oksenberg provides even stronger evidence, stating that the administration 
had always planned to present a weak draft which could provoke Congress to 
strengthen the security language.943 As we have seen, even former President Nixon 
had suggested such an approach to Carter. 
 Congressional intervention was most helpful in order to assure Taiwan of 
Washington’s ongoing support. The political system of the United States is way too 
complicated to predict any certain outcome, but in the context of the Taiwan legis-
lation this system was very useful to preserve American interests in Asia-Pacific. 
There is conclusive evidence that Washington still had a strong interest in the Tai-
wan issue, proven by the Taiwan Relations Act and the way it was developed. The 
TRA was a clever move and the perfect tool to allow the United States to remain 
fully involved in the Taiwan Strait on behalf of American law, not diplomatic con-
straints. As the U.S. administration had promised after the announcement of nor-
malization, the TRA made sure that U.S.-Taiwan relations, indeed, only changed in 
form but not in substance. 
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“[…] I tried to imagine what the Taiwanese were likely to say and do during my 
visit. It was hard to make a credible case to myself that I would be a welcome visi-
tor.”944 These are the thoughts Warren Christopher writes in his memoirs about his 
visit in Taiwan to explain to the ROC leadership President Carter’s reasons for 
normalization and the derecognition of Taiwan. Christopher’s words should prove 
prophetic. Neither the Taiwanese public nor its leadership took the announcement 
of normalization and the diplomatic consequences for Taiwan kindly. A Taiwanese 
mob attacked the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and his entourage’s motorcade, 
while ROC security personal seemed to look the other way. 
 The reaction of the people in Taiwan is understandable, because they feared 
that normalization was the beginning of the end of U.S. protection for the island 
from the mainland. They could not know how much effort the Carter administra-
tion had put into maintaining the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait, and 
how much effort all political circles in Washington would add to this endeavor over 
the following months until the Taiwan Relations Act was passed, constituting the 
U.S. role as protector of the people in Taiwan for the following decades. In the 
days after Jimmy Carter had announced his administration’s achievement, nobody 
outside the White House and the State Department had an idea how the relationship 
between Taiwanese and Americans could look like, and what role the United States 
would play in the Taiwan Strait in the future. 
 This thesis was set out to explore the process of normalization between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China and the meaning the Taiwan is-
sue had in this context. It also sought to explain how Chinese and Americans ap-
proached the Taiwan issue, and what risks their attitude presented to the success of 
the normalization process. The historiography on U.S.-Chinese relations and the 
ongoing American engagement in the Taiwan Strait is inconclusive on some vital 
questions within this subject and does not offer any satisfactory answers that do 
justice to the complexity of this topic. As this examination demonstrated, former 
studies have not paid enough attention to the Taiwan issue’s impact on the whole 
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normalization process and its direct aftermath, offering no answer to the question 
of why the Carter administration risked the success of normalization by insisting on 
arms sales and other security ties with Taiwan. Up to know no historical examina-
tion of U.S.-China relations has considered the strategic dimension of Washing-
ton’s interest in Taiwan and its unresolved status beyond normalization. In this 
context, the interplay between executive and legislative branch in the development 
of the Taiwan Relations Act has been completely overlooked. The constitution of 
America’s continuing involvement in the Taiwan Strait beyond normalization 
which we can deduce from the TRA was not the result of Congressional revolt but 
of a prudent labor division between the White House and Capitol Hill. 
 In an attempt to shed light on the role the Taiwan issue played for the nor-
malization of U.S.-PRC relations and its consequences, this study tried to answer 
the following questions: How did the Taiwan issue shape the normalization process 
and its outcome? Why did the Carter administration risk the success of normaliza-
tion to preserve America’s role for the security of Taiwan, and how was this prob-
lem approached in the aftermath of normalization? Why was the White House able 
to succeed with its tenacity about Taiwan, and why did the Chinese leadership ac-
cept the continuation of U.S. intervention in the Taiwan issue? Finally, how did it 






The Taiwan issue had a great impact on the normalization process because the Chi-
nese and Americans saw the matter as the main obstacle to normalization. Past ex-
periences, which even led to armed conflict, demonstrated how difficult it was for 
both sides to overcome their different positions on Taiwan. Even when China and 
the United States improved their relations in the course of rapprochement, Taiwan 
remained a problem. This also became apparent during the normalization process. 
In spite of considerable concessions by the Carter administration to the Chinese 
concerning the character and legal status of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, Bei-
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jing did not seem willing to meet American reconciliation by making concessions 
of their own. 
Several times, the PRC leadership pointed out to U.S. officials that Taiwan 
was a “renegade” province of China which had to be brought back under the rule of 
Beijing. It was an expression of Chinese nationalism, but the roots for this insist-
ence went deeper.945 The traumatizing experience of the 19th and early 20th century 
when vast parts of China were controlled by foreign nations, not only limiting the 
central Chinese government’s power but virtually taking away China’s sovereignty, 
fed Chinese anxieties to appear weak. Maintaining territorial integrity and strength-
ening the capability to protect China were therefore important tasks for the com-
munist government. This made Taiwan a matter of national principle for the PRC 
leadership, who could not accept any involvement of outsiders. Furthermore, Tai-
wan’s belonging to China was seen as a matter of justice and rectification.946 It was 
China’s right to rule Taiwan and Beijing believed the United States owed China a 
debt due to previous intervention in this Chinese affair. 
The Carter administration, on the other hand, did not only have to face Chi-
na’s inflexibility concerning Taiwan but was also obligated to honor promises by 
former U.S. administrations to the Chinese about this issue. Additionally, President 
Carter faced domestic pressure. The U.S. public and Congress expected him to 
achieve normalization in a way that would allow the United States to remain com-
mitted to the security and well-being of the people in Taiwan. In fact, the Carter 
administration was already planning to achieve exactly this feat. But Congress did 
not understand that the White House had to approach this matter carefully and with 
diplomatic prudence if the normalization process should still be successful. A fail-
ure of normalization would mean a considerable setback in Washington’s efforts to 
strengthen the strategic position of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
Although it was not the only motive for the pursuit of normalization, Carter and his 
aides had always considered normal relations with the PRC to be helpful in coun-
tering Moscow’s influence in Asia. 
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Still, as important as normalization was, Washington was not willing to pay 
any price the Chinese were demanding. Abandoning Taiwan was never open to 
debate despite Beijing’s criticism and threats. Domestic pressure was not the only 
reason why Carter and his aides denied the PRC’s claim that Washington should 
leave Taiwan alone. The president and his advisors were aware that the island and 
its regime had still a role to play for American policy in Asia-Pacific. U.S. com-
mitment to Taiwan’s security did not only demonstrate the reliability and credibil-
ity of the United States as an ally in general, the continuing commitment did also 
calm down any anxieties in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere that the U.S. 
planned to disengage from the region. Japan and South Korea were the closest 
American partners in East Asia, and Washington could not allow any discourage-
ment of them. They were too important for U.S. Cold War efforts in the Asia-
Pacific region. However, there was an even more significant reason why the Carter 
administration did its best to secure the U.S. position in the Taiwan Strait. 
Past experiences with the PRC regime had demonstrated to American polit-
ical decision-makers that U.S.-China relations could deteriorate at any time. The 
common threat of the Soviet Union was no guarantee that Chinese and Americans 
would be able to solve bilateral problems diplomatically. It was too obvious that 
Chinese and American interest were incongruent in too many aspects -not only in 
the context of the Taiwan issue. The PRC saw war with the Soviet Union as inevi-
table, while Washington was eager to prevent any escalation. The PRC’s attack on 
Vietnam demonstrated to American observers that Beijing could quickly become a 
troublemaker in the region. Moreover, an ascending China could mean a challenge 
to U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. In such an event, Taiwan could serve 
as a strategic hedge, helping the United States to put political pressure on Beijing. 
At the same time served keeping Taiwan out of the PRC’s grasp the purpose to 
deny a strengthening of China’s position in Asia at the cost of the United States. 
This could prove to be a valuable asset in the future. 
Beijing seemed aware of the U.S. considerations concerning Taiwan. How-
ever, at the end of the normalization negotiations, they still accepted U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan after normalization. Later, Beijing’s protests against the TRA ap-
peared modest, not threatening the previously achieved agreement. It became clear 
that in spite of the meaning of Taiwan as a matter of national principle, the Chinese 
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valued normal relations with the United States much more than an immediate 
weakening of the regime in Taipei.  
One reason for this constraint was that closer Sino-American ties deterred 
the Soviet Union from measures which could threaten China’s security. Another 
aspect, however, was even more important. Normalization served the self-
strengthening of the PRC, as it granted China access to western technology. China 
needed these technologies if it wanted to achieve the goals set by Deng Xiaoping 
when he introduced his reform agenda in late 1978. The argument was that, in the 
long-run, patience on the matter of Taiwan and accepting U.S. involvement in the 
Taiwan Strait for now would pay off in Beijing’s favor as long as the moderniza-
tion of China would succeed. 
The American insistence on an ongoing security relationship with Taiwan 
and the PRC’s last minute acceptance of these U.S. efforts proved that the United 
States had the better bargaining position. This led to significant consequences for 
the future of U.S.-China relations. The normalization agreement was not able to 
produce a solution of the Taiwan issue. Since Washington and Beijing were not 
able to find a common denominator which allowed them to leave their different 
positions about Taiwan’s status behind them, the Taiwan issue should remain one 




Serving U.S. Interests Beyond the Cold War 
Normalization and derecognition of Taiwan changed the character and the circum-
stances of the Taiwan issue. The problem was not part of the systemic constraints 
of the Cold War anymore. Neither Washington nor Beijing could use Taiwan to put 
pressure on each other with regard to the common Soviet threat. As normalization 
was achieved and the MDT replaced by the TRA, Taiwan became a purely bilateral 
matter between the Chinese and Americans. It was still a matter of dispute but had 
no influence on both countries’ Cold War strategy. This became clear during the 
1980s when Ronald Reagan pursued a very ambivalent China and Taiwan poli-
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cy.947 Between the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the 
successful conclusion of normalization in 1979, the Taiwan issue had always been 
enveloped in the dynamics of the antagonism between Americans and Soviets alt-
hough the Soviet Union had never intervened in the Taiwan Strait. First, the regime 
in Taipei served as America’s anti-communist agent in East-Asia, containing “Red 
China” and weakening Soviet power in the region this way. Later, the United States 
used Taiwan and concessions concerning U.S.-Taiwan relations as a bargaining 
chip to gain the PRC’s support against the Soviet Union. Even the Carter admin-
istration followed this strategy to a certain degree but marked a clear red line when 
Carter insisted on the continuation of arms sales to ensure Taiwan’s security.  
The TRA, however, altered the nature and legal basis for U.S. engagement 
in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. interventions there had been part of the strategy to 
demonstrate America’s commitment to its allies in East Asia. The TRA, on the 
other hand, allowed the United States now to decide whether they wanted to inter-
vene or not, without underlying the same diplomatic constraints as under the regi-
men of the MDT. This gain of leeway went far beyond the Cold War. The leeway 
and flexibility given to Washington by the TRA continues even today. Further-
more, any U.S. president could now point to the TRA as part of U.S. law to legiti-
mize American engagement in the Taiwan Strait. While this has never prevented 
the PRC from protesting against U.S. intervention, the TRA helped the United 
States as political justification. One example for this approach was the aforemen-
tioned crisis in the Taiwan Strait which occurred during the Taiwanese presidential 
election campaign in 1996.948 
Considering the U.S. reaction to tensions between Beijing and Taipei, the 
TRA also helps the United States to guarantee the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
The division of China along the Taiwan Strait serves U.S. interests well. Taiwan as 
an ally does not only strengthen the U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific. As long as 
Taiwan is not under the rule of the mainland, the island prevents the PRC from 
controlling the shipping routes through the Taiwan Straits. In addition, Beijing has 
invested heavily in containing the Taiwanese by political, economic, and military 
means. These resources cannot be used somewhere else where it could harm Amer-
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ican interests. This is one reason why the U.S. government has always opposed 
Taiwanese independence.949  
The other reason is that a unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Taiwanese would provoke a military response from the PRC; anything from naval 
and aerial blockades to airstrikes or an invasion. The U.S. wants to prevent a new 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait because it would force Washington’s hand. America had 
to commit itself on behalf of Taiwan’s security or needed to accept a weakening of 
its position in the Asia-Pacific. 
In this sense, the TRA and its vague security language increases the level of 
stability in the region, also serving as a warning to the Chinese and Taiwanese 
alike. On the one hand, it deters the Chinese from the use of force against Taiwan. 
One the other hand, Taipei cannot become too bold, as they cannot be entirely sure 
if the United States would intervene on their behalf. When we consider the division 
of labor between the U.S. executive and legislative branches during the develop-
ment of the TRA, it is surprising how effective a tool it has become for the White 
House’s China and Taiwan policy. This indicates that the Carter administration has 
never been opposed to the Congressional intervention in the law-making process. 
In spite of the vicissitudes of politics in Washington, Carter and his aides always 
seemed aware that the Congress could add a dimension to the Taiwan legislation, 
which was otherwise unavailable to the president due to diplomatic constraints.  
From this point of view, the Carter administration was not only able to 
achieve normalization, adjusting U.S. Asia policy to the realities of its time, but 
was also in a position to secure the American involvement in the Taiwan Strait at 
the lowest costs possible. Normalization allowed the United States to deal with the 
PRC on a new level, simplifying military and intelligence cooperation, but also 
improving the provisions for Sino-American trade and cultural exchange. All of 
this put pressure on the Soviet Union, improving the prospects of U.S.-Soviet co-
operation, and eventually helping the Carter administration to strike a new deal on 
SALT.  
Carter’s tenacity about a security relationship with Taiwan and the TRA, on 
the other hand, allowed the United States to maintain a strong position in the Asia-
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Pacific in general and vis-à-vis the People’s Republic in particular. In spite of these 
achievements, many scholars have criticized Carter’s China and Taiwan policy. 
James Mann calls Carter’s China policy “disappointing”. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 
claims the Carter administration had been “ill equipped” to deal with the Taiwan 
issue after normalization.950 But as this study showed, Carter’s China and Taiwan 
policy was successful and deserves praise because he was able to improve U.S.-
China relations and the strategic position of the United States in the world and 
Asia-Pacific. While Carter’s approach was not flawless, he and his advisors were 
able to find a solution, in the end, which served U.S. interests on a broad basis and 




IR-Theory Meets History 
Normalization was a complex matter. The high number of actors involved in the 
process and their respective perspectives, interests, and strategies makes it difficult 
to explain the outcome of this process. In addition, the amount of accessible 
sources and empirical data adds to this complexity, not giving an easy or at least 
direct answer to the motivations and intentions of certain actions. IR-theory, in this 
study’s case a two-level-approach based on Neo-realism and Neoclassical Realism, 
offers a chance to bring order into the disorder of historical records and the multi-
tude of plausible explanations. The biggest asset these theories offer is the way 
they interconnect different factors and variables, which explain the decision-
making and behavior of political actors. Most significant in this context are the 
theoretical assumptions which arise from an abstract level of thinking, making 
sense of the behavior and statements of the involved actors. 
 The first step was to understand the nature and dynamic of the international 
system. As Neo-realism argues, the structure of the international system has a pro-
found influence on the way nations and other actors act. Due to the anarchic char-
acter of the system and the necessity to accumulate as much power as possible in 
order to ensure the own survival, states see themselves in an ongoing competition 
with each other. This leads to the consequence of the Balance of Power paradigm: 
no matter how powerful an actor is it is never enough.  
                                                 
950 Bernkopf Tucker, “Strait”, 116; Mann, “Face”, 81.  
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 The historical record demonstrates that the Carter administration and their 
Chinese counterparts were aware of this dynamic. The aim of their suspicion was 
the Soviet Union because this nation presented the biggest challenge to U.S. and 
the PRC’s security. The anxiety to lose relative ground to the USSR forced Wash-
ington and Beijing to consider Sino-American cooperation. The desire to strength-
en the own position against the biggest threat relegated other considerations like 
ideology to the background. Otherwise, normalization would not have been possi-
ble as the social and cultural systems of China and the United States were too dif-
ferent. 
 If states are aware which actors present a threat to them, this indicates that 
statesmen are also aware of the distribution of power in the international system. 
This connection is very important and derives directly from the theoretical frame-
work of Neo-realism and Neoclassical Realism. It gives us an idea of how political 
decision-makers in the United States and China came to the conclusion that Sino-
American cooperation was useful. 
 Political leaders have an idea how powerful their states are compared to 
other actors in the international system. Of course, they do not have an exact notion 
of how much more or how much less powerful they are than their counterparts. But 
historical experience and some simple facts (size and equipment of a nation’s army, 
its national gross product etc.) give them a pretty good idea. The perception of the 
distribution of power and the idea of the own position in the international system in 
terms of capabilities affects the preferences and strategies, which political decision-
makers develop. In the case of the Carter administration, this aspect had a direct 
impact on its approach toward normalization, particularly when it came to the Tai-
wan issue. 
 The historical experience of U.S.-China relations during the Cold War indi-
cated to the Carter administration that Taiwan was very useful in order to contain 
China. Taiwan had always been helpful to affect the balance of power in Asia-
Pacific in Washington’s favor. The same experience led the U.S. government to 
believe that it was useful to remain involved in the Taiwan Strait. This made sense 
because the United States assumed that U.S. and Chinese interests were not con-
gruent. There existed many areas where Washington’s and Beijing’s preferences 
were quite different. While these differences did not prevent both sides from pursu-
ing normalization, the United States was still aware of them. 
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 Another aspect which affected the Carter administration’s approach to nor-
malization and the Taiwan issue was the necessity to legitimize its policy. We have 
to be aware that decision-makers need to find acceptance for their policies. Other-
wise, it is much more difficult or even impossible to implement their political strat-
egies. While U.S. Congress was not in a position to prevent normalization, it had 
an influence on the development of future U.S.-Taiwan relations. Furthermore, the 
legislative branch could blockade other policy initiatives of the Carter administra-
tion, giving Capitol Hill an opportunity to make the president’s life very difficult. 
Another reason why the legitimation of certain policies matters refers to public 
opinion. Especially a democratically elected government cannot afford to alienate 
the voters by adopting unpopular policies. This diminishes the chance for reelec-
tion significantly. Even authoritarian regimes take into account the people’s will 
when they conduct certain policies. Thus, the U.S. and PRC government faced do-
mestic pressure during the normalization process. 
 It was the interplay of these variables which affected the Carter administra-
tion’s approach to normalization and the Taiwan issue. But we can understand this 
interplay only if we allow abstract assumptions to guide our interpretations. Pub-
lished and unpublished sources suggest the importance of these factors, but it does 
not offer us an explanation of the reasons for their importance. Normalization and 
Carter’s tenacity on the matter of Taiwan was also not simply the result of realpoli-
tik. 
 Each of the aforementioned variables alone cannot explain the Carter ad-
ministration’s behavior. If the affect of the balance of power paradigm and the need 
for strategic advantages over the USSR had influenced the U.S. normalization poli-
cy alone, the Carter administration would not have bothered to insist on a security 
relationship with Taiwan. If the U.S. administration was aware of the distribution 
of power, the risk to alienate Beijing, which could result in a failure of normaliza-
tion, was too great. In such an event, Moscow might have made use of the U.S. 
miscue, affecting the distribution of power to the disadvantage of the United States. 
 If the Carter administration’s attempts to remain involved in the Taiwan 
Strait had served only to appease Congressional and public sentiments toward Tai-
wan, why would the executive worry so much about Beijing’s reaction to these 
efforts. In fact, the White House had to be careful not to let normalization fail. This 
would not only weaken the global position of the U.S. but would also lead to harsh 
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criticism from Carter’s political opponents, being more costly than the derecogni-
tion of Taiwan. Losing ground to the Soviet Union would present a much bigger 
problem for Carter’s foreign policy than unofficial relation with Taiwan. 
 If Carter had only considered the historical experience the United States had 
made with the PRC, he would have never pursued normalization in the first place. 
Nothing in the history of Sino-American relations suggested that Beijing could 
become a reliable ally of the United States. The Chinese shared this view and 
claimed several times during the normalization process that the Americans owed 
China a debt due to the historical role of the country in the Taiwan Strait. However, 
as long as Washington would still have an alliance-like relation with Taiwan, the 
U.S. could always put pressure on the PRC. This lesson derived from America’s 
historical experience and its perception of the distribution of power. Both factors 
told the decision-makers in Washington that Taiwan was an important asset for the 
United States. 
 This last point indicates that we have to connect our variables to explain 
Carter’s approach to China and Taiwan. One variable does not make sense without 
the other because we need a multicausal explanation. Normalization was the result 
of the insight that better U.S.-China relations improved America’s strategic posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, influencing the balance of power in the internation-
al system in Washington’s favor. However, other obligations intervened and did 
not allow the White House to pursue normalization, without taking those into ac-
count. The need to legitimize normalization and its consequences, namely the de-
recognition of Taiwan, as well as historical experiences in U.S. dealings with the 
PRC forced the Carter administration to consider the adoption of a position which 
would allow the United States to put pressure on China in the future. Washington 
was aware that the alliance with Taiwan and the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait had always been useful for the American dominance in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Thus, it made sense to rely on the island again to have a strategic hedge 
against China beyond normalization. The result of these considerations was the 
TRA. 
 From this point of view, normalization and its consequences affected the 
distribution of power in Washington’s favor in two ways. First, the improved rela-
tionship with the PRC made the United States more powerful than the Soviet Union 
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because it allowed the U.S. to put pressure on Moscow. It also prevented the Sovi-
ets from aggressive measures against China, containing Moscow’s influence in 
Asia. At the same time, the ongoing security relationship with Taiwan meant a 
huge advantage vis-à-vis the PRC. Since the future development of U.S.-China 
relations was unpredictable, ensuring the de-facto independence of Taipei and im-
plementing a framework which assured U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait con-





Limits and Lose Ends 
This study provides explanations about normalization, its consequences, and the 
role of the Taiwan issue within this context. It is an account of the American posi-
tion, offering only a limited understanding of the Taiwanese and Chinese leader-
ships’ decision-making because access to Chinese and Taiwanese archives and 
documents is heavily restricted. Without any question, our understanding of the 
normalization process would vastly increase if we had access to these sources. A 
first step might be a thorough examination of those Taiwanese and Chinese docu-
ments, which are publicly accessible. This study could not provide this kind of 
analysis due to linguistic limitations. The same is true for Taiwan. 
 Another limitation of this thesis accrues from its focus on the decision-
making process in Washington. The main interest was to explain the behavior of 
the political decision-makers and their considerations. When we take into account 
that the decision-making in the White House was influenced by public opinion 
about U.S.-Taiwan relations, it would be interesting to learn more about the rela-
tionship of these two societies. How did it come that Americans were so concerned 
about the well-being of the people in Taiwan? Was this purely the result of anti-
communist or anti-PRC attitudes among American people? While my own research 
offered an explanation of the political and strategic dimension of U.S involvement 
in the Taiwan Strait, our knowledge about America’s role in Asia would benefit if 
historians were going to examine the people-to-people relations between Ameri-
cans and Taiwanese and/or Americans and Chinese more profoundly, not only on a 
commercial but also on a cultural level. 
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 Examining transnational and trans-cultural relations with a focus on U.S.-
PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s could explain 
why the U.S. public was so eager to support Taiwan, and held a negative image of 
the PRC for such a long time. We find first attempts to explore the role of people-
to-people relations within the realm of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations in studies from 
different fields. The American historian Frank Nikovich for example examines the 
cultural relations between Chinese and Americans during World War II, finding 
out that their influence on the political decision-making was rather small, but still 
held symbolic value.951 We also have a study by the Chinese economist Shu Keng 
and the German Political Scientist Gunter Schubert. They deal with the role of 
Taiwanese business people for cross-strait relations.952 However, neither of these 
studies focuses on normalization and U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait. 
 Finally, this author suggests extending examinations about the Taiwan issue 
beyond normalization and the Carter administration, especially incorporating both 
Reagan administrations. The already sizable extent of this study did not allow such 
an approach, but it would certainly add to our understanding of the development of 
the Taiwan issue beyond the Cold War. Jimmy Carter’s successor in the Oval Of-
fice, Ronald Reagan, was a fervent advocate of U.S. engagement in the Taiwan 
Strait. For example, he had strongly opposed Richard Nixon’s rapprochement poli-
cy in the early 1970s. In fact, the regime in Taipei expected U.S.-Taiwan relations 
to become closer under President Reagan.953 Still, the Reagan administration did 
not only attempt to exploit Sino-American relations in their struggle to counter 
Soviet power during the last decade of the Cold War. They also negotiated a third 
communiqué in succession of the Shanghai Communiqué and the normalization 
agreement. This communiqué should restrict future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.954 
At the same time, the Reagan administration agreed with Taipei on six points in 
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order to express the ongoing U.S. support for Taiwan.955 This kind of double play 
gave a new twitch to U.S.-China relations and the role of the Taiwan issue within 
this context. The whole negotiation process about these two agreements has not 
been examined thoroughly, yet. Such a study could provide us with new insights 




Expanding the Knowledge of the Present 
Historical literature has often characterized normalization as the logical next step of 
Richard Nixon’s rapprochement policy which began in the early 1970s. All the 
U.S. administration would have to do was, finding a way to satisfy the Taiwan 
Lobby in Congress and tell Beijing that a deal could be done. This view, however, 
does not take into account how valuable Taiwan and a security relationship with 
the island still was for the United States. The Carter administration was aware of 
this value and tried everything to achieve normalization without selling out its in-
terests in the Taiwan Strait. In the end, Carter and his aides had to rely on Congress 
to ensure that the United States would remain involved in the Taiwan issue conun-
drum in the future and beyond the Cold War. It did not matter that this approach 
led to a loss of political prestige for the president, as his administration was able to 
finalize what two presidents before him could not. In addition, Washington was 
able to ensure Taiwan’s security, bolstering the American position in Asia-Pacific 
beyond pure Cold War considerations. 
 This study aimed to shed light on the dilemmas the Carter administration 
faced when it set out to normalize relations with China. It sought to explain why 
the White House took certain risks to secure a close relationship with Taiwan, and 
how the Americans prevailed in the face of China’s stubbornness concerning Tai-
wan. Borrowing analytical instruments from the field of IR-theory, this study was 
able to explain the reasons for the decisions made and the actions taken by the 
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Carter administration. It also offered an explanation why the PRC leadership ac-
cepted the U.S. position on Taiwan, in the end, without calling off normalization. 
Finally, this examination demonstrated that the normalization process could have 
never been successful without the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act, which set 
the frame for the continuing involvement of the United States in the Taiwan Strait. 
 By explaining the context of normalization, the Taiwan issue, and the Tai-
wan Relations Act, this study adds to our understanding of Sino-American relations 
and their present character. Moreover, it gives us an idea, why the United States is 
still involved in the Taiwan Strait, guaranteeing the de-facto independence of Tai-
wan. We know that Beijing sees the American role as an intervention in Chinese 
affairs. The nature of the Taiwan issue and the antagonistic involvement of such 
major powers like the PRC and the U.S., therefore, make the matter one of the most 
volatile political problems in the Asia-Pacific. We should not underestimate the 
potential for friction that arises from this issue, but a more extensive knowledge 
about U.S.-China relations and the Taiwan issue might help to prevent future con-
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